The nature of the right to a trade mark in South African law by Gardiner, Stuart James
THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO A TRADE MARK 
IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
by 
STUART JAMES GARDINER 
submitted in accordance with the requirements 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF LAWS 
at the 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
PROMOTER: PROF B R RUTHERFORD 
NOVEMBER 1995 
***************** 
THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO A TRADE MARK IN 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
by 
SJ GARDINER 
DEGREE: DOCTOR OF LAWS 
PROMOTER: PROF B R RUTHERFORD 
SUMMARY 
Modern trade marks perform multiple functions taken up in a functional matrix. 
Amongst them the distinguishing function is invariable whilst the other functions are 
variable. 
A legal-historical and comparative investigation of the law of trade marks in the United 
Kingdom, the European Union, the U.S.A. and South Africa reveals that only certain 
trade mark functions have traditionally been afforded protection under law. This is 
mainly because of a historical resistance to accepting trade marks as property in the 
Anglo and American trade mark systems and the primacy of origin theory in the 
European Community trade mark system. 
The bedrock of South African trade mark law has been the trade mark law of the United 
Kingdom. The restrictions brought about by common law property theory have been 
carried over into the South African law of trade marks. The South African law of 
property is however derived from the civil law and not the common law. 
The historical break in continuity of the common law trade mark tradition as a 
consequence of the interposition of the European Union and the reception of EC trade 
mark law in the United Kingdom affords the opportunity for a theory of trade mark 
rights to be established in South Africa which is derived from concepts already present 
in South African law. 
The thesis proposes that the legal right to the trade mark in South African law is an 
independent subjective right of the kind proposed by Joubert. The legal object of this 
right is the trade mark. The entitlements of use of the holder of the right are the 
functions which the holder is entitled to have the trade mark perform. A range of 
values in which the property in a trade mark is to be found are associated with the 
functions. Unlawful impingement upon any function infringes the trade mark right. 
This theory provides the Trade Marks Act, 1993 with a needed theoretical base. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Object 
This thesis concerns the law of trade marks. It is 
directed at providing the right to a trade mark in the 
South African law with definition and gestalt. 
The statutory and common law of trade marks in the 
United Kingdom has in the past provided the bedrock of 
the South African law of trade marks. South African 
trade mark law has been British law with a local gloss. 
This has meant that the themes and conflicts in the law 
of trade marks in the United Kingdom have been carried 
over to South Africa. They are, for historical reasons, 
present also in the trade mark law of the U.S.A .. 
Therefore, to be clear regarding the law of trade marks 
in South Africa an investigation of the trade mark law 
of the United Kingdom including its genesis and its 
historically developed concepts and institutions is 
required. As the South African courts seek guidance in 
the trade mark and related law of the U.S.A. when the 
local law is silent a discussion of the trade mark law 
of the latter jurisdiction is helpful and relevant, 
also. 
Trade mark law in the Anglo and American Common Law 
systems has been characterised by a tension between the 
approach which regards a trade mark as property in the 
hands of the holder of the right thereto and the 
approach which regards a trade mark as appurtenant to 
and symbolic of goodwill in the business of an 
enterprise without property existing in the trade mark 
itself. 
xii 
This dichotomy has been received into the law of trade 
marks in South Africa where added tension is provided by 
the legal fact that the law of property in South Africa 
is derived from Civil Law and differs substantially from 
the law of property in the Common Law. 
The historical interposition of the European Community 
in the macro sense and the reception of Community trade 
mark law in the micro sense has brought about 
significant changes to the Common Law trade mark 
tradition in the United Kingdom insofar as it has become 
oriented towards the policies of the European Community 
under treaty. 
From the perspective of the South African law of trade 
marks a hiatus results. The continuum of the British 
mercantile trade mark law tradition previously relied 
upon is in truth no more. European trade mark law has 
its own agenda the implementation of Common Market 
policies. These policies do not concern the internal 
rules of the trade mark law of South Africa. 
A theoretical basis for the modern South African law of 
trade marks which is able to underpin the Trade Marks 
Act No. 194 of 1993 is, therefore, required. In my 
view, the South African law provides an internal 
solution. This thesis is a modest attempt to direct the 
South African law of trade marks towards it. 
In order that Community policy might be distinguished 
from modernising rules of internal trade mark law 
present in the European model when applied in South 
Africa and because of its external legal-historical 
significance for the law of trade marks, the European 
Community is necessarily included as a jurisdiction of 
relevance to this work. 
xiii 
After the methodology of the thesis has been applied, 
the ultimate chapters provide a definition and 
description of the nature of the right to a trade mark 
based upon a particular South African conception of the 
theory of subjective rights which is then applied to the 
provisions of the Trade Marks Act, No. 194 of 1993. 
Method 
The method of the thesis has been to apply the 
legal-historical and comparative approaches (in the 
non-technical sense of the latter) to trade mark law in 
the jurisdictions of relevance to the South African law 
of trade marks the United Kingdom, the European 
Community (the EC), the U.S.A., and, of course, South 
Africa itself. 
The historical-legal method has been chosen because the 
Common Law is a historical system and the material legal 
institutions of its trade mark law are best clarified by 
considering their internal legal history and the 
external events which determined the circumstances and 
markets in which trade marks developed and functioned 
over time. The Medieval Guild period, the Industrial 
Revolution and the interposition of the European 
Community are of particular importance in regard to the 
external legal history of the Common Law trade mark 
systems. 
The comparative method has been applied to the internal 
rules of the law of trade marks so revealed in the 
jurisdictions chosen. Corresponding aspects of the 
legal systems concerned have been considered and placed 
in comparative perspective in order to establish the 
xiv 
links between them. This has provided an effective 
means of showing that the trade mark functions are of 
universal importance and provide a key to revealing the 
nature of the right to a trade mark in the South African 
law. 
The comparative method also becomes particularly useful 
in the final chapter where the similarities and 
differences between the most recent trade mark statutes 
in South Africa and the United Kingdom and their 
relation to the European Directive are discussed and 
considered. 
The material legal institutions which the thesis 
concentrates upon are the requirements of registrability 
and the concepts of distinctiveness, infringement and 
the assignment and licensing of trade marks. 
Application of the methodology reveals that the obstacle 
to regarding trade marks as property largely results 
from a failure by the law to protect the full range of 
functions trade marks present in modern markets. The 
historical break afforded by the interposition of the EC 
affords the South African system the opportunity of 
protecting the entire range of trade mark functions on a 
basis ultimately revealed within the institutions of our 
own law. 
This is not to say that useful learning elsewhere cannot 
be relied upon. In particular, the links with the trade 
mark laws of the United Kingdom are too strong to 
discount. There is, however, a present need to provide 
the South African law of trade marks with a sound 
theoretical basis derived from principles of South 
African law. Otherwise distortion of the new South 
African system could result through the application of 
xv 
the new laws with reference to outmoded and 
inappropriate concepts and doctrines of the past or with 
reference to new concepts and doctrines arising in the 
United Kingdom or in Europe which are primarily a means 
of implementing Community policy of no internal 
relevance to the South African law of trade marks. A 
touchstone is required against which the application of 
principles derived from the aforementioned sources might 
be tested. This can be provided by a suitable 
theoretical underpinning for the new South African 
system. 
Structure 
The thesis is structured into six parts. 
Part 1 is entitled: Trade marks Their origins, early 
functions, the early law and the genesis of enduring 
themes. It comprises four chapters. The first chapter 
commences the legal-historical investigation of the 
thesis and deals with marks in antiquity, Rome and the 
middle ages. The presence of the identifying, 
distinguishing, origin and assurance functions of marks 
are identified early. It is shown that the medieval 
guilds represent the first significant factor in the 
external history of the development of trade mark 
rights. The genesis of the modern trade mark is found 
in the function of marks in the cloth and cutlers trades 
as they developed into assets through the legal 
protection afforded them during the period. 
The second chapter deals with the first to the Victorian 
and earlier American cases. Its perspective is the 
internal history of trade mark law. It is shown that the 
xvi 
controversial case of Southern v How bridged the gap 
between mediaeval and modern marks whilst the Victorian 
cases in common law and equity established the basis of 
the law which would endure to the end of the twentieth 
century. At common law the trade mark infringement 
action was established as passing off in a specific 
guise with fraud as its essential element. The basis of 
trade mark policy was to protect the public against 
deception. Fraud was not an element for relief in 
equity which afforded protection to trade marks as 
property. This gave rise to the central and enduring 
debate in the Anglo American trade mark systems as to 
whether trade marks comprise property perse. This issue 
is reflected also in the early US cases discussed. From 
the perspective of the external history of trade mark 
law the chapter deals briefly also with the Industrial 
Revolution which led to trade marks taking on a modern 
guise. 
The third chapter considers the first trade mark Acts in 
Britain and the United States. It considers the 
internal legal history of the early British enactments 
from the 1875 to the 1919 Act and the early US statutes 
from the 1870 to the 1905 Act. It shows that the 
British Acts were more sophisticated and detailed and, 
significantly, were based upon the property law approach 
of equity. The enactments in both jurisdictions saw the 
introduction and development of the distinctiveness 
concept about which technical rules and terms of art 
soon came to abound. 
Chapter 4 considers the leading cases in the United 
Kingdom and the U.S.A. at the commencement of the 
twentieth century which hardened the central division in 
the internal legal history of trade mark law between 
property and anti - property approaches into a rigid 
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rejection of the concept of property in trade marks per 
se. 
Part 2 is entitled: The law under the 1938 Act; trade 
marks, goodwill, property and the development of 
enduring themes. It comprises chapters 5 to 9 of the 
thesis. The UK trade mark statutes prior to the Trade 
Marks Act, 1938 enacted the common law with the 
prevention of public deception and confusion as the 
fundamental premise of the statutes. The 1938 UK Act 
introduced matter not present in the common law which 
undermined the primacy of the public interest policies 
of the earlier enactments. The innovations related 
primarily to an extended infringement action and 
provisions for the licensing and assignment of trade 
marks including assignments without goodwill. Chapter 5 
discusses the changes introduced by the 1938 UK Act and 
the considerations which led to change. 
The 1938 UK Act, which influenced South African trade 
mark law in a fundamental way, and which is, therefore, 
considered in some depth, featured a number of complex 
provisions. Because of the importance of the enactment 
those of its provisions most relevant to an 
investigation as to the nature of the right to a trade 
mark are dealt with at some length. Thus, chapter 6 
deals with those detailed provisions of the Act which 
defined marks and trade marks, determined the 
distinctiveness criteria for registration and provided 
bars to registration. Chapter 7 reviews statutory 
infringement under the earlier enactments and the 
complex infringement provisions of the 1938 UK Act in 
particular. Chapter 8 reviews the concept and history 
of goodwill in the common law and the development of the 
xviii 
premise that trade marks are appurtenant to goodwill and 
have no value in gross. This approach is based upon the 
exclusive validity of origin theory and the protection 
of the public from confusion as the overriding 
consideration of trade mark law. This thesis suggests 
that it is necessary to displace the aforegoing 
entrenched concepts from their position of dominance if 
a property-based view of trade marks is to prevail. 
Against this background, chapter 8 reviews the 
assignment and licensing of trade marks under the old 
enactments and considers these topics in terms of the 
provisions of the 1938 UK Act. 
The discussion of trade marks and goodwill as property 
in the Common Law is continued in chapter 9 in view of 
the importance thereof to this thesis. The chapter 
considers the concepts of rights and ownership in the 
Common Law and the place of goodwill and other 
intangible property such as intellectual property in the 
property law concepts of the Common Law. It is shown 
that at the time of the 1938 UK Act unregistered trade 
marks remained appurtenances to goodwill whilst 
registered trade marks were regarded as personal 
property in the nature of either choses in action or 
personal property sui generis. 
Part 3 is entitled: The law of trade marks in South 
Africa. It comprises chapters 9 and 10. Chapter 9 
discusses the development of early trade mark law in 
South Africa, the paucity of material regarding trade 
marks in the works of the old authorities and judicial 
confirmation of the law of trade marks in the United 
Kingdom as the bedrock of the South African trade mark 
law. The early statutory enactments concerning trade 
marks in South Africa are dealt with in this chapter 
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whilst chapter 10 considers the Trade Marks Act No. 62 
of 1963 and particularly those provisions which differ 
from the corresponding provisions in the 1938 UK Act 
upon which it was based. 
Part 4 is entitled: The reception of European Community 
law. In the external history of the British trade mark 
system the interposition of the European Community and 
the reception of EC trade mark law in the United Kingdom 
is the most significant historical fact since the 
Industrial Revolution. The impact of this historical 
interruption upon the development of the South African 
law of trade marks needs to be assessed with direct 
reference to the community system itself of which 
chapter 12 provides a brief and necessary overview. 
Chapter 13 deals with the elements of the European 
Community trade mark system and the significance and 
context of the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice in relation to modern trade mark law. 
Part 5 is entitled: Modern trade mark law in the 
U.S.A.. It comprises chapter 14. It addresses the 
central theme of US trade mark law which concerns the 
development of the concept of trade marks as property 
and matters related thereto. These include whether 
trade marks foster or limit competition, extended 
protection for trade marks as quasi-property under the 
common law, protection under the Lanham Act and the 
anti-dilution statutes and theory. The relevance of 
modern trade mark law in the U.S.A. in relation to the 
South African law of trade marks is assessed. This 
chapter reveals the crucial importance of trade mark 
functioning, an aspect taken up fully in chapter 16. 
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Part 6 is entitled: Trade mark functions, the 
subjective right to trade marks and the new law. It 
comprises chapters 15 to 1 7. Chapter 15 is devoted to 
the multiple functions trade marks perform and proposes 
that all the aspects of trade mark functioning must be 
protected by law. It proposes the concept of the 
functional matrix in which the entitlements to the 
subjective right to a trade mark, formulated in chapter 
16, are to be found. Chapter 16 considers South African 
property law and the theory of subjective rights in the 
South African law and in the Common Law and proposes 
that the right to a trade mark in the South African law 
is a property right in the nature of a subjective right 
with entitlements of use derived from the functional 
matrix of the trade mark. It submits that the right to 
a trade mark is an independent right enforceable under 
the common law of South Africa which is protected by the 
Aquilian action in addition to the statutory trade mark 
infringement actions. The chapter provides a definition 
of the right and a description of the entitlements of 
the holder. 
Chapter 17 deals with the most recent statutes in the 
United Kingdom and South Africa against the background 
of the European Directive. The provisions of the 
enactments are compared and differences noted and 
discussed. The chapter completes the legal-historical 
discourse of the thesis and reveals the want of an 
existing theoretical base for the Trade Marks Act, No. 
194 of 1993. The theoretical conclusions of chapter 16 
are applied to the Act and the Act is assessed with 
reference to criteria proposed as essential in a modern 
trade mark system. 
Conclusion 
This thesis is, therefore, a comprehensive legal 
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historical and comparative legal study of British, 
American and EC trade mark law in general and the trade 
mark law of South Africa in particular from the time 
marks identified and distinguished things in antiquity 
and Rome to the time of recognition of multiple-function 
trade marks at the turn of the twentieth century. It 
arrives at the conclusion that the historical and 
comparative data revealed requires the modern trade mark 
law of South Africa to develop according to the 
principles of its own legal system whilst taking 
cognizance of developments regarding the new laws in the 
United Kingdom and material derived from the European 
Community trade mark system and the U.S.A .. To this end 
a definition and description of the trade mark right 
derived from a civil law oriented theory of subjective 
rights as adapted in the South African legal system is 
proposed and applied to the Trade Marks Act, No. 194 of 
1993. 
PARTl 
TRADE MARKS : THEIR ORIGINS, EARLY FUNCTIONS, 
THE EARLY LAW AND THE GENESIS OF ENDURING THEMES 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
ANTIQUITY, ROME AND THE MIDDLE AGES 
In order to qualify as a trade mark, a mark must be able 
to identify and to distinguish goods or services in the 
market place. A mark with this property performs two 
linked trade mark functions, namely, the identifying 
function and the distinguishing function. The writer 
mentions this at the outset in order that it might be 
noted from what follows that the linked identifying and 
distinguishing trade mark functions originated in the 
marking of goods during ancient times. So too the 
function of indicating the ownership of goods. 1 
This chapter comprises a brief historical overview of 
marks upon goods from antiquity to the Middle Ages. 
Emphasis is placed upon the functions performed by early 
marks and the legal protection afforded them. 
1. FROM ANTIQUITY TO ROME 
The earliest known marks included brands on animals and 
markings on pottery, stone, bricks and tiles. It is not 
known as to exactly when or which ancients started 
marking goods. 
The commencement of animal husbandry dates to 
approximately 9000 BC and the branding of cattle and 
other animals is believed to be the oldest form of 
marking chattels. 2 Branding was used from earliest 
1 . Trade marks (including service marks) perform multiple functions. It is my thesis that 
the distinguishing function is invariable, for should the capacity to distinguish be 
wanting in any particular mark it will not qualify as a trade mark. Other functions are 
variable in that their presence is not a determinant of whether a particular mark 
qualifies as a trade mark or not. This is fully explained in chapter 15. See p 499 infra. 
2. Garraty & Gay Columbia History 36, 48. (But see also 46 and Leakey and Lewis 
Origins 268 regarding Upper Paleolithic art). 
2 
times to indicate the ownership of branded goods and 
this function of a branded mark is still present today. 3 
The modern synonym for a trade mark, namely, "brand 
name", has its origins in the branding of animals by 
. 4 
ancients. 
Al though intended to indicate ownership these ancient 
marks served also to identify and distinguish the goods 
of one owner from those of another. If a mark could not 
function in this way it could also not pin ownership of 
the goods so marked. 
Pottery was discovered in the Near East probably around 
7000 BC and by 6000 BC pottery was already plentiful at 
Catal Huyuk (in Turkey) as well as at a farming 
settlement, Nea Nicomedia, in Macedonia. Pottery soon 
came to feature marking. As to when pottery marks first 
came to fulfil functions not merely decorative is not 
. 5 
certain. 
Markings dating from the Mesopotamian and Egyptian 
periods have been identified on bricks and tiles. The 
markings functioned to indicate the construction project 
for which the goods were earmarked or featured the name 
or symbol of the monarch of the time. Later, Roman 
terracotta tiles and bricks often featured their maker's 
3. Diamond 65 TMR 265 - 290 (1975) 266-267; McClure 69 TMR 305-356 (1979) 310; 
McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 1 31-1 32. 
4. Diamond 267; The word "brand" is derived from the Old English. A "brand" was 
originally a "piece of burning wood". In the 16th Century "brand" came to be applied 
to an identifying mark made with a hot iron. This provided the basis for its modern 
meaning of a "particular make of goods" which developed during the 19th Century: 
See Ayto Word Origins 76. A "brand" was included in the list of registrable markings 
in the earliest British legislation which referred to cases of branding on metal goods, 
wine corks, and possibly watermarking of paper. See Sebastian Trade Marks 33. 
5. Garratty & Gay Columbia History 54; There is uncertainty amongst trade mark 
historians regarding the date of invention of pottery and the accuracy of the dating of 
marks featured on ancient pottery. See Diamond 265-266; Paster 59 TMR 551-572 
( 1959) 552 has it that the earliest pottery of discernible origin was produced in China 
at approximately 2700 BC. 
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name or a factory mark of origin. 6 
2. ROME 
Pottery jars were a necessity of daily life in Greece 
and Rome and the maker's name usually featured on the 
handles. 7 
The marking of goods in Rome was not, however, confined 
to tiles, 
instance, 
source of 
bricks and 
has revealed 
stone as 
pottery. 
quarry 
well as 
Roman masonry, for 
marks indicating the 
stone-cutters' signs 
identifying the individual masons who worked on certain 
pieces. This is not to say that stone-marks and 
stone-cutters' signs were unique to Rome as they have 
been found upon Egyptian structures dating to 4000 BC, 
in the temple of Solomon in Jerusalem and amongst the 
ruins of Troy, Olympia and Damascus. 8 
Also featuring marks in Roman times were oil lamps, lead 
pipe, marble, glass works, bronze instruments, gold, 
silverware, gems, knives and other iron articles. 
Signboarding was also known. 9 Roman cheeses and wine 
containers were marked to indicate the origin of the 
d d . 1 . l' 10 pro uct an , on occasion, a so its qua ity. 
It has been suggested that whereas no action was 
available to the proprietor of a fraudulently imitated 
mark the purchaser of fraudulently marked goods was 
afforded a Roman civil law action against the vendor. 11 
6. Diamond 268-269. 
7. Diamond 267. Although goods were extensively marked in early Greece, as well, this 
requires mention only, for, from the point of view of trade mark development, the 
period does not appear to be particularly significant. 
8. Diamond 269-280. See also Drescher 82 TMR 301-340 (1992) 309-311. 
9. Diamond 271-272; Paster 554. 
10. "The famous cheeses of Estruscan Luna were marked with a picture of that city. 
Perhaps the most important commodity to the ancient Romans, wine, was subject to 
extensive trade mark use, the jugs often describing the origin of the grapes, the 
manufacture of the wine, and later the date of the wine's pressing.": per Paster 554. 
11. See McClure 310; Paster 554. 
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The availability of a civil law action in the aforegoing 
circumstances has, however, never been definitely 
reported and no action of this kind has been found in 
h . f R . . 12 t e commentaries o oman Jurists. 
Though clear evidence of a legal remedy based upon 
misrepresentation involving a mark is not to be found 
before or during Roman times, from the perspective of 
function' it is clear that in the commerce of Rome marks 
were used to indicate the origin of goods and in some 
instances their quality. It has also been suggested 
that in anticipation of the production marks of the 
Middle Ages, ceramics were marked pursuant to Government 
regulation in such a way that responsibility for 
inferior goods could be absolutely established and 
faulty workmanship punished. 13 
3. MARKS ON GOODS DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 
Prior to the resurgence of learning and trade during the 
late middle ages (roughly the 14th to the 16th 
Centuries), the almost universal absence of literacy led 
to the virtual disappearance of markings upon goods. 
With the revival of learning during the period of 
resurgence various types of marks upon goods, however, 
14 
reappeared. 
4. THE MEDIEVAL GUILDS 
The marking of goods 
Middle Ages onwards 
increased substantially from the 
and with few exceptions the 
12. Paster 554-555. He relies upon Kohler Das Recht des Markenschutzes (Wurzburg 
1884). See however Hertzog Functional Theory 2 Footnote 7. 
13. McClure 31 O; Paster 554. As my brief discussion of the earliest periods is directed at 
discerning possible legal protection afforded marks and the function of marks with 
reference to the genesis of trade mark law, I have not discussed matters such as the 
marking of porcelain in China (see Diamond 267), the substantial trade between India 
and Asia Minor during the period 1 300-1 200 BC when the Hindus regularly used 
marks on their goods (see Diamond 270) and the marking of goods during Biblical 
times (see Paster 553). 
14. Diamond 272. 
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proliferation of marks in medieval times was due to 
the rise of the merchant's and artisan's guilds. Guilds 
first appeared in Northern Europe from about 1000 AD and 
were later to grow rapidly as craft and trade guilds 
during the 13th Century. From at least the 13th Century 
the guilds regulated standards of workmanship and 
training whilst courts were held to resolve differences 
amongst members. With time, the guilds developed their 
own customary laws and corporate organisations developed. 
In fixing and controlling hours of work, prices, methods 
of selling and output, the guilds grew in power and 
importance. Profits were maximised through monopolistic 
restrictions, which multiplied. The guilds frequently 
gained State recognition and were often used by the 
State to regulate the economy. Al though they began a 
steady process of decline during the 15th Century, it 
required the Industrial Revolution and the growth of 
laissez' faire social and economic philosophy to bring about 
their final decline. 15 
5. MEDIEVAL MARKS IN GENERAL 
The various types of marks which were used in the Middle 
Ages may be classified into personal marks, house marks, 
geographical marks, merchants' proprietary marks and 
production marks. 
Personal marks identified individuals and included coats 
of arms, signets and seals. House marks were affixed 
to houses to identify the families who lived there. In 
the event of the occupant becoming an innkeeper or 
shopkeeper the house mark would feature upon a sign 
which indicated this to customers whilst if the house 
was that of an artisan the mark would come to be applied 
to his goods. Marks of geographical origin indicated the 
15. In England, the Municipal Corporations Act, 1825 finally abolished guild monopolies. 
In the interim, the guilds had given rise to the 16th Century joint-stock company, 
precursor of the modern corporation; Regarding the guilds generally see Walker Oxford 
Companion 544; Garraty & Gay Colombia History 388, 404; See also paragraph 11 p 
15 infra. 
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place of origin of the goods featuring them. Merchants' 
marks (also known as proprietary marks) indicated 
ownership of the goods in connection with which they 
were used. Production marks fixed responsibility for 
1 . h d' 16 poor qua ity mere an ise. 
Branding of cattle continued as in ancient times whilst 
other markings were placed upon all kinds of goods 
during the Middle Ages. Bells were marked in 
Switzerland as far back as the 12th Century, pottery was 
marked as before and stone masons' marks continued in 
use. Watermarking of paper started in Italy and France 
during the 13th Century and eventually came to indicate 
origin rather than serving merely to decorate. 17 
Printers' marks and devices were 
property and there is no evidence 
transmissible or transferable. 18 
not regarded as 
that they were 
The plethora of enactments relating to medieval marks, 
which underpinned the activities of the particular 
guilds with which the marks were associated, provided in 
the main for their being used for a particular purpose 
at the time of the enactment concerned. Thus, through 
the centuries of the Middle Ages, specific enactments 
can be found both in England and on the Continent 
relating to bakers' marks, goldsmiths' marks, 
silversmiths' marks, metalsmiths' marks, the marks of 
crossbow makers, arrowhead makers, coopers, wax-workers, 
clothiers and pewterers. 19 
16. Diamond 272-273, 277. See also Drescher 313-320. 
17. See Diamond 273-275 for a discussion of medieval marks generally (including printers' 
and publishers' marks); see also Schechter Historical Foundations 77. Schechter' s 
work, a doctoral thesis published by Columbia University during 1925, comprises an 
in-depth and scholarly historical investigation of marks with particular emphasis upon 
the marks of the medieval guilds. For a critical note on Schechter's work see Hiebert 
Parallel Importation 12-13. 
1 8. Except possibly in France during the 16th Century: see Schechter Historical 
Foundations 77. 
19. Diamond 277-280; Schechter Historical Foundations 21. 
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6. MERCHANTS' MARKS 
Because of their importance in the genesis of the modern 
trade mark, merchants' marks, (which were also known as 
proprietary marks), require closer scrutiny. Merchants' 
marks were placed on goods prior to shipment in order 
that they might be recovered and ownership therein 
proved after their loss by piracy or through shipwreck. 20 
Marks of this kind were extensively used in medieval 
England. Their use at the time was widespread 
throughout Continental Europe, as well, where they were 
afforded sophisticated legislative protection in many 
territories. In France, for instance, marks were 
already by the 13th Century regarded as property and 
afforded civil law protection against infringement. 21 
In England, constant legal protection was given to 
merchants' marks from the 14th Century onwards. The 
merchants' proprietary mark afforded almost conclusive 
evidence that the owner of a mark featured upon or used 
in connection with lost goods or the packaging of lost 
goods , owned the goods . This proprietary function of 
merchants' marks was not recognized only in connection 
with piracy or shipwreck but was also applied on 
occasion to goods lost in England or abroad through 
theft. 22 
An apt illustration of the function of the merchants' 
marks and the protection they afforded is the following: 
piracy was endemic during the reign of Edward III (1327 
- 1377) . 
To protect merchants, "privy or Stranger", it was 
provided by statute in 27 Edward III (1353) that should 
20. McClure 310. Schechter Historical Foundations 21. 
21. Paster 557-560, referring to the classic works of Lucien-Brun Les Marques de Fabrique 
et de Commerce (Paris 1895) and of Kohler (see footnote 12 p 4 supra). 
22. Schechter Historical Foundations 27-29. 
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any merchant be robbed of his goods at sea and his 
property therein were proven, the goods would be 
restored to him upon summons without suit at common law 
being required. Goods washed ashore after "Tempest or 
other Misfortune", if not wreck, would be similarly 
restored upon ownership being proven. One of the three 
methods of proving ownership under the statute was 
identification of the goods with reference to marks 
featured thereon or upon the packaging. Wreck belonged 
to the King and ref erred to cargo from ships lost at sea 
which could not be identified by the marking featured 
upon the cargo or by other recognised means after it had 
been washed up upon the land. 
The records of Admiralty and the Privy Council of the 
16th Century are replete with references to merchants' 
marks which were not only affixed to goods but endorsed 
also upon bills of lading and entered into the registers 
of ships. 
Schechter assesses the significance of merchants' marks 
as follows: 
Summarising briefly the evidence adduced in this chapter, mediaeval 
proprietary marks, while not, strictly speaking, trade-marks in the 
modern sense of the word, were an important factor in the 
development of modern trade-mark law. As appears from municipal 
documents and the records of the Admiralty Courts, and also from the 
statute of 27 Edward III, merchants' marks were regarded as 
establishing prima facie and often even conclusive evidence of the 
ownership of the goods to which they were affixed. This proprietary 
significance of merchants' marks still survives in and distinctly 
tinges the judicial concept of the function of a trade-mark. 23 
23. Schechter Historical Foundations 34. My discussion of merchants' marks is derived 
from chapter II (19-34) of Schechter's work. This chapter deals also with merchants' 
personal marks which must not be confused with the merchants' proprietary marks 
discussed in the text. Merchants' personal marks were marks of personality: When 
merchants became prominent they sought to perpetuate their achievements through 
the marks they had used to designate their products by having them placed in 
churches to which they had contributed, in house windows, upon grave stones and 
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7. PRODUCTION MARKS 
Of even greater importance to modern trade mark law is 
the production mark of medieval times. Production marks 
were marks which guild craftsmen were compelled to place 
upon the goods they made in order to identify their 
source and so fix responsibility for poor quality 
merchandise or poor workmanship. 
The use of production marks was rigidly controlled by 
the guild system in medieval England. Municipal law and 
guild rules required each local guild to place its 
distinctive mark on all goods of its manufacture. In 
facilitating the tracing of defective goods which would 
lead to punishment of the offending craftsman, 
production marks served the collective good of the 
guild. The interests of the guild were further served 
by production marks in that they enabled the guild to 
enforce monopolies. Guilds were established by grant or 
charter from the Sovereign, giving the guild a monopoly 
in the production and distribution of its product in a 
defined geographical area. Thus, through identification 
of marks upon goods appearing in a market outside their 
approved distribution area, territorial trade barriers 
could be enforced. Because they were applied to police 
poor workmanship and to enforce monopolies, production 
marks were regarded a liability. 24 
The guilds 
regulatory: 
were, therefore, anti-competitive and 
craftsmen producing wares defective in 
material or imperfect in workmanship not only violated 
the criminal code or police regulations, but perpetrated 
23. (cont) upon public buildings in respect of which they had been a benefactor. Later, the 
marks were featured on shields and upon trade tokens. Personal merchant's marks 
evoked the ire of the Heralds who asked "whether trade did now extinguish gentry" -
with little impact on the proliferation of the marks: (see Schechter 23-25). Merchants' 
proprietary marks are more significant from a trade mark perspective because of their 
commercial function of indicating ownership. 
24 McClure 310-311; Diamond 277; Schechter Historical Foundations 38,47. Schechter 
points out that with the exception of the printing and publishing industries and some 
others, production marks were compulsory in practically every trade in England and on 
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an injury to the collective goodwill of the guilds, as 
well. 25 
The profuse guild legislation was specifically directed 
at maintaining standards of workmanship for the 
protection of a collective guild goodwill and both the 
physical circumstances surrounding guild life and the 
economic theories underlying guild functions worked 
against the development of a craftsman's personal 
goodwill and the exploitation of a mark as its symbol. 26 
Nevertheless and despite guild regulation, production 
marks eventually came 
significance, namely, as a 
the maker's workmanship and 
to acquire a secondary 
symbol of the excellence of 
27 
wares. 
Apart from the compulsory production marks which 
craftsmen were compelled to affix to their wares, the 
proprietary or personal mark could also function as the 
symbol of a personal goodwill. 28 Notwithstanding the 
potential of merchants' proprietary and personal marks 
to ref le ct a personal goodwill, however, it was 
ultimately the production mark which through time 
became a valuable symbol of individual goodwill and, as 
such, an asset rather than a liability to skilled 
craftsmen. 29 
The most significant development regarding production 
marks from the point of view of the genesis of the modern 
25. Schechter Historical Foundations 46. 
26. Schechter Historical Foundations 62. 
27. Schechter Historical Foundations 47. 
28 Schechter Historical Foundations 63. 
29. Diamond 280 sums up thus: "In summary, the guild marks which were the principal 
development of the medieval period very largely were compulsory marks whose 
primary purpose was to fix the blame for inferior workmanship. They evolved into 
trade marks in the modern sense when goods began to be shipped for substantial 
distances. There no longer was direct contact between the consumer and the artisan 
in his workshop. Preferences for particular workmanship began to develop and, as in 
modern times, the trade mark on the goods made it possible for the consumer to 
identify a product with its source." 
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trade mark through the development of personal goodwill 
took place in industries producing commodities capable 
of transportation over long distances goods such as 
cloth, cutlery and to some extent pewterware as 
opposed to baked goods and other perishable foodstuffs. 30 
8. THE CLOTH AND CUTLER'S TRADES 
The idea of a collective goodwill enjoyed by a 
particular locality or guild and of the protection of a 
mark or seal as the symbol of that collective goodwill 
is a common feature of the history of medieval commerce. 
Virtually every guild compelled the fixing of its seal 
or mark to the products of the members in the exercise 
of its policing functions. In many instances, the seals 
or marks which were the symbols of the municipal 
authorities under whose auspices a particular guild fell 
became assets of great value to the corporation or 
universitas from which they came. In some instances and 
with the passage of time, 
merely on the strength 
goods bearing them were sold 
of the marks without the 
purchaser opening or carefully scrutinising the goods to 
which the marks were affixed, for example, with bales or 
bolts of cloth in the cloth trade. 31 
It is to be expected, therefore, that the evolution of 
an individual goodwill in a milieu where the emphasis 
was upon a rigidly enforced collective goodwill and 
monopoly did not come about easily. Ultimately, 
however, developments in the cloth and cutlers' crafts 
cracked the collective cast and it is especially in the 
cloth and cutlers' trades of England where the evolution 
of a mark upon goods from a mark of origin to a mark of 
quality and hence from a liability to an asset of 
distinct value to the owner of the mark - can be clearly 
d . d 32 1scerne . 
30. Schechter Historical Foundations 63. 
31. Schechter Historical Foundations 79-80. 
32. Schechter Historical Foundations 80. 
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9. CLOTH MARKS 
The development of a collective goodwill was 
particularly conspicuous in the cloth trade in England 
although it was found connected also to a number of high 
quality corporate and regional trades on the Continent. 33 
Wool had become England's major export by the later 
Middle Ages. Through active intervention by the Crown, 
cloth represented two-thirds of England's exports by the 
end of the 17th Century. 34 The Crown undertook the 
regulation of the cloth trade from very early times, 
directing it through government and guild officials, 
jointly. Early statutes relating to clothmaking are to 
be found during the reign of Richard II (1377 - 1399) 
and Richard III (1483 - 1485) . 35 
During the reign of Elizabeth I (1558 1603) 
especially, strong Royal control of the industry came 
about with 
. . 36 position. 
Under this 
marks were 
the notion 
the Privy Council placed in 
government protection, local and 
further developed and protected, 
of a mark as an asset rather 
a central 
collective 
fostering 
than as a 
liability. The reputation of a mark attached largely to 
a locality and the collective goodwill symbolised by a 
mark at this time had a distinctly geographical 
connotation. 37 Despite the added protection of the 
Crown, local reputations were still guarded jealously by 
1 1 h . . 38 oca aut orities. 
33. Schechter Historical Foundations 78. 
34. Schechter Historical Foundations 81 . 
35. These early statutes were 15 Richard II and I Richard Ill. See also Schechter Historical 
Foundations 84. 
36. Schechter Historical Foundations 94. 
37. Schechter Historical Foundations 82. 
38. Schechter Historical Foundations 81. 
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In general, however, the growth of the cloth industry 
was too rapid for guild restrictions to restrain it and 
the guild system thus broke down first in this trade. 39 
From 1591 onwards, the Privy Council was charged by the 
Crown with the whole subject of 'trade' marks, both 
individual and collective. This came about as a 
response to the then popular demand for cloth to be 
purchased on the basis of the seals featured therein as 
well as in response to substantive losses both in the 
clothing trade and to royal revenue brought about at the 
time through the debasement of cloth seals, then 
common.
40 
The Privy Council soon indicated that it would use its 
new power and during 1592 in the case of John Godsall, a 
Taunton clothier, it recognised and protected the 
clothier's individual mark. This was significant in 
that the value of a clothier's personal mark, as opposed 
to a weaver's mark with its geographical connotations, 
for example, obtained protection. 41 
During the period of the Stewarts (1603 - 1714) a system 
of trade marks became quickly established in the cloth 
trade. 42 
Schechter suggests that the proclamation of Charles I in 
1632 against "frauds and deceits used in Draperie" 
illustrates that by its date at least some lawyers of 
the 17th Century had already perceived "trade marks" to 
be symbols of goodwill and assets of value rather than 
merely regulatory marks of origin and, as such, a 
1 . b · 1 · 43 ia i ity. 
39. Schechter Historical Foundations 86; See also McClure 311. 
40. Schechter Historical Foundations 87-88; McClure 311. 
41 . Schechter Historical Foundations 91 ; McClure 311 . 
42. Schechter Historical Foundations 94. 
43. Schechter Historical Foundations 94,96. 
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Thus, the contribution of the English cloth trade to 
trade mark development was that it led to a perception 
that marks not only identified defects but could also 
from a source of indicate good qualities emanating 
production revealed by the marks. Al though not yet so 
courts, the national regarded by the common law 
administrative courts of the time such as the Kings 
Council and the Star Chamber-perceived marks to be 
h f . 44 assets wort y o protection. 
10. CUTLERS' MARKS 
In Schechter•s view, the cutlers' marks, especially, 
provide a link between the typically regulatory and 
liability marks of the middle ages and the modern view 
of a trade mark as an asset and as property. Like other 
medieval marks, cutlers' marks originated as police 
marks but they became of such great value to their users 
that the tribunals having jurisdiction over the cutlers 
came to protect their marks as being subject to a 
qualified legal ownership. Thus, an individual cutler 
was afforded protection against infringement of his mark 
and damages for its infringement, his mark could be sold 
or leased, his widow had a life estate in his mark, 
whilst his sons had a claim to its reversion. These 
concepts were practically exclusive to the cutlery trade 
although at later stages there is evidence of their 
. . . h d h . d . 45 germination in t e pewter an ot er in ustries. 
A review of the history of cutlers' marks evidences 
their evolution from the compulsory production marks of 
the Middle Ages to marks having the characteristics of 
early trade marks. The cutlers' records show a sense of 
44. Schechter Historical Foundations 101-102. 
45. See Schechter Historical Foundations 102, 108, 110, 121. McClure 311 holds that 
early in the 1 5th Century marks in the cutlery industries began to evolve from marks of 
origin to marks of quality. 
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property and value in the marks as early as the 15th 
Century and there is evidence of recognition of the 
widow's right during 1452. By the 17th Century, the 
records show recognition of limited transactions for the 
purchase of cutlers' marks, their transmissibility, 
albeit also limited, and vigorous measures to protect 
them. 46 Under 41 Geo III, enacted in 1801, the right 
of any Freeman of the Cutlers' Company to bequeath his 
mark subject to the widow's right to a life estate 
h . f' d 47 t ere1n was con irme . 
11. THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD AND THE LAW 
I conclude this survey of the marks of the medieval 
period by considering them in in the context of the law 
of the guilds and from the perspective of their role in 
the development of the modern trade mark. 
Until at least the 15th Century, the guild system 
provided the whole organisation of industry. This 
continued even when the industry became a matter of 
national rather than local organisation. As the Crown 
still relied upon the guilds and companies to supervise 
all manufacturing activity, Royal grants and monopolies 
formed a regular and almost universal feature in guild 
charters and required a high standard of merchandise and 
workmanship. As I have recorded, these monopolies and 
standards were enforced and policed by means of 
d . k 48 pro uct1on mar s. 
Marks of this kind initially functioned in at least 
three clearly discernible ways, namely, to identify and 
distinguish goods, to fix the source of goods and to 
enforce monopolies. As will become clearer later, the 
link between marking goods and the monopolies of the 
period, coupled with later Royal abuses in the grant of 
46. Schechter Historical Foundations 101. 
4 7. Schechter Historical Foundations 1 21 . 
48. See p 9-11 supra. 
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monopolies, ingrained anti-monopoly feelings deeply 
within the psyche of Anglo-American economists and 
jurists and the debate as to whether trade marks lead to 
monopolies remains topical and will be considered later 
. h' k 49 on in t is wor . 
It is also abundantly clear that production marks were 
inextricably linked to considerations of quality, 
functioning to identify poor quality initially but 
eventually, as a corollary, functioning also to ensure 
that the craftsmen performed to high standards. In the 
clothing and cutlery trades certain marks came to 
function as badges of quality with reference to which 
purchases were made. 50 
In the guild itself, cooperation and not competition was 
the order of the day. The guilds and the companies 
which succeeded them repressed the establishment of an 
individual goodwill on the part of the members, 
nurturing instead a guild or collective goodwill. This 
was sustained even up to the 17th Century when their 
control over members eventually began to wane. An 
environment in which the actual producer of goods sold 
directly to the consumer in circumstances of an ongoing 
direct relationship and close physical proximity was 
1 d . d . . d 1 . 51 a so not con ucive to tra e competition eve oping. 
It was the cloth and cutlers' industries which broke 
through the territorial and other trade barriers. Cloth 
marks, first in the geographical sense and later in an 
individual sense, and cutlers' marks, enabled individual 
craftsmen to obtain individual value from their marks' 
reputation as opposed 
fostered by the guilds. 
to 
49. See chapter 14 infra paragraph 2 p 391-405. 
the collective 
50. Schechter Historical Foundations 41-42, 44; p 11-15 supra. 
51. Schechter Historical Foundations 124-125. 
goodwill 
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As far as the law was concerned, medieval marks were 
founded in the guild system and for centuries the guilds 
and towns established, promulgated, administered and in 
their customary courts, adjudicated 
monopolistic rules and regulations of the 
masters and warders of the guild were 
arbitration amongst guildsmen and for 
upon 
guilds. 
charged 
guildsmen 
the 
The 
with 
to 
resort to litigation at common law was a grave offence 
which could lead to expulsion. Non-litigation 
ordinances were enacted regularly up to the commencement 
of the 17th Century despite an Act of Parliament in 
1504, 19 Hen. VII c. 7, which prohibited non-litigation 
ordinances. 
The guild jurisprudence and consular law developed by 
administrative courts such as the Kings Council and Star 
Chamber were the primary source of and had by the 17th 
Century made the major contribution towards the law 
regarding marks. In the light of this, the absence of 
reported cases in the common law at that time is to be 
expected. 52 
From the point of view of the common law it must be 
noted that rules which were applied for centuries in the 
customary courts of the guilds and towns were not 
contemporaneously recognised by the Royal courts of 
England. No matter how uniformly administered, the 
customs of merchants were not recognised as English 
common law. It is ironic that the entire body of 
commercial law which had previously been decided by 
communal courts was not received as law by the courts of 
common law when these matters came to fall under their 
jurisdiction, whilst the commercial rules 
centuries in the English common law courts 
law and not indigenous English law. 53 
52. Schechter Historical Foundations 126-127. 
applied for 
were European 
53. Schechter Historical Foundations xi-x (per Munro Smith in the foreword of the work). 
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12. IN SUM 
Marks have been placed on goods and chattels since 
antiquity. Probably the first non-decorative marks were 
animals which enabled their owner to 
distinguish his animals from those of 
brands upon 
identify and 
others. 
Marking of goods has continued throughout history. It 
was evident in Rome throughout the early period of our 
legal history. In Rome and elsewhere, certain marks 
functioned not only to identify and distinguish goods 
but also to indicate origin and to indicate quality. 
There is, however, no evidence of a civil action being 
available to redress the fraudulent imitation of a mark 
during the Roman period. 
Marking of goods virtually disappeared during the dark 
ages but a resurgence took place during the medieval 
period when the marking of goods became widespread. 
Amongst the medieval marks it is the merchants' 
proprietary marks - which served the commercial function 
of indicating ownership and the production marks, 
especially, which are significant from the point of view 
of the development of the modern trade mark. 
Whilst serving initially as symbols of a collective 
guild goodwill, production marks, particularly through 
their development in the cloth and cutlers' trades, came 
to reflect the personal goodwill of individual craftsmen 
and were regarded and protected as his property by the 
guild and Royal administrative courts of the time. 
Protection was also afforded to such marks under certain 
national enactments - albeit not on an extensive scale. 
The evolution of the production mark from a liability 
and symbol of collective goodwill to a symbol of the 
craftsman's individual goodwill - and as such an asset -
was the primary contribution of medieval marks to the 
development of the modern trade mark. 
19 
Marks were not, however, protected in the medieval 
common law courts which did not recognise customary 
guild and administrative law as part of the common law. 
As the following chapters will show, the protection of 
trade marks by the common law courts was a long time in 
coming, whilst the modern trade mark was to establish 
itself only in the second half of the 19th Century. 
20 
CHAPTER 2 
FROM THE FIRST TO THE VICTORIAN AND EARLY AMERICAN CASES 
1. TOWARDS THE 19TH CENTURY 
Despite attempts by the Tudors and Stewarts to regulate 
industry on a national scale during the medieval period 
and to bring goods marks under Royal control, goods 
marks had only a slight degree of national economic 
significance prior to the mid-19th Century (when the 
modern trade mark first developed) . This accounts for 
the slow growth of the modern common law of trade marks 
both in England and the United States. For the most 
part, producer and consumer had remained in close 
contact until the advent of canals, railways and the 
factory towns of the Industrial Revolution. 1 With the 
tremendous expansion of the means of production and 
distribution came a concomitant increase in the 
advertisement of goods to acquaint consumers with the 
available goods. This led to marks upon goods soon 
becoming trade marks in the modern sense, obtaining a 
national significance far greater than in times of loca~ 
monopoly. By the second half of the 19th Century, trade 
marks had become significant as assets of value in 
national markets. 2 
This chapter deals with the development of marks upon 
goods as they became modern trade marks through the 
cases both at law and in equity. 
2. THE EARLIEST CASES 
2.1 Southern v How 
Linking the law of the Middle Ages with the rise of 
1. Schechter Historical Foundations 129; Diamond 282. 
2. Schechter Historical Foundations 130; Diamond 280. 
21 
modern trade mark law during the 19th Century is the 
case of Southern v How. There are five reports of this 
case, 
3 
which was a King's Bench action for the sale of 
counterfeit jewels by the defendant to the plaintiff 
through the defendant's servant. It had no relation 
whatsoever to trade mark law but the report in Popham 
states at page 144: 
Doderidge said, that 22 Eliz. the action upon which the case was 
brought in the Common Pleas by a clothier, that whereas he had gained 
great reputation for his making of his cloth by reason whereof he had 
great utterance to his benefit and profit, and that he used to set his mark 
on his cloth whereby it should be known to be his cloth: and another 
clothier, observing it, used the same mark to his ill-made cloth on 
purpose to deceive him, and it was resolved that the action did well lie. 4 
The next report of the case was in J Bridgeman's Reports 
published in 1659 where no reference to Dodderidge's 
dictum appears. The 1659 report of the case in Croke' s 
Report provides a different version of the dictum stating 
unequivocally that the action was brought by the 
defrauded purchaser (not the clothier as indicated in 
Popham's report). 
Volume II 
of 
of Rolle' s Reports contains two 
the case: firstly regarding 
conflicting 
the term in reports 
which it was decided and secondly in not mentioning 
Dodderidge in the first report (2 Rolle 5). In the 
second report (2 Rolle 28), mention is made of the dictum 
from which it appears that the action was awarded to the 
purchaser and not the clothier, although this is not 
absolutely clear. 
Schechter is sharply critical of the weight which had 
3. Southern v How [16561 Popham 143; J Bridgeman 125;[16591 Cro Jae 469; 2 Rolle 
5; 2 Rolle 28. My discussion of this case is gleaned from Sebastian, Trade Marks 6, 
156-157, Schechter Historical Foundations 6-10, 123-124 and Paster 362, 571 
Footnote 5 7. 
4. See Schechter Historical Foundations 7. 
been given to the legendary Southern v How: 
It is possible that some day in some moldering mass of unpublished 
records of the common law may be found a report of a case in the reign 
of Elizabeth by a clothier for infringement of his trade mark that will 
justify the authority with which Southern v How has been so 
unanimously endowed. Until that day, however, Southern v How would 
give no slight support to Dean Pound's complaint against courts and 
text writers by whom 'a principle was found latent in some meagrely 
reported, ambiguous and fragmentary pronouncement of a medieval 
court which had culminated in the latest decisions of English and 
American Courts. 15 
22 
Sebastian states that there is uncertainty as to whether 
the plaintiff was the clothier or the purchaser but 
concludes, sensibly, that in the light of subsequent 
history, the principle was in any event established that 
the courts could redress trade mark piracy - whatever 
the particular circumstances of the case might have 
been. Schechter is constrained to agree that the 
English courts relied on the authority of Southern v 
How, unequivocally, to establish the antiquity of their 
jurisdiction to prevent trade mark piracy. 6 
Thus, Southern v How established the principle: a 
person who has suffered by reason of his trade mark 
being intentionally imitated by another has a right at 
common law to redress against the infringer. 7 
2.2 Other Early Cases 
Two further cases decided prior to the 19th Century 
require notice. 
The first, Blanchard v Hill, 8 was a request for 
injunctive relief in equity against piracy of the mark 
GREAT MOGUL when used in respect of playing cards. 
5. Schechter Historical Foundations 123. 
6. Sebastian Trade Marks 6, 157; Schechter Historical Foundations 9; Paster 362. 
7. Sebastian Trade Marks 1 5 7. 
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Lord Hardwicke refused relief on the basis that 
protection of trade marks would create or protect 
monopolies, deciding in effect that there was no right 
of property in a trade mark, but that actual fraud might 
be restrained or punished as in Southern v How. 
Sebastian places the judgment in perspective: 
The decision seems in great measure to have been founded upon a dread 
of setting up a monopoly, the distinction between a trade mark and a 
patent not being clearly present in his Lordship's mind. 9 
The case had no impact and generated no comment. It has 
been effectively ignored or repudiated by Anglo-
American Courts of Law and Equity. 10 
Common Law piracy of a trade mark was touched upon in 
Singleton v Bolton. 11 Lord Mansfield, CJ, in the Court 
of King's Bench, stated the principle that should the 
defendant have sold medicine of his own under the name 
or mark of the plaintiff, this would have constituted an 
actionable fraud. The issues in the case at hand were, 
however, coloured by the question of transmissibility of 
a name, for the plaintiff's goods were being sold under 
the name of the inventor of the original medicine and 
not under the plaintiff's name or trade mark. 12 
3. DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE MARK LAW DURING THE 19TH CENTURY 
3.1 The Common Law 
Trade mark rights were first recognised by the common 
law of England in 1824 in the case of Sykes v Sykes13 in 
which the plaintiff succeeded upon the following 
allegations: 
(a) he had made large quantities of goods which he 
labelled SYKES PATENT in order to distinguish them 
9. Sebastian Trade Marks 6. 
10. Schechter Historical Foundations 136-137; Paster 565. 
11. Singleton v Bolton 3 Doug. 293, decided in 1783. 
12. Sebastian Trade Marks 6; Schechter Historical Foundations 1 37. 
1 ') c ................. c ... 1 .............. 'l D o_ ,... CA 1 
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from goods of the same description manufactured by 
others; 
(b) he had a great reputation with the public on 
account of the quality of the goods so marked and 
made great gains selling them; 
(c) the defendant, appraised of the aforegoing, made a 
large quantity of the same goods and marked them 
SYKES PATENT in imitation of the plaintiff's goods 
and sold them in quantity as the goods of the 
plaintiff without his consent or acquiescence; 
(d) the plaintiff was thus prevented from selling a 
great quantity of his goods and was also greatly 
injured in his reputation as the goods of the 
defendant were inferior. 14 
Abbott, CJ, decided as settled law that in order for the 
plaintiff to succeed in damages at common law he was 
required to prove: 
(aa) use of the mark to designate the goods of his 
manufacture; 
(bb) his mark was known in the trade; 
(cc) the defendant had imitated the mark and sold goods 
bearing it as and for the plaintiff's goods; 
(dd) the defendant had done so with intent to defraud. 15 
This case also decided for the first time in England 
that although goods sold with a pirated mark attached 
might not deceive an immediate purchaser, they could 
still deceive a later purchaser who might have had no 
notice of the fraud. 
14. See Schechter Historical Foundations at 137-138 for the plaintiff's declaration and a 
discussion of the case; See also McClure 318, Blanco & White and Jacob Kerly 10th 
ed, 2-3. 
15. See Schechter Historical Foundations 137-138 and Sebastian Trade Marks 7. 
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It settled the principle that whilst it was necessary at 
common law to prove a fraudulent intention it was not 
required that the defendant represent to an 
immediate purchaser that the goods were the plaintiff's. 
It was sufficient if he intended them to be resold as 
th d f h 1 . . ff 16 e goo s o t e p a1nt1 . 
According to Sebastian17 , writing in 1899, this case 
also marked the ultimate stage of development in the law 
of trade marks at common law. 18 
Specific reference must, however, be made to the King's 
19 Bench decision in Bl of ield v Payne. It was 
specifically held in this case, decided in 1833, that it 
was not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for 
damages at common law to show that the goods sold by the 
defendant were inferior to the goods to which the 
plaintiff applied his mark, or to prove special damage 
had resulted from the actions of the defendant. 20 
3.2 Equity 
The earliest case 
injunctive relief 
mark which featured 
16. Sebastian Trade Marks 116. 
1 7. Sebastian Trade Marks 6-7. 
21 in equity, Day v Day, granted 
against the infringement of a trade 
a label placed upon blacking. 
18. The case was decided well prior to the Judicature Acts, 1873-1875 and the Patents, 
Designs and Trade Marks Acts, 1883-1888. The Judicature Acts were statutes of 
1873-1875 which abolished nearly all the then existing superior courts and placed the 
Supreme Court of Judicature in their stead. The civil procedure and the administration 
of law were rendered uniform. Law and Equity could be administered in all courts 
thereafter but in the case of conflict, the rules of equity were to prevail: See Walker 
Oxford Companion 672. 
19. Blafield v Payne 4 B. & Ad.410. 
20. Schechter Historical Foundations 142; Blanco White and Jacob Kerly 10th ed. 3. The 
authors observe that in Edelstein v Edelstein 1 De G.J. & S. 185 the principle in 
Blafield v Payne was held to be settled beyond doubt also in equity. 
21 . Day v Day Eden on Injunctions ( 1 821 ) . 
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The case was decided in 1816 and pre-dated Sykes v 
Sykes. Unfortunately, it is merely referred to in a 
work by Eden on injunctions, published in 1821, and no 
record of the reasoning of the court appears to be 
extant. 22 
The leading trade mark case in equity decided during the 
19th Century was Millington v Fox. 23 Lord Cottenham 
held that an injunction could be obtained to restrain 
infringement of a trade mark even though the 
infringement was in ignorance and without fraudulent 
intent. No authority was cited and Blanchard v Hill was 
ignored. The Lord Chancellor reasoned that whatever the 
intent of the infringer might be, purchasers would buy 
the infringer's goods in the belief that they were those 
of the trade mark owner who would thereby be deprived of 
custom intended for him. Thus, the infringer, whether 
by his own contrivance or not, would profit at the 
expense of both the trade mark owner and the public. 24 
This case led to the recognition of the concept of 
property in a trade mark. Blanco White and Jacob write 
that the case recognised a "right of property" 
arising from adoption and use of a trade mark and 
observe that although the nature of this right gave rise 
to much discussion and was defined in different terms 
by Chancery judges in subsequent cases, it soon became 
firmly established and the protection of trade marks in 
equity was expressly based thereon. Common law courts 
never accepted the theory of property in trade marks, and 
22. Blanco White and Jacob Kerly 10th ed. 2; Schechter Historical Foundations 138. 
23. Millington v Fox (1838) 3 My. Cr. 338. McClure 313 suggests that this was the first 
time an English Court of Equity had granted an injunction for trade mark infringement 
as equity courts were prevented from doing so earlier due to the absence of any 
conception of a property right in the trade mark itself. I have, however, noted that an 
injunction had been granted earlier in Day v Day (supra). Other such cases were Henry 
v Price (1831) 1 Leg. Obs. 364 and Gout v Aleploglu (1833) 6 Beav. 69 See 
Sebastian Trade Marks 163. 
24. Sebastian Trade Marks 8, 165; Blanco White and Jacob Kerly 10th ed. 3-4; McClure 
313; Schechter Historical Foundations 138-139. 
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at common law, fraud remained essential to a cause of 
action for trade mark infringement up until the time the 
Courts of Law and Equity were joined together under the 
Judicature Acts. 25 
4. TRADE MARK LAW AT THE TIME OF THE JUDICATURE ACTS 1873-1875 
AND THE PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADE MARKS ACTS 1883-1888 
The law of trade marks at common law and at equity at 
the time of the Judicature Acts and immediately prior to 
the enactment of the Patents, Designs and Trade Mark 
Acts 1883-188826 is definitively set out in the 
following three dicta from leading cases of the time 
which are included in the text by virtue of their clear 
statement of the law. In Singer Manufacturing Co. v V 
Wilson, 27 decided in 1877, Mellish, LJ stated the common 
law thus: 
Now, in my opinion, all actions of this nature must be founded upon 
false representations. Originally, I apprehend, the right to bring an 
action in respect of the improper use of a trade-mark arose out of the 
common law right to bring an action for a false representation, which, 
of course, must be a false representation made fraudulently. It differed 
from an ordinary action for false representation in this respect, that an 
action for false representation is generally brought by the person to 
whom the false representation is made; but in the the case of the 
improper use of a trade-mark, Common Law Courts noticed that the 
false representation which is made by putting another man's trade-mark 
or the trade name of another manufacturer, on the goods which the 
wrongdoer sells, is calculated to do an injury, not only to the person to 
whom the false or fraudulent representation is made, but to the 
manufacturer whose trade-mark is imitated; and, therefore, the Common 
Law Courts held that such a manufacturer had a right of action for the 
improper use of his trade-mark. Then the Common Law Courts 
extended that doctrine one step farther; first, if I recollect rightly, in the 
25. Blanco White and Jacob Kerly 10th ed. 3-4; Paster 566. According to McClure 313, 
however, the common law courts applied the intent-to-defraud rule for a period and 
ultimately accepted the equitable rule; See also GE Trade Mark [19731 R.P.C. 297 325. 
26. These Acts are discussed in some detail in chapter 3. 
27. Singer Manufacturing Co v Wilson 2 Ch. D. 434,453. 
case of Sykes v Sykes. There it was held, that, although the 
representation was peifectly true as between the original vendor and the 
original purchaser, in this sense, that the original purchaser knew 
peifectly who was the real manufacturer of the goods, and, therefore, 
was not deceived into believing that he had bought goods manufactured 
by another person, yet if the trade-mark was put on the goods for the 
purpose of enabling that purchaser, when he came to resell the goods, 
to deceive any one of the public into thinking that he was purchasing the 
goods of the mamifacturer to whom the trade-mark properly belonged, 
then that was equally a deception, a selling of goods with a false 
representation, which would give the original user of the trade mark a 
right of action. That was the Common Law right. 
28 
It must be noted that trade mark infringement at common 
law was regarded as passing off in a specific guise. A 
clear statement of the common law in this context is to 
be found in the words of Lord Blackburn in his review of 
the history of trade mark law in Singer Manufacturing Co 
v Loog: 28 
The original foundation of the whole law is this, that when one, 
knowing that goods are not made by a particular trader, sells them as 
and for the goods of that trader, he does that which injures that trader. 
At first it was put upon the ground that he did so when he sold inferior 
goods as and for the trader's (but it is established, alike at law: 
Blofeld v Payne, and in equity: Edelstein v Edelstein), 
that it is an actionable injury to pass off goods known not to be the 
plaintiff's as and for the plaintiff's, even though not inferior. 
The modes in which goods may be passed off as and for the plaintiff's 
vary. The most usual is where a particular mark on the goods or on the 
packages in which they are sold has been used to denote that they are 
made by a particular firm to such an extent that it is understood in the 
market to bear that meaning. 
The law as to those trade-marks is now regulated by statutes, but before 
there was any legislation on the subject it was well settled that when any 
one adopted a mark so closely resembling the trade mark of the plaintiff 
28. Singer Manufacturing Co v Loog 8 A.C. 15 29-30. 
that it would be likely to be mistaken for it, and put it on his goods and 
sold them, knowing that though the persons to whom he sold them were 
well aware that they were not the plaintiff's make, yet they were meant 
to be sold to others who would see only the trade-mark, and were likely 
to be deceived by its resemblance to that of the plaintiff, he might be 
properly found to have knowingly and fraudulently sold the goods as 
and for the plaintiff's goods: Sykes v Sykes. And, so far, there 
was no difference between law and equity. But at law it was necessary 
to prove that an injury had been actually done; in equity it was enough 
to show that the defendant threatened to do, and would, if not 
prevented, do that injury. 
But there is a further question on which there may be a difference 
between law and equity. 
29 
The final sentence refers to the ruling in Millington v 
Fox where it was held, as we have seen, that in equity 
it was not necessary to prove an actual fraudulent 
intention. An injunction would be obtainable if the 
conduct of the defendant, albeit innocent, would produce 
the effect of fraud. 29 
The approach in equity holding that there is property in 
a trade mark is thus stated by perhaps its strongest 
proponent of the time, Lord Westbury, C, in Leather 
Cloth Co. v American Leather Co. : 30 
The representation which the Defendant is supposed to make, that his 
goods are the goods of another person, is not actually made otherwise 
than by his appropriating and using the trade mark which such other 
29. See p 26 supra and Sebastian Trade Marks 8. Equity accepted the common law rule 
in Sykes v Sykes " ... although the immediate purchaser from him is aware that the 
goods in questions are not manufactured by any other person than the vendor, yet, as 
he passes them on, the representation does not necessarily pass on with them, and 
therefore the next purchaser, or the following or some other purchaser, or the public at 
large who are the ultimate purchasers, would be as much deceived as if no such 
communication took place. Consequently, whenever you get to a case of the 
first-class, you have nothing more to do than to show that the trade mark has been 
taken." Per Sir G Jessel, M R, in Singer Manufacturing Co. v Wilson Ch. D. 434, 442. 
30. Leather Cloth Co. v American Leather Cloth Co. 4 De G.J. & S. 137, 142. 
person has an exclusive right to use in connection with the sale of some 
commodity; and if the plaintiff has an exclusive right to use any 
particular mark or symbol, it becomes his property for the purposes of 
such application, and the act of the Defendant is a violation of such 
right of property, corresponding with the piracy of copyright or the 
infringement of a patent. I cannot therefore assent to the dictum that 
there is no property in a trade mark. 
It is correct to say that there is no exclusive ownership of the symbols 
which constitute a trademark, apart from the use or application of them; 
but the word "trade mark" is the designation of marks or symbols when 
applied to a vendable commodity, and the exclusive right to make such 
user or application is rightly called property. The true principle 
therefore seems to be that the jurisdiction of the Court in the protection 
given to trade marks vests upon property, and that the Court inteiferes 
by injunction, because that is the only mode by which such property can 
be effectually protected. 
The same things are necessary to constitute a title to relief in equity in 
the case of the infringement of the right to a trade mark as in the case of 
the violation of any other right of property. The true principle therefore 
would seem to be, that the jurisdiction of the Court in the protection 
given to trade marks rests upon the property, and that the Court 
inteiferes by injunction, because that is the only mode by which property 
of this description can be effectually protected. 
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The exclusive right of property is obtained as follows 
in the words of Bacon, VC: 
That principle may be stated thus: a mamifacturer who produces an 
article of merchandise which he announces as one of public utility, and 
who places upon it a mark by which it is distinguished from all other 
articles of a similar kind, with the intention that it may be known to be 
of his manufacture, becomes the exclusive owner of that which is 
henceforth called his trade mark. By the law of this country, and the 
like law prevails in other civilised countries, he obtains a property in 
the mark which he so affix.es to his goods. The property thus acquired 
by the manufacturer, like all other property, is under the protection of 
the law, and for the invasion of right of the owner of such property the 
law affords a remedy similar in all respect to that by which the 
possession and enjoyment of all property is secured to the owners. 31 
31 
Essentially, therefore, the aforegoing dicta show that 
the common law regarding trade mark infringement at the 
turn of the 19th Century was founded upon fraudulent 
. . h. h ff d d . . d . 32 misrepresentation w ic a or e an action in eceit. 
It differed from the ordinary action for false 
representation in that the trade mark action was brought 
by the claimant of the mark and not the party to whom 
the false representation had been directed even though 
the injury was calculated to do damage to both. The 
fraud need not have been perpetuated at the first sale. 
It was sufficient that subsequent purchasers might be 
deceived (the rule in Sykes v Sykes) 
The essential feature of the trade mark infringement 
action both at law and at equity was passing off. The 
difference between law and equity was that in law an 
injury had actively to be done whilst in equity a threat 
of injury would suffice. Furthermore, at equity, 
fraudulent intent was not required (the rule in 
Millington v Fox) . Innocent use would become fraudulent 
use if an innocent defendant continued use of the 
plaintiff's mark after he had knowledge that the mark 
was that of the plaintiff. In equity, relief was based 
upon infringement of an exclusive right of property in 
the mark which arose through its adoption and use in 
respect of the manufacturer's goods. 
31. In Ransome v Graham 51 L.J. Ch. 897, 900. 
32. In Crawshay v Thompson 4 Man. & G. 357, decided in 1842, it was held that as the 
common law action for trade mark infringement was an action in deceit the declaration 
had to allege that the defendant was aware of the matter by which he deceived and 
that he did it falsely and fraudulently. See Schechter Historical Foundations 142-144. 
See also Addley Bourne v Swan and Edgar Ld [19021 R.P.C. 105 at pp 119-120 for a 
brief survey of leading cases confirming deceit was not relevant to relief in equity and 
the remarks of Lord Parker in Spalding v Gamage (discussed at p 77-81 infra) which 
distinguished the passing-off and trade mark infringement actions from the tort of 
deceit. 
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According to the researches of McClure, 33 the earliest 
common law actions were founded in deceit and a 
fraudulent intent to deceive the public was required. 
No property in the mark was acknowledged. Common law 
courts continued to apply the old intent to defraud rule 
but later accepted the equitable rule in that proof of 
an intent to defraud and knowledge of plaintiff's 
ownership of the trade mark on the defendant's part was 
not required in order for the plaintiff to obtain 
relief. Trade mark infringement moved from a passing 
off requiring actual fraud or misrepresentation to a 
trespass upon property. The view that a trade mark was 
property led to a need to define the limits of the 
property right. The view that a trade mark is in itself 
property did not, however, prevail in the end. 
I have found no clear authority indicating that the 
common law courts fully accepted the "property right" 
approach of equity or that this led to a switching of 
the basis of the trade mark infringement action from 
deceit to a trespass upon property. Indeed there are 
indications of the opposite being true. 
In Reddeway v 
following: 
34 Banham, Lord Herschell stated the 
33. McClure 312-313; After the Judicature Acts equity prevailed in the sense that fraud 
ceased to be an essential element of passing off: See Drysdale and Silverleaf Passing 
Off 10. The defendant's knowledge remained material in relation to the nature of relief 
the Plaintiff could seek. 
34. Reddeway v Banham [18961 A.C. 199,209-210. Sebastian Trade Marks 168 states: 
"The view taken by Lord Westbury of the existence of property in a trade mark, 
independently of statute, has, however, not escaped criticism in later years, and the 
prevailing opinion in recent times is probably in accordance with that expressed by 
Lord Herschell in the leading case of Reddeway v Banham". The words of Lord 
Kingsdown in Leather Cloth Co. v American Leather Cloth Co. 11 H.L.C. 538 to which 
Lord Herschell refers in the quoted passage were: "The fundamental rule is that one 
man has no right to put off his goods for sale as the goods of a rival trader, and he 
cannot, therefore (in the language of Lord Langdale in the case of Perry v Truefit) be 
allowed to use names, marks, letters, or other indicia, by which he may induce 
purchasers to believe that the goods which he is selling are the manufacture of another 
person". See also Perry v Truefitt 6 Beav. 66. The term "passing off" was first 
f"ninArl in thii:: f"::IJ::A" nrvi::rl::ilA ;:inrl ~ihtArlA::if P;1<:<:inn nff Fi 
The word 'property' has been sometimes applied to what has been 
termed a trade mark at Common Law. I doubt myself whether it is 
accurate to speak of there being property in such a trade mark, though, 
no doubt some of the rights which are incident to property may attach to 
it. Where the trade mark is a word or device never in use before, and 
meaningless, except as indicating by whom the goods in connection with 
which it is used were made, there could be no conceivable legitimate 
use of it by another person. His only object in employing it in 
connection with goods of his manufacture must be to deceive. In 
circumstances such as these the mere proof that the trade mark of one 
manufacturer had been thus appropriated by another, would be enough 
to bring the case within the rule as laid down by Lord Kingsdown, and 
to entitle the person aggrieved to an irzjunction to restrain its use. In 
the case of a trade mark thus identified with a particular manufactory, 
the rights of the person whose trade mark it was would not, it may be, 
differ substantially from those which would exist if it were, strictly 
speaking, his property. But there are other cases which equally come 
within the rule that a man may not pass off his goods as those of his 
rival which are not of this simple character - cases where the mere use 
of the particular mark or device which had been employed by another 
manufacturer would not of itself necessarily indicate that the person who 
employed it was thereby inducing purchasers to believe that the goods 
he was selling were the goods of another manufacturer. 
The name of the person, or words forming part of the common stock of 
language, may become so far associated with the goods of a particular 
maker that it is capable of proof that the use of them by themselves 
without explanation or qualification by another manufacturer would 
deceive a purchaser into the belief that he was getting the goods of A 
when he was really getting the goods of B. In a case of this description 
the mere proof by the plaintiff that the defendant was using a name, 
word, or device which he had adopted to distinguish his goods would 
not entitle him to any relief. He could only obtain it by proving further 
that the defendant was using it under such circumstances or in such 
manner as to put off his goods as the goods of the plaintiff. If he could 
succeed in proving this I think he would, on well-established principles, 
be entitled to an irzjunction. 
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I have quoted Lord Herschell at length because his words 
are relevant not only to the then and still topical 
34 
debate upon the question as to whether there is property 
in a trade mark but also as to the nature of the matter 
which can function in a trade mark sense, which will be 
considered later. 
Sebastian took a pragmatic view stating that the 
principle upon which the equity courts acted was really 
immaterial since the essential point was completely 
established both at law and in equity: in cases of 
trade marks nothing had to be done other than to show 
that the mark had been taken. In any event, plaintiffs 
were more concerned about obtaining redress than about 
the basis upon which redress would be granted. 35 
Nevertheless, the property-based view of Chancery cannot 
merely be brushed aside for it underpins the first and 
all subsequent British trade mark legislation. 
Even prior to the Judicature Acts a steadily increasing 
number of trade mark cases were coming before Chancery 
because the remedy of injunction and account had a more 
beneficial character than the common law remedy of 
damages. It appears that eventually the Court of 
Chancery absorbed jurisdiction in all trade mark cases 
except where cases were remitted by a Chancery judge for 
. 1 1 36 tria at common aw. 
According to Schechter, with the merger of common law 
and equity also in the United States of America, coupled 
with the fact that there, also, injunctive relief was 
found to be more effective than damages, trade mark 
infringement fell more and more within the scope of 
equity and the principles governing relief in such cases 
accordingly followed those of equity rather than of 
37 law. 
35. Sebastian Trade Marks 170. 
36. Sebastian Trade Marks 163. 
37. Schechter Historical Foundations 145. 
35 
5. EARLY TRADE MARK LAW IN THE U.S.A. 
Trade mark law in the U.S.A. will be considered in a 
later chapter. It is, however, appropriate to make some 
reference to early trade mark law in the U.S.A. in order 
to reveal and compare its early trends with those of 
English law. 38 
There appears to have been a certain amount of 
litigation involving trade marks in State courts in the 
early 19th Century. The first reported case of trade 
mark infringement came before a state court in 183 7, 39 
but it was not until 1844 that the first case was 
40 
reported in the Federal courts. It appears that up to 
1870 only sixty-two trade mark cases were decided by 
American courts. 41 
In the first reported American case Thompson v 
Winchester, the court granted the plaintiff relief on 
the basis of the "imposition, falsehood and fraud" by 
the defendant who had passed off his medicines as those 
of the plaintiff. 
42 According to McClure, trade mark law in America 
developed in parallel fashion to that of English Law in 
that it derived from a tort of fraud and deceit, called 
"passing off", 
essential. 
and for which proof of fraud was 
Schechter43 is not of the same strict view. According 
to him, the courts in the United States did not, in 
trade mark infringement cases, proceed on English common 
law deceit theory. 
38. A most informative treatment of early U.S.A. cases and doctrines is to be found in 
Pattishall 68 TMR 121-145 (1978) 123-131. 
39. Thompson v Winchester Sup. Ct. Mass. 1837, 19 Pick. 214. 
40. Taylor v Carpenter U.S. Cir. Ct., Dist. of Mass. 3 Story 458. 
41. Schechter Historical Foundations 133-134. 
42. McClure 314. 
43. Schechter Historical Foundations 143-144. 
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Protection was granted rather upon substantially the 
same equitable grounds in the nature of a passing off 
as were indicated by Lord Langdale, MR, in Perry v 
Truefitt, 44 namely, that the courts would grant relief 
against the party who through the marking of goods 
induced the purchasers to believe that the goods he was 
selling were those of another. This was because no 
person had the right to use marks for the purpose of 
deception and in order to attract custom which would 
otherwise have gone to the usual user of the mark. 
In a landmark case 
Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v 
of the time, decided in 1849, 
Spear, 45 the court regarded the 
taking of a trade mark as a deception which invaded the 
right of an owner to the trade mark in which he had a 
prior and exclusive title. The false representation of 
affixing to his own goods an imitation of an original 
mark was aimed at a dishonest purpose comprising a fraud 
upon the public and upon the true owner of the trade 
mark, as the purchaser had imposed upon him an article 
he never meant to buy whilst the owner was robbed of the 
fruits of his reputation which he had acquired through 
skill, enterprise and successful labour. This 
constituted a fraud coupled with damage and the court 
would act to suppress this fraud by an injunction to 
prevent a mischief that might otherwise prove 
irreparable. 
44. Perry v Truefitt (1842) 6 Beav. 66,73, where Lord Lonsdale said: "A man is not to sell 
his own goods under the pretence that they are goods of another man; he cannot be 
permitted to practice such deception, nor to use the means which contribute to that 
end. He cannot, therefore, be allowed to use names, marks, letters, or other indicia by 
which he may induce purchasers to believe that the goods which he is selling are the 
manufacture of another person . . . . I have no doubt that another person has not a 
right to use that name or mark for the purpose of deception, and in order to attract to 
himself that course of trade, or that custom, which, without the proper act, would 
have flowed to the person which first used, or alone was in the habit of using the 
trade name or mark". 
45. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v Spear 2 Sandf. SC 599, 605, (N.Y.) Super. See particularly the 
words of Duer J at 605-606 (also quoted in Schechter 144-145); See also Pattishall 
124-125. 
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It appears from the aforegoing that relief was granted 
in early US trade mark cases upon a commixture of 
grounds available at law and in equity in England at the 
corresponding time. According to McClure, fraud was a 
prerequisite and relief was granted upon considerations 
of protecting the public from fraud and deception 
coupled with considerations of honesty and fair dealing 
in that no person had the right to hold his goods out to 
be the goods of another. He regards the promotion of 
honesty and fair dealing as the dominant rationale for 
relief in the early American trade mark cases. 46 
Trade mark law in the U.S.A. was slow to develop. 
Pattishall writes: 47 
It could be said for most of our first century there was no such thing in 
the United States as trademark law in the sense we understand the term 
today. Walter J Derenberg points out in his treatise 
"Trade-Mark Protection and Unfair Trading" that even 
as late as 1860 the term 'trademark' really denoted only the name of the 
manufacturer. Even though an article may have become well-known 
under an arbitrary mark, if that mark did not directly denote the 
article's source, another was free to use it. 
Indeed, whether or not a mark provided an exclusive 
right to its use turned upon the degree to which it 
could identify the manufacturer - perform 'the office of 
the name and address of the manufacturer' . 48 Here one 
finds the U . S . source of the deep-rooted 'origin 
function' of trade marks to which I shall return later. 
By the time the United States Congress had enacted the 
first Trade Marks Act which provided for Federal 
registration of trade marks 
interstate commerce in 1905, 
and their protection in 
the common law of trade 
marks had developed two actions: the trade mark 
46. McClure 314. 
47. Pattishall 128. 
48. Pattishall 128 footnote 35. 
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infringement action which protected 'technical trade 
marks' and unfair competition which protected 'trade 
names'. 
I shall revert to these developments during the course 
of the chapter which follows as they are more 
conveniently dealt with against the background of the 
1905 Act. 
6. IN SUM 
Although trade marks only achieved national significance 
in England during the second part of the 19th Century, 
the case of Southern v How, first reported in 1656, led 
to the principle being established that the common law 
afforded redress against trade mark piracy. 
The cases of Sykes v Sykes and Blof ield v Payne, decided 
in 1824 and 1833, respectively, settled the common law 
regarding trade marks. It was established that a 
plaintiff would have an action at common law if he could 
prove his use of and reputation in a mark designating 
goods of his manufacture and sale of goods by the 
defendant - featuring a mark imitating the plaintiff's 
mark - as and for the goods of the plaintiff with the 
intention to defraud. The action was based upon false 
representation. It differed from the ordinary action 
for false representation in that the latter action was 
ordinarily brought by the person to whom the false 
representation was made whilst in the trade mark action, 
the injury was directed at the party whose mark was 
imitated. It did not matter that a first purchaser 
would not be deceived or that the fraudulent goods were 
not inferior to those of the plaintiff. 
Essentially, both the common law and equity regarded 
trade mark 
passing off 
infringement 
and proof of 
as a particular 
the taking of a 
afforded relief in both systems. 
species of 
trade mark 
Millington v Fox, decided in 1838, settled that equity 
would restrain trade mark infringement by way of 
39 
injunction even in circumstances where no fraudulent 
intent was present and the infringement was innocent. 
This case laid the foundation upon which equitable 
relief would be granted in trade mark cases henceforth: 
the infringement was of a right of property in the trade 
mark, even though the nature of this right never 
obtained clear definition. The theory of property in 
trade marks never gained common law acceptance. 
In the U.S.A., the applicable principles did not 
precipitate and settle in as clear a form as did the law 
in England and relief was granted upon a commixture of 
the legal and equitable principles available in cases of 
trade mark infringement in England at the corresponding 
time. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE FIRST ACTS IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 
This chapter considers early trade mark legislation in 
England and the Unites Stated and the background thereto. 
1. THE BACKGROUND TO EARLY TRADE MARK LEGISLATION IN ENGLAND 
At the time trade mark related legislation was first 
passed in England during the late 19th Century, conduct 
of every kind directed at the passing off of the goods 
of one trader as those of another - whatever the nature 
of the imitation involved - provided cause for relief 
both at law and in equity. 
It is to be noted that the cases of passing off 
involving imitation of trade marks were not only more 
numerous but were regarded as more important and came to 
be seen as a more specialised and distinct form of 
action than the general action for passing off. This 
specialised action was known as the action for 
. f . 1 in ringement. 
The infringement action was, 
consuming and the defendants 
essential feature of the 
however, expensive, time 
were often indigent. An 
action was the need to 
prove the plaintiff's title to the mark. The plaintiff 
was required to adduce evidence of its use and the 
evidence had to establish plaintiff's reputation in the 
mark. A substantial quantum of evidence was required 
and this brought about large expense. Success against 
one infringer did not relieve the plaintiff from proving 
his title anew against every subsequent infringer who 
decided to put it to the test. Furthermore, trade mark 
1. Lloyd and Bray Kerly 7th ed. 5. 
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infringement was not within easy reach of criminal 
sanction as a possible alternative or additional means 
of relief. The aforegoing considerations coupled with 
what was then regarded as the unsatisfactory state of 
the law concerning the marking of goods in general, led 
to a demand by concerned traders for more effective 
legal protection for marks. 2 
Cornish3 observes that by the 1850' s, there was 
substantial public agitation about the extent to which 
food, clothes, drugs and other commodities were sold in 
an adulterated state. At the same time, traders were 
complaining assertively of the damage suffered by them 
through adulteration practices, losses through cheap 
imports not being properly identified, and losses 
through the imitation of brands, marks and names. 
In 1862, a Parliamentary Select Committee reported 
negatively upon legislation then before Parliament which 
proposed a system of trade mark registration. The 
Select Committee saw the Criminal Law as the principal 
machinery for addressing the problems which had brought 
about the clamour of complaint. Consequently, a Bill 
with a criminal sanction approach to protecting marks 
found favour and led to the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862. 4 
According to Cornish, liberal opposition to a new 
property right led to the choice of the Criminal Law 
2. Lloyd and Bray Kerly 7th ed. 5-6. Regarding the passing off action, Cornish 
Intellectual Property 394 states: "The passing-off action, though useful, depended on 
proving in each case that the plaintiff had a trade reputation with the public. That 
could sometimes be costly and laborious. If there were a register, the issue could be 
reduced to the question: Was the defendant imitating the mark in a manner liable to 
deceive?" 
3. Cornish Intellectual Property 394. With no register, potential users of conflicting 
marks had no easy practical way of determing pre-existing rights or claims: See GE 
Trade Mark [19731 R.P.C. 297,327. 
4. Lloyd and Bray Kerly 7th ed. 6. 
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machinery of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862. 5 It was 
reasoned that if a new property right in a trade mark 
were to be introduced through legislation this would 
lead to monopolies because a first registrant would 
thereby be able to appropriate ways of marking his goods 
which would exclude and consequently prejudice later 
competitors. Hence the refusal in 1862 of the first 
attempt to obtain trade mark registration in England. 6 
Although trade mark legislation eventually resulted also 
from the diverse causes already mentioned, 
considerations of international trade turned out to be 
the final reason for the passage, in 1875, of a trade 
marks registration Act. It was asserted at the time 
that counterfeiters were passing off their goods as 
English goods in various parts of the world. Foreign 
imitations of British marks could be prevented by 
establishing a British register which would afford 
foreigners protection in England in return for the grant 
of reciprocal protection to the British. This 
reciprocity was attained through the provisions of the 
Paris Convention on Industrial Property of 1883. 7 
2. THE FIRST MERCHANDISE MARKS ACTS 8 
At the time of the passage of the early Acts, the 
criminal law insofar as it related to trade marks was 
this: the imitation of a trade mark or of trade dress 
was not regarded a forgery, but an indictment for 
obtaining money under false pretences, could, however, 
be sought in respect thereof . 9 
5. Cornish Intellectual Property 394-395. The Act, he states, never achieved popularity 
amongst competitors as a means of protection. 
6. McClure 313. 
7. Cornish Intellectual Property 394, 398. Schechter Historical Foundations 140. 
8. Merchandise Marks Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Viet. c.88) and the Merchandise Marks Act, 
1887 (50 & 51 Viet. c.28). 
9. See Sebastian Trade Marks 146. 
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The Merchandise Marks Act, 1862, rendered the forgery of 
a trade mark a misdemeanour as did the Merchandise Marks 
10 Act, 1887. 
A conviction under section 2 of the latter Act (which 
set out the offences under the Act including forgery of 
a trade mark), did not relieve the defendant from civil 
1 . b'l' f h' 11 ia i ity or is acts. 
Forgery of a trade mark was defined in section 4 and 
included fraudulent imitation and falsification of marks. 
The 1862 and 1887 Acts contribute nothing of substance 
to an enquiry regarding the nature of trade mark rights 
but require mention because of their historical position 
in regard to legislation, involving trade marks. 
Essentially, the Merchandise Marks Acts were aimed at 
imposing a sanction upon the false marking of goods 
rather than protection of the rights of the trade mark 
owner. 
12 
1 0. See Sebastian Trade Marks 1 4 7. 
11. Section 9 of the Act; Sebastian Trade Marks 150. 
12. Cornish Intellectual Property 394-395. He states: "The Merchandise Marks Act 1862, 
which included 'forging a trade mark' prominently amongst its prohibition on the false 
marking of goods, was solely a criminal statute, and deliberately so. A pattern of 
considerable moment was thus established: the criminal law was to provide the 
general machinery against misdescription of wares. The normal principle that any 
citizen might prosecute was to apply - indeed, in the 1 862 Act it was encouraged by 
the old device of sharing the penalty between the prosecutor and Crown. But 
competitors were not to have the weaponry of civil suits to deal with a wide range of 
misleading trade descriptions. The Merchandise Marks legislation grew in 
completeness with a revised statute of 1887. This was to continue in force (with 
amendments) until the Trade Descriptions Act of 1968. But its actual enforcement 
was to remain extremely patchy. For unlike the neighbouring legislation on food and 
drugs and weights and measures, local authorities were not placed under any duty to 
provide inspectors and others who would see to observance. And in practice 
competitors showed little interest in putting their resources to the task."; the Trade 
Descriptions Act of 1 968 does not give a right of civil action for breach of a statutory 
duty to a trader whose mark is falsely appropriated and is not regarded as a measure 
intended to prevent unfair competition. It is aimed at the protection of consumers and 
its provisions need not receive specific attention for they are not relevant for the 
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3. THE TRADE MARKS REGISTRATION ACT, 1875 13 
This Act was contemporaneous with the Judicature Acts, 
1873 - 1875. 14 The equity view was the prevailing one 
at this time, namely, that property in a trade mark 
existed from the moment when it was first used on 
vendible goods in the market. A trader acquired a right 
of property in a distinctive mark merely by using it 
upon or in connection with the goods irrespective of the 
length of such user and the extent of his trade. 
Although it was not a firmly established proposition of 
law at the time, it followed from the prevalent view 
that trade mark infringement was 
right of property in the mark. 15 
the 1875 Act. 
an infringement of a 
This idea underpinned 
The Act had the following objectives: to reduce the 
difficulty and the cost of proving title by removing the 
necessity of proof of use and reputation in trade mark 
infringement actions, to secure the publication of marks 
appropriated as trade marks, to define the rights of 
registrants for the information of traders and to define 
the classes of marks which could be registered. 16 
Whereas the proposed Act of 1862 made no provision for a 
Register, section 1 of the Act of 1875 established a 
register 
provided 
of trade marks and to ensure registration, 
that after 1 July 1896, no action for the 
infringement of a trade mark (as defined in the Act), 
would lie unless the mark was registered under the Act. 
The registration of a person as the first proprietor of 
a trade mark was, in terms of section 3 of the Act, prima 
facie evidence of his right to the exclusive use of 
the trade mark. Registration became conclusive evidence 
13. 38 & 39 Viet. c.91 (a). A useful short discussion of the Act is to be found in Lloyd and 
Bray Kerly 7th ed. 6-7. 
14. See footnote 18 p 25 supra. 
15. Lloyd and Bray Kerly 7th ed. 388-389. 
16. Lloyd and Bray Kerly 7th ed. 5. 
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of this right after five years provided the mark 
remained on the Register and it had not, contrary to 
section 2 of the Act, been assigned or transmitted 
otherwise than in connection with the goodwill of the 
business concerned in the goods or classes of goods in 
respect of which it had been registered. In other 
words, the owner of the registration had also to be the 
owner of the goodwill of the business in the mark. 
Registration of a trade mark was deemed, in terms of 
section 2 of the Act, to be equivalent to public use of 
the mark. 
Concepts extant in current British and South African 
Trade Mark legislation despite a change in terminology 
in many instances, find an archetypal echo in this Act, 
such as: registration in respect of particular goods or 
classes of goods and assignment and transmission with 
goodwill (section 2) ; 'proprietor' and the right to 
exclusive use (section 3); 'persons aggrieved' and 
rectification of the Register (section 4) ; resembling 
trade marks 'calculated to deceive' and identical trade 
marks not to be registered side by side as a general 
rule in respect of the same goods or classes of goods, 
(section 6); marks which would be denied protection in 
a court of equity or scandalous designs were not to be 
registered (section 6) ; administrative rules for the 
administration of the Act and registry were provided for 
(section 7). 
The Act, in section 4, recognised that successors in 
title to trade marks stand in the same position as if 
their title were a continuation of the title of the 
first registered proprietor. 
The court was empowered by section 5 of the Act to 
rectify the Register at the instance of a person 
aggrieved in circumstances where the Registrar had 
entered the wrong proprietor or refused to enter the 
rightful proprietor upon the Register, to remove wrongly 
registered marks from the Register, to decide between 
rival claimants to a trade mark and, generally, to deal 
with any aspect of the Register requiring rectification. 
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In terms of section 6, identical trade marks could only 
be registered in respect of the same goods or classes of 
goods by the leave of the court, and the Registrar was 
enjoined to refuse registration of a trade mark which so 
nearly resembled a trade mark already on the Register as 
to be calculated to deceive. In terms of the same 
section, scandalous designs were to be refused 
registration, as was other matter which would not be 
afforded protection by a court of equity. 
Section 7 dealt with the establishment of the registry 
and general rules applicable thereto whilst section 8 
dealt with the evidential weight of certificates issued 
by the Registrar. Section 9 dealt especially with 
Cutlers' Company and Sheffield corporate marks whilst 
section 11 was the short title section. 
For the purposes of this thesis the definitions section, 
section 10 and, particularly, the definition of the 
essential elements which would render a mark a 
registrable trade mark, is the most relevant part of the 
Act. 
For a mark to qualify for registration it had, under 
section 10, to comprise or feature at least one of the 
following essential particulars, namely: 
(a) a name of an individual or firm (printed, impressed 
or woven in some particular and distinctive manner); 
(b) the written signature of an individual or firm or a 
copy thereof; 
(c) a distinctive device, mark, 
ticket; 
heading, label, or 
(d) any special and distinctive word or words or 
combination of figures or letters which had been 
used as a trade mark prior to the passing of the Act. 
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The concept of distinctiveness taken up in section 10 
has remained a corner-stone of trade mark law ever 
since, as will be clearly apparent throughout this work. 
McClure expresses the view that the judicial doctrine 
that a trade mark could achieve the status of a property 
right if it acquired distinctiveness through use was 
accepted in the Act and, henceforth, by its successors. 
Judicial perceptions of trade marks as property and the 
need to find the limits of this property right led to 
the first Acts providing for the registration of 
distinctive marks in England. The distinctiveness 
requirement had given rise to two classes of action in 
England: the trade mark infringement action and the 
action under the tort of passing off. 17 
In considering 
treatment of the 
subsequent Acts, therefore, their 
'distinctiveness' requirement of trade 
mark law will be afforded close attention. The 
requirement will be discussed specifically later on in 
paragraph 5 of this chapter. 
Essentially, from 1875 to 1833, the mode of acquiring a 
trade mark was regulated by the Trade Marks Registration 
Acts, 1875 - 1877. 18 
17. McClure 313-314. 
18. These were the 1875 Act, the Trade Marks Registration Amendment Act, 1876 (39 & 
40 Viet. c.331 and the Trade Marks Registration Extension Act, 1877 (40 & 41 Viet. 
c.37). Section 2 of the 1876 Act provided: "When an application by any person to 
register as a trade mark a device, mark, name, word, combination of words, or other 
matter or thing proposed for registration as a trade mark, which has been in use as a 
trade mark before the passing of the recited Act, has been refused, it shall be the duty 
of the registrar, on request, and on payment of the prescribed fee, to give to the 
applicant a certificate of such refusal, and a certificate so granted shall be conclusive 
evidence of such refusal". Section 1 of the Act extended the date after which no 
person could institute a trade mark infringement action without having the mark 
registered to 1 July 1877, subject to section 2. The 1877 Act merely extended the 
time for registration of trade marks used in the textile industries. 
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A trade mark was required to meet the requirements of 
section 10 of the Act of 1875 and not to offend section 
6 if it were to be registered. 
The mark had to be registered if it were to afford an 
infringement action, unless it had been used before the 
Act commenced, refused registration, and a certificate 
of refusal to register it had been issued by the 
Registrar. 
Thus, unsuccessful applicants retained such rights as 
they already had before the Act, for if there had been 
some user of the mark in respect of the goods.to which 
its user had adopted and applied it, he would, according 
to the law of that time, have had an infringement action 
. f . . . b h 19 in respect o its appropriation y anot er. 
The Trade Marks Acts, 1875 1877, were repealed and 
replaced by the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Acts, 
1883 - 1888. The later Acts provided a wider and more 
comprehensive definition of the registrability 
requirements. For the rest, much remained the same: 
marks were to be registered in respect of particular 
goods or classes of goods, marks used before 1875 were 
only protected in respect of goods in relation to which 
they had been habitually used, trade marks were 
assignable and transmissible but only in connection with 
the business in the goods or classes of goods to which 
the mark related. 20 
4. THE PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADE MARKS ACTS, 1883 - 1888 
The Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 
into force on 1 January 1884. 
19. See Sebastian Trade Marks 1-8. 
came 
20. Sebastian Trade Marks 9-10; The question of detaching a mark from the goodwill in 
the business in the goods in connection with which the trade mark has obtained a 
reputation is a pressing question in modern trade mark law which receives full 
attention later in this work (see p 177-181, 279-299 and 531-539 infra). 
21. 46 & 47 Viet. c.57. 
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The new Act, following the 1875 Act, required a trade 
mark to be distinctive before it would qualify for 
registration. 
of or contain 
To be registrable, 
at least one of 
a mark had to consist 
the enacted list of 
essential particulars provided for in section 64. 
Because of its importance, section 64 of the 1883 Act is 
set out in full in the text hereunder. The text of 
section 64 as amended by the 1888 Act22 is set out 
immediately thereafter. The reader is requested to bear 
this in mind when, in the discussions which follow, 
reference is made to the provisions of the section and 
to amendments thereto: 
64. (1) For the pwposes of this Act, a trade mark must consist of or 
contain at least one of the following essential particulars: 
(a) A name of an individual or firm printed, impressed, or 
woven in some particular and distinctive manner; or 
(b) A written signature or copy of a written signature of the 
individual or firm applying for registration thereof as a 
trade mark; or 
(c) A distinctive device, mark, brand, heading, label, ticket, 
or fancy word or words not in common use. 
(2) There may be added to any one or more of these particulars any 
letters, words or figures, or combination of letters, words or 
figures, or any of them. 
(3) Provided that any special and distinctive word or words, letter, 
figure, or combination of letters of figures or of letters and 
figures used as a trade mark before the thirteenth day of August, 
one thousand eight hundred and seventy five, may be registered 
as a trade mark under this part of this Act. 
22. The Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Viet. c.50). 
Turning, as indicated, to the 1888 Act: 
64. (1) For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark must consist of or 
contain at least one of the following essential particulars: 
(a) A name of an individual or firm printed, impressed, or 
woven in some particular and distinctive manner; or 
(b) A written signature or copy of a written signature of the 
individual or firm applying for registration thereof as a 
trade mark; or 
(c) A distinctive device, mark, brand, heading, label, or 
ticket; or 
(d) An invented word or invented words: or 
(e) A word or words having no reference to the character or 
quality ofthe goods and not being a geographical name. 
(2) There may be added to any one or more of the essential 
particulars mentioned in this section any letters, words, or 
figures, or combination of letters, words, or figures, or of any of 
them; but the applicant for registration of any such additional 
matter must state in his application the essential particulars of 
the trade mark, and must disclaim in his application any right to 
the exclusive use of the added matter, and a copy of the 
statement and disclaimer shall be entered on the Register. 
(3) Provided as follows: 
(i) A person need not under this section disclaim his 
own name or the foreign equivalent thereof, or his 
place of business; but no entry of any such name 
shall affect the right of any owner of the same name 
to use that name or the foreign equivalent thereof,· 
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(ii) Any special and distinctive word or words, letter, 
figure, or combination of letters or figures, or of 
letters and figures, used as a trade mark before the 
thirteenth day of August, one thousand eight 
hundred and seventy-five, may be registered as a 
trade mark under this part of this Act. 
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The underlining which I have introduced in the first 
part indicates the additions to the requirements in 
section 10 of the 1875 Act introduced by the 1883 Act, 
whilst the underlining in the second part reflects the 
amendments introduced by the 1888 Act, insofar as the 
amendments relate to the essential particulars for 
registrable trade marks. It will be noted that section 
64(2) introduced disclaimers for the first time. 
5. DISTINCTIVENESS 
Under the 1875, 1883 and 1888 Acts, distinctiveness 
meant that the mark was required to have, at the date of 
its registration, the capacity to distinguish the goods 
of the person registering the mark from goods of the 
same class emanating elsewhere. 23 The manner of 
distinguishing had not, however, to be by means of the 
mark describing a particular quality of goods which 
differed from the qualities of other goods of the 
class. 24 
23. "Now it appears to me that to satisfy the requirements of the definition the word or 
words must be distinctive in this sense, that they distinguish the manufacture of the 
person who has registered the trade mark from the manufacture of all other persons. I 
say 'manufacture' but of course there may be cases in which they distinguish, not the 
manufacture, but the selection, or some other operation, upon the goods. But in all 
cases the word or words must distinguish the product of the person claiming the trade 
mark from the product of all other persons, and it appears to me that it must have that 
distinctive character at the time of registration." Per Fry, LJ. in Wood v Lambert 32 
Ch.D. 247,262. See also Sebastian Trade Marks 40, 332. 
24. Sebastian Trade Marks 47. 
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It is to be noted that although not every category of 
the essential particulars for registrability mentioned 
in each of the Acts specifically includes the word 
'distinctive' the distinctiveness requirement is, 
however, implied also in each instance where it is not 
specifically stated. 
Insofar as the written signature of an individual or 
firm is one of a kind it is distinctive, per se. So too 
fancy words, invented words and words not being 
geographical and which have no reference to the 
character or quality of the goods, for they were 
expected to have the inherent capacity to distinguish 
the goods of the applicant in a particular class from 
those of another in the same class. 
6. FANCY WORDS 
As will have been noted from paragraph 4, although the 
1883 Act repealed the 1875 Act together with its 
amending acts of 1876 and 1877, it re-enacted its 
provisions regarding the requirements for registrable 
marks except for introducing 'a fancy word or fancy 
words, not in common use' as an additional category of 
registrable marks. 25 
This came about as follows: the 1875 Act did not allow 
words to be registered as trade marks unless they were 
old marks or were combined with one or more of the 
stated essential requirements. Yet, word marks were 
popular and were registrable abroad. Consequently, they 
were subsequently admitted to registration also in 
Britain by virtue of section 64 (1) (c) of the 1883 Act 
under the umbrella, 'fancy words' . 26 
In defining fancy words the courts adopted a strict 
approach. Fancy words were words which could have no 
reference to the goods in respect of which registration 
25. Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 7. 
26. Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 8. 
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was sought, were in no way descriptive of the goods and 
were in no way to designate any characteristic of the 
goods or the place of their manufacture. The word was 
to have no meaning at all, or, if it had a meaning, 
this had to be wholly non-descriptive when used as a 
trade mark. The word or words had, essentially, to be 
meaningless when applied to the article in question. 
Put another way, fancy words had to be obviously and 
notoriously neither descriptive nor suggestive of the 
goods and there was to be no hint or allusion as to the 
nature or character of the goods. A fancy word was to 
have an innate and inherent character of fancifulness, 
that is to say, it had to be fanciful, per se, without 
evidence. 27 For a word to qualify as a 'fancy word' it 
had to speak for itself and be a fancy word on its own 
. h h 28 in erent strengt . 
As Sebastian points out, the new phrase was so 
restrictively interpreted that in all but five cases 
decided under the Act, the marks concerned were denied 
registration as not being fanciful. Two marks, BOVRIL 
and MAZAWATTEE which are still known today, were amongst 
the few marks found to be fanciful and allowed 
. . 29 
registration. 
As far as the category "words not in common use" are 
concerned, they were interpreted to mean either common 
use by persons in respect of the trade in which the 
'fancy' word was to be applied as a trade mark or even 
more restrictively, namely, that if the word or words 
were in common use generally this was 'common use' 
thereof as contemplated by the Act. 30 
2 7. Sebastian Trade Marks 39. 
28. See Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed 8 and Van Duzer's and Leaf's Tm' (1887), R.P.C. 31. 
29. See Sebastian Trade Marks 39. 
30. Sebastian Trade Marks 41. 
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7. INVENTED WORDS 
In 1887, the Board of Trade appointed a committee, 
chaired by Lord Herschell, 31 to enquire into the 
operation of the Patent Off ice under the legislation 
then current. The Report, however, both at the interim 
stage (1887) and final stage (1888), went beyond matters 
relating solely to the workings of the Patent Off ice and 
dealt also with general questions of trade mark 
. . 32 
registration. 
This report led to the enactment of the Patents, Designs 
and Trade Marks Act, 1888, which commenced on 1 January 
1889. Following the suggestions of the report that the 
difficulties which had arisen in judicial endeavours to 
construe the 'fancy word' clause of the preceding Acts 
should be removed, the Act of 1888 introduced 
sub-sections 64(1)(d) and ( e) . So were added two 
further categories to the list of essential particulars 
required of registrable marks. The new categories were 
11 an invented word or invented words 11 and 11 a word or 
words having no reference to the character or quality of 
the goods, and not being a geographical name 11 • 33 
Before discussing the two new categories mentioned, it 
must be noted that pursuant to the Herschell Report, the 
Act of 1888 introduced the concept of specific 
disclaimer of all elements in a mark which did not fall 
within the 
sub-sections 
marks). 34 
categories 
(a) to (e} 
defined in section 64 ( 1) I 
(the categories of registrable 
31. THE REPORT, dated 16th March, 1888, of the DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE 
appointed by the Board of Trade on 24th February, 1887, "to enquire into the duties, 
organisation and arrangement of the Patent Office, under the Patents, Designs and 
Trade Marks Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Viet. c.57) so far as it relates to trade marks and 
designs." 
32. Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7 ed. 8. 
33. Seep 50 supra. 
34. Sees 64(2) p 49, 50 supra. 
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It must also be noted that the Herschell Report 
indicated that where it was doubtful whether a mark 
should be accepted or not, 
led to the introduction 
it should be rejected. 
of the concept of 
This 
the 
Registrar's discretion which in practice rendered the 
choice of new marks or registration of existing marks 
"often a matter of considerable uncertainty and 
trouble". 35 
The introduction of the category of "invented words" was 
not immediately successful for the courts remained 
hidebound to the earlier and limiting decisions relating 
to the concept of 'fancy words' introduced by the 
earlier enactment. Thus, for some years the courts 
showed a disposition to construe the new term 'invented 
word' in the light of the decisions upon 'fancy words'. 
It was held that the term 'invented word' was subject to 
the qualification expressly imposed by the legislature 
in sub-section (e) in the case of known words, namely, 
that an invented word should have no reference to the 
character or quality of the goods. Indeed, the courts 
went to great lengths in pursuit of some covert 
reference to character or quality in words which, to the 
ordinary purchaser, would convey no meaning. 36 
In sum, the strict approach followed by the courts was 
based upon the following: 
(a) it was held that in order to qualify for 
registration, a mark had to satisfy both clauses 
(d) and ( e) of section 64(1) of the Act, 
simultaneously; and 
(b) it was held that even a remote suggestion of some 
real or assumed characteristic of the goods would 
render the invented word non-registrable. 37 
35. See Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 9. 
36. See Sebastian Trade Marks 333. 
37. Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 9. 
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Eventually, the House of Lords placed the intended 
interpretation upon the innovations to section 64 under 
the 1888 Act, holding in the Solio case, 38 that clauses 
(d) and (e) of the new section 64 (1) were alternative 
and independent. Thus: 
(i) a truly coined word, whether or not it had some 
reference to or contained some suggestion of the 
goods, was still registrable; 
(ii) an existing word which had no reference to the 
goods could be an essential particular of a 
trade mark provided it was not objectionable for 
some other reason; 39 
(iii) the term, 
without 
'invented words', was to be construed 
reference to decisions relating to 
'fancy words' under the earlier enactment or 
with reference to any other part of the new Act; 
the only question to be determined was whether 
or not the word sought to be registered was an 
invented word. Such an invented word would be 
registrable because it would not deprive any 
member of the community of his right to use the 
existing vocabulary as he wished. There had, 
however, to be invention and not the appearance 
of invention, only. 40 
The Solio case enhanced the usefulness of the Register 
by enlarging the area from which new marks might be 
chosen and by admitting a large number of existing 
marks to the Register. The courts, however, still 
maintained a strict approach and did not easily 
conclude that a word was 'invented', despite the House 
of Lords' decision. 41 
38. Eastman Photographic Co.'s Appn. [18981 A.C. 571, R.P.C. 707. 
39. See Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 9 and Sebastian Trade Marks 41-42. 
40. Sebastian Trade Marks 333-334. 
41. Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 9. 
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As far as geographical names were concerned, a word 
would not be a geographical name merely because some 
place on the earth's surface has been called by it. To 
fall within the meaning of that term in the Act, a word 
would be regarded a geographical name - (a) if in its 
primary and obvious meaning it had reference to 
locality; (b) it had become recognised in the country 
as a geographical word, and (c) there existed a 
connection between the locality to which the word 
referred and the goods in question. 42 
8. OLD MARKS 
Marks which fell within one or more of the categories 
specifically mentioned in the Acts were registrable 
whether they had been used prior to 13 August 1875, or 
not. 
However, many valuable trade marks had been adopted and 
used before precise definition of the requirements for 
registrability had been formulated under the Acts. 
Numerous of these old trade marks did not fall within 
one of the categories formulated by the enactments and 
would, therefore, have been deprived of the benefits of 
the legislation without some special provision being 
enacted therein for their protection. Hence, the 
enactment of section 64(3) in the Act of 1883 and 
section 64(3) (ii) in the Act of 1888. 43 
Not any old mark could, however, qualify for 
registration despite use prior to 13 August 1875. Such 
old marks had to be special and distinctive and used as 
a trade mark to qualify for registration. 
The abovementioned sub-sections, therefore, introduced 
a further category of distinctive marks registrable 
under the Act in question. 
42. See Sebastian Trade Marks 43-44, 334. 
43. See p 49, 50-51 (supra) for the text of the sub-sections referred to. 
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It is interesting to note that the courts were far more 
lenient regarding the registrability of old marks than 
they were when deciding issues of registrability with 
regard to 'fancy words' . This was so much so that 
Sebastian was moved to write: 
In fact, in some of these cases the words have been so far descriptive as 
to cause a reasonable doubt whether the leniency shown was not 
. 44 
excessive. 
The principle, however, was clear - descriptiveness was 
fatal also to old marks from the point of view of 
registrability although otherwise than with fancy words, 
a mere suggestion or suspicion of descriptiveness would 
not lead to judicial invalidation for registration 
45 purposes. 
Finally, it is to be noted that old marks had to be 
registered as a whole and in the exact form in which 
46 they had been actually used. 
9. THE 1905 ACT 47 
This Act repealed almost all the existing statutory 
civil trade mark law only to re-enact much of it, albeit 
in improved form. It did, however, introduce many new 
provisions, as well. 
A definition of a trade mark was given for the first 
time - and defined thus by section 3 of the Act: 48 
44. Sebastian Trade Marks 48. 
45. Sebastian Trade Marks 49. This category of registrable marks are not to be confused 
with old marks which did not qualify for registration in terms of the registrability 
requirements of the Acts and in respect of which the Registrar could issue a certificate 
of refusal to register. 
46. See Sebastian Trade Marks 335-336. 
47. Trade Marks Act, 1905 (5 Edw. 7 c.15). 
48. Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 9. A very wide definition had earlier been given to "Trade 
Marks" in section 21 of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862. It was, however, too 
imprecise to be of value in practice outside of the Act. 
A trade mark shall mean a mark used or proposed to be used upon or 
in connection with goods for the purpose of indicating that they are the 
goods of the proprietor of such trade mark by virtue of manufacture, 
selection, certification, dealing with, or offering for sale. 
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To the familiar categories of marks which would have 
qualified for registration also under the earlier Acts 
(with slight modification) was added a new category of 
registrable marks falling under the umbrella of "any 
other distinctive marks". The categories of distinctive 
marks provided for in this Act as at the time of its 
ultimate repeal by the Trade Marks Act, 1938, were the 
following: 49 
9. A registrable trade mark must contain or consist of at least one 
of the following essential particulars: 
(1) the name of a company, individual or firm represented in a 
special or particular manner; 
(2) the signature of the applicant for registration or some 
predecessor in his business; 
(3) an invented word or invented words; 
(4) a word or words having no direct reference to the character or 
quality of the goods, and not being according to its ordinary 
signification a geographical name or a surname; 
(5) any other distinctive mark, but a name, signature, or word or 
words, other than such as fall within the descriptions in the 
49. The parts of the section repealed by the Trade Marks Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c.16) 
and the Trade Marks Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 79) are underlined whilst additions 
have been placed in square brackets. 
above paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4), shall not, except by 
order of the Board of Trade or the Court be deemed a 
distinctive mark [be registrable under the provisions of this 
paragraph, except upon evidence of its distinctiveness]. 
Provided always that any special or distinctive word or words. letter. 
numeral. or combination of letters or numerals used as a trade mark 
by the applicant or his predecessors in business before the thirteenth 
day of August one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five. which has 
continued to be used (either in its original form or with additions or 
alterations not substantially affecting the identity of the same) down to 
the date of the application for registration. shall be registrable as a 
trade mark under this Act. 
For the purposes of this section "distinctive" shall mean adaoted to 
distinguish the goods of the proprietor of the trade mark from those of 
other persons. 
In determining whether a trade mark is so adapted. the tribunal may. 
in the case of a trade mark in actual use. take into consideration the 
extent to which such user has rendered such trade mark in fact 
distinctive for the goods with respect to which it is registered or 
proposed to be registered. 
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Further innovations introduced by section 9 are worth 
noting. It will be seen that the "old marks" category 
now allowed the registration of additions or alterations 
thereto not substantially affecting their identity. The 
term "distinctive" is given a definition for the 
purposes of the section; and for the first time the 
extent of actual use of the mark could be considered as 
having rendered it de facto distinctive and therefore 
registrable in the sense that it had become adapted to 
distinguish as contemplated by the definition 
f .d 50 a oresai . 
50. As will be indicated in chapter 17, under the new legislation both in the United 
Kingdom and in South Africa, de facto is now also de iure distinctiveness. 
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Marks became vulnerable to removal from the Register for 
the first time on the basis of the want of a bona fide 
intention to use the mark which was required to be 
present at the time of the application (provided it had 
not been subsequently saved by actual bona fide use) , as 
well as on the basis of non-use for a continuous period 
f f . f . . 51 o ive years a ter registration. 
The Act of 1905 brought an end to trade mark licensing. 
At that time, section 87 of the 1883 Act acknowledged the 
right of the proprietor of a trade mark to grant licences 
for its use (subject to the provisions of that Act and 
the rights of other proprietors) . The Courts, however, 
with reference to section 22 of the 1905 Act, which 
authorised assignment of the marks only with the goodwill 
of the business concerned in the goods for which the mark 
had been registered, subsequently held that the licensing 
of a trade mark would render it expungeable because it 
could obscure whether the mark was connected in trade with 
51. Section 37 was the relevant section and provided: "A registered trade mark may, on the 
application to the Court of any person aggrieved, be taken off the Register in respect of 
any of the goods for which it is registered, on the ground that it was registered by the 
proprietor or a predecessor in title without any bona fide intention to use the same in 
connection with such goods, and there has in fact been no bona fide use of the same in 
connection therewith, or on the ground that there has been no bona fide use of such 
trade mark in connection with such goods during the five years immediately preceding 
the application, unless in either cases such non-use is shown to be due to special 
circumstances in the trade, and not to any intention not to use or to abandon such trade 
mark in respect of such goods." 
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. . d . . h h l' 52 its registere proprietor or wit t e icensee. 
10. THE TRADE MARKS ACT, 1919 
The Trade Marks Act, 1919, came into force on 1 April 
1920. It amended a number of sections of the 1905 Act. 
The principal change was the introduction of a new part 
of the Register, Part B, in which a weaker registration 
could be obtained than was the case in respect of 
registrations already present in the old part of the 
Register (Part A) or which were subsequently obtained 
in Part A - in that a Part B registration always remained 
primafacie evidence only of the owner's exclusive rights to 
the trade mark under the Act. In order to qualify for 
Part B registration, a mark had to have been used bona fide 
as a trade mark for a two-year period prior to the 
application for its registration as contemplated by the 
. . d. f p . . . 2 53 section provi ing or art B registrations, section . 
52. See Cornish Intellectual Property 396. He states with reference to the attitude of the 
courts in this regard: "They would not consider the registered right as a discreet part of 
the trader's property which might be dealt with by him without reference to the public's 
understanding of its meaning." Of the right to licence under section 87 of the 1883 
Act, Sebastian Trade Marks states at 336: "The power of granting licences must not be 
exercised so as to deceive the public, eg. so as to authorise the use of the mark on 
inferior goods. The power of granting licences at all seems, in the case of trade marks, 
rather to conflict with section 70; the intention of which appears to be that only the 
person entitled to the goodwill shall have the right of using the trade mark." 
Subsequent amending Acts, up to and including the 1 888 Act, left the absolute right to 
grant licences, subject to the provisions of that Act, intact. The question whether a 
trade mark can be regarded as discrete property detached from goodwill is a central 
topic of this work discussed in chapters 8, 11 and 17. 
53. Section 2(1) provided: "Where any mark has for not less than two years been bona fide 
used in the United Kingdom upon or in connection with any goods (whether for sale in 
the United Kingdom or exportation abroad), for the purpose of indicating that they are 
the goods of the proprietor of the mark by virtue of manufacture, selection, certification, 
dealing with or offering for sale, the person claiming to be the proprietor of the mark 
may apply in writing to the Registrar in the prescribed manner to have the mark entered 
as his registered trade mark in Part B of the register in respect of such goods". 
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11. REGISTRATION AND THE INFRINGEMENT ACTION 
Under the earlier Acts, registration of the trade mark 
was deemed to be equivalent to public use of the trade 
mark. 54 An equivalent provision did not feature in 
either of the 1905 and 1919 Acts. 
Also, under the earlier Acts, as well as the 1905 Act, a 
failure to obtain registration or a certificate of 
refusal to register from the Registrar was fatal to the 
owner's infringement action which was not available 
without registration or a Registrar's certificate of 
refusal. 55 
According to Cornish it had not for a time been clear 
whether registrable, albeit unregistered marks, were 
protectable only through legislation. Protection was, as 
we have, however, seen, afforded at both common law and 
equity in passing off situations where the act of passing 
off comprised an imitation of a mark that might have been 
registered. Thus, the method of protection was 
cumulative and not alternative56 and section 45 of the 
Act of 1905 enacted this specifically. 57 
The advent of trade mark legislation led to a change in 
terminology: the expression "infringement" being 
thereafter generally reserved for the statutory action 
whilst "passing off" was applied to non-statutory actions 
whether or not they involved a trade mark. 58 
54. Section 1 of the Act of 1875, section 75 of the Act of 1883, as amended. 
55. Section 1 of the Act of 1875, section 77 of the Act of 1883, and section 42 of the Act 
of 1905. 
56. See Cornish Intellectual Property 396. 
57. See section 45 of the Act of 1905 which provided: "Nothing in this Act contained shall 
be deemed to affect rights of action against any person for passing-off goods as those 
of another person or the remedy in respect thereof". 
58. Shanahan Trade Mark Law 4. 
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Registration provided prima facie evidence of the right of 
the registered proprietor to the exclusive use of the 
trade mark and, subject to the provisions of the Acts, 
the right became conclusive after five years of 
. . 
59 h . d d d registration. T e perio was exten e to seven years 
under the Act of 190s. 60 
It must be noted throughout that trade marks registered 
under the Acts remained inextricably linked to specific 
goods or classes of goods and did not afford the 
proprietors thereof an infringement action against all 
users in trade but only in respect of use in relation to 
the same goods. 61 
12. EARLY LEGISLATION IN THE U.S.A. 
12.1 The Acts of 1870 and 1881 
The first Federal trade mark registration statute was 
passed by Congress in 1870. 62 The Act had a short 
lifespan for in 1879 the United States Supreme Court held 
the Act unconstitutional. 63 The Court decided that the 
power to regulate trade marks probably resorted under the 
Commerce Power which was "to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations and among the several states, and with the 
59. Section 3 of the Act of 1875, section 76 of the Act of 1883 and see section 40 of the 
Act of 1905. 
60. Section 4 1 . 
61. See section 2 of the Act of 1875 which provided that "a trade mark must be registered 
as belonging to particular goods, or classes of goods"; section 65 of the Act of 1883 
and section 8 of the Act of 1905 both provided: "a trade mark must be registered for 
particular goods or classes of goods". The extent to which this fundamental early 
concept of trade mark law can be put aside is a central question to the debate relating to 
the concept of trade mark dilution discussed in chapters 14 and 1 7. 
62. "An Act to revise, consolidate and amend the statutes relating to patents and 
copyrights", Act of July 8, 1870, ch 2, Acts 77-84, Stat. 198; New York had already 
passed a statute "to prevent fraud in the use of false stamps and labels" and eleven 
similar state statutes had been passed by 1870. The California registration statute was 
enacted in 1863: See Pattishall 68 TMR 121-147 (1978) 126, 129. 
63. In the Trade Mark Cases (1879) 100 US 82, 25 Led. 550. 
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Indian Tribes" . As the Act purported to deal with trade 
mark matters under the patent and copyright clause of the 
Constitution to which trade marks had no reference, it 
was held that Congress had unconstitutionally exceeded 
. d h 'd 64 its powers an t e Act was set asi e. 
It is interesting to note that also in the U.S.A., the 
primary reason for the enactment of the first trade mark 
legislation was not so much the protection of traders at 
home but in order to obtain the advantages of reciprocal 
statutes abroad and proposed treaties with countries such 
1 . . d G . . 65 as Be gium, France, Russia an reat Britain. 
The 1870 Act provided a common law action for damages and 
injunctive relief in a court of competent jurisdiction in 
respect of an infringement comprising unlawful 
reproduction, copying, counterfeiting or imitation of a 
trade mark recorded under the Act and affixed to goods of 
the same kind as those referred to in the registration. 66 
64. See McCarthy Trade Marks and Unfair Competition 135-136, and Pattishall 130-131, 
regarding the Trade Mark Cases. 
65. Schechter Historical Foundations 140. 
66. See the Act of July 8, 1870 16 Stat. at L 198, section 79: "And be it further enacted, 
that any person or corporation who shall reproduce, copy, counterfeit, or imitate any 
such recorded trade mark, and affix the same to goods of substantially the same 
description, properties and qualities as those referred to in the registration, shall be liable 
to an action on the case for damages for such unlawful use of such trade mark at the 
suit of the owner thereof in any Court of competent jurisdiction in the United States, and 
the party aggrieved shall have his remedy according to the course of equity to enjoin the 
wrongful use of his trade mark, and to recover compensation therefor in any Court 
having jurisdiction over the person guilty of such wrongful use. The Commissioner of 
Patents shall not receive and record any proposed trade mark which is not and cannot 
become a lawful trade mark, or which is merely the name of a person, firm or 
corporation only, unaccompanied by a mark sufficient to distinguish it from the same 
name where used by other persons, or which is identical with a trade mark appropriated 
to the same class of merchandise and belonging to a different owner and already 
registered or received for registration, or which so nearly resembles such last-mentioned 
trade mark as to be likely to deceive the public: Provided that this 
66 
The Act did not provide criteria according to which marks 
were to be adjudged registrable or define categories of 
registrable marks. Persons claiming an entitlement to 
the exclusive use of a trade mark or intending to adopt 
and use it exclusively, could apply for its 
. . 67 
registration. 
In 1881, a new statute providing for registration of 
trade marks to be used in commerce with foreign nations 
and the Indian tribes was enacted without in any way 
providing for marks used in interstate commerce. 
According to McCarthy, as a result, American business 
chafed under the totally inadequate provisions of the 
1881 Act for twenty-four years. 68 
The remedies afforded against infringement under the 1881 
Act were the same as those provided by the Act of 1870, 
but the criminal sanction fell away. 69 
Under both enactments, registration was to endure for 
thirty years. Under the 1870 Act, the registrant was 
entitled to exclusive use of the registered mark, whilst 
under the 1881 Act, registration merely afforded prima facie 
'd f h' 70 evi ence o owners ip. 
66. (cont) section shall not prevent the registry of any lawful trade mark rightfully used at 
the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was amended in 1876 to provide criminal 
sanctions for counterfeiting of trade marks and the sale or dealing in counterfeit 
trade-marked goods. See McClure 315. No criminal sanction has appeared in any 
subsequent federal trade mark legislation. See Pattishall 130. 
67. See Pattishall 130. 
68. See McCarthy Trade Marks and Unfair Competition 136-137; According to Pattishall 
1 34 the framers of the 1 881 Act, no doubt over-reacting to the Supreme Court's 
decision in the Trade-Mark Cases two years earlier, strictly confined the Act's scope to 
marks used in commerce with foreign nations and the Indian tribes; The Act was 
entitled: An Act to authorise registration of trade marks and protect the same, March 3 
1881, ch 138, 21 Stat. 502. The Act was again not based on the commerce clause. 
69. See section 7 of the Act of 1870. 
70. Section 78 of the Act of 1870 and section 7 of the Act of 1881. 
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A mark which so nearly resembled some other person's 
lawful trade mark as to be likely to cause confusion or 
mistake in the minds of the public, or to deceive 
purchasers, were denied registration. Any lawful trade 
mark rightfully used at the time of the enactment of the 
amending Act of 1882 was not, however, in terms of the 
d . A b d . d . . 71 amen ing ct, to e en1e reg1strat1on. 
12.2 The Act of 1905 
Eventually, in 1905, Congress enacted the Trade-Mark Act 
1905 72 which provided machinery for the registration and 
protection of trade marks in inter-state commerce. The 
Act did not create substantive rights and expressly 
provided in section 23 that common law rights were to be 
left unaffected. Protection was afforded against use of 
marks in respect of goods with the 'same descriptive 
properties'. For the most part, registrability followed 
the common law doctrines discussed immediately below. 73 
The common law at the time of the 1905 Act was briefly 
this: two different suits 
different standards of proof. 
were available involving 
Technical trade marks were 
afforded absolute protection by the trade mark 
infringement action for the success of which the 
plaintiff had merely to show a taking of the trade mark 
without having to prove actual confusion or fraudulent 
intent on the part of the taker. Non-technical marks 
were afforded protection by the passing-off or unfair 
competition action in which the plaintiff had to prove 
actual deception of purchasers, fraudulent intent on the 
part of the defendant, and secondary meaning. In order 
to prove secondary meaning it had to be shown that the 
mark had become distinctive through long use and had 
become associated in the public mind with the goods of 
the plaintiff . 74 
71. The amending Act was named: An Act relating to the registration of trade marks, 
August 5, 1882, ch 393, 22 Stat. 298. See Pattishall 134. 
72. The Trade Mark Act of 1905, ch 592, 33 Stat. 724. 
73. See McCarthy Trade Marks and Unfair Competition 137; McClure 316, 324. 
74. McCarthy Trade Marks and Unfair Competition 117-121. 
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The expression 'technical trade mark' was a term of art 
at the time and referred to trade marks which could be 
said to have one or more of the following properties, 
namely, that of being fanciful, invented, arbitrary, 
distinctive, or non-descriptive. McClure, 
consequently, states that the basis of protection of 
trade marks was at that time determined by etymology. 75 
The marks which were protected by the law of unfair 
competition, once they had attained a secondary meaning, 
were termed 'trade names' and included marks which were 
descriptive, geographical, and personal names. "Trade 
name", therefore, was a generic term of art used to 
indicate marks of a category which required proof of 
secondary meaning to obtain legal protection under the 
1 f f . . . 76 aw o un air compet1t1on. 
Thus, under the Act of 1905, only technical common-law 
trade marks could be registered and registration of 
geographical terms, descriptive marks, personal names and 
names of individuals, firms or corporations was enjoined 
- unless the mark had been in actual and exclusive use by 
the applicant upon his goods for a ten-year period 
77 preceding 20 February 1905 (the 10-year clause) . 
Registration of marks which would be likely to cause 
confusion with reference to prior use or registered marks 
h 'b' d 78 was pro 1 1te . 
With the passage of time an additional category of marks, 
'suggestive marks' , were held to be registrable by the 
Courts under the Act of 1905. We have seen that the Act 
refused registration to descriptive marks regardless of 
proof of secondary meaning. When faced with marks which 
75. McClure 316; and see McCarthy Trade Marks and Unfair Competition 118-119. 
76. McCarthy Trade Marks and Unfair Competition 119-121 . 
77. McCarthy Trade Marks and Unfair Competition 1 37. 
78. See Pattishall 135. 
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skillfully alluded to the goods in a subtly descriptive 
way marks in the grey area between arbitrary and 
descriptive the courts labelled them suggestive and 
allowed them registration (in effect giving them the 
benefit of the doubt) . 79 
Registration under the Act of 1905 offered prima facie 
evidence of ownership of the mark only, and the 
registrant's entitlement could, therefore, be rebutted. 80 
Infringement remained couched in terms of counterfeits, 
copies and imitations when applied to goods of the same 
descriptive qualities and only marks used in inter-state 
ld . f . 81 commerce cou in r1nge. 
McCarthy observes, in sum, that the numerous amendments 
led to the Act taking on the guise of a 'crazy quilt of 
modifications and amendments' which was never able to 
cope with the demands of 20th Century commerce. 82 
13. IN SUM 
The first trade mark registration came about through 
diverse causes: the onerous and expensive nature of the 
passing-off action in cases of trade mark imitation, the 
failure of the law to control the adulteration of 
commodities, the prevalence of the false marking of goods 
and, ultimately, the advantages of international 
arrangements which a trade mark registration system could 
provide. 
79. McCarthy Trade Marks and Unfair Competition 488-489; An amendment to the 1905 
Act during 1 920 came to allow registration of non-technical marks which were not, 
however, regarded under the Act as providing prima facie evidence of the registrant's 
rights thereto: See McCarthy, supra 138, footnote 13; Registration under the 1920 
Act provided little benefit other than access to the Federal Courts and the right to 
display notice of registration with the mark: See Pattishall 136; The 1905 Act was 
amended or supplemented sixteen times up to 1938: See Pattishall 138, footnote 78. 
80. McCarthy Trade Marks and Unfair Competition 138. 
81 . See Pattishall 1 35. 
82. McCarthy Trade Marks and Unfair Competition 138. 
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At first, a criminal sanction approach was adapted under 
the Merchandise Marks Act of 1862. Criminal sanctions 
were, however, more suited to addressing the false 
marking of goods problem than to affording complainants 
relief in passing-off situations involving trade marks. 
When the first trade mark registration Act was introduced 
during 1875 the equity view that trade mark infringement 
was an infringement of property underpinned the Act. The 
idea that registration created a right of property 
underpinned also the subsequent enactments. This 
property right was, however, of uncertain definition and 
subject to an important limitation - its protection was 
confined to use of the mark in respect of the goods or 
class of goods for which registration had been obtained. 
Registration was, at first, regarded as equivalent to 
public use of the mark and afforded prima fade evidence of 
the right of the registrant to use the mark exclusively. 
After five years (seven years from the 1905 Act onwards), 
registration afforded conclusive evidence of the 
registrant's exclusive rights, subject to the provisions 
of the applicable Act. 
Special exceptions regarding certain old marks aside, no 
infringement action was afforded to non-registered marks 
and relief under the Acts and at common law was 
cumulative. 
In equity at the time of the enactment of the first Act, 
adoption and use of a distinctive mark on vendable goods 
in the market-place created property in the mark. The 
first trade mark Acts re-inforced the judicial concept 
that distinctive marks achieved the status of property 
through use and the concept of distinctiveness was 
entrenched by the enactments as a corner-stone of trade 
mark law. For a mark to be registrable - to be afforded 
the status of property it had to be distinctive. 
Despite the expanded range of registrable marks 
introduced by subsequent Acts, such as fancy words, 
invented words, old 
categories, the true 
that of distinctiveness. 
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distinctive marks and later 
test of registrability remained 
Considerations of international reciprocity was also a 
primary reason for early trade mark legislation in the 
U.S.A. . Early legislation in the United States did not 
feature the detail of concurrent trade mark legislation 
in the United Kingdom. 
No subs tan ti ve rights were enacted and the law as to 
registrability and infringement was largely a 
re-enactment of the common law. 
The American legislation did not provide criteria for 
judging the registrability of marks or define categories 
of registrable marks. Nevertheless, only technical trade 
marks (which were distinctive per se) and, later, marks 
which were de facto distinctive, qualified for 
registration. Thus, registrability 
distinctiveness in the United States, also. 
turned on 
Although the initial legislation entitled a registrant to 
exclusive use of the registered mark for a thirty-year 
period, registration under subsequent enactments provided 
primafacie evidence of ownership, only. 
On the whole, the early legislative enactments, 
culminating in the Trade Mark Act of 1905, failed 
substantially to meet the demands and needs of commerce 
and the United States national market. 
The shortcomings 
however, result 
of the early American enactments did, 
in the parallel common law unfair 
competition trade mark action which was developed by 
the courts - having a far more significant role to play 
in the trade mark law of the United States than was the 
case in England where the common law action was to become 
secondary to the trade mark infringement action of the 
trade mark Acts. 
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CHAPTER4 
TRADE MARKS AS PROPERTY: THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY 
1 . 
2. 
3. 
This chapter considers judicial attitudes towards the 
concept of "property" in early twentieth century 
Anglo-American trade mark law, and concludes the first 
part of this work. 
English law on the question was settled by then: 
registration afforded the registrant a registered right 
of property whilst at common law, as we shall see, the 
House of Lords had held that outside of registration 
there was no property in a trade mark perse. 
American law appears to have been less certain concerning 
the matter. I have by way of illustration, highlighted 
the views of two American researchers regarding the 
topic, namely, Frank I Schechter and Daniel M McClure. 
Schechter•s1 views were expressed more or less 
1 contemporaneously with the two landmark cases which I 
shall discuss whilst McClure' s 2 historical study has the 
benefit of hindsight. 
Sebastian3 , in his work on English trade mark law 
published during 1899, states that the right afforded by 
a trade mark registration under the trade mark Acts of 
1875, and 1883-1888, was a right of property. The person 
Frank I Schechter is an important figure in the history of US trade mark law. His primary 
research - especially regarding medieval marks - for his doctoral thesis The Historical 
Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade Marks, New York, 1925, has not been 
surpassed in the U.S.A.. Schechter is also regarded as the father of the dilution doctrine 
and his article - The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection 40 Harvard Law Review 813 
- is seen as seminal thereto. See also p 439-444 infra regarding Schechter. 
Daniel M McClure's scholarly article - Trade Mark and Unfair Competition: A Critical 
History of Legal Thought 69 TMR 305-356 (1979) earned him the Stephen P.Ladas 
Memorial Award for 1978. 
See Sebastian Trade Marks 170. 
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entitled to the mark was, in terms of this legislation, 
the proprietor of the mark entitled to its exclusive use. 
Although his rights were "less unlimited" than those of 
owners of other kinds of property in the sense that 
trade marks could be transferred only in connection with 
the goodwill of the business in the goods in respect of 
which the mark was registered the proprietor was 
otherwise entitled to deal with his mark as he chose, 
subject to the provisions of the Act. 4 
Schechter points out that early twentieth century text 
writers on equity and tort regarded trade mark 
infringement as the violation of a property right of one 
kind or another: a property right of an indefinite kind. 5 
The courts, on the other hand, whilst seeking to protect 
trade marks, were at the same time largely disinclined to 
base relief upon a theory of property protection even 
though they were not able to discover a sound alternative 
ground for relief. 
A review of the cases from Sykes v Sykes6 to Addley 
Bourne7 revealed, in Schechter•s view, that at common law 
the trade mark infringement action was founded in deceit 
and proof of fraud by the defendant was the essence. 
Equity set out to protect the plaintiff's exclusive use 
of the mark irrespective of fraud and acted on the 
principle of protecting property. The nature of the 
property concerned was not, however, defined. (In this 
regard Schechter refers specifically to Edelstein•s 
case
8 
and the Leather Cloth case. 9) Nevertheless, 
4. This remained the theoretical position under the Trade Marks Act, 1938. See Drysdale 
and Silverleaf Passing Off 3 and p 219-220 infra. 
5. Schechter Historical Foundations 1 51 . 
6. See p 23-25 supra. 
7. Seep 31 footnote 32 supra. 
8. See p 25 footnote 20 supra. 
9. See p 29-31 supra. 
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certain English judges, including equity judges, held 
that there is no property in a trade mark (referring to 
Reddeway v Banham10 and the other English cases referred 
to in Hanover Star Milling Co. v Metcalt 11 ) . 12 
Ref erring to Anglo-American 
Schechter concluded that the 
trade mark law in general, 
courts were faced with a 
dilemma: on the one hand,' judges were anxious to protect 
trade marks because trade mark piracy was regarded 
repugnant to the judicial conscience. On the other hand, 
the courts had to feel their way towards some legal 
theory of trade mark protection which avoided the 
necessity of having to invoke the only basis of equitable 
protection to which they had at one time become 
accustomed to resort, namely, 
. h 13 h h property rig t. W y t e courts 
the protection of a 
should have tried to 
avoid regarding trade marks as property is not clear from 
Schechter•s discussion. It appears, however, that it was 
the spectre of allowing a monopoly which led to 
resistance. 
According to McClure, the idea of trade marks as property 
developed slowly in the United States. Despite that the 
Supreme Court had held in the Trade Mark Cases 14 that the 
right to a trade mark was a property right, American 
courts showed an early and strong disinclination to base 
relief in trade mark cases upon a theory of property: 
The reluctance of courts to recognise a property right in trademarks 
stemmed from the feeling that to do so would give a monopoly in 
10. See p 32-33 supra. 
11. See 81-83 infra. 
12. See Schechter Historical Foundations 152-153. The investigation of the early cases in 
chapter 2 confirms Schechter's conclusions. See p 38 supra. 
13. See Schechter Historical Foundations 60. In the U.S.A. this dilemma is still present and 
is as apparent today as it was at the time of Schechter's writing, 1925: See Chapter 14. 
14. See footnote 63 p 64 supra. 
language to private individuals, thus depriving competitors of the use of 
the word. The English vocabulary was said to be "the common property 
of mankind, in which all have an equal share and character of interest. 
From these fountains whosoever will may drink, but an exclusive right 
to do so cannot be acquired by any ". It was believed that to give a 
monopoly in language would lead to a monopoly in production. 1 5 
75 
During the late 19th Century, however, with the rise in 
legal formalism, 'property' was conceived as conferring 
an exclusive right which was good against the whole 
world. When trade marks came to be regarded as property 
during this time, the trade mark owner was seen to be 
endowed with all the natural rights to which any other 
property holder was entitled. Thus, says McClure, fraud 
in technical trade mark infringement cases fell away for 
if a man had an absolute right to use a mark, innocent 
infringement had also to be forbidden. 16 
The researches of Schechter revealed that in a long line 
of early decisions in state courts prior to the Supreme 
Court decision, in the Trade Mark Cases, 17 it had been 
held that there was property in trade marks which was 
protectable at common law without reference to statute. 18 
However, when judicial scrutiny of trade marks moved from 
constitutional questions to tort, caution set in and 
trade marks became appurtenant to an existing business 
goodwill. 19 
In Schechter' s view, the primary difficulties faced by 
the courts and text writers were not so much as to the 
nature of trade marks but as to the nature of trade mark 
15. See McClure 314-315. But see also p 533-534 infra. 
16. McClure 317-318. See also p 384 infra regarding formalism in US trade mark 
jurisprudence. 
17. P 64 supra. 
18. Schechter Historical Foundations 153-154. 
19. Schechter Historical Foundations 154-155, referring especially to Hanover Star Milling 
Co. v Metcalf 240 U.S. 403 (1918) discussed at p 81-83 infra. 
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rights and the proper basis for their protection. The 
principal obstruction had been whether or not trade marks 
. h 20 were "property rig ts": 
This uncertainty, it will be recalled, was very noticeable in the 
deliberations of both the British Parliament and the Congress of the 
United States concerning legislation providing for trade-mark 
registration, and while a great deal of law has been made in the last 
half century and much commentary has been written in recent years 
upon that law, there still appears to be much confusion on the point. 21 
Schechter poses two problems which are central also to 
the address of this thesis: 
Two problems of trade-mark law and of the law of unfair competition, 
which has been developed largely by analogies to the law involving 
cases of technical trade-marks, perplex the minds of both British and 
American courts, and conflicting theories with regard to these problems 
are materially affecting the decisions of these courts in cases that are 
constantly being presented to them. In the first place, in both British 
and American courts, the very nature of the right in a trade-mark is still 
unfixed. 
In the second place, aside from the determination of the somewhat 
metaphysical question as to the exact nature of a right in a trade-mark 
and of injury to trade marks, there is the very practical consideration as 
to the basis of relief in trade-mark cases and, more particularly, in 
cases of unfair competition. 
20. As will be seen (p 511-51 2, 51 3-51 8 infra) the common law does not know the 
doctrine of subjective rights and the courts of Schechter' s time could not, therefore, see 
trade marks as the object of such a right as I will suggest they should be regarded in our 
law. 
21 . See Schechter Historical Foundations 1 50-1 51 . I have already observed that British 
trade mark legislation accepted the property approach of equity from the start and even 
today registration is seen as conferring a right of property and exclusive use: see 
p 607-608, infra. It is certainly so, however, that this "property right" only obtained a 
definition in the 1994 UK Act (see p 607 infra). In the common law the "property" 
concerned has found gestalt in the concept of goodwill in the business of the mark. See 
par. 4 Chapter 8 p 170-187, infra; Chapter 9 and p 608-609 infra. 
In England and, to a much greater degree, in this country courts are 
endeavouring to reach a conclusion as to whether, in such cases, the 
true basis of relief is the deception of the public or whether, on the 
other hand, it is the injury to the owner of the trade mark involved. 22 
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It is certainly so that in England, the tort of 
passing-off - of which the trade mark infringement action 
was regarded as the most important example was and 
still is founded in a misrepresentation of fact, like the 
tort of deceit. The misrepresentation, although directed 
at the public (who stand to be deceived) is actionable at 
the suit of the person whose business is injured by the 
misrepresentation and not at the instance of the deceived 
- as is the case with the tort of deceit. 23 
1. THE CONFLUENCE OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CASE LAW REGARDING 
PROPERTY IN TRADE MARKS 
In two major cases, the one decided in the House of Lords 
and the other by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
it was determined in 1915 and in 1916, respectively, that 
the species of property protected by the trade mark 
infringement action is not to be found in the mark, name, 
or get-up taken by the defendant but in the business or 
goodwill likely to be injured by the defendant's taking. 24 
It is clear that even though his work was published a 
decade or so after these decisions, Schechter did not 
then entirely foresee the lasting imprint which the 
English case, especially, was to have upon the law. 
1.1 Spalding v Gamage25 
The speech of Lord Parker26 in this case has had a 
22. Schechter Historical Foundations 4-5. 
23. See Drysdale and Silverleaf Passing Off 9; see also the words of Lord Parker in Spalding 
v Gamage discussed below. 
24. Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 391-392; Shanahan Trade Marks 3. 
25. AG Spalding v AW Gamage Ltd (1915) R.P.C. 274(HL). 
26. Lord Parker of Waddington p 283 - 288 of the report. 
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lasting effect upon the English law of passing-off and 
trade marks. His dictum as to the nature of the property 
involved in trade mark cases is of particular relevance 
to this enquiry. The case was one of passing-off. In 
this regard it must be borne in mind that the common law 
trade mark infringement action is a species of 
passing-off and passing-off provides the context of the 
discussion. 
The principle underlying passing-off, confirmed Lord 
Parker, was that nobody has the right to represent his 
goods as the goods of somebody else. This, he observed, 
is also sometimes stated in the proposition that nobody 
has the right to pass-off his goods as the goods of 
somebody else. Lord Parker pref erred the first 
formulation because it had long been settled, in his 
judgment, that actual passing-off of a defendant's goods 
for the plaintiff's need not be proved as a condition 
precedent for relief in equity. For equitable relief it 
was enough for the representation to lead to or give rise 
to a probability that damage would ensue. Equity treated 
the representation as the invasion of a right. 
. d 27 not require . 
Fraud was 
A different view had, however, been taken at common law 
for it was said that the plaintiff's common law remedy 
was in the nature of an action for deceit. According to 
Lord Parker, the passing-off action only resembled the 
action for deceit in that the misrepresentation relied 
upon had to have been fraudulently made. It differed, he 
said, from an action for deceit in all other respects. 28 
In Blof ield v Payne29 the action had been treated as one 
founded on the invasion of a right. Thus, the principle 
underlying the passing-off action ought possibly to be 
re-stated as follows: 
27. Seep 283 of the report. 
28 See p 283 of the report. 
29. Blofield v Payne (1833) 4 B. Ad. 410. See p 25 supra. 
A cannot, without infringing the rights of B, represent goods which are 
not B's goods or B's goods of a particular class or quality to be B's 
goods or B's goods of that particular class or quality. The wrong for 
which relief is sought in a passing-off action consists in every case of a 
representation of this nature. 30 
79 
Lord Parker proceeded to examine the nature of the right 
which was invaded in passing-off actions. There was, he 
observed, a considerable diversity of opinion regarding 
the nature of the right. The more general opinion was 
that the right was a right of property. This, he said, 
demanded an answer to the question: property in what? 
Some authorities had held that the property was in the 
mark, name, or get-up improperly used by the defendant. 
Others held the view that it was property in the 
business or goodwill which was likely to be injured by 
h . . 31 d k . . f h t e misrepresentation. In Lor Par er's view, i t e 
right invaded was a right of property at all, there were 
strong reasons for preferring the latter view. These 
were the following: 
(a) the cases of misrepresentation through the use of a 
mark, name, or get-up did not exhaust all possible 
cases of misrepresentation giving rise to a 
passing-off action; 
30. See p 284 of the report. The basis of the passing-off action was, therefore, a false 
representation by the defendant which had to be proved as a fact in each case. The 
representation could be express of implied. Lord Parker went on to say: "The more 
common case is, where the representation is implied in the use or imitation of a mark, 
trade name, or get-up with which the goods of another are associated in the minds of 
the public, or of a particular class of the public. In such cases the point to be decided is 
whether, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the use by the defendant, 
in connection with the goods of the mark, name, or get-up in question impliedly 
represents such goods to be the goods of the plaintiff, or the goods of the plaintiff of a 
particular class or quality, or, as it is sometimes put, whether the defendant's use of 
such mark, name, or get-up is calculated to deceive. It would, however, be impossible 
to enumerate or classify all the possible ways in which a man may make the false 
representation relied on." 
31 . See p 284 of the report. 
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(b) as the facts in Reddeway v Banham ( [1870] A.C. 199) 
Lord 
case 
the 
was 
h d '11 32 . . ' ' a i ustrated, a misrepresentation involving 
descriptive words which the court had found every 
trader could use - except if his use was calculated 
to deceive might well afford a passing-off 
action. Yet, it was extremely difficult to see how 
a man could be said to have property in descriptive 
words. Even in the case of common law trade marks 
the property, if any, was by its very nature 
transitory, for it only existed for so long as the 
mark was distinctive of the goods of the so-called 
owner in the market place. Indeed, the essential 
need of proving distinctiveness in every case was 
one of the evils sought to be remedied by the Trade 
Marks Act, 1875 which, said Lord Parker, conferred a 
real right of property on the owner of a registered 
mark. 33 
Parker then confirmed his conclusion in the earlier 
of Burberry's Cording, 34 where he had held that v 
property which was to be protected by an injunction 
not property in the word or name concerned, but 
property in the trade or goodwill which would be injured 
by its unlawful use. 35 
The few words of Lord Parker in Spalding v Gamage were 
seen as the final blow to the doctrine in English Law 
that there is property in a trade mark itself. When the 
earlier acts were passed the prevalent view was that 
trade mark cases were a species of the genus of 
passing-off cases distinguishable by virtue of the fact 
that there was "property" in the trade mark which its 
32. The House of Lords had restrained use of the words "Camel-hair Belting" in respect of 
belting in circumstances where the successful appellant had established the words as a 
mark for belting of his manufacture made of yarn derived chiefly from camel hair. 
33. See p 284 - 285 of the report. 
34. [1878] A.C. 199. 
35. See p 285 of the report. 
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imitation would infringe. The reasoning in Spalding v 
Gamage sought to show that this distinction could not be 
borne out by logic. Therefore, the case established that 
except in relation to the rights which flowed from a 
valid trade mark registration under the trade mark Acts, 
the "property" involved in trade mark matters is to be 
found in the goodwill of the business concerned and it is 
pursuant to real or potential damage thereto that the law 
grants relief in passing-off cases. The fact that a 
trade mark provides a means for identifying the goods of 
the owner of a business and functions as a means of 
bringing custom to the business merely establishes the 
mark as an element of the goodwill of that business and 
not as property, perse. 36 
1.2 Hanover Star Milling Co. v Metca!f 7 
In this case Mr Justice Pitney delivered a 
contemporaneous and counterpart United States judgment to 
Spalding v Gamage. 
The Judge held that the essence of the wrong of trade 
mark infringement in the United States comprised the 
sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor for those 
of another. This essential element was the same both in 
trade mark cases and in cases of unfair competition which 
were unaccompanied by trade mark infringement. The 
common law of trade marks was but a part of the broader 
1 f f . . . 38 aw o un air competition. 
Regarding property in a trade mark Pitney J held: 
Common-law trademarks, and the right to their exclusive use, are of 
course to be classified amongst property rights, Trade-Mark 
36. See Lloyd and Bray Kerly 7th ed. 392; GE Trade Mark [19731 R.P.C. 297, 325-326. 
37. Hanover Star Milling Co. v Metcalf 240 US 403 (1916). 
38. See p 413 of the report. 
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92, 93 25 L ed. 550,551]; but only in the sense that 
a man's right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the 
good will that flows from it, free from unwarranted inteiference by 
others, is a property right, for the protection of which a trade mark is an 
instrumentality. As was said in the same case (p.94), the right grows out 
of use, not mere adoption. In the English courts it often has been said 
that there is no property whatever in a trade mark, as such. Per Ld . 
Langdale, M.R., in Perry v Truefitt 6 Beav. 73; per 
Vice Chancellor Sir Wm Page Wood (afterwards Ld. 
Hatherly), in Collins Co. v Brown, 3 Kay & J. 423, 
426, 3 Jur. N.S. 930 5 Week. Rep. 676; per Ld. 
Herschell in Reddeway v Banham A. C. 1896, 199, 209, 
65 L.J.O.B.N.S. 381, 74 L.T.N.S. 289, 44 Week. 
Rep. 638, 25 Eng. Rul. Cas. 193. But since in the same 
cases the courts recognised the right of the party to the exclusive use of 
marks adopted to indicate goods of his manufacture, upon the ground that 
'a man is not to sell his own goods under the pretence that they are the 
goods of another man; he cannot be permitted to practise such a 
deception, nor to use the means which contribute to that end. He cannot 
therefore be allowed to use names, marks, letters, or other indicia, by 
which he may induce purchases to believe, that the goods which he is 
selling are the manufacture of another person' (6 Beav. 73); it is plain 
that in denying the right of property in a trade mark it was intended only 
to deny such property right except as appurtenant to an established 
business or trade in connection with which the mark is used. 
This is evident from the expressions used in these and other English 
cases. Thus, in Ainsworth v Walmsley, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas. 
518, 524, Vice Chancellor Sir Wm. Page Wood 
said: "This court has taken upon itself to protect a man in the use of 
a certain trademark as applied to a particular description of article. He 
has no property in that mark per se any more than in any other fanciful 
denomination he may assume for his own private use, otherwise than with 
reference to his trade. If he does not carry on a trade in iron, but carries 
on a trade in linen, and stamps a lion on his linen, another person may 
stamp a lion on iron; but when he has appropriated a mark to a 
particular species of goods, and caused his goods to circulate with this 
mark upon them, the court has said that no one shall be at liberty to 
defraud that man by using that mark, and passing off goods of his 
manufacture as being the goods of the owner of that mark. 
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In short, the trade mark is treated as merely a protection for the good 
will and not the subject of property except in connection with an existing 
business. The same rule prevails generally in this country, and is 
recognised in the decisions of this court already cited. 39 
2. IN SUM 
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Thus, in 1915 and 1916, respectively, the British and 
American courts in landmark decisions adopted the view 
that trade marks were appurtenant to the goodwill of the 
business in the trade in which the mark was used and this 
is where the property involved in passing-off and common 
law trade mark infringement cases is located. No 
property is to be found in the trade mark itself. 
The concept of property in British and American trade 
mark law where it has still not attained certain 
definition - is of particular relevance to the topic of 
this thesis. It is equally relevant, however, to note 
that common law and civil law concepts of property differ. 
There has always been a close connection between South 
African and British trade mark law. The South Africa law 
of trade marks has, for the most part, been based upon 
British legislation and precedent. Furthermore, the new 
trade mark legislation in South Africa is again intended 
to follow developments in the United Kingdom. 
Thus, in Part 2 I shall consider those aspects of trade 
mark law in the United Kingdom prior to 31 October 1994 
which are most relevant to an examination of the nature 
of the right to a trade mark. 
The concept of trade mark dilution, which new trade mark 
legislation has introduced to the South African law, 
originates 
where it 
in the trade mark law of 
features in a particular 
39. P4 13 of the report. 
the United States 
historical and 
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theoretical context. This should be known to South 
African lawyers called upon to apply the doctrine. 
Thus, Part 5 will consider current theories in the trade 
mark law of the U.S.A. which seek to expand the limits of 
protection traditionally afforded trade marks - including 
the dilution doctrine - and the significance of US trade 
mark law and theory in relation to the South African law 
of trade marks. 
PART2 
UNITED KINGDOM: THE LAW UNDER THE 1938 ACT; 
TRADE MARKS, GOODWILL, PROPERTY AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF ENDURING THEMES 
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CHAPTER5 
UNITED KINGDOM: THE 1938 ACT- INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with changes to the trade mark law of 
the United Kingdom brought about by the Amendment Act of 
1937 and the consolidating Act of 1938. 1 The 1937 Act 
came into force on 27 July 1938 and was immediately 
repealed and re-enacted on the same day by the 1938 Act. 2 
The 1937 Act amended aspects of the then current 
legislation, the 1905 Act as amended by the 1919 Act. 
The 1938 Act was a consolidating Act which made no 
further changes to the law. Thus, on 27 July 1938, the 
law of trade marks in the United Kingdom was the law 
applicable prior to that date as amended by the 1937 Act 
and then consolidated by the 1938 Act. It followed that 
decisions of court applicable to the provisions of the 
1905 Act (as amended prior to 27 July 1938) were 
maintained as the law under equivalent provisions of the 
1938 Act. 3 Where changes were introduced, however, the 
rules of common law derived from decisions upon matters 
in respect of which changes had been made could not 
provide a guide to the meaning of the new statutory 
. . 4 provisions. 
Prior legislation had 
establishing a system 
been 
of 
directed 
rights, 
chiefly at 
confirmed by 
registration, approximating to the common law rights 
derived through use of a trade mark. 
1. The Trade Marks Amendment Act, 1937 (1 Edw. 8 1 Geo. 6,c.49) and the Trade 
Marks Act, 1938 (1 & 2 Geo. 6, c.22). 
2. See Lloyd Kerly 8th ed. 8; Bray & Underhay 1938 Act 3. 
3. See Lloyd Kerly 8th ed.12. 
4. See Bray & Underhay 1938 Act xiii - xiv. 
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The statutory rights were more easily established and 
more definite in effect but were nevertheless 
supplementary and similar in character to the rights in 
and to a trade mark at common law. It followed that the 
statutes were only properly 
to the common law. 5 
understood with reference 
Consequently the legislation in force immediately prior 
to the enactment of the 1938 Act and thereafter (save 
for those aspects which were changed by the 1937 Act) 
gave statutory effect to the nature and content of trade 
mark rights at common law. 
The law concerning unregistered trade marks was not, for 
the most part, 6 changed by the 1938 Act and common law 
trade marks remained under the protection of the passing 
off action. Common law rights were maintained side by 
side with the statutory rights. Statute and the common 
law provided cumulative relief against interference with 
trade mark rights. 7 
Section 2 of the 1938 Act specifically provided: 
2. No action for infringement of unregistered trade mark 
No person shall be entitled to institute any proceeding to prevent, or to 
recover damages for, the infringement of an unregistered trade mark, 
but nothing in the Act shall be deemed to affect rights of action against 
any person for passing off or the remedies in respect thereof 8 
5. See Bray & Underhay 1938 Act xiii; See also GE Trade Mark [19731 R.P.C. 297, 324 
- 325 and 331 - 333 regarding changes brought about by the 1905 Act. 
6. But see p 175, 189-191 infra concerning assignment of unregistered trade marks in 
certain circumstances. 
7. Blanco White and Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 2. 
8. In the version of the Act applicable to services the word "service mark" merely 
replaces the word "trade mark" in section 2. For the historical development of the 
provision see section 1 of the 1875 Act, section 1 of the 1877 Act, section 77 of the 
1883 Act and sections 42 and 45 of the 1905 Act. 
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Bray & Underhay point out that the latter part of the 
section was merely declaratory of the law as it was 
established prior to the 1905 Act. They go on to 
observe that it would be no defence to a passing off 
that the defendant was the registered proprietor of a 
mark, the use of which provided the basis of the 
plaintiff's action. A motion to rectify the Register by 
way of additional relief could however be appropriate in 
h . . 9 t is instance. 
1. CHANGES MADE BY THE 1938 ACT 
Many of the changes brought about by the 1937 amendment 
Act followed the recommendations of the Report of a 
Departmental Committee presented to Parliament during 
1934. 
The report revealed criticism in the market-place 
against those aspects of the then existing legislation 
which merely comprised the statutory assimilation of 
common law rights. In terms of the report a broader 
monopoly was required with wider and more effective 
provisions for the implementation thereof. 10 
The prevention 
regarded as a 
of public 
fundamental 
deception 
tenet of 
had always been 
trade mark law 
throughout its development prior to 1938. Insofar as 
the earlier registration statutes created monopoly 
rights these rights were qualified so that the statutes 
would not normally operate to encourage practices which 
would be likely to result in deception. 11 
However in 
modification 
seeking 
of trade 
recommendations of 
to meet public demand 
mark law by implementing 
the Departmental Report 
for 
the 
the 
legislation which came into force during 1938 created 
9. Bray & Underhay 1938 Act xiii. 
10. Bray & Underhay 1938 Act xiv; See Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 11 regarding the 
Report. 
11. Lloyd & Bray Ker!y 7th ed. 13. See also GE Trade Mark [1973] R.P.C. 297, 326 - 327. 
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statutory rights which diverged from aspects of the 
common law bedrock and the method previously applied 
in determining the import of statutory provisions 
relating to trade marks - a review of the cases. 
1.1 Infringement 
Firstly the 1938 Act broadened the infringement action. 
Sections 4 and 5, in delimiting the rights given by Part 
A and Part B registration, respectively, and defining 
the infringement thereof, deemed certain uses of marks 
which were not calculated to deceive to be infringement. 
Furthermore section 6 in providing for infringement by 
breach of certain restrictions extended the infringement 
right beyond its historical developments in the common 
12 law. 
In sum, the infringement sections broadened the trade 
mark owners monopoly beyond the common law and rendered 
certain trade mark uses infringements whether or not 
this conduct would be deceptive. 
1.2 Methodology 
The second innovation brought about by the 1938 Act was 
one of method. In those instances where changes of 
principle had been introduced the common law was no 
longer a sure guide to the interpretation of the new 
statute. 13 The intention of the legislature was to be 
determined according to the 
the law of Interpretation 
rules and presumptions 
of Statutes without 
of 
a 
governing rider that the provisions were necessarily a 
re-formulation of existing principles of common law. 
12. Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 13. and see the discussion of the Yeast-Vite case at p 240 
infra. 
13 Bray & Underhay 1938 Act xiii. 
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1. 3 Licensing and Assignment 
The third change of substance was the introduction of 
licensing provisions and assignment without goodwill. 
After the 1905 Act it became a fundamental principle of 
trade mark law that a trade mark should be connected in 
trade with the particular business in the 
featuring the mark. If this connection were 
goods 
to be 
severed public 
featuring the 
policy. It 
deception as to the origin of the goods 
mark would arise contrary to public 
followed therefore that insofar as the 
licensing and assignment of trade marks without goodwill 
would sever the essential connection between those trade 
marks and the business in the goods which had featured 
the marks, deception would thereby result contrary to 
the public good. Licensing and assignment without 
goodwill were thus to be eschewed. 
The 1938 Act broke with the fundamental principle 
discussed above in permitting licenses and assignment 
without goodwill albeit subject to restrictions: only 
registered marks should be licensed whilst unregistered 
marks used with registered marks had to be assigned 
alongside the registered marks in assignments without 
goodwill. 
In making the aforementioned changes the 1938 Act 
recognised that the rigid approach anticipating 
deception in all cases of assignment and licensing was 
too narrow a view if cognizance was to be taken of 
1 d . . 'l' . d 14 actua con it1ons preva1 ing in tra e. 
Thus, assignment and licensing of trade marks became 
ordinary events in trade under the 1938 Act. This 
rendered it unsound to assume that goods bearing certain 
trade marks whether registered or not - always 
14. Bray & Underhay 1938 Act xiv; Lloyd Kerly 8th ed. 9-10. 
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emanated from a single business. 15 
1.4 FURTHER INNOVATIONS 
Further innovations of importance were: 
1.4.1 The abolition of the two year prior use requirement for 
acceptance of trade marks in Part B of the register and 
the establishment of the Registrar's discretion in 
dealing with such applications; 
1. 4. 2 Certain relaxations in the registrability requirements 
regarding marks primafacie not registrable; 
1. 4. 3 The introduction of defensive registrations of invented 
words in certain circumstances; 16 
1.4.4 Other changes not relevant to the theme of this work. 17 
Comment regarding the complexity of the 1938 Act was 
immediate. It was described by Bray &: Underhay as "a 
complicated piece of legislation abounding in cross 
f . d . 18 re erences provisos an exceptions." 
In the Preface to the seventh edition of Kerly Lloyd &: 
Bray stated the following concerning the Act: 
15. Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 12. Seep 61-62, 73 supra and p 164-169 infra regarding 
the position prior to the 1 905 Act. 
16. Provided for in section 27 of the 1938 Act. 
17. See Lloyd Kerly 8th ed. 11 concerning sections 26, 29, 33, 26, 27, 29 and 63 for 
changes of a less fundamental nature than those specifically mentioned in the text. 
Changes concerning the definitions regarding marks and use are dealt with in the 
following chapter. 
18. Bray & Underhay 1938 Act xiv. This work was published during 1938. F.G. 
Underhay was the author of the 6th ed. of Karly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade 
Names published in 1927 whilst Bray K.C. was to author the 7th ed. of the work with 
F.G. Lloyd, which was published in 1951. 
The Trade Marks Act of 1938 had introduced conceptions of a wholly 
novel nature into the law of trade marks. Many of the statutory rights 
created diverge from and in some cases coriflict with the principles 
which had been applied in determining the common law rights of trade 
marks. 
The Act of 1938 is therefore a complicated piece of legislation 
abounding in cross references, provisos and exceptions and containing 
some sections drafted in language which the Courts have described as 
turgid and diffuse. 
The law of trade marks has always been full of difficulties and pitfalls 
and as Sir Duncan Kerly always insisted is much wider and more 
comprehensive than the Trade Marks Acts themselves. 19 
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Writers views of 
substantially over 
the 1938 
the years. 
Act did not change 
Thus during 1986 the 
refrain was repeated: although it was the intention that 
the 1938 Act should consolidate the law, parts of the 
Act could not be properly understood without recourse to 
the Acts which had preceded it and even to the law prior 
to the advent of the first registration statute. 20 
Cornish, writing in retrospect, aptly states the 
evolving requirements and expectations of the commercial 
milieu both at the time of enactment of the Act and in 
which it would be required to function thereafter: 
The scale of business organisation in the twentieth century, following 
the lead of the American "trusts", has led to many shifts in trading 
practice. The spread of production, the growth of a popular press 
with its immense prospects for advertising, the increase of 
trans-national business in successful products and the consequent need 
to shield high-priced markets against parallel imports from elsewhere 
were all characteristics of the new era. Brand advertising on a large 
19. Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. v. 
20. Blanco White and Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 1. 
scale by manufacturers replaced goodwill that was principally 
associated with retail outlets, and this only increased the commercial 
significance of the trade marks around which it revolved. There was 
considerable pressure to be able to license and assign marks more 
freely than was possible under the British system. This stemmed not 
only from the spread of corporated groupings under parent holding 
companies and the increase in licensing of technology of business 
''packages". One panicular advantage, it was hoped, was that if the 
same trade mark was in legally distinct ownership in different 
countries the rights could be employed to deter parallel impo11ing. An 
elaborate and not very satisfactory compromise over assignment and 
licensing was embodied in the presently governing statute, the Trade 
Marks Act 1938. 
New advenising techniques also led to pressure on the registration 
system to compensate for the absence of a general unfair competition 
law. The 1938 Act contained two concessions in this direction. Very 
well-known trade marks became registrable "defensively" for goods in 
which the owner did not trade, in the hope of preventing others from 
annexing any of their notoriety. But the judges treated this 
arrangement coldly and it has not had much impact. Owners of Pan 
A trade marks were also enabled to object to comparative advenising 
and similar practices which attempted to take the benefit of the 
advenising without paying for it. Again, some judges found the 
expansion of the law unpalatable and the provision has had an 
uncenain effect. 
In 1974, the Mathys Depanmental Committee reponed on the British 
system under the 1938 Act in terms of general satisfaction with the 
British way of doing things. After that much would begin to happen 
which would cast increasing doubt on those inherent vinues, which 
will be discussed in the next section. One result has been that the 
Trade Marks (Amendment) Act 1984 has extended the registration 
system to service marks for businesses, so that it is no longer necessary 
to prove passing off in order to protect the name, symbol or get-up of 
a business. The new section of the Register was opened in October 
1986. 21 
21 . Cornish Intellectual Property 396-397. 
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2. SERVICE MARKS 
Prior to 1 October 1986 and pursuant to the decision of 
the House of Lords in Aristoc v Rysta22 which held that 
a mark could not be registered as a trade mark by an 
applicant providing a repair service for goods, no 
protection for service marks as such was afforded by the 
laws of the United Kingdom. 
As Cornish observes, The Mathys Committee had 
recommended that provision should be made in the Trade 
Marks Act for registration of service marks. 23 It was 
not however until the Trade Marks (Amendment) Act, 1984 
which came into force on 1 October 1986 with certain 
amendments made by the Patents, Designs and Marks Act, 
1986, that a comprehensive system for the protection and 
registration of service marks was introduced. 
Morcom states regarding the service mark legislation: 
Broadly, the effect of the 1984 Act is, by means of its two Schedules to 
create two "1938 Acts". One is essentially the original 1938 Act, as it 
has always applied to trade marks for goods, but amended in certain 
respects by the 1984 and 1986 Acts, in particular to take account of 
the new statutory recognition of service marks. The other is a 
substantially amended 1938 Act which is concerned with the 
registration and protection of service marks. By making an action for 
infringement available in addition to the common law action for 
passing off, the new law gives scope for greater protection for marks 
d . h . "nd 24 use m t e service z ustry. 
22. Aristoc v Rystra (1943) 62 R.P.C. 65. 
23. See p 20 and 71 of the Report of the Committee to examine British Trade Mark Law 
and Practice dated 20 December 1973. 
24. Morcom Service Marks 2. 
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It is to be noted however that the legislation did not 
bring two Acts into being at law. One law remained, the 
Trade Marks Act, 1938, but modified and amended to apply 
to both trade marks and service marks. 25 
It appears that at common law service marks are not 
regarded as property to which a party might have title. 
According to Morcom, the 1984 Act therefore possibly 
created a right of property in a service mark not 
previously recognised by law. 26 
3. IN SUM 
The substantive amendments to the law effected during 
1938 and 1986 denote those areas of the law where trade 
mark rights were by that time in pressing need of 
development: the ambit of the infringement action, 
assignment, licensing and the need to afford protection 
to service marks. These aspects together with those 
aspects of the law indicating which matter could be a 
trade mark and which matter would be registrable as a 
trade mark require further examination in an enquiry as 
to the nature and development of trade mark rights. 
This is done in the chapters which follow. 
25. Morcom Service Marks 7. 
26. Morcom Service Marks 6. 
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CHAPTER6 
UNITED KINGDOM: THE 1938 ACT - OBTAINING REGISTRATION 
Immediately prior to the coming into force of The Trade 
Marks Act, 1994 1 the law of trade marks in the United 
Kingdom was governed by the common law, The Trade Marks 
Act, 1938 as amended by the Trade Marks (Amendment) Act, 
19842 , the Patents, Designs and Marks Act, 19863 and the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988. 4 
It will be recalled that from the coming into force of 
the 1984 and the 1986 Acts the 1938 Act subsisted in two 
different albeit parallel versions which differed in 
detail and which applied to trade marks in the one 
instance and service marks in the other. 5 
This chapter and the next consider the provisions of the 
1938 Act, as amended and supplemented, which are most 
relevant to the central enquiry of this work - the nature 
of the trade mark right. 
Henceforth, references to "the 1938 Act" or "the Act" 
include the provisions of the enactment itself as well as 
the provisions of all relevant amending and supplementary 
legislation thereto. 
This chapter considers those provisions which defined a 
"mark" and a "trade mark" and which determined which 
1. On 31 October 1994. 
2. Trade Marks (Amendment) Act, 1984 (1984 c 19). This Act introduced registration of 
service marks to the United Kingdom. 
3. Patents, Designs and Marks Act 1986 (1986 c 39). 
4. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 (1988 c 48). As far as trade marks are 
concerned, this Act dealt with trade mark agents and certain offences. 
5. See Blanco Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 491 and p 93-94 supra. 
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including the key concepts of marks were registrable 
"distinctiveness" and "use". Consideration is given 
throughout to the role of the exercise of the Registrar's 
discretion 
concerned. 
in the application of the provisions 
An examination of the rights and remedies afforded by 
registration and relevant aspects of the assignment and 
licensing of trade marks follows in chapters 7 and 8. 
1. OBTAINING TRADE AND SERVICE MARK REGISTRATION UNDER THE ACT 
In order to obtain Part A registration an applicant was 
required to satisfy and overcome a four tier set of 
requirements and obstacles provided by the Act. The onus 
was upon the applicant to show that: 
1.1 the subject of his application was a "mark" as defined; 
1. 2 the mark comprised a "trade mark" or "service mark" as 
defined; 
1. 3 the trade mark was sufficiently distinctive in terms of 
the Act to qualify for Part A registration; 
1.4 the trade mark was not disqualified from registration for 
some other reason provided for in the Act. 6 
Essentially, therefore, the Act provided a series of 
positive requirements 
applicant had the onus 
mark would be registered. 
for registration which the 
of overcoming before the trade 
I shall deal with each requirement in turn in the 
paragraphs which follow. 
2. "MARK" 
6. Annand 19 Anglo-American Law Journal 261-305 [19901 264. 
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The definition of a "mark" in section 68 (1) of the 1938 
Act, as amended, provided: 
a "mark" includes a device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, 
signature, word, letter, numeral, or any combination thereof; 
Where the Act referred to a "mark" in the context of 
services "brand, heading, label, ticket", were excluded. 
Thus the 1938 Act did not give an all-encompassing 
definition of a mark but provided examples of the 
traditional forms of marks. This is not to say that 
something not falling within one of the traditional forms 
specified could not be a mark for the purposes of the 
Act. It was however required to be of the same nature as 
were the examples provided by the Act - and in the case 
of goods something which could be applied or attached 
thereto. 7 
Section 68(2) provided: 
68(2). - References in this Act to the use of a mark shall be construed as 
references to the use of a printed or other visual representation of the 
mark, and references therein to the use of a mark in relation to goods 
shall be construed as references to the use thereof upon, or in physical 
relation to, goods. 
In the context of services section 68(2) provided: 
68(2). - References in this Act to the use of a mark shall be construed as 
references to the use of a printed or other visual representation of the 
mark, and references therein to the use of a mark in relation to services 
shall be construed as references to the use of the mark as or as part of 
any statement about the availability or pelformance of services. 
Having regard to the manner of use of service marks which 
the Act contemplated it becomes clear that "a brand, 
heading, label, ticket" - which can only feature in 
7. Reform of Trade Marks Law Cm1203 6. 
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some physical relation to something material were 
categories which necessarily had to be eliminated from 
the definition of a "mark" when it was to serve as a 
service mark. 
Insofar as section 68(2) required use in the nature of a 
printed or other visual representation of the mark, 
sounds and smells could not, therefore, serve as marks 
and were denied registration under the 1938 Act. 
Blanco White & Jacob observe in regard to the definition 
of a mark under the Act: 
The definition of "mark" has little more than historical interest. Almost 
any visual characteristic of goods or of the presentation, of goods or 
services, that serves the function of a trade or service mark as defined by 
the Act - that serves to distinguish goods or services which have a 
particular connection from those which have not - can fairly be described 
as a "mark". Thus the question whether something is a "mark" rarely 
arises: it is a "trade mark" or "service mark", or it is not. In only one 
reported case have the courts rejected something othawise registrable as 
not being a "mark" and that was where the shaping of a container was 
concemed. 8 
For the purposes of this work little will be served by 
embarking 
according 
upon 
to the 
an excursus regarding matter which 
cases satisfied the definition of "a 
mark" under the Act. The cases discussed briefly below 
are, however, in need of mention insofar as they provide 
the clearest indication of the limitations imposed by the 
Act upon those claiming trade mark rights in the shape of 
goods, in colours and in containers for goods. 
In James• Trade Mark9 the court had to decide whether the 
picture of a dome could serve as a distinctive mark under 
8. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 5-6. The case referred to is Coca-Cola Trade 
Marks (1986] R.P.C. 421 discussed below. 
9. In re James' Trade Mark (1886) 3 R.P.C. 340. 
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Section 10 of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, in 
respect of black lead. The dome had been registered 
formerly as a design and the design registration had 
since expired. It was argued that as the mark was a 
pictorial representation of an article on which it was 
intended to be used it was not a good trade mark despite 
evidence of distinctiveness in fact. 
Lyndley, L.J. in finding the mark distinctive held: 
We must be careful to avoid confusion of ideas. I take it that a mark is 
something distinct from the thing marked. The thing itself cannot be a 
mark of itself; but here we have got a thing, and we have got a mark on 
the thing, and the question is whether that mark on the thing is or is not a 
distinctive mark within the meaning of the Trade Marks Act. Of course, it 
is obvious to all lawyers that the plaintiffs in this case have no monopoly 
in black lead of this shape. Anybody may make black lead of this shape, 
provided they do not mark it as Plaintiffs' black lead. There is no 
monopoly in the shape, and I cannot help thinking that that has not been 
quite kept in mind. Now what the Plaintiffs have registered is a brand - a 
mark like a dome, intended to represent a dome. That that is a distinctive 
mark, as a matter off act, is proved by the evidence; and that it can be a 
distinctive mark is obvious, I think when you look at it. 10 
In the SKF case 11 an applicant for the registration of a 
trade mark comprising a colour applied to one half of a 
pharmaceutical capsule and various colours applied to 
individual pellets within the capsule - which could be 
seen through the transparent remaining half of the 
capsule ultimately obtained registration with the 
approval of the House of Lords. 
The respondents' had opposed the applications on the 
basis that the colour combinations used and claimed as 
10. See p 344 of the report. The words which I have underlined in the quote are known as 
Lindley, L.J.'s apothegm. See p 100 infra. 
11. Smith, Kline and French Laboratories Limited v Sterling-Winthrop Group Limited [1976] 
R.P.C. 511. 
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trade marks represented an attempt to register the 
external appearance of the goods - which could not be a 
"mark" and therefore was not registrable as a "trade 
mark" within the meaning of section 68 (1) of the 1938 
Act. 12 
Lord Diplock in granting the appellant relief, could find 
nothing in the Act to exclude from registration a mark 
which covered the whole of the visible surface of the 
goods. It was reasoned with reference to section 67 (2) 
of the Act: 
So, if it is to be a trade mark, a "mark" must be something that can be 
represented visually and may be something that can be applied to the 
surface of the goods ("use upon") or incorporated in the structure of the 
goods ("use in physical relation to"). The inclusion of "heading" (viz. 
coloured threads woven into the selvedge of textile goods) in the meaning 
of "mark" also confirms that a mark, provided that it can be seen upon 
visual examination of the goods, may be incorporated in their structure. 
My Lords, I see nothing in this context that requires one to exclude from 
the definition of "trade mark" a mark which covers the whole of the 
visible surf ace of the goods to which it is applied. 1 3 
Referring to James•s case Lord Diplock held: 
James 's case does not, in my view, throw any light upon the question 
involved in the instant appeal; but even if Lyndley, L.J. 's apothegm 
were treated as being of general application, the "thing marked" in the 
instant case is the pharmaceutical substance in pellet form within 
capsules and the "mark" is the colour applied to one half of the capsule 
and the various colours applied to the individual pellets within the 
capsule. 14 
A further ground of appeal that the appellants marks were 
not distinctive was defeated on the bases that the 
respondents had conceded that the colour combinations 
12. See p 534 of the report. 
13. See p 534 of the report. 
14. See p 537 of the report. 
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were de facto distinctive of the appellants drugs to a 
degree where use of the same colour combinations by 
another drug manufacturer could be restrained through an 
action for passing off and in a finding that the marks 
were, in any event, per se distinctive in terms of the 
Act. 15 
In dealing obiter with examples of marks which could serve 
as trade marks Lord Dip lock referred inter alia to a 11 raised 
moulded pattern round the neck of a bottle containing the 
manufacturer's product 11 • 16 
This example and the reasoning of Lord Diplock in the SKF 
case underpinned three applications by the Coca-Cola 
company for the registration of their unusually shaped 
bottle as a trade mark in class 32 for non-alcoholic 
beverages included in that class. The bottle had 
previously enjoyed protection as a registered design in 
respect of which the term of protection had since expired. 
The Registrar refused to register the marks and Lord 
Templeman upheld the refusal in the House of Lords 
finding the applications to be 11 ••• another attempt to 
expand the boundaries of intellectual property and to 
convert a protective law into a source of monopoly . 
. . . . the present attempt is based on the Trade Marks Act 
1938. 1117 
Dealing with the definition of a mark in section 68(1) of 
the Act Lord Templeman stated: 
The word "mark" both in its normal meaning and in its statutory 
definition is apt only to describe something which distinguishes goods 
rather than the goods themselves. A bottle is a container not a mark. 
15. See p 538-539 of the report. 
16. See p 536 of the report. 
17. Coca-Cola Trade Marks [19861 R.P.C. 421, 456. See also Goodall & Sons Ltd v John 
Waddington Ltd (1928) 41 R.P.C. 668 688. 
The distinction between a mark and the thing which is marked is 
supported by authority. 18 
The SKF case was distinguished on the basis that 
related only to the colour of goods and had 
application to the goods themselves or to a container 
goods. 19 
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it 
no 
for 
Thus, under the 1938 Act colour applied to a product was 
regarded registrable as a trade mark and so too a 
pictorial representation of goods applied as a trade mark 
in respect of goods. A distinctive container for goods 
was however not registrable. 
3. "TRADEMARK" AND "SERVICE MARK" 
A "trade mark" was defined in section 68 (1) of the Act 
which provided: 
"trade mark" means, except in relation to a certification trade mark, a 
mark used or proposed to be used in relation to goods for the purpose of 
indicating, or so as to indicate, a connection in the course of trade 
between the goods and some person having the right either as proprietor 
or as registered user to use the mark, whether with or without any 
indication of the identity of that person, and means, in relation to a 
certification trade mark, a mark registered or deemed to have been 
registered under Section Thirty - Seven of this Act; 
When applied to services section 68(1) provided: 
"service mark" means a mark (including a device, name, signature, 
word, letter, numeral or any combination thereof) used or proposed to be 
used in relation to services for the purpose of indicating, or so as to 
indicate, that a particular person is connected, in the course of business, 
with the provision of those services, whether with or without any 
indication of the identity of that person; 
18. See p 457 of the report. The authority relied upon was the dictum of Lindley L.J. in 
James' Trade Mark quoted at p 99 supra. 
19. See p 458 of the report. 
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It will be recalled that under the common law adoption 
and use of the mark by a trader upon his goods created 
trade mark rights therein. The advent of the first 
registration Acts did not alter the common law rules 
that a mark did not become a trade mark until it had been 
publicly used as such by the proprietor although there 
was no specific requirement for an applicant to use or 
intend using the mark applied for. Thus, a tenuous 
monopoly could, on the face of it, be obtained through 
registration of a mark without the registrant truly 
intending to use the mark in trade. The words "proposed 
to be used" were therefore introduced by the 1905 Act in 
order to make is clear by way of definition that 
henceforth only marks already in use or which were 
k d f 1 . f . d f . . 20 A h earmar e or use qua i ie or registration. t t e 
same time a sanction was introduced: the mark could be 
removed from the register should the applicant not have 
had the bona fide intention of using it at the time of the 
application and the mark had not in fact been used 
21 
subsequently. 
Under the 1938 Act the ambit of the phrase "proposed to 
be used" in the definition of trade marks and service 
marks never obtained clear circumscription. What is 
however apparent from the definition is that the use or 
proposed use contemplated had to connect the goods or 
services in the course of trade or business, as the case 
might have been, with the proprietor or a registered user 
of the mark. 22 
The leading case regarding the phrase is the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal in the NERIT case which held the 
phrase "proposed to use" to mean "intend to use 11 • 23 
20. See section 3 of the Trade Marks Act, 1905 and GE Trade Mark [19731 R.P.C. 297 
327, 331; See also Sebastian Trade Marks 328,329. 
21. See section 37 of the 1905 Act; Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 7. 
22. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 7 - 9. 
23. Imperial Group Ltd. v Philip Morris & Co. Ltd. 1982 [F S RJ 72 (C.A.). 
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In that case the appellants had registered the trade mark 
NERIT as a ghost-mark for MERIT which was unregistrable. 
It was held that the absence of a bona fide intention to 
use the mark NERIT prevented it from being a trade mark 
within the meaning of the Act. It had been previously 
said by Lord Hanworth, M. R. in Ducker' s case regarding 
the phrase in the 1905 Act: 
I think that the words ''proposed to be used 11 mean a real intention to use, 
not a mere problematical intention, not an uncertain or indeterminate 
possibility, but a resolve or settled purpose which has been reached at the 
time when the mark is to be registered. 24 
This led Brightman, L.J. to state in the NERIT case that: 
The words ''propose 11 and "intend", are, in my opinion sometimes 
interchangeable and sometimes different in meaning. "Proposed to use" 
can in a suitable context mean the same as "intend to use". "Proposed" 
can alternatively mean ''propose for consideration", as distinct from a 
settled purpose. In the Ducker case this court saw no distinction in 
content between the verb ''propose" in the predecessor to Section 68 and 
the noun "intention" in the predecessor to Section 26. I see no reason to 
quarrel with that approach, even if I were entitled to do so. 25 
Thus, the Court of Appeal held that the phrase "propose 
to use" in section 68 had the same meaning as the phrase 
"intention to use" in section 26 of the 1938 Act which 
provided for removal of marks from the register on the 
grounds of no bonafide intention to use or non-use. 
Lord Brightman found that the use 
appellant was "an uncertain 
contemplated by the 
and indeterminate 
possibility" and not a "definite intention to deal" or "a 
real intention to use" or an intention to use with 
"resolve or settle purpose" 
concurring with Lawton, L.J. 
- following Ducker's case -
who required the use 
24. Re Ducker's Trade Marks [19291 1 Ch. 113 116. 
25. See p 87 of the report. 
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intended to be use in the ordinary course of business and 
1 . . 1 26 rea use in a commerc1a sense. 
Shaw, L.J. went further, requiring that the appellant 
should have the intention of using the mark NERIT to 
develop a goodwill arising from the connection of the use 
of that word in the business of the appellant. An 
intention to deprive others from using the word MERIT in 
the trade would not found a claim to reputation. 27 
Turning to the words "use in relation to goods", 
alternatively, "use in relation to services" it needs be 
noted that "in relation to" was a phrase introduced to 
the 1938 Act to overcome rulings by the Registrar under 
the 1905 Act which used the phrase "in connection with". 
The Registrar had ruled that use of a trade mark in 
advertisements was not use thereof as a trade mark "in 
connection with" goods even though in the context of 
infringement, claims of infringement had succeeded where 
the sole infringing use had been use in advertisements. 28 
The definition of a trade mark and a service mark 
required there to be a connection in the course of trade 
(in the case of a trade mark) and a connection in the 
course of business (in the case of a service mark) 
between the goods (and in regard to a service, the 
service) and a person entitled to use the mark. Thus, 
the mark was required to indicate the source of the goods 
or services (as the case may be) albeit not in the 
sense that the actual source thereof must be known. The 
consumer was merely required to recognise that the goods 
or services bearing or featuring the mark emanated from 
the same source. 29 
26. See p 88 of the report. 
2 7. See p 81 of the report. 
28. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 10. The authors state at footnote 18: "Where 
service marks are concerned, the use has to be part of a "statement about the 
availability or performance of services," which can hardly fail to be essentially some sort 
of advertisement". 
29. See Annand 271. 
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It must be borne in mind that a distinction was drawn 
between goods and services in this context in that the 
provision of services with which a trade connection was 
required had to be performed for money or moneys worth. 30 
There was no corresponding requirement under the Act or 
at common law for goods supplied under a mark to be 
supplied for money. 31 
So called "retail services" comprising the provision of 
advice to customers, a selection of goods, a congenial 
atmosphere in which to shop, car-parking, and check-out 
and credit facilities not itemised separately on 
customers bills were held to be not for "money or moneys 
worth" and too indefinite to be afforded service mark 
. . 32 
reg1strat1on. 
A connection in the course of business required of 
service marks by the definition - was different to the 
goods mark concept of a "connection in the course of 
trade", according to Blanco White & Jacob. 33 If the 
service itself was paid for the connection test was 
. f. d 34 sat1s ie . 
30. Section 68(1) provides: "provision" in relation to services means their provision for 
money or money's worth. 
31. Visa Trade Mark [19851 R.P.C. 323 (which followed the Irish case of Golden Pages 
Trade Mark [19851 F.S.R. 27 which was to the same effect). See p 329 - 31 of the 
report of the Visa case. See also Aristoc v Rysta (1945) R.P.C. 65. 
32. Dee Corporation's Application [19891 F.S.R. 297; See Annand 272 and Cornish 
Intellectual Property 440. 
33. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 14. 
34. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 18. 
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Reverting to goods, the required connection could be 
found in diverse conduct in relation to the goods such as 
manufacture, production, preparation for the market 
place, the selection and offering for sale, dealing in 
the sense of controlling the placement of goods on the 
market, certification, and the like. 
Proprietors who retained the right of control over the 
manufacture, or who ensured adherence to quality and 
standards, specifications of manufacture, market 
salesman, 
suppliers 
dyers, finishers, 
of materials who 
controlled use of materials 
d f . . . 35 e lnltlOn. 
4. DISTINCTIVENESS 
converters of goods, 
controlled quantity or 
could all satisfy the 
As already observed the register was divided into two 
parts - Part A and Part B - from the time of the 1919 
Act. 36 
An applicant, having satisfied the requirements of the 
Act regarding the definitions therein stated of "mark" 
and "trade mark" or "service mark" had to show that his 
mark was sufficiently distinctive for Part A registration 
or possessed the capability of becoming so distinctive 
for Part B registration. 
A mark could not be placed in Part A of the register 
unless it complied with the restrictive terms of section 
9 of the Act. 37 
Section 9 provided: 
9 Distinctiveness requisite for registration in Part A 
(1) In order for a trade mark (other than a certification trade mark) to 
35. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 15 - 18. See also sections 62 and 63. 
36. See section 1 (1) of the 1919 Act. 
37. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 74. 
be registrable in Part A of the register, it must contain or consist of at 
least one of the following essential particulars:-
(a) the name of a company, individual, or firm represented in a 
special or particular manner; 
(b) The signature of the applicant for registration or some 
predecessor in his business; 
(c) an invented word or invented words; 
(d) a word or words having no direct reference to the character 
or quality of the goods, and not being according to its 
ordinary signification a geographical name or a surname; 
(e) any other distinctive mark, but a name, signature, or word or 
words, other than such as fall within the descriptions in the 
foregoing paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d), shall not be 
registrable under the provisions of this paragraph except upon 
evidence of its distinctiveness. 
(2) For the pwposes of this section "distinctive" means adapted, in 
relation to the goods in respect of which a trade mark is registered or 
proposed to be registered, to distinguish goods with which the 
proprietor of the trade mark is or may be connected in the course of 
trade from goods in the case of which no such connection subsists, 
either generally or, where the trade mark is registered or proposed to 
be registered subject to limitations, in relation to use within the 
extent of the registration. 
(3) In determining whether a trade mark is adapted to distinguish as 
aforesaid the tribunal may have regard to the extent to which -
(a) the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish as 
aforesaid; and 
(b) by reason of the use of the trade mark or of any other 
circumstances, the trade mark is in fact adapted to distinguish 
as aforesaid. 
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Regarding service marks section 9 provided: 
9 Distinctiveness requisite for registration in Part A 
(1) In order for a service mark to be registrable in Part A of the register, 
it must contain or consist of at least one of the following essential 
particulars:-
(a) the name of a company, individual, or firm, represented in a 
special or particular manner; 
(b) the signature of the applicant for registration or some 
predecessor in his business; 
(c) an invented word or invented words; 
(d) a word or words having no direct reference to the character 
or quality of the services, and not being according to its 
ordinary signification a geographical name or a surname; 
(e) any other distinctive mark, but a name, signature, or word or 
words, other than such a s fall within the descriptions in the 
foregoing paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d), shall not be 
registrable under the provisions of this paragraph except upon 
evidence of its distinctiveness. 
(2) For the .pwposes of this section "distinctive" means adapted, in 
relation to the services in respect of which a service mark is 
registered or proposed to be registered, to distinguishing services 
with the provision of which the proprietor is or may be connected, in 
the course of business, from the services with the provision of which 
he is not so connected either generally or, where the service mark is 
registered or proposed to be registered subject to limitations, in 
relation to use within the extent of the registration. 
(3) In determining whether a service mark is adapted to distinguish as 
aforesaid the tribunal may have regard to the extent to which -
(a) the service mark is inherently adapted to distinguish as 
aforesaid; and 
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(b) by reason of the use of the savice mark or of any other 
circumstances, the service mark is in fact adapted to 
distinguish as aforesaid. 
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Section 9 was structured as follows: there were five 
categories of "essential particulars" defined in 
sub-section 9 (1) the categories (a) to (d) inclusive 
defining certain types of words of which a word-based 
mark must comprise and (e) comprising a category of 
"other distinctive" marks not falling within one of the 
word-based mark categories [(a) (d)] In determining 
which marks qualified for category (e) regard was to be 
had to sub-sections 9(2) and 9(3) which provided the 
definition of distinctiveness and elements which could 
be ref erred to in determining whether a mark was 
distinctive or not. 
Categories {a) (d) were enacted by the registration 
Acts prior to the 1905 Act which then added the umbrella 
· · " h d' · · k • 38 provision any ot er istinct1ve mar . '
The essential particulars comprised separate and distinct 
divisions and if a trade mark qualified under one or more 
of the headings it was registrable under section 9 
'd d . 1 d' . . 39 provi e it was a so istinctive. 
The legislature assumed those particulars in categories 
(a) to (d) to be distinctive. Marks of this kind were not 
distinctive by virtue of their qualification for one of 
the categories but qualified for inclusion therein 
because of their distinctiveness. Thus, a non-distinctive 
mark could not qualify for inclusion in any of the 
categories (a) to (d) . 40 
38. See p 59-60 supra and the discussion of the old registration Acts generally at p 44 - 58 
supra. 
39. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 74. 
40. See Fanfold Ltd.'s Applications (1928) R.P.C. 325 332 - 334. Standard Camera Ld.'s 
Application (1952) 69 R.P.C. 125 129. 
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4.1 Names and Signatures [Categories (a) - (b)] 
Category (a) words had to appear in a special or 
particular manner 
names of persons 
relevant trade. 41 
representing the 
distinguishing and 
to distinguish the mark concerned from 
honestly using their own name in the 
The special and particular manner of 
mark afforded it the power of 
d d · d' · · 42 h' l so ren ere it ist1nct1ve w i st a 
signature being in itself unique to the signatory was as 
such distinctive per se. Thus a name printed or 
represented in ordinary type or ordinary writing was 
43 
excluded from categories (a) and (b) . 
4.2 Invented Words [Category (b)] 
As far as invented words were concerned it is of note 
44 that Solio remained the leading case. 
An apt description of what the Courts regarded an 
invented word to be is provided by the following dictum 
of Parker J in a matter decided under the 1905 Act45 : 
To be an invented word, within the meaning of the Act, a word must not 
only be newly coined, in the sense of not being already current in the 
English language, but must be such as not to convey any meaning, or at 
any rate, any obvious meaning to ordinary Englishmen. It must be a 
word having no meaning or no obvious meaning until one has been 
assigned to it. I use the expression "obvious meaning" and referred to 
"ordinary Englishmen" because to prevent a newly coined word from 
being an invented word, it is not enough that it might suggest some 
meaning to a few scholars. Further, while on the one hand the fact that a 
word may be found in the vocabulary of a foreign language does not, in 
itself, preclude it from being an invented word, so on the other hand a 
41 . Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 1 2th ed. 77. 
42. Fanfold Ltd.'s Application (1928) R.P.C. 325. 
43. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 78. 
44. Eastman Photographic Co.'s Appn. [18981 A.C. 571, R.P.C. 707. See the discussion of 
this case at p56 supra. 
45. Phillepart v William Whiteley Lid. (1908) 25 R.P.C. 565 569. 
foreign word is not an invented word merely because it is not current in 
the English tongue. 
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The standard of invention required was however never 
clearly defined. 46 
4.3 Category (d) Marks 
Category (d) marks comprised words which needed to avoid 
two pitfalls ie they were to have no direct reference to 
the character or quality of the goods or services 
concerned and had not to be, according to ordinary 
signification, a geographical name or surname. 
No principles or definitive practices ever developed in 
relation to which marks could be regarded as having a 
tainted reference to character or quality despite that 
47 the category was introduced by the 1888 Act. 
As Blanco White & Jacob put it: 
. . . . almost every immediately attractive trade mark is, in some sense, 
descriptive or laudatory of the goods and so in some degree has reference 
to their character or quality. The difficulty is to decide whether that 
reference is a direct reference: one that seriously affects the word's 
capacity for distinguishing goods from a particular source, as distinct 
from the sort of reference that can be found only as an academic exercise. 
This is at best a somewhat metaphorical question and one depending 
ultimately upon the reaction of the public to the chosen word. In these 
circumstances, the Registrar, who has a duty to maintain the purity of the 
register, may well incline to rely upon possibilities of interpretation of a 
mark which later experience may show to be fanciful. Sometimes, he can 
be persuaded by argument; but in general, the applicant's proper course 
is to apply again when the mark has been tested by use. 48 
46. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 80 - 88. 
4 7. See p 50 supra. 
48. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 88'. 
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Essentially, therefore, and subject to appeal to the 
Court, the Registrar's discretion determined the matter 
with reference to his view as to whether registration 
would hamper other traders from using the word or words 
alluded to by the "invented" word, fairly and honestly in 
the trade. 49 
4.3.1 Geographical Names 
By the same method words which were in their ordinary 
signification geographical names were denied registration 
in the interests of rival traders: 
Commercially valuable associations between a place and type of 
goods are not infrequently built up by use of the place name. The 
association may derive from the physical conditions for production of raw 
material (e.g. wine grapes) or for carrying out a manufacturing process 
(e.g. Roquefort Cheese) or from an established tradition of local 
craftsmanship. The appellations of origin and indications of source are 
commonly used by a number of independent traders in the region. One 
purpose of the rule presently under discussion is to prevent any one of 
them securing a vital advantage over the others. 50 
The test was an objective one i.e. that of normal 
signification. Where the geographical name was obscure 
and not linked to the goods the word was open to a 
finding that its ordinary signification was not that of a 
h . 1 51 h l' h h geograp ica name. T e Eng is courts were owever 
conservative in this regard accepting, 
interpretation provided by the Magnolia 
under the 1888 Act. 
at most, the 
case 
52 decided 
In the Magnolia case the evidence had shown that there 
were places in the United States named Magnolia. 
49. See Cornish Intellectual Property 444. 
50. Per Cornish Intellectual Property 445. 
51. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 93; Cornish Intellectual Property 446. 
52. Magnolia Metal's T.M. [18971 14 R.P.C. 621. 
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The court held, however, that "geographical name" was not 
equivalent to the name of any place - a word did not 
become a geographical name simply because some place upon 
the earth's surface had been called by it. Yet, even 
where the primary signification of the word was not 
geographical, it could still be a geographical name 
within the meaning of the Act if the name was chosen as a 
trade mark because the goods concerned were connected 
with its locality - despite that the locality concerned 
was little known. 
It must be recalled that the 1888 Act under which the 
Magnolia case was decided excluded any geographical name 
and that the qualification of "ordinary signification" 
was introduced by the 1905 Act. 
The registry practice in the United Kingdom relating to 
geographical marks was interesting. It is stated thus by 
Blanco White & Jacob: 
The Registry practice on this point is relatively simple. If a word sought 
to be registered in part A is recognised as a place name, an objection will 
be taken under Section 9(1) unless the use of that name is obviously 
fanciful. The mark may still be registrable on evidence of distinctiveness; 
see below the discussion of Section 9(l)(e) - or it would seem, on 
evidence that in relation to the goods concerned its use is clearly fanciful. 
Or, if the geographical reference is unlikely to cause any confusion, the 
mark may be accepted in part B. Thus the important question under this 
head is less often "Is this mark a geographical name?" than "how strong 
must the evidence of distinctiveness be, to render this mark registrable?" 
However, since York, the practice has tightened somewhat - most 
geographical names are, as trade marks, refused. 53 
And regarding service marks: 
Where service marks are concerned, the position will in many cases be 
rather different, since many service trades are inherently local. Thus 
foreign place names are expected to be relatively freely accepted for 
53. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 94. 
registration for services without international character: and even a 
United Kingdom place name may be acceptable in part B, as a new 
mark, if the registration is geographically limited to put the place 
concerned far enough away. Thus the evidence needed to establish 
distinctiveness may well be much less for a service mark. 54 
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In the York case55 the House of Lords considered a 
refusal by the Registry to waive disclaimer of the word 
YORK in a Part B acceptance of a mark comprising the word 
YORK in block capital letters in a rectangular device 
which also featured a leaf within the letter "0". 
Evidence showed that the applicant's mark was in fact 
distinctive of its goods. The Registrar's decision was 
essentially based upon the ground that the applicant was 
not to be allowed a monopoly in the name of an important 
. k . . . h . d 56 city - Yor - in connection wit its goo s. 
In a stern judgment Lord Wilberforce confirmed the strong 
line of authority holding that even though the 1905 Act 
had changed the position in that geographical names were 
no longer absolutely excluded from registration and each 
individual case was thereafter to be afforded judicial 
examination on the merits, the rule was that no matter 
how distinctive such a mark might be in fact it had to be 
capable of distinguishing in law. Applying the Liverpool 
Cables 57 and Yorkshire58 cases Lord Wilberforce held that 
the applicants for registration were not entitled to 
claim as their own to the detriment of other traders a 
geographical name which was or might at some time in the 
future be the place of manufacture of goods similar to 
h . 59 t eir own. 
54. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 107. 
55. York Trade Mark [19841 R.P.C. 231. 
56. See p 251 of the report. 
57. Liverpool Electric Cable Co. Ltd. 's Application (1929) 46 R.P.C. 99. 
58. Yorkshire Copper Works Ltd.'s Application [19531 71 R.P.C. 150. 
59. See p 254 - 255 of the report. 
4.3.2 
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Surnames 
As was the case with geographical names, surnames were 
absolutely denied registration under the 1888 Act. The 
1905 Act introduced the "ordinary signification" 
qualification to registration of surnames also taken up 
in the 1938 Act. 
The disqualification extended to foreign surnames but, 
following the Ciba case, the registry followed a de minimis 
rule. 60 
In Ciba the approach of the registry to surname 
applications at the time was revealed to be the following: 
a) where the mark concerned had no signification other 
than a surname the application was refused Part A 
registration although Part B registration could be 
considered; 
b) where the mark applied for was a rare surname which 
had a dominating secondary meaning in itself, as 
well, Part A registration would be granted as the 
ordinary signification of the word was not a surname; 
c) where the surname was less rare and featured a 
secondary meaning, as well, the registry would grant 
Part B acceptance of the application without 
. d f d. . . 61 ev1 ence o ist1nct1veness. 
Ciba was found to be a very rare German surname which was 
featured, according to the evidence, once in the Berlin 
and once in the Hamburg telephone directories. Without 
providing guidance of a general kind it was held by 
Whitford J that the word Ciba fell well outside any 
possibility of being regarded a surname in its ordinary 
. . f. . 1 d b h 62 s1gn1 icat1on as contemp ate y t e Act. 
60. Ciba Trade Mark [1983] R.P.C. 75. 
61. See p 81 - 82 of the report. 
62. See p 82 of the report. 
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Pursuant to this judgment the Registry published the 
following policy by way of a footnote to the report of 
the case: 
..... , the practice regarding the treatment of applications to register rare 
surnames as new, i.e. unused marks, has been reviewed. 
In future, words which have no signification other than as surnames, in 
the sense that they are to be found in telephone directories, will be 
allowed prima facie in part A of the Register if they occur not more than 
twice in an appropriate U.K. directory (usually the London telephone 
directory) and not more than 5 times in an appropriate foreign directory. 
The principal reason for this change in practice is that although such 
words might convey a surnominal significance to some people in this 
country and so cannot be regarded as invented word, the number of such 
people is likely to be so small as to be disregarded as being de mini mis. 
If the application is for part B of the register the limits of 2 and 5 will be 
replaced by 5 and 10 respectively. 63 
Finally, in order to establish the outer limits of the 
registration of surnames as trade marks under earlier 
legislation it is to be noted that there are no judicial 
pronouncements indicating that a surname could be 
regarded so common as to be absolutely incapable of 
registration under the 1938 Act. 64 
4.4 Other Distinctive Marks 
The final category of marks which qualified for Part A 
registration under section 9 were the "other distinctive 
marks" of section 9(1) (e). 
This category constituted a general class under which a 
large proportion of trade marks were registered. There 
are two sub-classifications, namely those 
word marks which would offend paragraphs (a), 
63. P 86 of the report. 
64. Cornish Intellectual Property 44 7. 
essentially 
(b), (c) or 
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(d) but which nevertheless had become distinctive of the 
applicant's goods, and other marks such as devices, 
device combinations or device and word combinations. 65 
In determining whether marks in the af oregoing categories 
were distinctive it was necessary to have regard to 
sections 9(2) and (3) of the Act. 
In deriving the essential principles to be applied to 
those sections from case law it is to be noted that 
although the definition of "distinctive" in section 9(5) 
of the 1905 Act66 differed from the definition thereof in 
the 1938 Act, the change brought about by the latter Act 
did not occasion a change in the principles applied by 
the Registrar and by the courts in determining questions 
f d . . . h f 67 o ist1nct1veness t erea ter. 
It is to be noted regarding the first sub-category of 
section 9(1) (e) i.e. names, signatures, a word or words 
not falling in categories (a) (d) , that in the event of 
their being registered without evidence of 
distinctiveness they were liable to removal from the 
register as wrongly registered unless protected by the 
65. Moses Trade Marks Practice 25. 
66. The relevant clause in section 9 of the 1905 Act provided: 
"For the purposes of this section "distinctive" shall mean adapted to distinguish the 
goods of the proprietor of the trade mark from those of other persons. 
In determining whether a trade mark is so adapted, the tribunal may, in the case of a 
trade mark in actual use, take into consideration the extent to which such user has 
rendered such trade mark in fact distinctive for the goods with respect to which it is 
registered or proposed to be registered." 
67. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 97; Bray and Underhay 1938 Act 15. The 
changes in the 1938 Act were occasioned by the definition of a trade mark in section 
68: Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 98 - 99. 
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1 . d d f . . 68 seven-year cause provi e or in section 13. 
The date for assessing the distinctiveness required to 
obtain registration under section 9(1) (e) was the date of 
the application although subsequent events were not 
disregarded. 69 
In determining whether a mark was adapted to distinguish 
under section 9(2) the Tribunal had to have regard to the 
mandatory guidelines set out in section 9 (3). The 
guidelines provided in sub-section 9 (3) (a) and (b) were 
not inter-dependent: both had to be considered 
independently. Thus, if a mark was not inherently 
adapted to distinguish perse in terms of sub-section 3(a) 
reliance upon sub-section 3(b) could counter-balance this 
and lead to registration on the basis that the mark was 
adapted to distinguish de facto. Where, however, the mark 
was completely devoid of any feature visiting it with 
adaptability to distinguish no amount of de facto 
distinctiveness acquired through use would render it 
distinctive in terms of section 9 and the mark was 
d . d . . 70 enie registration. 
68. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 97; Bray and Underhay 1938 Act 14; Section 
1 3 provided: 
"13 Registration in Part A to be conclusive as to validity after seven years. 
(1) In all legal proceedings relating to a trade mark registered in Part A of the register 
(including applications under section thirty-two of this Act) the original registration in 
Part A of the register of the trade mark shall, after the expiration of seven years from 
the date of that registration, be taken to be valid in all respects, unless -
(a) that registration was obtained by fraud, or 
(bl the trade mark offends against the provisions of section eleven of this Act. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of section five of this Act shall be construed as making 
applicable to a trade mark, as being a trade mark registered in Part B of the register, the 
foregoing provisions of this section relating to a trade mark registered in Part A of the 
register". 
"Service Mark" replaced "Trade Mark" insofar as the Act applied to service marks. 
69. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 98; Bray and Underhay 1938 Act 15. 
70. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 99. 
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Inherently adapted to distinguish indicated that 
something within the mark itself provided it with the 
necessary means of being able to distinguish goods or 
services as contemplated by section 9. 
If the mark was not sufficiently distinctive in itself to 
justify registration, evidence of its de facto 
distinctiveness was required in order to show that it was 
adapted to distinguish in fact. 
Thus, a mark could be innately distinctive or it could 
acquire distinctiveness through use or by other means. 
The distinctiveness requirements of section 9 of the 1905 
Act were explained by Lord Maulton as follows 71 : 
A 
If the Tribunal is of opinion that the nature of the word is such that it is 
adapted to distinguish those particular goods of the trader from those of 
other persons it will be its duty - in the absence of special circumstances -
to allow the registration to proceed. But the applicant is not confined to 
arguments drawn from the word itself. He may support his application, 
in the case of a mark already in use, by showing that by user the mark 
has, in fact, become more or less completely identified with the goods by 
having been continuously used in connection therewith and the Statute 
expressly provides that the Court may take this into consideration for the 
purposes of its decision. To my mind this provision can bear but one 
interpretation. It recognised that distinctiveness - that is, being adapted 
to distinguish the goods from those of other traders - is not necessarily an 
innate quality of the word. It may be acquired. 
universally accepted test for 
applicant's claim to distinctiveness 
discounting an 
is provided by 
k . h 72 Par er J. in t e W. & G. case. 
The applicant for registration in effect says, "I intend to use this mark as 
a Trade Mark, i.e. for the purpose of distinguishing my goods from the 
goods of other persons", and the Registrar or the Court has to determine, 
71. Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd. 's Application (1909) R.P.C. 837 858. 
72. W & G. Du Cros Ltd. 's Application (1913) 30 R.P.C. 660 672. 
before the mark be admitted to registration, whether it is of such a kind 
that the applicant, quite apart from the effect of registration, is likely or 
unlikely to attain the object he has in view. The applicants' chance of 
success in this respect must, I think, largely depend upon whether other 
traders are likely, in the ordinary course of their business and without 
any improper motive, to desire to use the same mark, or some mark 
nearly resembling it, upon or in connection with their own goods. It is 
apparent from the history of Trade Marks in this country that both the 
Legislature and the Courts have always shown a natural disinclination to 
allow any person to obtain by registration under the Trade Marks Act a 
monopoly in what other may legitimately desire to use. 
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An apt observation regarding the question of 
distinctiveness is provided by Narayanan dealing with 
section 9(5) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 1958, 
to some degree the Indian equivalent of section 9 (3) of 
the 1938 Act: 
The question whether a trade mark is distinctive or not is a practical one 
and a question that can only be settled by considering the whole of the 
circumstances of the case. The words "may have regard" in Section 9(5) 
show that the factors referred to therein under clauses "a" and "b" are 
neither exhaustive nor conclusive. The word "extend" shows that there 
are degrees of distinctiveness. It is clear therefore that a wide discretion 
is vested in the Tribunal in deciding whether a mark is adapted to 
distinguish within the meaning of the section. It may be observed that the 
question whether a mark is adapted to distinguish or not is a question of 
fact, or, to be more accurate, a question of opinion to be formed upon 
facts. The facts to be considered include those inherent in the mark itself 
and those resulting from its use as a trade mark. If there is any factor 
other than those mentioned in Section 9(5), it would be the right and duty 
of the Registrar to take that also into consideration. 73 
4.5 Qualification for Part B 
Section 10 of the Act provided the following in relation 
73. Narayanan Trade Marks 98 - 99. 
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to trade marks intended for registration in Part B of the 
Register: 
10 Capability of distinguishing requisite for registration in Part B 
(1) In order for a trade mark to be registrable in Part B of the register it 
must be capable, in relation to the goods in respect of which it is 
registered or proposed to be registered, of distinguishing goods with 
which the proprietor of the trade mark is or may be connected in the 
course of trade from goods in the case of which no such connection 
subsists, either generally or, where the trade mark is registered or 
proposed to be registered subject to limitations, in relation to use within 
the extent of the registration. 
(2) In determining whether a trade mark is capable of distinguishing as 
aforesaid the tribunal may have regard to the extent to which-
(a) the trade mark is inherently capable of distinguishing as 
aforesaid; and 
(b) by reason of the use of the trade mark or of any other 
circumstances, the trade mark is in fact capable of 
distinguishing as aforesaid. 
(3) A trade mark may be registered in Part B notwithstanding any 
registration in Part A in the name of the same proprietor of the same 
trade mark or any part or parts thereof. 
In relation to service marks the Act provides: 
10 Capability of distinguishing requisite for registration in Part B 
(1) In order for a service mark to be registrable in Part B of the register 
it must be capable, in relation to the services in respect of which it is 
registered or proposed to be registered, of distinguishing services with the 
provision of which the proprietor is or may be connected in the course of 
business from services with the provision of which he is not so connected 
either generally or, where the service mark is registered or proposed to 
be registered subject to limitations, in relation to use within the extent of 
the registration. 
(2) In determining whether a se-rvice mark is capable of distinguishing as 
aforesaid the tribunal may have regard to the extent to which -
(a) the service mark is inherently capable of distinguishing as 
aforesaid; and 
(b) by reason of the use of the service mark or of any other 
circumstances, the service mark is in fact capable of 
distinguishing as aforesaid. 
(3) A service mark may be registered in Part B notwithstanding any 
registration in Part A in the name of the same proprietor of the same 
service mark or any part or parts thereof 
123 
There are no essential particulars and categories of 
marks equivalent to those set out in section 9. 
Essentially, the only requirement for registrability of a 
mark in Part B was that it should be "capable of 
distinguishing" goods or services, connected in the 
course of trade or business (as the case may be) from 
those of others. Similarly to when adaptability to 
distinguish was being considered in the context of 
section 9, regard could be had to inherent and actual 
capability when considering whether a mark possessed that 
property which rendered it "capable of distinguishing". 
Clearly "capable of distinguishing" is wider than 
"adapted to distinguish". Nevertheless "inherently 
capable of distinguishing" required something inherent in 
the mark itself apart from mere user which made it 
capable of distinguishing particular goods or services. 
Whether a mark could in fact be "capable of 
distinguishing" was a matter of proof based on evidence 
of use of the mark. 74 
No precise line of demarcation between the concepts 
74. Moses Trade Marks Practice 29; See also Weldmesh TM [1966] R.P.C. 220 227. 
124 
"adapted to distinguish" and "capable of distinguishing" 
was ever determined by the courts or laid down in 
practice as an investigation of the sources will 
reveal. All that is certain is that the registrability 
requirements of section 10 were less stringent than those 
of section 9. 
The absence of absolute criteria valid when considering 
either section are also clearly a consequence of the role 
played by the exercise of the Registrar's discretion in 
the application thereof. In regard to Part B marks 
particularly a practice evolved around guidelines as to 
how the Registrar would exercise his discretion when 
considering applications. 
In practice applications for registration of trade or 
service marks were first considered for registration in 
Part A under section 9 - Part B applications de novo being 
rare. 
Registration in Part B for the most part occurred where 
border-line cases for registration in Part A failed to 
qualify for Part A registration at the instance of the 
Registry in the exercise of the Registrar's discretion. 
The Registry would consider, in respect of unused marks, 
whether they were inherently distinctive as contemplated 
by section 9 and where evidence of distinctiveness had 
been lodged, whether 
sufficient degree of 
the evidence 
distinctiveness 
established 
for Part 
a 
A 
acceptance to be granted. On the lower end of the scale 
there was a tendency to accept marks for Part B 
registration which were clearly not registrable in Part A 
of the register and which were essentially border-line 
f . b · 1 · 75 cases or reg1stra 1 1ty. 
Section 10 of the 1938 Act, differs in two substantial 
respects from the corresponding section under the Act of 
75. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 131; See also Cornish Intellectual Property 448. 
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1919, section 2. Firstly, under the 1919 Act, bona fide 
use of a trade mark for two years prior to the date of 
the application was a condition precedent to Part B 
registration. 
The 1938 Act omitted this distinction. Secondly, in the 
event of the condition precedent being fulfilled and the 
mark not off ending against any other provision of the 
Act, the Registrar was directed to register the mark in 
Part B. This direction to register was omitted from the 
1938 Act, as well. 
When considering Part B applications under the 1938 Act 
there was a discretion as with Part A applications which 
required determination upon the exercise of similar 
principles i.e. whether the mark was inherently capable 
of distinguishing goods or services or whether by reason 
of use or other circumstances the mark was, in fact, 
capable of distinguishing. 
It must also be borne in mind that names, signatures or 
words which did not satisfy the requirements of section 
9 (1) (a) (d) could only obtain registration in Part A 
upon satisfactory evidence of distinctiveness being 
adduced. In the case of Part B, however, such marks 
could be accepted in the exercise of the Registrar's 
discretion without evidence having to be adduced. 
Finally, regard must be had to the following passage from 
Blanco White & Jacob regarding a further difference 
between the parts: 
Whilst the question of capacity to distinguish must of course be decided 
as of the date of the application for registration, it should be borne in 
mind that evidence of subsequent events may be particularly relevant to a 
part B application: for if a mark has between application and decision 
become distinctive (even to particular groups of people or in particular 
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places) it must at the date of application been capable of doing so. 76 
5. REMAINING DISQUALIFICATIONS 
An applicant who reached the stage where his trade or 
service mark qualified as such under the definitions of 
mark and trade or service mark in terms of the Act and 
who satisfied the distinctiveness requirements for 
either Part A or Part B registration thereunder could 
anticipate that his mark would proceed to registration: 
provided it was not deceptive in the sense that, at the 
date of application, it was identical or closely similar 
to that of another party or was deceptive in some other 
way in that it created a misleading impression about the 
nature of the goods or services which it was intended to 
distinguish. 77 This brings us to a consideration of 
sections 11 and 12 of the Act. 
5.1 Marks offending section 11 
Section 11 of the 1938 Act, as amended, provided: 
11 Prohibition of registration of deceptive. etc .. matter 
It shall not be lawful to register as a trade mark or part of a trade mark 
any matter the use of which would, by reason of its being likely to deceive 
or cause confusion or otherwise, be disentitled to protection in a court of 
justice, or would be contrary to law or morality, or any scandalous 
design. 
The provision applied to service marks with no special 
modifications. "Service mark" merely replaced "trade 
mark" in the text. 
The provision has a long history having its origin in the 
common law prior to the 1875 Act. According to Blanco 
76. The aforegoing discussion is derived from Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 128 -
129 where the quotation appears at p 129 and Moses Trade Marks Practice 28 - 29. 
77. See Cornish Intellectual Property 448 - 449. 
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White &: Jacob the "protection" referred to was that 
afforded a distinctive mark at common law which had 
been adopted by a trader and used (regardless of 
recognition by the public) . 78 The provision was first 
enacted in 1875. 79 
Reference to a "court of justice" in the 1883 Act 
replaced reference to "a court of equity" in the 1875 Act 
- resulting from the procedural changes brought about by 
the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875. The 1883 Act 
featured a change in drafting style whilst "words" was 
replaced by "matter" in the 1905 and 1938 Acts. Then, 
the words "as a trade mark or part of a trade mark" 
replaced the words "as part of or in combination with a 
trade mark" under of the 1905 Act which omitted all 
provision for registering additions to trade marks. 
The 1905 Act included "or would be contrary to law or 
morality" whilst the 1938 Act added "or cause confusion". 
The word "likely" replaced the word "calculated" in the 
1938 Act. 80 The cumulative effect of all these changes 
over the years was to widen the scope of the provision. 
It is to be noted that the section was not intended to 
81 benefit traders alone but also the public at large. 
78. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 165 - 166. But see GE Trade Mark [1973] 
R.P.C. 297 at 325 - 326. 
79. The relevant part of section 6 of the 1875 Act provided: "It shall not be lawful to 
register as part of or in combination with a trade mark any words the exclusive use of 
which would not, by reason of there being calculated to deceive or otherwise, be 
deemed entitled to protection in a court of equity; or any scandalous designs". 
Section 73 of the 1883 Act provided: "It shall not be lawful to register as part of or in 
combination with a trade mark any words the exclusive use of which would, by reason 
of there being calculated to deceive or otherwise, be deemed disentitled to protection in 
a Court of Justice, or any scandalous design". 
Section 11 of the 1905 Act provided: "It shall not be lawful to register as a trade mark 
or part of a trade mark any matter, the use of which would by reason of its being 
calculated to deceive or otherwise be disentitled to protection in a court of justice, or 
would be contrary to law or morality, or any scandalous design". 
80. See Reid Trade Marks 29 - 30; Lloyd and Bray Kerly 7th ed. 237 footnote 7. 
81. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 165. 
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In a broad sense section 11 and its predecessors 
comprised a general provision under 
could be refused for sound reasons. 
objectionable under another section 
which registration 
Thus, if a mark was 
it offended also 
section 11 in the broad sense that the other sections 
were part of the "law" the contravention of which section 
11 eschewed as being "contrary to law". 82 
Those aspects of the section "contrary to law or 
morality" and "any scandalous design" were never relied 
upon to a significant degree. 83 
Objections under the section were of two main types: 
1. where there was some vice in the mark itself; 
2. where there was some improper manner of use or 
dealing in the mark involved. 84 
A number of categories of deception covered by the 
provision are discernible such as deception or confusion 
85 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
concerning the quality of the product or service; 86 
87 giving rise to a public danger; 
88 
concerning geographical origin; 
concerning the form of trade connection; 89 
concerning spurious suggestions of approval or 
. . 90 
association; 
82. Reid Trade Marks 29. 
83. Reid Trade Marks 3. See for example Hallelujah Trade Mark [19761 R.P.C. 605. 
84. Reid Trade Marks 29 - 32. 
85. Cornish Intellectual Property 454 - 456. 
86. Seligmann's Application (1954) 7 R.P.C. 52. 
87. Levi Thomas Edward's Application (1946) 63 R.P.C. 19. 
88. See for example Wee Mc Glen Trade Mark (1980) R.P.C. 115. 
89. Aristoc v Rysta (1945) 62 R.P.C. 65. 
90. Vitasafe T.M. (1963) R.P.C. 250; Golden Jet T.M. (1979) R.P.C. 19. 
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f) concerning spurious statements about legal rights, 
for example by using the words "patent 11 , 11 copyright" 
or other words asserting rights which the applicant 
did not have or could not enforce; 91 
g) concerning other marks on the register. Here 
section 11 would avail in most cases where a 
confusingly similar mark could not be relied upon 
under section 12(1) because the goods or services of 
the application were not considered to be of the 
same description to the goods or services covered by 
the registered mark. 92 
Section 11 would also come into play in circumstances 
where the deception or confusion arose or was likely to 
arise through prior use of an unregistered mark. It was 
not necessary that the prior use be upon the same goods 
for which registration was sought or for goods of the 
same description. It was in this regard also not 
necessary to show that the prior use had vested in the 
prior user such a reputation in the mark that use of the 
mark proposed to be registered would be a passing off 
vis-a-vis the unregistered mark. Where a real tangible 
danger of confusion as to the source of the marks in the 
minds of a number of persons was present the application 
was to be refused. 93 
The test for deception contemplated by the provision did 
not visit every form of deception offensive to the 
section. The section only provided a sanction where the 
risk of confusion or deception would disentitle the 
1 . f . . f . . 94 app icant rom protection in a court o Justice. 
The section was mandatory and not discretionary in its 
operation. As stated by Morton J in the Black Magic 
case
95 
91. Cornish Intellectual Property 456; Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 171. 
92. Levi Thomas Edward's Application (1946) 63 R.P.C. 19. 
93. Cornish Intellectual Property 449 - 450 and Bali T.M. [19691 R.P.C. 472 496 - 497. 
94. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 165. 
95. Hack's Application (1941) 58 R.P.C. 91 108. 
What the Registrar has to decide in the first instance under section 11 .... 
is a question of fact. In deciding it, the Registrar is not, in my view, 
exercising a discretion at all. . . . . . . . The discretion of the Registrar arises 
if, and only if, he decided that preliminary question off act in favour of 
the applicant; he has a discretion to register or refuse the registration. 
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An objection under section 11 could be taken at three 
stages i.e. at examination, or during opposition or 
expungement proceedings. 
5.2 Marks offending section 12 
Section 12 provided regarding trade marks: 
12 Prohibition of registration of identical and resembling trade marks 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, no trade 
mark shall be registered in respect of any goods or description of goods 
that is identical with or nearly resembles a mark belonging to a dijf erent 
proprietor and already on the register in respect of -
(a) the same goods, 
(b) the same description of goods, or 
(c) services or a description of services which are associated with those 
goods or goods of that description. 
(2) In case of honest concurrent use, or of other special circumstances 
which in the opinion of the Court or the Registrar make it proper so to 
do, the Court or the Registrar may permit the registration by more than 
one proprietor, in respect of -
(a) the same goods, 
(b) the same description of goods, or 
(c) goods and services or descriptions of goods and services which are 
associated with each other, 
of marks that are identical or nearly resemble each other, subject to such 
conditions and limitations, if any, as the Court or the Registrar, as the 
case may be, may think it right to impose. 
(3) Where separate applications are made by different persons to be 
registered as proprietors respectively of marks that are identical or nearly 
resemble each other, in respect of -
(a) the same goods, 
(b) the same description of goods, or 
(c) goods and services or descriptions of goods and services which are 
associated with each other, 
the Registrar may refuse to register any of them until their rights have 
been determined by the Court, or have been settled by agreement in a 
manner approved by him or on an appeal (which may be brought either 
to the Board of Trade or to the Court at the option of the appellant) by 
the Board or the Court, as the case may be. 
Section 12 provided regarding service marks: 
12 Prohibition of registration of identical and resembling service marks 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, no service 
mark shall be registered in respect of any services or description of 
services that is identical with or nearly resembles a mark belonging to a 
different proprietor and already on the register in respect of the same 
services, the same description of services, or goods or a description of 
goods which are associated with those services or services of that 
description. 
(2) In case of honest concurrent use, or of other special circumstances 
which in the opinion of the Court or the Registrar make it proper so to 
do, the Court or the Registrar may permit the registration by more than 
one proprietor, in respect of -
(a) the same services, 
(b) the same description of services, or 
(c) services and goods or descriptions of services and goods which are 
associated with each other, 
of marks that are identical or nearly resemble each other, subject to such 
conditions and limitations, if any, as the Court or the Registrar, as the 
case may be, may think it right to impose. 
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(3) Where separate applications are made by different persons to be 
registered as proprietors respectively of marks that are identical or 
nearly resemble each other, in respect of -
(a) the same services, 
(b) the same description of services, or 
(c) services and goods or descriptions of services and goods which are 
associated with each other, 
the Registrar may refuse to register any of them until their rights have 
been determined by the Court, or have been settled by agreement in a 
manner approved by him or on an appeal (which may be brought either 
to the Board of Trade or the the Court at the option of the appellant) by 
the Board or the Court, as the case may be. 
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Note must also be taken of section 68(2) (B) which 
provided regarding both trade marks and service marks: 
(2B) References in this Act to a near resemblance of marks are 
references to a resemblance so near as to be likely to deceive or cause 
confusion. 
Section 12(1) had as its object the prevention of 
deception or confusion which might arise if identical or 
closely resembling trade marks for the same goods or 
d . . f d 11 d h . 96 escr1pt1on o goo s were a owe on t e register. 
The origin of the provision was to be found in section 11 
of the 1875 Act which featured a wording not too 
dissimilar from that of section 12(1) of the 1938 Act. 97 
96. Moses Trade Marks Practice 35. 
97. The first paragraph of section 6 of the 1875 Act provided: "The Registrar shall not, 
without the special leave of the Court, to be given in the prescribed manner, register in 
respect of the same goods or classes of goods a trade mark identical with one which is 
already registered with respect to such goods or classes of goods, and the Registrar 
shall not register with respect to the same goods or classes of goods a trade mark so 
nearly resembling a trade mark already on the register with respect to such goods or 
classes of goods as to be calculated to deceive". 
133 
The matters dealt with in section 12 were covered by 
sections 19, 20 and 21 of the 1905 Act (as amended) in 
substantially the same terms at that of the 1938 Act. 
Section 39(8) extended the operation of section 12 to the 
so called refused marks for textile goods which were 
treated as registered marks for the purpose of section 
12 (1) and 12 (2). 
Section 12 could be raised at three stages, namely, upon 
examination, at the time of opposition and at the time of 
expungement. The onus was upon the applicant to show 
that section 12(1) was not applicable at the examination 
and opposition stages. Where section 12 was relied upon 
in an expungement application, however, the onus was on 
the party seeking expungement to show the applicability 
of section 12(1) because expungement was always a matter 
of discretion under the Act and the wording of the 
enabling section section 32(1) was couched in 
d . . 98 1scret1onary terms. 
A court had to deal with two questions in considering the 
applicability of section 12(1): 
Under Section 12(1) the Tribunal has to consider two questions (a) 
whether any of the goods in respect of which the applicants are seeking 
registration are the same or of the same description as any of the goods 
of any one or more of the relevant trade marks already on the Register 
and cited against the pending application; and (b) if this question is 
answered in the affirmative, whether, presuming use of the marks in a 
normal and fair manner, there will be a reasonable likelihood of 
deception or confusion arising among a substantial number of persons if 
the mark is allowed to be registered. 99 
The statutory classification of goods and services was 
regarded as being merely a guide and could not determine 
98. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 34. 
99. Per Lloyd and Bray Kerly 7th ed. 21 7. 
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the question whether goods or services were the same or 
of the same description. Thus, that goods or services 
under consideration were classified in the same or 
different classes was not conclusive. 100 The enquiry was 
one of fact. 
the cases: 
Lloyd and Bray observe with reference to 
The time test whether or not goods are "of the same description" would 
seem to be supplied by the question - Are the two sets of goods so 
commonly dealt in by the same trader that his customers, knowing his 
mark in connection with one set and seeing it upon the other, would be 
likely to suppose that is was used upon them also to indicate that they 
were his goods? The matter should be looked at from a business and 
commercial point of view. As Viscount Dunedin said in the Myol Case, 
"The material considerations arising in connection with the registration 
of Trade Marks are practical". Statutory classification is no criterion as 
to whether or not two sets of goods are of the same description. 
In Jellinek's Application, Romer, J., classified the various matters to be 
taken into account in deciding whether goods are goods of the same 
description into three classes -
(a) the nature and composition of the goods; 
(b) the respective uses of the articles; 
(c) the trade channels through which the commodities respectively are 
bought and sold. 101 
When considering the possibility of trade and service 
marks conflicting as contemplated by section 12 the test 
was one of association in terms of the section. The 
question resolves itself as one of statutory definition, 
therefore, as section 68(2A) - inserted by the 1984 Act -
provides: 
(2A) For the purposes of this Act goods and services are associated with 
each other if it is likely that those goods might be sold or othenvise 
traded in and those services might be provided by the same business, and 
so with descriptions of goods and descriptions of services. 
100. See Lloyd and Bray Kerly 7th ed. 218 - 219; Reid Trade Marks 35. 
101. Lloyd and Bray Kerly 7th ed. 218 - 219. See also McDowell's Appn. (1947) 63 R.P.C. 
36 (the Myol case) and Jellineks' Application (1946) 63 R.P.C. 59 (the Panda case). 
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It is to be noted that it did not matter whether the 
conflicting mark upon which section 12(1) was invoked was 
P A P B . . l' . 102 a art or art registration or app ication. 
It is to be noted further that the finding that an 
applicant's mark contravened section 12(1) was a finding 
of fact compelling the Registrar to refuse the 
application. No discretion to allow registration was 
available as is clear from the mandatory wording of the 
section. 103 
The provisions of section 12 (1) embodied the old rule, 
taken up in the 1875 Act, that a mark which can from its 
resemblance to an existing trade mark be regarded as 
being "calculated to deceive" cannot be protected as a 
trade mark because its use would infringe the other trade 
mark and a court would restrain this conduct. 
In applying section 12 no regard was had to use of the 
mark applied for. The onus of proving that no reasonable 
probability of deception was present was cast upon the 
applicant for registration of the mark and this onus 
became heavier where the mark had not been used and no 
trade had been established in it without complaint or 
restraint by others. As with section 11, the restriction 
on registration of deceptive marks under section 12 were 
not only for the protection of traders with marks on the 
register but also for the protection of the public. 
Thus, the consent of the proprietor of a registered mark 
could not bind the registry in the application of either 
. 104 
sections. 
5.3 Honest Concurrent User 
In the case of honest concurrent use or other special 
circumstances section 12(2) afforded the Court or the 
Registrar the discretion to allow side by side 
102. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 145 - 146. 
103. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 146. 
104. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 224 - 226. 
136 
registration of identical or merely resembling marks in 
respect of the same goods or description of goods or 
services, subject to limitations if necessary. 105 
It is to be noted that section 12(2) provided an 
exception to section 12(1) only and could not be applied 
h . . f . 9 d 106 to overcome t e provisions o sections an 11. 
The onus was upon the applicant to justify registration 
under section 12 ( 2) . All the surrounding circumstances 
were taken into consideration such as the degree of 
deception and confusion likely to arise from use of the 
two marks, the circumstances under which the applicant 
chose the mark, the period of use of the mark, the extent 
of use of the marks, the existence of evidence of 
confusion in actual use of the mark applied for, the size 
of the parties enterprises, geographical considerations, 
the goods or services in respect of which the respective 
marks were actually in use and the hardships involved in 
. . . . h k 107 registering or not registering t e mar . 
Cornish points out that when the register was first 
established there were numerous instances where 
unconnected honest users sought registration for similar 
marks at the same time. The court was given a discretion 
to admit such users to the register under the earlier 
acts and a three mark rule developed as a question of 
practice ie. three registrations of identical or similar 
marks could be allowed but no more. Additional marks were 
regarded as common to the trade. 108 Hence this earlier 
arrangement - but without the three mark rule - found an 
105. See section 12(2) set out at p 130, 131 supra. 
106. Moses Trade Marks Practice 48. 
107. See Moses Trade Marks Practice 48; Reid Trade Marks 41; Cornish Intellectual 
Property 451 - 452; Blanco White and Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 158; Alex Pirie and Sons 
Ltd.'s Application (1933) 50 R.P.C. 147. 
108. Cornish Intellectual Property 451 . 
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echo in section 12(2) of the 1938 Act. 109 
Essentially, the matter concerned a balancing of the 
public interest with the private interests of the 
applicant: 
A delicate balance is involved in deciding whether registration should be 
permitted under Section 12(2). Once it is decided that the marks are 
potentially confusing, the public interest in not having the marks upon the 
register has to be set against the legitimate interest of the traders which 
derives from their actual use. There is no obligation to allow registration 
despite a high risk of confusion; and if one of the users can prove that the 
other is passing-off in any circumstances, he may sue to prevent it. The 
exception should, in other words, be regarded not as one in which the 
public interest gives place to private entitlement, so much as one in which 
a special concession is allowed if the danger to the public can be reduced 
. . 110 to minor proportion. 
5.4 Conflicting Co-Pending Applications 
Section 12(3) provided for the situation where there was 
a conflict between pending applications. As such it was 
not an exception to section 12(1) which applied only when 
the prior mark was registered. 
Section 12(3) empowered the Registrar to refuse both 
applications until the applicants' rights had been 
determined by a court or settled by agreement inter se in a 
manner acceptable to the Registrar or a Tribunal on 
Appeal. 111 
In this regard it must be noted that although at first 
glance the first applicant to apply should have prevailed 
the history of the British system led to claims based upon 
109. Cornish Intellectual Property 452. 
110. Cornish Intellectual Property 452. 
111. See section 12(3) set out at p 131, 132 supra. 
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actual use in trade being preferred. Thus, if one of the 
rival applicants had commenced use before the other 
applicant had either used or registered the mark and had 
continued use without interruption, he had a better right 
to register and could not, under section 7 of the Act, be 
sued for infringement. Should his rival have obtained 
registration first he could seek concurrent registration. 
In the event of concurrent registration not being sought 
or not succeeding, he could seek to remove the other mark 
on the basis of section 11 in order to make way for 
. . f h' k 112 reg1strat1on o is own mar . 
6. MISCELLANEOUS REMAINING RESTRAINTS 
An applicant who satisfied the requirements of sections 
68, 9 or 10 and who overcame the obstacles of sections 
11 and 12 would be entitled to registration provided his 
mark was not generic in terms of section 15 of the Act or 
did not off end rules 15 - 18 of the Board of Trade under 
sections 40 (1) and (2) of the Act. These rules related 
to marks implying or claiming patent, design, copyright 
or hall-mark status, other unfounded legal claims, 
112. Section 7 of the 1938 Act provided: 
"7 Saving for vested rights 
Nothing in this Act shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of a registered trade 
mark to interfere with or restrain the use by any person of a trade mark identical with or 
nearly resembling it in relation to goods in relation to which that person or a predecessor 
in title of his has continuously used that trade mark from a date anterior -
(a) to the use of the first-mentioned trade mark in relation to those goods by the 
proprietor or a predecessor in title of his; or 
(b) to the registration of the first-mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods in 
the name of the proprietor or a predecessor in title of his; 
whichever is the earlier, or to object (on such use being proved) to that person being put 
on the register for that identical or nearly resembling trade mark in respect of those 
goods under subsection (2) of section twelve of this Act." 
When the Act applied to service marks the words "service marks" replaced the words 
"trade marks" in the section. 
See Cornish Intellectual Property 453. 
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implications of royal patronage, representations of 
royalty and use of certain prohibited crosses or armorial 
bearings. Finally, note must be taken of section 39(5) 
regarding textile piece goods in respect of which the 
section prohibited trade marks consisting of line 
headings and section 15 (3) which restricted registration 
of trade marks which related to the names of certain 
chemical substances. 
7. IN SUM 
In order to obtain registration of a mark as a trade or 
service mark under the 1938 Act as amended the applicant 
had a four element onus to discharge. He had to show 
firstly that his mark qualified as a mark, secondly that 
his mark qualified as a trade or service mark, thirdly 
that his mark was sufficiently distinctive or was capable 
of distinguishing to a degree which would qualify it for 
acceptance (the registrability provisions), and fourthly 
that it was not disqualified from registration under a 
number of provisions (the bars to registration) . To all 
this a considerable body of case law and Registrar's 
practice applied. 
The trade mark law of the United Kingdom, throughout its 
development, evidenced a tension between the rights of 
the proprietor on the one hand and the public interest -
represented by the principle that confusion and deception 
should be eschewed on the other. This tension 
indicated not a conflict of principle but a balancing of 
' 113 interests. 
It was the principle that use of a trade mark should not 
result in public confusion and deception which determined 
the limits of and circumscribed the proprietor's rights 
on the one hand - and it was the bar to registration 
provisions which illustrated this most aptly. 
113. See GE Trade Mark [19731 R.P.C. 297 326. 
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On the other hand, the infringement provisions determined 
the extent of operation of the registered trade mark or 
service mark right. These provisions are considered in 
the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
UNITED KINGDOM: mE 1938 ACT - INFRINGEMENT 
This chapter deals in the main with the infringement of 
registered trade marks under the 1938 Act (as amended and 
supplemented to date of repeal) . It commences with a 
review of those sections of the earlier Acts which set 
out the probative value and extent of the registered 
trade mark right under each of the enactments concerned. 
It will be seen that the earlier enactments confirmed the 
common law for the most part whilst the 1938 Act extended 
the infringement action some way beyond its traditional 
form. 
1. INFRINGEMENT UNDER mE EARLIER ACTS 
The 1875 and 1883 Acts provided that registration of a 
trade mark afforded prima facie evidence of the proprietor's 
right to the exclusive use thereof subject to the 
provisions of the enactment concerned. The relevant 
sections 1 provided further that after the effluxion of 
five years a valid registration would provide conclusive 
evidence of an exclusive right. The validity of a 
registration could however be attacked and the entry 
d . 2 expunge at any time. 
Valid registration under the 1905 Act gave the registrant 
the exclusive right of use of the registered trade mark 
subject to the provisions of the Act and the original 
registration 
subject to 
. 3 
sections. 
was regarded conclusive after seven years -
the limitations set out in the relevant 
1. See sections 3 and 76 respectively. 
2. See Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 398. 
3. See sections 39, 40 and 41. 
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It will be recalled that the 1919 Act introduced Part B 
registration. 4 It provided that Part B registration 
afforded prima facie evidence of an exclusive right of use 
of the registered mark. 5 Part B registrations did not 
however ever become conclusive despite the passage of 
time. Thus Part B registrations remained permanently 
open to attack. Part A registrations followed the 
provisions of the 1905 Act (which included marks 
registered prior to the 1919 Act) . 
Until the 1938 Act introduced extensive changes no 
earlier Act attempted to define the nature of the 
exclusive right afforded by registration or the actions 
which infringed a registration. 6 
It will be recalled that the legislation prior to the 
1938 Act had been largely aimed at establishing a system 
of enacted rights which took up the common law into 
legislation and supplemented it in an insubstantial way. 7 
Under the earlier Acts the ambit of the registered trade 
mark right and the acts which infringed it were to be 
derived from the general principles laid down by the 
cases. 8 
The key principles were to be found in the Champagne 
Heidsieck case in which it was held that: 
(a) the exclusive right to use a trade mark conferred upon 
the proprietor through registration was the right to use 
the mark as a trade mark i.e. as indicating that the 
goods upon which it was placed were his goods and to 
exclude others from selling goods which were not his 
under the mark; 
4. See p 62 supra. 
5. Section 4. 
6. See Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 399. 
7 See p 86 supra. 
8. See Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 399. 
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~) this exclusive right did not, however, empower the 
proprietor to exercise control over his goods once they 
had been sold. 9 
2. 1938 ACT: INFRINGEMENT OF PART A REGISTRATIONS 
9. 
The provisions relating to infringement of Part A 
registrations were structured as follows: 
The right afforded a registrant through registration in 
Part A of the register was defined in section 4 (1) of 
the Act whilst the right afforded by Part B registration 
was defined in section 5 (1) . 
Those acts which constituted infringement were defined in 
sections 4 (1) (a) and (b) whilst certain acts which were 
saved from infringement were defined in sections 4 (2), 
( 3 ) , ( 4 ) , ( 6 ) and ( 7 ) . 
Section 5(2) excluded certain infringement-type acts from 
constituting an infringement of Part B registrations. 
Each of these matters are considered briefly in turn in 
the following paragraphs. 
Champagne Heidsieck et Cie Monopole Societe Anonyme v Buxton (1930) 47 R.P.C. 28. 
This case is discussed at greater length in chapter 10. See p 232-234 infra. The 
degree to which the 1 938 Act extended the ambit of the right so described - if at all - is 
not clear. According to Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 264-265 the "exclusive 
right" of section 4 ( 1) covered what was covered before 1938, plus what was specified 
by section 4 ( 1 )(b) and nothing more. (See also Bismag Ltd v Amblins (Chemists) Ltd 
(1940) 57 R.P.C. 209). According to the authors at p 263: "It was well settled, under 
the previous Acts, that the "exclusive right" given by registration was limited to use as 
an indication of origin of the user's goods." 
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2 .1 The Registered right 
Registration of a trade mark in Part A of the register 
afforded the registered proprietor of the mark the 
exclusive right to use it in relation to the goods or 
services in respect of which it was registered, subject 
to the provisions of the Act. 10 
A Part B registration conferred the same exclusive right 
upon a proprietor as did a Part A registration but was 
subject to the provisions of section 5(2) of the Act. 11 
The essence of the right was to exclude others from using 
the registered mark in connection with the goods or 
services in respect of which it was registered. 
In general registration gave no right of use to a mark 
which did not already exist without registration [except 
in the case of the use of concurrently registered 
identical or nearly resembling marks (an aspect 
specifically provided for in section 4 ( 4) ] . 12 An 
important consequence thereof was this: the mere fact of 
registration was not a defence to a passing off action 
against a registrant in respect of use of the registered 
mark. 13 
2.2 Sections 4(1)(a) and (b). 14 
In regard to trade marks the section provided: 
4(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, and of sections seven and 
eight of this Act, the registration (whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act) of a person in Part A of the register as 
proprietor of a trade mark (other than a certification trade mark) in 
10. Section 4(1 ). 
11. Section 5(1 ). Section 5(2) is discussed at p 152-154 infra. 
12. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 262-263. 
13. See section 2 of the Act. 
14. Regarding the wording of the section see Bismag Ltd v Amblins (Chemists) Ltd (1940) 
57 R.P.C. 209 232, 237. 
respect of any goods shall, if valid, give or be deemed to have given to 
that person the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to 
those goods and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing 
words, that right shall be deemed to be infringed by any person who, not 
being the proprietor of the trade mark or a registered user thereof using 
by way of the permitted use, uses in the course of trade a mark identical 
with or nearly resembling it, in relation to any goods in respect of which 
it is registered, and in such manner as to render the use of the mark likely 
to be taken either -
(a) as being use as a trade mark; or 
(b) in a case in which the use is use upon the goods or in physical 
relation thereto or in an advertising circular or other advertisement 
issued to the public, as importing a reference to some person having 
the right either as proprietor or as registered user to use the trade 
mark or to goods with which such a person as aforesaid is connected 
in the course of trade. 
In regard to service marks the section provided: 
4(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, and of sections seven and 
eight of this Act, the registration (after the coming into force of the 
Trade Marks (Amendment) Act 1984) of a person in Part A of the 
register as proprietor of a service mark in respect of any services 
shall, if valid, give to that person the exclusive right to the use of the 
service mark in relation to those services and, without prejudice to 
the generality of the foregoing words, that right shall be deemed to 
be infringed by any person who, not being the proprietor of the 
service mark or a registered user thereof using by way of the 
permitted use, uses in connection with the provision of any services a 
mark identical with or nearly resembling it in relation to any services 
in respect of which it is registered, and in such manner as to render 
the use of the mark likely to be taken either -
(a) as being use as a service mark; or 
145 
(b) in a case in which the use is use at or near the place where the 
services are available for acceptance or peiformed or in an 
advenising circular or other advenisement issued to the public, as 
imponing a reference to some person having the right either as 
proprietor or as registered user to use the mark or to services with 
the provision of which such a person as aforesaid is connected in the 
course of business. 
2.3 Section 4(l)(a) Infringements 
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An analysis of section 4(1) (a) reveals that a valid Part 
A registration was infringed by non-permitted use by 
persons other than the proprietor, of an identical or 
nearly resembling mark as a trade mark in the course of 
trade (or as a service mark in the provision of 
services), in relation to the goods (or services in the 
case of service marks) covered by the registration. 
These circumstances represented the traditional and only 
form of infringement recognised by the registration 
system before the advent of the 1938 Act and section 4 
(1) (b) infringements. 15 
The Plaintiff's title depended upon a valid 
. . 16 d . . d . registration an upon registration a tra e or service 
mark acquired the date upon which the application for its 
registration was filed as the date of its registration. 17 
Damages were only claimable if they arose after the date 
of application for registration whether or not 
Convention priority had been claimed in respect of the 
1 . . 18 app ication. 
15. Cornish Intellectual Property 472. 
16. See Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 395. 
17. Section 19 (1 ). 
18. See sections 39A(2) and A(3). 
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A defendant using an identical or closely resembling 
mark otherwise than as a trade mark did not commit an act 
of infringement under section 4(1) (a) . 19 
What is meant by "identical mark" needs no explanation 
but the concept of "nearly resembling" marks requires 
comment. 
It will be recalled that section 68 (2B) provided that 
references in the Act to near resemblance of marks "are 
references to a resemblance so near as to be likely to 
deceive or cause confusion". The concept of near 
resemblance or confusing similarity in section 4 (1) and 
section 5 (2) embodied in the wording "likely to deceive 
or cause confusion" was the same as that applied under 
sections 11 and 12 (1). In the context of section 4 it 
was the task of the Court to establish, objectively and 
according to the normal rules of the burden of proof in 
civil proceedings, whether relevant members of the public 
were more likely to be deceived or confused than not. 20 
In actions for infringement under the 1938 Act a 
comparison was to be made between the mark as registered 
taking into account any disclaimer and the 
defendant's mark as it appeared in actual use. 21 
Otherwise than in the case of passing-off the manner of 
actual use of the registered mark by the plaintiff was 
irrelevant in a trade mark infringement action. The 
defendant's mark in actual use was compared with a 
19. Of the later cases Mars GB Ltd v Cadbury Ltd [19871 R.P.C. 387 affords an apt example 
where "treat size" used otherwise than as a trade mark was held not to infringe a 
registrations for TREETS. See also Unidoor Ltd v Marks & Spencer pie [19881 R.P.C. 
275 and Mothercare UK Ltd v Penquin Books Ltd [19881 R.P.C. 275. 
20. Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 19.3.3 Rel 5 [1994]. 
21. Per Lord Cameron in Coca-Cola Co v William Struthers & Sons Ltd [19681 R.P.C. 231 
242; See also Saville Perfumery Ltd v June Perfect and F W Woolworth & Co Ltd 
[1941158 R.P.C. 147 161. 
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reasonable and honest use of the registered mark by the 
plaintiff. In this sense the test for confusion in 
. f . . . f. . 1 22 in ringement actions was an arti icia one. 
The taking of one or more of its essential features could 
infringe a registered trade mark. 23 
Whether or not the use complained of was in the course of 
trade or in the provision of services was a question of 
fact and no ready-made test at law for the presence of 
. h . l' d . 24 eit er materia ise over time. 
The Cheetah case (one of the last decided before repeal 
of the 1938 Act) illustrates the application of the 
section. There the Court held use of a registered mark 
not upon goods or their container but in documentation 
issued subsequent to delivery of the goods to be use of 
the mark in the course of trade and inf ringing use under 
section 4 (1) (a) . 25 
Infringement could 
complained of was 
occur 
upon 
the 
only when the use of 
or in relation to 
the mark 
goods or 
services within letter of the registered 
specification. Use on or in relation to approximate 
goods or services not specifically covered or upon goods 
or services of the same description would not 
. f . . 26 h h in ringement action. T e onus was upon t e 
of the registered mark to show infringement. 27 
22. See Cornish Intellectual Property 474. 
23. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 273. 
sustain an 
proprietor 
24. See the discussion of this element in Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 265 - 266 & 
Jacob, Kitchin and Mellor Supplement to Kerly 33 - 34, from which this conclusion is 
derived. 
25. Cheetah TM [1993] F.S.R. 389. 
26. See Cornish Intellectual Property 473. 
27. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 272. 
2.4 Section 4 (l)(b) Infringements 
In the Yeast-Vite 28 case 
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the Appellants had a 
registration for the trade mark YEAST-VITE in class 3 in 
respect of medicinal 
The Respondents had 
the fallowing on 
preparations of yeast for human use. 
sold a tablet in bottles featuring 
the label: "Yeast Tablets" a 
substitution for "Yeast-Vite". The Appellants alleged 
infringement. The House of the Lords held that there had 
been no infringement because the Respondents had not used 
the words "Yeast-Vite" on its labels so as to indicate 
that the goods to which the expression on the label 
applied were the goods of the Appellants indeed the 
Respondents had correctly stated the origin of the goods. 
Although the enactments provided a registrant with an 
exclusive right to use a registered trade mark this did 
not mean that the proprietor could stop use of the mark 
in every case. His right was limited to preventing use 
of the registered mark as a trade mark in connection with 
goods which were not his goods and which were covered by 
h . d . f. . 29 t e registere speci 1cat1on. 
Section 4 (1) (b) of the 1938 Act was enacted to overrule 
the Yeast-Vite case30 so extending the trade mark 
infringement action beyond its traditional form. 
Under section 4 (1) (b) a valid Part A registration was 
infringed by non-permitted use by persons other than the 
proprietor, of an identical or nearly resembling mark in 
the course of trade (or as a service mark in the 
provision of services) in relation to the goods (or 
services in the case of service marks) for which it was 
registered, in the manner contemplated in (b) . 
28. Irving's Yeast-Vite Ltd v F.A. Horsenail [19341 51 R.P.C. 110. This case is discussed 
further at p 240-242 infra. 
29. Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 403. 
30. Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 19.4.1 Rel 5 [19941; Cornish Intellectual 
Property 479. 
2.4.1 
2.4.2 
2.4.3 
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The circumstances contemplated in (b) were use of an 
identical or nearly resembling mark: 
upon or in physical relation to goods (in the case of 
trade marks) or at or near the place where the services 
were available (in the case of service marks) ; 
alternatively in an advertising circular or other 
advertisement issued to the public; 
and in the case of both alternatives -
the use had to import a reference to: 
2.4.3.1 the proprietor; or 
2.4.3.2 a registered user; or 
2.4.3.3 the proprietors' or registered users' goods or services. 31 
No principles of general significance are to be derived 
from the decided cases under section 4 (1) (b) and the 
following limited observations serve for the purpose of 
this work. 
The comment in preceding paragraphs applicable to section 
4 (1) (a) infringements relating to a valid registration 
being pre-requisite, considerations regarding identical 
or nearly resembling marks and the concepts of use in the 
course of trade or in the provision of services in 
relation to the goods or services covered by the 
registered specification, apply equally to section 4 
(1) (b) infringements. 
It must however be observed that under the latter section 
as a general premise "public" meant the class of ordinary 
purchasers and not those in the trade in the goods or 
services concerned. Hence dealers and producers could 
31. See section 4(1 )(b) set out at p 145-146 supra. 
2.4.4 
2.4.5 
2.4.6 
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employ a description which included a trade mark or 
service mark when recommending goods to a trader who 
would not be deceived thereby but were not allowed to use 
such descriptions when goods were offered to the 
bl . 32 pu J.C. 
In this regard cognizance must be taken of the decision 
in Chanel Ltd v L'Arome where the Court departed from the 
general premise and held that a comparison chart forming 
part of a confidential document issued to distributors 
coupled with a contractual term forbidding exhibition 
thereof to customers was an advertisement to the public 
because of the numbers and the kind of distributor 
. 1 d 33 invo ve . 
The limits and scope of the phrase "importing a 
reference" was not closely defined and a numerus clausus of 
instances importing a reference could not be derived from 
the cases. The matter fell to be determined as a 
question of fact in each case. The following instances 
of non-trade mark use serve as examples: 
comparative comments (whether true or false) as to 
quality, similarity or price were for the most part taken 
as importing a reference; 
comparative advertising of products side by side with 
accompanying text implying that there was nothing to 
choose between the products was importing a reference; 
statements featuring the registered trade mark in such a 
way as to make capital out o+ a previous business 
connection with the proprietors of the registered trade 
mark were regarded as importing a reference. 34 
32. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 276 - 277. 
33. Chanel Ltd v L'Arome (UK) Ltd [19911 R.P.C. 335. 
34. In regard to "importing a reference" see Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 277 -
278; Cornish Intellectual Property 480 and Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 
19.4.5 Rel 5 [19941. 
3. 1938 ACT: INFRINGEMENT OF PART B REGISTRATIONS 
In regard to trade marks section 5 of the Act provided: 
(1) Except as provided by subsection (2) of this section, the registration 
(whether before or after the commencement of this Act) of a person in 
Part B of the register as proprietors of a trade mark in respect of any 
goods shall, if valid, give or be deemed to have given to the person the 
like right in relation to those goods as if the registration had been in Part 
A of the register, and the provisions of the last foregoing section shall 
have effect in like manner in relation to a trade mark registered in Part B 
of the register as they have effect in relation to a trade mark registered in 
Part A of the register. 
(2) In any action for infringement of the right to the use of a trade mark 
given by registration as aforesaid in Part B of the register, otherwise than 
by an act that is deemed to be an tnjringement by virtue of the next 
succeeding section, no injunction or other relief shall be granted to the 
plaintiff if the defendant establishes to the satisfaction of the court that 
the use of which the plaintiff complains is not likely to deceive or cause 
confusion or to be taken as indicating a connection in the course of trade 
between the goods and some person having the right as proprietor or as 
registered user to use the trade mark. 
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In regard to service marks section 5 of the Act provided: 
(1) Except as provided by subsection (2) of this section, the registration 
(after the commencement of the Trade Marks (Amendment) Act 1984) of a 
person in Part B of the register as proprietor of a service mark in respect 
of any services shall, if valid, give to that person the like right in relation 
to those services as if the registration had been in Part A of the register, 
and the provisions of the last foregoing section shall have effect in like 
manner in relation to a service mark registered in Part B of the register 
as they have effect in relation to a service mark registered in Part A of the 
register. 
(2) In any action for infringement of the right to the use of a trade mark 
given by registration as aforesaid in Part B of the register, otherwise than 
by an act that is deemed to be an infringement by virtue of the next 
succeeding section, no irljunction or other relief shall be granted to the 
plaintiff if the defendant establishes to the satisfaction of the court that 
the use of which the plaintiff complains is not likely to deceive or cause 
confusion or to be taken as indicating a connection in the course of trade 
between the goods and some person having the right as proprietor or as 
registered user to use the trade mark. 
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An analysis of the section reveals that a Part B 
registration afforded a registrant the same rights as did 
a Part A registration save for the provision of section 5 
(2) which would release a defendant from the consequences 
of infringement in certain circumstances. To escape the 
defendant had to prove two things regarding the 
inf ringing use namely -
3 .1 that such use was not likely to deceive or to cause 
confusion; 
3.2 that such use was not likely to be taken as indicating a 
connection in the course of trade (in the case of trade 
marks) or in the course of business (in the case of 
service marks) between the defendant's goods (in the case 
of trade marks) or the provision of services by the 
defendant (in the case of service marks) and the 
proprietor or a registered user of the registered mark. 35 
Thus, under the 1938 Act no differentiation was made 
between the acts which constituted an infringement of a 
Part A as opposed to a Part B registration - the only 
difference was that section 5 (2) provided the infringer 
with immunity if he were able to invoke its provisions 
35. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 285-286, 288; The connection in the course 
of trade doctrine is discussed - in the context of the definition of a trade or service mark 
under the Act - at p 1 05-1 07. 
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successfully (and the onus was on the alleged infringer 
to do so if he could) . 
No case law of material importance developed regarding 
the effect of section 5 (2) 36 and the differences which 
separated Part A from Part B registrations were 
37 
significant in unusual cases only. 
4. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS UPON SECTION 4 (1) 
As already observed regarding the structure of the 
provisions relating to infringement in the 1938 Act, 
sections 4 (2), 4 (3), 4 (4) and sections 6 and 7 limited 
the infringement action provided by section 4 ( 1) . I 
shall deal briefly with the limitations seriatim: 
4.1 Section 4 (2) 
In regard to trade marks section 4 (2) of the Act 
provided: 
The right to the use of a trade mark given by registration as aforesaid 
shall be subject to any conditions or limitations entered on the register, 
and shall not be deemed to be infringed by the use of any such mark as 
aforesaid in any mode, in relation to goods to be sold or othe-rwise traded 
in any place, in relation to goods to be exported to any market, or in any 
other circumstances, to which, having regard to any such limitations, the 
registration does not extend. 
In regard to service marks section 4 (2) of the Act 
provided: 
The right to the use of a service mark given by registration as aforesaid 
shall be subject to any conditions or limitations entered on the register, 
and shall not be deemed to be infringed by the use of any such mark as 
36. Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 286. 
37. See Cornish Intellectual Property 474 - 475. 
aforesaid in any mode, in relation to services for use or available for 
acceptance in any place, country or territory or in any other 
circumstances, to which, having regard to any such limitations, the 
registration does not extend. 
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Thus a registered trade mark or service mark subject to 
conditions or limitations entered on the register would 
not be infringed by use falling outside the scope of the 
registration so limited. 
4.2 Sections 4 (3)(a), (b) and (c) 
In regard to trade marks this section of the Act provided: 
(3) The right to the use of a trade mark given by registration as aforesaid 
shall not be deemed to be infringed by the use of any such mark as 
aforesaid by any person -
(a) in relation to goods connected in the course of trade with the 
proprietor or a registered user of the trade mark if, as to those goods or a 
bulk of which they form part, the proprietor or the registered user 
conforming to the permitted use has applied the trade mark and has not 
subsequently removed or obliterated it, or has at any time expressly or 
impliedly consented to the use of the trade mark; or 
(b) in relation to goods adapted to form part of, or to be accessory to, 
other goods in relation to which the trade mark has been used without 
infringement of the right given as aforesaid or might for the time being be 
so used, if the use of the mark is reasonably necessary in order to 
indicate that the goods are so adapted and neither the purpose nor the 
effect of the use of the mark is to indicate othawise than in accordance 
with the fact a connection in the course of trade between any person and 
the goods. 
In regard to service marks this section of the Act 
provided: 
(3) The right to the use of a trade mark given by registration as aforesaid 
shall not be deemed to be infringed by the use of any such mark as 
aforesaid by any person -
4.2.1 
4.2.2 
(a) in relation to services to which the proprietor of the mark or a 
registered user conforming to the permitted use has applied the mark, 
where the purpose and effect of the use of the mark is to indicate, in 
accordance with the fact, that those services have been paformed by the 
proprietor or a registered user of the mark; or 
(b) in relation to services the provision of which is connected in the 
course of business with the proprietor or a registered user of the mark, 
where the proprietor or registered user has at any time expressly or 
impliedly consented to the use of the mark; or 
(c) in relation to services available for use with other services in relation 
to which the mark has been used without infringement of the right given 
by registration or might for the time being be so used, if -
(i) the use of the mark is reasonably necessary in order to indicate that 
the services are available for such use, and 
(ii) neither the purpose nor the effect of the use of the mark is to indicate 
otherwise than in accordance with the fact a connection in the course of 
business between any person and the provision of those services. 
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According to Cornish38 section 4 (3) (a) expressed the 
rule that prior consent and subsequent acquiescence 
constituted defences to infringement, and rendered the 
following general principles explicit: 
the principle that a registered proprietor (or a 
registered user acting within the permitted use) could 
not infringe; 
the principle that where a registered proprietor or a 
registered user had applied the registered trade mark to 
goods without subsequently removing or obliterating the 
38. See Cornish Intellectual Property 476. 
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mark it was not an infringement for others to deal with 
the goods in commerce. 
In the context of services the wording of section 4 
(3) {a) referred to use by a third party having the 
purpose and effect of correctly indicating that the 
services had been performed by the proprietor or 
1 . 39 icensee. 
A number of diverse issues such as use of marks on 
altered or adulterated goods40 , the relevance of the 
party who first places the goods on the market41 , 
second-hand goods and possession of goods bearing an 
infringing trade mark42 were considered by the Courts 
under section 4 (3) (a). These issues are not pertinent 
to the theme of this work and for this reason are not 
elaborated upon. The question of parallel imports 
however requires some comment at this stage in 
anticipation of a discussion of relevant jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice in Part 4 of this work. 
The question concerned whether the proprietor of a United 
Kingdom trade mark or service mark registration could 
prevent the entry of genuine goods or services under the 
mark into the United Kingdom by way of import or 
re-import in the face of the provisions of section 4 
(3) {a) of the 1938 Act. 
A review of the later cases decided prior to the coming 
into force of the Trade Marks Act 1994 provides this 
answer: Relying upon implied consent on the part of the 
registered proprietor the Courts would not prevent 
parallel importation of goods or services featuring a 
registered United Kingdom mark unless the registered 
proprietor could rely upon an express contractual 
39. Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 19.5.2 Rel 5 [19941. 
40. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 279 - 281. 
41. See Accurist Watches Ltd v King [1992] F.S.R. 80. 
42. See Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 19.5.2 Rel 5 [1994]. 
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condition against such sale of goods or the provision of 
such services in the United Kingdom as stipulations of 
this kind indicated a want of consent on the part of the 
. 43 proprietor. 
As this chapter is directed solely at the law of the 
United Kingdom under the 1938 Act I shall deal with those 
aspects of the relevant law applicable to movement of 
goods and services between Member States of the European 
Community where appropriate in Part 4 of this work. 
Sections 4 (3) (b) and 4 (3) (c) provided a legislative 
echo of a line of authority commencing with the Panoram 
TM case44 which held that a registered trade mark was not 
infringed by a third party incorporating the registered 
trade mark in a bona fide description of his goods e.g. 
"films for use with No. 1 Kodak" (in circumstances where 
Kodak was a registered trade mark for films as well as 
cameras) . The ambit of the sections were never mapped 
out or clarified through the cases and an examination of 
the sources reveals a dearth of cases decided 
thereunder. 45 
4.3 Section 4 (4) 
In regard to trade marks section 4 (4) of the Act 
provided: 
The use of a registered trade mark, being one of two or more registered 
trade marks that are identical or nearly resemble each other, in exercise 
of the right to the use of that trade mark given by registration as 
aforesaid, shall not be deemed to be an infringement of the right so given 
to the use of any other of those trade marks. 
43. See Revlon Inc v Cripps & Lee Ltd [19801 F.S.R. 80; Castrol Ltd v Automotive Oil 
Supplies Ltd [19831 R.P.C. 315; Colgate-Palmolive Ltd v Markwell Finance Ltd [19891 
R.P.C. 497. 
44. Kodak Ltd v London Steroscopic and Photographic Co Ltd [19031 20 R.P.C. 337. 
45. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 284 - 285. 
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The provision in regard to service marks was identical 
save that "service mark" replaced "trade mark" in the 
wording of the section. 
The provisions of this section applied to both Part A and 
Part B trade and service marks and essentially determined 
that proprietors using their own registered marks 
provided such use was bona fide - would not infringe the 
concurrently registered marks of others. 
4.4 Sections 7 and 8 
In regard to trade marks section 7 of the Act provided: 
Nothing in this Act shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of a 
registered trade mark to interfere with or restrain the use by any person 
of a trade mark identical with or nearly resembling it in relation to goods 
in relation to which that person or a predecessor in title of his has 
continuously used that trade mark from a date anterior -
(a) to the use of the first-mentioned trade mark in relation to those goods 
by the proprietor or a predecessor in title of his; or 
(2) to the registration of the first-mentioned trade mark in respect of 
those goods in the name of the proprietor or a predecessor in title of his; 
whichever is the earlier, or to object (on such use being proved) to that 
person being put on the register for that identical or nearly resembling 
trade mark in respect of those goods under subsection (2) of section 
twelve of this Act. 
In regard to service marks the provision was couched in 
identical terms save that "service mark" replaced "trade 
mark" and "services" replaced "goods" in the wording of 
the section. 
Thus where a third party had used a trade or service 
mark in relation to goods or services falling within the 
specification of a registered trade or service mark from 
a date prior to the earliest of the following dates 
namely -
4.4.1 
4.4.2 
4.4.3 
4.4.4 
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the date of first use of the registered mark; 
the date of registration of the registered mark; 
then the proprietor of the registered mark -
could not enforce the registered right against the prior 
user; 
could not object to an application by the prior user for 
registration of the mark in respect of which he could 
show continuous prior use. 
In regard to trade marks section 8 of the Act provided: 
No registration of a trade mark shall intelf ere with: 
(a) any bona fide use by a person of his own name or of the name of his 
place of business, or of the name, or of the name of the place of business, 
of any of his predecessors in business; or 
(b) the use by any person of any bona fide description of the character or 
quality of his goods, not being a description that would be likely to be 
taken as importing any such reference as is mentioned in paragraph (b) of 
subsection (1) of section four, of this Act. 
In regard to service marks the wording of section 8 was 
identical save for "service mark" replacing "trade mark" 
and "services" replacing "goods" in the wording of the 
section. 
The essence of this section was that bona fide action of 
the kind described in the section would absolve the doer 
from infringement. 
In regard to both sections 7 and 8 the enquiry turned on 
a subjective bona fides on the part of the party invoking 
either section who had to show the absence of an intention 
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to deceive or confuse or of fraudulent intention. 46 
5. SECTION 6 INFRINGEMENT 
This section concerned trade marks only and for the 
purposes of this work it is unnecessary to go beyond the 
following succinct treatment thereof by Cornish: 
In Section 6 the Act specifies five ways in which properly marked goods 
may not be subsequently treated, if the mark owner or registered user 
makes it a condition not to do so. If then, the restriction is broken, the 
acts are deemed infringement. They are i) applying the mark after 
impermissible alteration of the goods as respects their state or condition, 
get-up or packaging; ii) altering, partly removing or obliterating the 
mark; iii) removing or obliterating the mark without removing other 
references to the registered proprietor or users; iv) applying any other 
trade mark in addition; v) adding other written material likely to ifljure 
the reputation of the marks. But to have the required effect, the condition 
against doing any of these things must be specified in a written contract 
between proprietor or user and purchaser or owner of the goods. If 
binding, the condition affects all owners of the goods who have notice of 
it, except a purchaser who at the time of purchase did not know of it. 4 7 
6. DEFENCES 
In order to complete a review of the law relating to 
infringement under the 1938 Act the defences available to 
a defendant to an infringement action must be mentioned 
briefly. Gold & Nicholls list twenty-seven discernable 
defences48 each of which fall within one of the five 
broad categories defined by Blanco White & Jacob namely: 
6.1 want of title on the plaintiff's part; 
46. See Baume & Co Ltd v A.H. Moore Ltd [19571 R.P.C. 459 and Adrema Ltd v 
Adrema-Werke GmbH [19581 R.P.C. 323. 
47. Cornish Intellectual Property 476 - 477 and section 6 of the Act. 
48. Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 19.9.1 Rel 5 [19941. 
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6.2 the registration relied upon was invalid or expungable; 
6.3 there was no infringement; 
6. 4 the defendant had an independent right to use the mark 
complained of; 
6.5 the plaintiff was debarred from suing the defendant 
(e.g.. on the basis of an agreement, estoppel, 
acquiescence, licence, delay, deceptiveness of the mark, 
fraud, section 5 (2) or under European Community Law. 49 
7. IN SUM 
Following the historical pattern set by earlier 
enactments the 1938 Act provided the registrant with the 
exclusive right to use of the registered trade mark (or 
service mark) in connection with the goods (or services) 
in respect of which it was registered and section 4 
(1) (a) provided the registrant with the traditional form 
of the trade mark infringement action derived from the 
common law. 
It has been generally accepted that the draftsmanship of 
the infringement section 4 of the Act was obscure and 
convoluted. 
The infringement action was extended from its traditional 
form by section 4 (1) (b) of the Act. But it is here that 
h f 1 . . b . 50 f h d . f h t e " u iginous o scur1ty 11 o t e wor ing o t e 
section fails to provide a clear indication of the outer 
limits of the action beyond the circumstances of the 
Yeast-Vite case which it overruled. 51 
Section 4 presents the registrants rights in 
way. The right of exclusive use of the 
49. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 299. 
a negative 
mark is 
50. Per Mackinnon L J in Bismag Ltd v Amblins (Chemists) Ltd [19401 57 R.P.C. 209. 
51. Seep 149-151 supra. 
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circumscribed by providing the registrant with the means 
of preventing others from performing infringing conduct 
defined in complex provisions. In this sense the trade 
mark right in the law of the United Kingdom has always 
been a negative right far removed from an approach which 
would vest in the holder of a trade mark positive 
entitlements which would afford it a full range of 
extended functions in law. 
These aspects are considered in the latter parts of this 
work. 
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CHAPTER 8 
UNITED KINGDOM: - THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE MARKS AND GOODWILL: 
ASSIGNMENT AND LICENSING UNDER THE 1938 ACT 
This chapter considers the law relating to assignments 
and licensing under the 1938 Act as amended. The topic 
requires investigation of the relationship between trade 
marks and the concept "goodwill". This investigation 
reveals much regarding the nature of trade mark rights 
under the law of the United Kingdom. In a preliminary 
way this chapter takes cognizance also of views relating 
to the above topics in the U.S.A.. Relevant aspects of 
the trade mark law of the latter jurisdiction are 
considered more fully in Part 5. 
1. ASSIGNMENTS PRIOR TO THE 1938 ACT 
Trade mark theory prior to the 1938 Act evolved from the 
premise that a trade mark indicated to the public that 
the goods bearing the mark emanated from a particular 
business exclusively. If the link between the trade mark 
and the business which it indicated was broken, the 
exclusive right to use the mark afforded by registration 
was vitiated. A registered trade mark could therefore 
not be assigned or devolve in gross. It could however be 
assigned or transmitted together with the goodwill in the 
business in the goods in respect of which it was 
registered - unless the personal connection between the 
original owner and the goods in connection with which it 
was used was so strong that an assignment would amount to 
a misrepresentation - in which event the registered mark 
was regarded as not properly assignable. 1 
1. See Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 343. 337 - 338. 
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These principles were established prior to the 1875 Act 
and were partly embodied both therein and in the 1883 
Act. Thereafter they were largely taken up with other 
matter in section 22 of the 1905 Act. 2 
The close relationship between trade marks and goodwill 
was recognised by section 2 of the 1875 Act which 
required a registered trade mark to be assigned or 
transmitted only in connection with the goodwill of the 
business concerned in such particular goods or classes of 
goods for which it was registered. The section provided 
further that the trade mark was determinable with such 
goodwill. Thus there was no trade mark without goodwill 
and it was held that a registered trade mark could not be 
assigned if no business existed in which it was used. 3 
Section 3 of the Act rendered the right of the registered 
proprietor to the exclusive use of the registered mark 
specifically subject to the provisions of the Act 
concerning the connection between the mark and the 
goodwill of the business associated therewith. These 
provisions were subsequently 
4 70 and 76 of the 1883 Act. 
re-enacted under sections 
2. THE EARLY CASES CONCERNING GOODWILL 
The earliest judicial 
tended to connect the 
pronouncements 
goodwill of a 
about goodwill 
business to the 
business premises and, in this context, Lord Eldon, C had 
said in Cruttwell v Lye5 that goodwill was "nothing more than 
the probability that the old customers will resort to the old place". 6 
2. See Lloyd & Bray Kerley 7th ed. 338. 
3. Ex Parte Laurence Bros., 44 L.T.N.S. 98; see Sebastian Trade Marks 343. 
4. See Sebastian Trade Marks 300. 
5. Cruttwell v Lye 17 Ves. 335. 
6. See Sebastian Trade Marks 301. 
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This approach was extended by Wood, VC in the leading 
case of Churton v Douglas where he held that goodwill 
meant every positive advantage that had been acquired by 
an enterprise in the carrying on of its business whether 
this was connected with the premises in which the 
business was carried on or with the name of the business 
or with any other benefit of the business. In this 
context he regarded trade marks as being of the same 
nature as the name of the firm. A firm using its trade 
marks thereby stamped its name on the articles with which 
it carried on business to prove that they emanated from 
the firm. This firm thereby became the known firm to 
which customers apply for such goods, just as when a 
customer enters a shop in a known locality. 7 
In the further leading case of Trego v Hunt8 (approving 
Churton v Douglas), it was established that the dictum of 
Lord Eldon must be read as meaning that goodwill is the 
probability that the old customers will buy the old goods 
from the old firm or their successors in business, 
whether the means of identification be the place of 
business or otherwise. "It is the whole advantage, whatever it may be, 
of the reputation and connection of the firm". 9 
A review of the earlier cases reveals that they dealt 
particularly with two aspects of goodwill locality and 
personal goodwill of members of the legal and medical 
professions practising in partnership. This reflects the 
kind of case involving goodwill which came before the 
courts of the time. 10 
7. Churton v Douglas Johns. 174 and see Sebastian Trade Marks 307. 
8. Trego v Hunt (1896) A.C.7. 
9. Per Lord MacNaughten at p 24 of the report of the case. 
10. See Sebastian Trade Marks 302 - 326. 
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That the goodwill of a trade mark could be of 
considerable value was already recognised in England 
during the 18th Century and, by the advent of the 19th 
Century, contracts for the enforcement of the sale of 
11 goodwill were being enforced regularly. 
Writing at the turn of the 19th 
confirms the close link between trade 
in the law of his time: on the basis 
Century, Sebastian 
marks and goodwill 
of early authority 
concerning the interpretation of certain clauses in sale 
of business agreements he wrote that the sale of a 
business carried with it the goodwill and trade marks of 
the business whilst the stated sale of a business and the 
goodwill carried with it also the right to the trade name 
f h . 12 o t e enterprise. 
Sebastian cites English, Canadian and U.S.A. authority 
indicating early acceptance of the principle that a trade 
mark did not exist in gross apart from the goodwill of 
the business with which it had been connected. 13 
Fry, LJ, stated the law as it then stood and was 
maintained prior to the 1938 Act thus in Pinto v 
Badman14 : 
It is plain, therefore, that that being the title which the Plaintiffs have 
disclosed, the question comes to be one of law, and by the English law, 
can a trader, who has used a brand upon a particular article, and who 
continues to manufacture that article, alienate that brand to another 
person, so as to give the alienee any right whatever? It appears to me 
that, upon principles, he can have no such right. The brand is an 
indication of origin, and if you trans! er the indication of origin, without 
transferring the origin itself, you are transferring a right, if any right at 
all, to commit a fraud upon the public, and such right is not recognised 
11. Sebastian Trade Marks 299. 
12. Sebastian Trade Marks 299. 
13. See Sebastian Trade Marks 300 and particularly footnote (b). 
14. Pinto v Badman (1891) 8 R.P.C. 181, 194 - 195. 
by the law of England. I confess that seems to me to be the whole 
principle of the case. For many years nobody ever supposed that you 
could assign a trade mark at all. For many years, a trade mark was only 
put in evidence as one of the pieces of evidence which might tend to show 
that a Defendant was selling as and for the goods of the Plaintiff, goods 
which were not the goods of the Plaintiff. But gradually, the trade mark 
obtained more and more importance in such discussions, until Lord 
Westbury surprised the profession by assening that there might be 
property in a trade mark. When that had been held, the question arose 
how that property could be dealt with, and whether it was assignable 
property, or a property not the subject of assignment. Therefore, the 
enquiry which agitated the Couns was this : can a trade mark be 
assigned at all, and if so, under what circumstances? 
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Fry, LJ went on to discuss what Lord Westbury had to 
15 
say and proceeded: 
It follows, therefore, that it has been laid down by the clearest authority 
that a trade mark can be assigned when it is transferred together with, to 
use Lord Cranworth 's language : "the manufactory of the goods in which 
the mark has 'been used to be affixed' ". Beyond that, so far as my 
knowledge goes, and so far as any case that has been cited to us at the 
Bar is concerned, no authority can be produced. Therefore, I conceive 
that it is the limit of the assignability of trade mark. It can be assigned, 
if it is indicative of origin, when the origin is assigned with it. It cannot 
be assigned when it is divorced from its place of origin, or when, in the 
hands of the trans/ eree, it would indicate something different to what it 
indicated in the hands of the transferor. 
Now another indication that that is the law is to be found in this, that 
both the Statutes of 1875 and 1883 have regulated the right of transfer 
after registration, and in both cases they have confined it to assignment 
or transfer with the goodwill of the business in the article in respect of 
which the trade mark is registered. It is obvious that the Legislature in 
so enacting are intending to confine the right of assigning the trade mark 
15. In Leather Cloth Co v American Leather Cloth Co 4 De G. J.S. 137. See p 29-30 supra. 
after registration within the same limits by which it is confined at law and 
in equity before registration. Therefore, there can be no doubt, to my 
mind, that before and after registration, a trade mark cannot be assigned 
independently of the manufacture of the goods to which it relates. It 
never can be assigned in any way which will enable the transferee to 
represent something different to that which it represented in the hands of 
the transferor. 
3. THE 1938 ACT: BACKGROUND TO THE ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS 
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The position regarding the assignment of trade marks at 
common law reflected in the 1875 and 1883 Acts was taken 
up in section 22 of the 1905 Act. 16 The substantial 
changes brought about by the 1938 Act were made largely 
in response to the Report of the Goschen Committee which 
was published in 1934. 17 
The Committee had a large volume of evidence to consider. 
Of particular interest in the context of the enquiry of 
this work, was the evidence which challenged the theory 
that a trade mark owes its value to the goodwill and 
reputation of the business in which it is used. This 
evidence indicated that under the then modern conditions 
of trading, the tendency was for a business to be built 
up around the trade mark, leading to the view being 
established in commerce that the goodwill of a business 
was frequently inherent in the trade mark itself. 18 
After reviewing all the evidence, the Committee reported 
thus prior to proceeding to make specific recommendations: 
16. See p 61-62 supra. 
17. See the discussion of the Report in Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 350 - 354. 
1 8. See par. 1 07 of the Report. This view did not prevail. 
110. We have given prolonged consideration to the representations made 
to us on this subject and have come to the conclusion that the requirement 
for the trans/ er of the goodwill of the business on the assignment of a 
trade mark is unduly restrictive in the circumstances of modem business 
and ought, in the interests of trade, to be relaxed. We have, therefore, 
attempted to suggest a means by which traders may be allowed the 
greatest possible liberty for the assignment of their marks, consistent with 
the avoidance of deception to the purchasing public and the prevention of 
mere trafficking in trade marks. 
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The recommendations of the Goschen Committee were 
substantially embodied in section 22 of the 1938 Act. 
The section was complicated by an endeavour to minimise 
the undesirable consequences which the old laws were 
designed to counter and which could result from changes 
to the old laws. 19 
Prior to considering section 22 and the other sections in 
the 1938 Act related thereto it is necessary to consider 
the concept of goodwill itself and then to return to the 
relationship between trade marks and goodwill. 
4. GOODWILL 
4.1 The Nature of Goodwill 
The leading case of The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v 
Muller & Co's Margarine, Limited20 left a permanent 
imprint upon the law relating to goodwill in the United 
Kingdom. 
In that case, Lord Macnaughten said of goodwill 21 : 
19. Lloyd & Bray Kerly 7th ed. 354. 
20. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Muller & Co.s Margarine, Limited 1901 A.C. 
217. 
21 . At p 223 - 224 of the report. 
It was argued that if goodwill be property, it is property having no local 
situation. It is very difficult, as it seems to me, to say that goodwill is not 
property. Goodwill is bought and sold every day. It may be acquired, I 
think, in any of the different ways in which property is usually acquired. 
When a man has got it he may keep it as his own. He may vindicate his 
exclusive right to it if necessary by process of law. He may dispose of it 
as he will - of course under the conditions attaching to property of that 
nature. 
What is goodwill? It is a thing very easy to describe, very difficult to 
define. It is the benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation, and 
connection of a business. It is the attractive force which brings in 
custom. It is the one thing which distinguishes an old-established 
business from a new business at its first start. The goodwill of a business 
must emanate from a particular centre or source. However widely 
extended or diffused its influence may be, goodwill is worth nothing 
unless it has power of attraction sufficient to bring customers home to the 
source from which it emanates. Goodwill is composed of a variety of 
elements. It differs in its composition in different trades and in different 
businesses in the same trade. One element may preponderate here and 
another element there. To analyze goodwill and split it up into its 
component parts, to pare it down as the Commissioners desire to do until 
nothing is left but a dry residuum ingrained in the actual place in which 
the business is carried on while everything else is in the air, seems to me 
to be as useful for practical purposes as it would be to resolve the human 
body into the various substances of which it is said to be composed. The 
goodwill of a business is one whole, and in a case like this it must be 
dealt with as such. 
For my part, I think if there is one attribute common to all cases of 
goodwill, it is the attribute of locality. For goodwill has no independent 
existence. It cannot subsist by itself. It must be attached to a business. 
Destroy the business, and the goodwill perishes with it, though elements 
remain which may perhaps be gathered up and revived again. No doubt, 
where the reputation of a business is very widely spread or where it is the 
article produced rather than the producer of the article that has won 
popular favour, it may be difficult to localise goodwill. 
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4 .1.1 
4 .1.2 
4 .1.3 
4.1.4 
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In the same case Lord Lindley had the following to say 
concerning goodwill: 
Goodwill regarded as property has no meaning except in connection with 
some trade, business or calling, In that connection I understand the word 
to include whatever adds value to a business by reason of situation, name 
and reputation, connection, introduction to old customers, and agreed 
absence from competition, or any of these things, and there may be others 
which do not occur to me. In this wide sense, goodwill is inseparable 
from the business to which it adds value, and, in my opinion, exists where 
the business is carried on. 
Such business may be carried on in one place or country or in several 
and if, in several, there may be several businesses, each having a 
goodwill of its own. 22 
The above passages were oft quoted and relied upon and 
provided the framework about which the courts 
constructed the relationship between goodwill and trade 
marks. For this reason, I have quoted extensively from 
the words of his Lordships. 
An examination of the dicta reveals the following 
fundamentals: 
Goodwill is property and can be treated as such subject 
to the limitations imposed by its nature; 
Goodwill is not easily defined; 
The essence and value of goodwill lies in its power to 
bring in custom to the business of which it is a part; 
Goodwill is comprised of various elements which vary in 
preponderance from business to business but which 
together comprise a whole which must be dealt with as 
such; 
22. At p 235 of the report. 
4 .1.5 
4 .1. 6 
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Goodwill cannot exist unconnected to a business and, as 
a general rule, takes the locality of the business 
concerned; 
Where a business is carried on in several places a 
separate goodwill can attach to the business at each of 
its localities; 
According to Cookson23 who subscribes to Lord 
Macnaughten•s approach a business has only one 
goodwill comprising a single inseparable asset. The 
only favourable argument for multiple goodwills within a 
single business can be derived from the fact that 
historically goodwill has been treated along territorial 
lines as if there is a separate property in a business's 
goodwill in each country or in the jurisdiction of each 
legal system where it does business. 24 
In different businesses, goodwill may be formed by a 
different mix of components which contribute in varying 
degrees to the overall reputation of the business. 
According to Cookson these components are the keys to 
goodwill. They are not the goodwill itself but symbols 
representing the goodwill. Examples of these keys are: 
4.1.7 The locality of the business and its premises; 
4.1.8 The telephone numbers of the business; 
4.1.9 The trade marks of the business; 
4.1.10 The research and development programmes of the business; 
4.1.11 The employees of the business; 
4.1.12 The customer lists of the business. 25 
23. Cookson (1991] 7 E I P R 248 - 252. 
24. Cookson 248. 
25. Cookson 249 - 250. 
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The author suggests that it is misleading to attribute 
an independent value to any particular key insofar as 
they are merely, as already observed, symbols of the 
goodwill of the business. 26 
Within the context of the indivisibility and 
inseparability of goodwill as an asset of a business, it 
must be noted that the Statement of Standard Accounting 
Practice (SSAP) 22 of the United Kingdom suggests that 
goodwill is the difference between the value of a 
business as a whole and the aggregate of the fair values 
of its separable net assets. This is, of course, a 
definition of "value". Of goodwill, it says no more, 
Cookson states, than that goodwill is an inseparable 
f b . 27 asset o a us1ness. 
A number of questions arise which require the 
fundamentals laid down in Muller & Co• s Margarine case 
to be tested - as will appear from the paragraphs which 
follow. 
4.2 Assignment of Goodwill 
As goodwill is property it is capable of ownership and 
transfer and can be mortgaged or charged to raise 
28 
money. 
As personal property, goodwill can be transferred by 
assignment, 
operation of 
transmitted under will or 
law. The traditional 
intestacy or by 
restriction must, 
however, be borne in mind: goodwill cannot be assigned 
or otherwise dealt with in gross and must remain under 
the same ownership as the business to which it 
relates. 29 
26. Cookson 250. 
27. See Cookson 248. There are a number of methods by means of which the value of 
goodwill can be determined : see for instance McCarthy Trade Marks and Unfair 
Competition 77 - 84. 
28. Cookson 250. 
29. See Wadlow Law of Passing Off 88. 
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4.2.1 Assignments in Gross 
The following form of dealing with goodwill would be 
regarded as inherently deceptive at common law and would 
confer no rights upon third parties against the world at 
large: 
4. 2. 1. 1 Where the owner of goodwill grants a third party the 
right to use a mark appurtenant to the goodwill, which is 
distinctive of the owner alone; 
4.2.1.2 Where an assignor purports to assign goodwill without at 
the same time transferring the business connected with 
the goodwill transferred. 
The reason for denying validity to such dealings with 
goodwill in gross is one of public policy the public 
must not be confused. 30 
4.2.2 Valid Assignments of Goodwill 
Where a valid assignment of goodwill takes place the 
effect thereof between the parties is to confer upon the 
assignee the exclusive right to carry on the business 
with the goodwill assigned and to represent himself as 
the party entitled to carry on that business. 
As against the world at large an assignment of goodwill 
with the business to which it relates places the assignee 
in the position formerly enjoyed by the assignor 
notwithstanding such residue of association between the 
business assigned and the assignor personally which 
remains in the public mind. It is for the assignee to 
satisfy the public that he is carrying on the same 
business and that the public can expect the same 
attention and quality of goods and/or services as were 
30. See the dictum of Fry, LT, in Pinto v Badman set out at p 167-169 supra and Wadlow 
Law of Passing Off 89. 
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provided before. Any de facto deception arising in this 
way pursuant to a valid assignment is lawful. 31 
Upon assignment the assignee obtains a passing off 
action against any party impinging upon the goodwill of 
the business assigned in circumstances comprising a 
. ff 32 passing o . 
4. 3 Separate Goodwills 
I have observed that in 1901 the House of Lords 
recognised that an undertaking which has several 
businesses in different localities or countries can 
acquire a separate goodwill in respect of each 
b . 33 usiness. 
In modern business a single undertaking may have 
separate 
goodwill, 
and distinct businesses each with its 
determined not by 
lines 
locality but according 
branded independently 
own 
to 
in separate product 
different markets. The separate goodwill is then built 
up behind the brand or trade marks used specifically in 
those markets. 
On the other hand the activities of an undertaking may 
be grouped together and associated in the minds of 
consumers under a house mark or corporate logo which 
unites goodwill generated under separate marks used in 
connection with the different products or services of 
the undertaking into a unity representing a single 
business. 
As will be observed in paragraph 4.4. it is often said 
that trade marks symbolise the business in the goods or 
services in connection with which they are used. 
31. See Wadlow Law of Passing Off 91 - 92. 
32. As laid down by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnick B.V. and Another v V.J. Townsend & 
Sons (Hull) Limited and Another [19801 R.P.C.31 93. 
33. See the dictum of Lord Lindley quoted at p 172 supra. 
From 
marks 
the point 
and the 
of view of assignment 
connected goodwill, the 
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of these trade 
marks are more 
easily divested without public confusion arising where 
separate goodwills exist at different business 
localities or in different markets. Where, however, the 
marks and goodwill have been unified under a house mark 
or corporate logo, an endeavour to split off or assign 
one of the trade marks from the global goodwill of the 
undertaking could lead to public confusion and deception 
34 to such a degree that the mark could be lost. 
Thus, in dealing with marks it is essential to consider 
the question of accompanying goodwill if damage to both 
is to be avoided. 
4. 4 Trade Marks as Symbols of Goodwill 
In Chapter Four of this work it is made clear that the 
contemporaneous decisions in Spalding v Gamage36 and 
Hanover Star Milling Co v v Metcalf37 aptly illustrate 
the once well established principle in both British law 
and the law of the U.S.A. that a trade mark has no 
existence apart from the goodwill of the business in the 
goods or services in connection with which the mark is 
used and in passing-off and common law trade mark 
infringement actions this is where the property impinged 
upon is situated. 
The common law infringement action 
unregistered trade marks was abolished 
the 1938 Act but the passing off 
in respect of 
by section 2 of 
action remained 
34. In the sense that it loses the essential quality of distinctiveness. See Gold & Nicholls 
(eds) Trade Mark Handbook 16.1.6 Rel 2 [19921 regarding the discussion under 
paragraph 4.3. 
36. See p 77-81. 
37. See p 81-83. 
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available in regard to the passing off of unregistered 
marks. 38 That the property damaged was not the 
unregistered trade mark but the goodwill in the business 
in respect of which the unregistered mark was used led 
to the notion that, insofar as a trade mark had no 
existence apart from the goodwill in the business in the 
goods or services in respect of which it was used, the 
trade mark could be regarded as symbolising that 
goodwill to which it was inseparably attached. The 
trade mark was seen as merely one means by which 
goodwill could be identified, bought, sold and made 
known to the public. 
This view restates the approach that there is no 
property in a trade mark in gross - trade marks serve 
merely as appurtenances to an established business or 
trade in connection with which they are employed. 
As to the general concept 
goodwill the following 
illuminating: 
that trade marks symbolize 
passage from McCarthy 
Good will and its symbol, a trademark, are inseparable. Trademark has 
no independent significance apart from the good will it symbolises. If 
there is no business and no good will, a trademark symbolises nothing. 
For this reason, a trademark cannot be sold or assigned apart from the 
good will it symbolises. 39 
is 
What is meant when it is said that trade marks symbolise 
goodwill is succinctly stated thus by Gold & Nicholls: 
38. Section 2 of the 1938 Act as amended provided: 2. No action for infringement of 
unregistered trade mark: No person shall be entitled to institute any proceedings to 
prevent, or to recover damages for, the infringement of an unregistered trade mark. 
In respect of service marks the Act referred to an unregistered service mark. 
39. McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 76. 
Once a trade or service mark has been used to promote a product or 
service, it starts to acquire real value because is represents and 
symbolises goodwill. As the reputation of a product or service grows, the 
more likely it becomes that customers will want to acquire that product or 
obtain that service. To do so they will have to refer to it by name and so 
the mark (or brand name) comes to represent the goodwill associated with 
the product or service. 40 
4.5 Intrinsic Value in Trade Marks per se 
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Consider a purchaser making a choice amongst competing 
brands in circumstances where he is not familiar with any 
of them and their pricing is identical. 
Something intrinsic to the trade marks or packaging or 
get-up of the goods will determine the buyer's subjective 
decision as to which product to buy. Where his choice is 
determined by the appeal to him of the trade mark 
featured in relation to the product chosen the question 
arises: what is this intrinsic attractive force of the 
trade mark and does it have a value expressable in 
economic terms? 
In other words can a trade mark have a value of its own 
distinguishable from the goodwill of the business in the 
goods or services in connection with which it is used and 
purportedly symbolises? 
In regard to the aforegoing the following words of 
Justice Frankfurter are relevant: 
The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the psychological 
function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true 
that we purchase goods by them. A trademark is a merchandising 
short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he 
40. See Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 16.1.1 Rel 2 [1992]. 
has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a trademark exploits this 
human propensity by making every human effort to impregnate the 
atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. 
Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same : to convey through 
the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the 
commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trademark 
owner has something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial 
magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal 
redress. 41 
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In other words the "congenial symbol" which led the 
purchaser we considered at the outset to choose one 
unknown product above another acquires, it seems, a value 
only when it functions in this manner to a degree where 
its drawing power becomes an established fact in the 
marketplace and a goodwill in the activity with which the 
mark is connected becomes apparent. 
As will be seen when this work deals with the law of the 
United States most relevant to the topic of this thesis, 
the idea that a trade mark is something more than a mere 
symbol of goodwill was persuasively suggested by 
Schechter42 and he is quoted in the following relevant 
passage from McCarthy: 
In fact, a trademark may be more than a mere symbol of good will, it 
may itself be an instrument for creating good will. "To describe a 
trademark merely as a symbol of good will, without recognising it as an 
agency for actual creation and perpetuation of good will, ignores the 
most potent aspect of the nature of a trademark and that phase most in 
need of protection". When an article bearing a trademark is sold, the 
good will which that trademark symbolises is a factor in making the sale. 
As Justice Frankfurter said, when a customer's psychological reaction to 
the trademark symbol is favourable, "the trademark owner has something 
of value". 
41. In Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v S.S. Kresge Co. 316 U.S. 203 [1942]. 
42. See Schechter [1970] T.M.R. 334 - 352. See also p 482-489 infra regarding the 
advertising, goodwill and comunication functions. 
This "something of value" is most usually characterised as "good will". 
"Good will" is the best semantic term we have to describe the consumer 
. . d . if ad ,,, 43 recogmtwn or rawmg power o a tri eman\,. 
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It appears that Schechter is referring to one of the 
multiple ways in which a trade mark can function rather 
than necessarily to a specific element of reasonable 
economic value inherent in the trade mark. 
The more functions a particular trade mark performs in a 
business will no doubt render it more valuable to the 
business concerned. It is an open question whether a 
specific economic value can be attributed in a scientific 
manner to each input the trade mark makes to the 
d k ' 44 un erta ing. 
4.6 Goodwill in Brands 
The possibility of there being separate goodwills in 
separate businesses represented by separate brands 
emanating from the same undertaking but applied in 
separate markets has already been mentioned. Where this 
is so, each brand represents a separate goodwill. Under 
the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) 22 
of the United Kingdom, trade marks are treatable as 
separate net assets and under the Companies Act of the 
United Kingdom, trade marks and other intangible assets 
can be valued and included, as intangible assets, in the 
balance sheets of a company. 
43. McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 71 - 72. 
44. Trade Mark functions are discussed in chapter 1 5 where the attractive force of trade 
marks are considered in a less restricted context. 
182 
The valuation of trade marks and brands by the accounting 
profession has now become commonplace. This clearly 
represents a major inroad into the traditional approach 
that trade marks are not distinguishable from the 
goodwill of an undertaking as a whole and are not 
separately identifiable intangible assets. 
Cookson, however, warns that for goodwill in a business 
to be maintained, there must be input in many areas such 
as marketing, product development, advertising and the 
like. She points out that if one of the keys relating to 
the goodwill in any particular brand suffers serious 
change the goodwill in the brand could decline although 
the trade mark itself remains unchanged. 45 
Jacob, Kitchin & Mellor also sound a warning. Pointing 
out that the accounting approach to goodwill is not 
necessarily congruent with the approach the law adopts in 
the context of passing off they state: 
Currently, there are moves within the accounting profession to include the 
goodwill associated with important company brands as separate items in 
the balance sheets of the company. Whilst this can be done in theory, 
there are dangers both from an accounting point of view and from a legal 
perspective. The accountancy danger is that such an exercise could lead 
to over-valuing a company, not only because there would be a risk that 
the goodwill of the company generally might be over-valued. The legal 
danger is that businessmen will tend to regard the goodwill of the brand 
as an asset which can be used, borrowed against or otherwise dealt with 
just as in the case of any other assets. But goodwill poses special 
problems : the general common law rule that it cannot be divorced from 
the business, although now relaxed in some cases, is founded on an 
innate feeling about the nature of goodwill itself. Thus, unless there are 
very special licensing provisions, the goodwill of a brand is not a suitable 
security for a loan: the lender would not be sure of his security. 46 
45. See Cookson 250 - 251. 
46. Jacob, Kitchin & Mellor First Supplement to Kerly 30 - 31. 
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From the perspective of this work it is indeed the manner 
in which the law treats trade marks, goodwill and the 
relationship between them which must be afforded primacy. 
Insofar as the realities of the marketplace clearly 
suggests that the role of the trade and service mark as 
they now function in fact in modern commerce might not 
enjoy the law's proper patronage these matters raised in 
the present chapter will require further consideration in 
later chapters which deal with functional theory. 47 
4. 7 Reputation and Goodwill 
Wadlow points out that goodwill is a form of legal 
property which is distinguishable from mere reputation, 
though the concepts are closely related. A business with 
goodwill must have a reputation but the fact that a 
person, mark, product or business name has a reputation 
does not necessarily imply that a goodwill recognisable 
at law attaches thereto. 
case. 48 
Wadlow relies on the Budweiser 
In that case the Plaintiffs' beer, sold under the trade 
mark BUDWEISER was known to a substantial number of 
people in the United Kingdom as a beer brewed by the 
Plaintiffs in the U.S.A.. The question was, however, 
that as this reputation was associated with a beer which 
nobody could buy in the United Kingdom at that time, 
could it then be said that the Plaintiffs had a local 
goodwill which the law would recognise? The Court found 
that the Plaintiffs' reputation in the mark had been 
acquired otherwise than through advertising directed at 
the United Kingdom market and that the Plaintiffs had no 
goodwill and had suffered no damage in the United 
Kingdom. Thus, there had not been a passing-off . 49 
47. See chapter 15. 
48. Anheuser-Bausch Inc. v Budejovicky Budvar Narodine Podnik [1984] FSR 413. See 
Wadlow Law of Passing Off 45. 
49. Per Oliver J at p 470 - 471 of the report. 
4.7.1 
4.7.2 
4.7.3 
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Wadlow points out that a reputation can be relevant to 
goodwill, trade marks and passing-off in the following 
respects: 50 
Proof of a reputation in a mark can assist in showing 
that it is recognised as being distinctive by a 
sufficiently large proportion of the public; 
The presence of a reputation can assist in showing the 
possible presence of goodwill; 
The Plaintiff can show damage if the goods passed off are 
inferior to the genuine goods having a sound reputation. 
As reputation alone is not property, it cannot be 
assigned or otherwise dealt with as property. 51 
4. 8 International Goodwill 
This paragraph considers the law in the United Kingdom in 
those circumstances where it is alleged that the 
reputation and goodwill attached to a famous mark has 
become international and therefore transcends national 
borders. 
According to Mostert there is a line of cases in the 
United Kingdom recognising and protecting "international" 
goodwill and reputation whilst there is another "hard" 
line of cases which do not do so. 52 
In the first line of cases mentioned by Mostert53 , the 
Courts protected an international 
requiring the support of customers, 
goodwill without 
actual trade, or 
business activity of substance in the United Kingdom 
before granting relief. 
50. See Wadlow Law of Passing Off 45. 
51 . See Wadlow Law of Passing Off 46. But see also p 295-300 infra. 
52. Mostert [1989] 12 EIPR 440 - 448, 441. 
53. Poiret v Jules Poiret Ltd. and AF Nash [19201 37 R.P.C. 177; Baskin Robbins Ice Cream 
Co. v Gutman [19761 F.S.R. 545; Sheraton Corporation of America v Sheraton Motels 
Ltd. [19641 R.P.C. 202. 
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In the hardline cases -which include the Budweiser case 
discussed above - the Courts found insufficient business 
activity or reputation to found a protectable goodwill in 
the United Kingdom. 54 
In my view the cases mentioned by Mostert, although 
divergent, are not irreconcilable. What is required is 
that the Plaintiff must show a right of property in the 
United Kingdom which the Defendant is infringing. A 
measure of reputation or business activity insufficient 
to establish this will not sustain relief. The question 
is one of fact. 
4.9 Shared Goodwill 
In certain circumstances different parties may share 
goodwill in a name, trade mark or get-up in which event 
they may, as Plaintiffs, bring proceedings jointly or 
separately or as representatives of the remainder. 55 A 
form of shared goodwill is to be found in certain types 
of descriptive "class" marks 
Scotch Whisky and Advokaat. 56 
e . g. Champagne, Sherry, 
The question of goodwill as it was dealt with in the 
Drinks cases is best approached from the point of view of 
the speech of Lord Diplock in the Advokaat case and 
particularly the following aspects thereof. 
In confirming the view that the action for passing off is 
based on a property right in the goodwill attached to the 
54. The other cases mentioned are Star Industrial Company Limited v Yap Kwee Kor [19761 
F.S.R. 256 and The Athlete's Foot Marketing Associates, Inc v Cobra Sports Limited & 
Another [19801 R.P.C. 343. 
55. See Drysdale and Silverleaf Passing Off 51. 
56. See Bollinger (J) and ors. v Costa Brava Wine Co. Ltd. [19611 R.P.C. 116 (The 
Champagne case); Vine Products Co. Ltd. v Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. [19691 R.P.C. 1 (the 
Sherry case); Erven Warnick B.V. and Anr. v V.J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd. and Anr. 
[1980] R.P.C. 31 (the Advokaat case) - collectively known as the Drinks cases. 
4.9.1 
4.9.2 
4.9.3 
4.9.4 
4.9.5 
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Plaintiff's business, Lord Diplock identified five 
characteristics which must be present if the Plaintiff is 
to succeed in an action for passing off: 
My Lords, Spalding v. Gamage and the later cases make it possible to 
identify five characteristics which must be present in order to create a 
valid cause of action for passing off: (1) A misrepresentation (2) made by 
a trader in the course of trade, (3) to prospective customers of his or 
ultimate consumers of goods or services supplied by him, (4) which is 
calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader (in the 
sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence) and (5) which 
causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of the trader by whom the 
action is brought or (in a quia timet action) will probably do so. 57 
Lord Diplock, in approving the Champagne case, then 
stated the following assumptions of fact upon which the 
Champagne case had been decided: 
Plaintiffs carried on business in a geographical area in 
France known as Champagne; 
The Plaintiffs' wine was produced in Champagne, from 
grapes grown in Champagne; 
The Plaintiffs' wine had been known in the trade for a 
long time as "Champagne" with a high reputation; 
Members of the public or traders ordering or seeing wine 
advertised as "Champagne" would expect to get a wine 
produced in Champagne from grapes grown there; 
-
The Defendants were producing a wine not produced in that 
geographical area, which they were selling under the name 
"Spanish Champagne". 
In this regard, Lord Diplock stated: 
57. Lord Diplock at p 93 of the report. 
These findings disclose a factual situation (assuming that damage was 
thereby caused to the Plaintiffs' business) which contains each of the five 
characteristics which I have suggested must be present in order to create 
a valid cause of action for passing off. The features that distinguish it 
from all previous cases were: (a) that the element in the goodwill of each 
of the individual Plaintiffs that was represented by his ability to use 
without deception (in addition to his individual house mark) the word 
"Champagne" to distinguish his wines from sparkling wines not made by 
the champenois process from grapes produced in the Champagne district 
of France, was not exclusive to himself but was shared with every other 
shipper of sparkling wine to England whose wines could satisfy the same 
condition and (b) that the class of traders entitled to a proprietary right 
in "the attractive force that brings in custom" represented by the ability 
without deception to call one's wine "Champagne" was capable of 
continuing expansion, since it might be joined by any further shipper of 
wine who was able to satisfy that condition. 58 
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What generated the relevant goodwill in the Drinks cases 
was the reputation which the type of product indicated by 
the particular "class" mark gained in the market by 
reason of its recognisable and distinctive qualities. 59 
The property affected was not to be found in words such 
as "Champagne" or "Advokaat" but in the product 
described and distinguished by the word in 
This property was in the hands of the 
which was 
question. 
class of 
manufacturers who were entitled to apply the words to the 
product. 
It will be recalled that the idea of a collective 
goodwill is not novel and can be traced back to the 
production marks of the medieval guilds. 60 
5. ASSIGNMENT OF MARKS UNDER THE 1938 ACT 
Section 22 (1) provides in regard to trade marks: 
58. At p 94 - 95. 
59. See p 98 of the report. 
60. See chapter 1 p 11, 16. 
Notwithstamling any rule of law or equity to the contrary, a registered 
trade mark shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, assignable 
aml transmissible either in connection with the goodwill of a business or 
not. 
In regard to service marks section 22 (1) provides: 
A registered service mark shall be assignable aml transmissible either in 
connection with the goodwill of a business or not. 
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Section 22 (2) of the Act provides in regard to trade 
marks: 
A registered trade mark shall be, aml shall be deemed always to have 
been, assignable and transmissible in respect either of all the goods in 
respect of which it is registered, or was registered, as the case may be, or 
of some (but not all) of those goods. 
Regarding service marks, section 22 (2) of the Act 
provides: 
A registered service mark shall be assignable aml transmissible in respect 
either of all the services in respect of which it is registered or of some 
(but not all) of those services. 
These sections introduced the following concepts to trade 
mark legislation in the United Kingdom: 
(a) A trade mark could be transferred otherwise than 
with the goodwill of a business; 
(b) A trade mark could be transferred in connection with 
only some of the goods or services in respect of 
which it was registered. 
Section 
case. 
61 
22 
In 
(1) was 
that 
needed 
case a 
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to overrule the Lacteosote 
French manufacturer had 
established a business in the United Kingdom where it had 
registered the trade mark SIROP FAMEL in connection 
therewith. The Plaintiffs were later appointed sole 
distributors of the manufacturer's goods in the United 
Kingdom and took assignment of the trade mark 
registration - purportedly together with the goodwill of 
the business concerned in the goods in respect of which 
the trade mark had been registered. Plaintiffs failed in 
an infringement action because the assignment was held 
not to have been made with the entire goodwill of the 
. . . ( business which comprised the manufacture of the goods (by 
the assignor in France) and the vending of the goods (by 
the assignees in the United Kingdom) . As the goodwill 
could not be assigned with the vending part of the 
business only, which was in effect what had happened, the 
Plaintiffs' use of the mark SIROP FAMEL (and another 
substantially identical mark which had been registered by 
the Plaintiff), was held to be deceptive. 
5.1 Assignments without Goodwill 
Trade mark theory at the time of the enactment of the 
1938 Act advocated that the public returned to the same 
goods as identified by a trade mark used in relation 
thereto and which indicated the origin of the goods. The 
purchaser would seldom look to establish the actual 
identity of the manufacturer and would be guided 
regarding the origin of the goods by the trade mark 
featured in connection therewith. Thus, if the trade 
mark was detached from the business of origin, it would 
be necessary to notify the 
public advertisement of the 
enactment of section 22 (7) 
1 ff . . 62 rea e ect in practice. 
change in origin through 
change. This led to the 
of the Act which had little 
61. Lacteosote Ltd. v Alberman [19271 44 R.P.C. 211. 
62. See Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 16.2.9 Rel 1 [1992]. 
The section provided regarding trade marks: 
Where an assignment in respect of any goods of a trade mark that is at 
the time of the assignment used in a business in those goods is made, on 
or after the appointed day, otherwise than in connection with the goodwill 
of that business, the assignment shall not take effect until the following 
requirements have been satisfied, that is to say, the assignee must, not 
later than the expiration of six months from the date on which the 
assignment is made or within such extended period, if any, as the 
Registrar may allow, apply to him for directions with respect to the 
advertisement of the assignment, and must advertise it in such form and 
manner and within such period as the Registrar may direct. 
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The Act applied the same strictures to service marks 
registered thereunder. The essence of the matter was 
that the assignment of a registered mark without goodwill 
had to be advertised before the assignment would take 
effect. 
Whether or not to assign a trade mark with or without 
goodwill required an assessment of the circumstances in 
each case. There was no difficulty in assigning marks to 
which no goodwill attached such as unused marks or marks 
which had fallen into disuse and in connection with which 
no residue of goodwill remained. Such marks could be 
assigned without goodwill for obvious reasons and the 
registry would not require advertisement of the 
. 63 
assignment. 
Where a product mark which had always been used in 
connection with a house-mark or corporate logo was 
assigned, it was advisable for the assignment to be 
without goodwill in order to safeguard the goodwill of 
64 the house-mark or corporate logo. 
It must also be borne in mind that as goodwill remained 
the basis of the passing off action the assignment of 
registered trade marks without goodwill meant that the 
63. See Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 16.2.12 Rel 4 [1992]. 
64. See Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 16.2.10 Rel 2 [1992]. 
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assignee did not have a passing off action 
the mark otherwise than in respect of 
generated in connection therewith after 
took place. 65 
in respect of 
new goodwill 
the assignment 
5.2 The Assignment of Unregistered Marks 
The purported assignment of an unregistered trade mark in 
gross was of no effect and the assignment of an 
unregistered trade mark was similarly regarded where the 
assignor had no goodwill to . h . h 66 assign t erewit . 
Thus, if an assignee who had 
registered trade mark wished to 
taken assignment of a 
use the trade mark in 
connection with goods or services in respect of which the 
mark was not registered but in connection with which the 
assignor had acquired goodwill through use of the mark in 
respect of such goods, the assignee had to acquire also 
this goodwill alongside the registered mark and any other 
goodwill assigned. The assignee would not in that event 
obtain an exclusive right to use of the registered trade 
mark upon the goods or services outside the registered 
specification in respect of which the assignee had 
obtained the additional goodwill but would have a passing 
ff . . h d . 67 o action in respect of t ose goo s or services. 
5.3 Section 22 (3) 
Section 22 (3) of the Act provides in regard to trade marks: 
The provisions of the two foregoing subsections shall have ejf ect in the 
case of an unregistered trade mark used in relation to any goods as they 
have effect in the case of a registered trade mark registered in respect of 
any goods, if at the time of the assignment or transmission of the 
unregistered trade mark it is or was used in the same business as a 
registered trade mark, and if it is or was assigned or transmitted at the 
65. Star Industrial Company Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor [1976] F.S.R. 256. 
66. Thorneloe v Hill [1894] 11 R.P.C. 61 70; Harness T.M. [1900] 17 R.P.C. 40. 
67. See Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 16.2.1 Rel 1 [1992]. 
same time and to the same person as that registered trade mark and in 
respect of goods all of which are goods in relation to which the 
unregistered trade mark is or was used in that business and in respect of 
which that registered trade mark is or was assigned or transmitted. 
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In the corresponding section relating to service marks, 
the Act provides: 
The provisions of the two foregoing subsections shall have effect in the 
case of an unregistered service mark used in relation to any services as 
they have effect in the case of a registered service mark registered in 
respect of any services, if at the time of the assignment or transmission of 
the unregistered service mark it was used in the same business as a 
registered service mark, and if it is assigned or transmitted at the same 
time and to the same person as that registered service mark and in respect 
of services all of which are services in relation to which the unregistered 
service mark is used in that business and in respect of which that 
registered service mark is or was assigned or transmitted. 
Section 22 (3), therefore, applies the provisions of 
sections 22 (1) and 22 (2) to unregistered trade marks. 
Section 22 
unregistered 
(3) did not mean that goodwill in an 
mark could only be transferred in 
circumstances where at least one registered mark was 
transferred therewith simultaneously in respect of the 
same goods or services. 
The section applied where transfer of the unregistered 
mark did not include goodwill or included some of the 
goodwill only, or where only some of the goods or 
services in respect of which the mark had been used were 
transferred with the mark. Essentially the section 
permitted the assignment of unregistered marks in gross 
together with registered marks. 
It is to be noted that a pending application was an 
unregistered mark for the purposes of section 22 (3) . 
Thus, assignment of a pending application which was 
regarded as the transfer of the goodwill symbolised by the 
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mark would not be recorded by the registry without 
simultaneous assignment of another mark for the same 
goods or services to the same assignee. Upon 
registration of the pending application, however, the 
registrar would record an assignment based on a document 
purporting to assign the pending application executed 
. . . . 68 prior to its registration. 
5.4 Associations 
In terms of sections 22 (2) and 22 (2A) of the Act, the 
Registrar 
where he 
would require association 
considered them to be for 
of registrations 
similar goods or 
services and believed that they could not have been 
separately registered except in the name of the same 
owner. Where the Registrar was of the view that the 
af oregoing considerations no longer applied and no 
likelihood of confusion or deception would arise if the 
registrations were used by different proprietors, the 
registrar could dissolve the association. Associated 
marks could not be assigned separately. 69 
6. LICENSING 
Under section 87 of the 1883 Act any registered 
proprietor could grant licenses and otherwise deal 
therewith subject to equities. The relevant part of the 
section provided: 
87 .... The person for the time being entered in the register of patents, 
designs, or trade marks, as proprietor of a patent, copyright in a design, 
or trade mark, as the case may be, shall, subject to the provisions of this 
Act and to any rights appearing from such register to be vested in any 
other person, have power absolutely to assign, grant licenses as to, or 
otherwise deal with, the same, and to give effectual receipts for any 
consideration for such assignment, license, or dealing. Provided that any 
equities in respect of such patent, design, or trade mark may be enforced 
in like manner as in respect of any other personal property. 
68. See Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 16.2.3 Rel 2 [19921 from which source 
the discussion in paragraph 5.3 was derived. 
69. See sections 23 (3), 23 (2A), 23 (5) and 23 (1) of the 1938 Act as amended. See also 
eoo,..t-inneo ?? /a:;,\ "'""' ?? IA\ ron<>rrlinn "c:nlittinn" <>cc:innmAntc:~ 
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Sebastian observed that the power of granting licenses 
had not to be exercised so as to deceive the public. In 
his view the power to licence trade marks was in conflict 
with section 70 of the Act which appeared to him to 
intend that only the person entitled to the goodwill 
connected therewith should have the right to use the 
mark. It will be recalled that section 70 provided also 
that a trade mark would be determinable with the goodwill 
of the business concerned in the particular goods in 
respect of which the mark was registered. 70 
This approach was taken up in the 1905 Act which 
contained no provision for the registered proprietor of a 
trade mark to grant licences. A trade mark was to be 
used in connection with the goods of the registered 
proprietor. If it were to be used in relation to the 
goods of any other person this would lead to deception. 71 
6.1 Licensing and the 1938 Act 
In the law immediately prior to the coming into force of 
the 1994 Act trade mark licences could be either 
registered or unregistered. In the case of registered 
licences the licensee was recorded as a registered user 
of the mark under section 28 of the Act. The provisions 
of section 28 were not mandatory and unregistered 
licensing was not therefore prohibited. 72 
6.1.1 Registered Licences 
A licensee could be recorded as registered user in respect 
of all or certain of the goods or services covered by the 
registration and with or without restrictions as to how 
the mark was to be used. 73 
70. See Sebastian Trade Marks 366; See also p 62 regarding section 70. 
71. See Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 252. 
72. See Bostitch TM [19631 R.P.C. 183. 
73. Section 28(1 ). 
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6.1. 2 Consequences of Recordal 
6.1.3 
The permitted use of a registered mark - which was use 
thereof according to the terms upon which the registered 
user was recorded in the registry - was deemed to be use 
of the mark by the registered proprietor thereof and not 
by any other person (including the registered user) . 74 
The registered user could himself sue an inf ringer if the 
proprietor refused to do so within two months of a 
request for intervention made to the proprietor by the 
registered user. This provision could be excluded by 
agreement. 75 
Essentially, if the proprietor of a trade or service mark 
wanted to ensure that his rights in the mark were 
maintained and even extended under the licence he needed 
to ensure that all the goodwill generated through use of 
the mark accrued to himself in law and not to the 
licencee. Attainment of this objective could be greatly 
enhanced by recording a registered user arrangement in 
respect of the licence under the Act. 
Obtaining Recordal 
The statutory provisions relating to registered users 
76 
applied only to registered marks. 
Obtaining the recordal of a registered user was not a 
mere formality in terms of the Act. The Registrar had to 
decide in the exercise of his discretion whether an 
agreement placed before him for recordal was against the 
74. Sections 28(2) and 68(1). 
75. Section 28(3). See Cornish Intellectual Property 469 - 470 and Gold and Nicholls (eds) 
Trade Mark Handbook 17.2.2 and 17.2.3 Rel 0 [1991]. 
76. See Blanco White and Jacob Kerly 12th ed, 252. 
6.1.4 
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public interest in which event he could refuse the 
application. In terms of section 28 (4) (a) the 
proprietor and the registered user had to apply jointly 
for the arrangement to be recorded and the applicants had 
to furnish particulars of the degree of control which the 
proprietor would exercise over the permitted use. In 
practice the Registrar's enquiry was then directed at 
whether the proposed permitted use would indicate some 
connection in the course of trade or business between the 
. d k d . . 77 h .. registere mar an its proprietor. T e requisite 
control could be established by the presence of control 
provisions applicable between the licensor and the 
licencee, a parent and subsidiary relationship or other 
suitable group arrangement between corporate bodies or by 
means of other appropriate circumstances such as use of 
the mark appurtenant to a patent licence. 78 
Trafficking 
Lord Brightman defined trafficking thus in the leading 
case of Holly Hobbie T M79 : 
To my mind, trafficking in a trade mark context conveys the notion of 
dealing in a trade mark primarily as a commodity in its own right and not 
primarily for the pU1pose of identifying or promoting merchandise in 
which the proprietor of the mark is interested. 
In the Court of Appeal Sir Denys Buckley said of 
trafficking: 
77. See section 28(4) (5). Cornish Intellectual Property 470. Norman [19941 E.l.P.R. 154 -
158 154. 
78. Where there was no de facto application of control provisions the use of a registered 
mark by a registered user was not permitted use thereof under the Act : McGregor 
Clothing Co's T M [19791 R.P.C. 36. See also Gold and Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark 
Handbook 17.2.1 Rel 0 [19911; Radiation TM [19301 47 R.P.C. 37; Revlon Inc. v 
Cripps & Fee Ltd. and ors. [19801 F.S.R. 85; The reference to a connection in the 
course of trade or business in the text refers to the definition of trade and service marks 
in section 68( 1 ) . 
79. Holly Hobbie TM [19841 R.P.C. 329 356 - 357. 
In my judgment "trafficking" in section 28 (6) extends to any conduct 
carried out or intended to be carried out in respect of a mark or a 
proposed mark with a view to commercial gain which is not a bona fide 
exploitation of that mark in pursuance of the true function of a trade 
mark, viz. its use in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating, or so 
as to indicate, a connection in the course of trade between the goods and 
some person having the right either as proprietor or as a registered user 
to use the mark [Trade Marks Act 1938, Section 68 (l)]. 80 
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This case concerned character merchandising. An apt 
description of the activity was provided by Dillon LJ. in 
the Court of Appeal: 
A person who has a popular fictional character to exploit, for instance, a 
fictional character from a film or television series or book or drawing, 
does so by granting licences to use the character, its name, and relevant 
copyright material, usually on a royalty basis, to licensees who wish to 
promote their own goods by using the fictional character in association 
with those goods. 81 
The applicants had sought registration of the trade mark 
HOLLY HOBBIE in twelve classes in the United Kingdom 
under section 29 (1) (b) of the Act and each application 
was accompanied by an application for registration of a 
producer of relevant goods in each class as registered 
user of the mark. The proprietor of the trade mark had 
no trading connection with goods in a number of the 
classes in which registration of the mark had been 
sought. 
quality 
Despite provisions in the user 
control the Court found that 
agreements for 
trafficking was 
intended and refused to register 
were contrary to section 28 (6) 
section provided: 
80. At p 347 of the report. 
81. At p 339 of the report. 
such applications as 
of the Act. 82 This 
82. The quality control had to be actual and not merely potential. See Norman [19941 4 
EIPR 154 - 158. 
[28 (6)] The Registrar shall refuse an application under the foregoing 
provisions of the section if it appears to him that the grant thereof would 
tend to facilitate trafficking in a trade mark. 83 
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Thus in terms of the Act the Registrar could refuse to 
register that which he believed would facilitate 
trafficking - which term was not defined in the Act. 
In the context of the law under the 1938 Act Gold and 
Nicholls place the question of trafficking and character 
merchandising in proper perspective: 
In order to appreciate the relevance of this anti-trafficking provision [i.e. 
s 28 (6) of the Trade Marks Act 1938] it is necessary to recognise that 
trade and service marks are currently used in a range of ways. The 
traditional role of the mark is to indicate the origin of the goods and that 
the owner is responsible for the quality of the goods. The mark used in 
this traditional role acts as a signpost to the customer so that he may 
purchase again products with which he has been satisfied. At the other 
end of the spectrum, marks are used to "decorate" the goods. This is 
essentially the area of charcter merchandising, although not all the marks 
used in this manner are characters. Indeed many are trade marks 
representing goodwill in a business in a primary product but which are 
being used on other goods. 84 
In view of the importance which the so-called advertising 
function of trade and service marks has taken on in the 
modern law to which the concept of character 
merchandising is linked the latter topic will be 
revisited in the discussion of the South African law and 
in that chapter of this work which deals specifically 
with the function of trade marks. 85 
83. Regarding service marks the provision is identical save that "service mark" replaces 
"trade mark" in the text. 
84. Gold and Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 17.1.6 Ref (0) [1991 J. 
85. See chapter 15. 
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6.2 Unregistered Licences 
Although the registered user provisions of the 1938 Act 
were not the only legitimate way in which effect could be 
given to a trade mark licence at the time, that this 
should be the case underpinned the approach of the Goshen 
Committee which recommended the enactment of the 
registered user provisions of the 1938 Act to prevent 
unregistered licences deceiving the public and vitiating 
trade marks. 86 
The Committee after careful consideration of the evidence decided that 
the trend of modern commercial development required some relaxation of 
the then existing restrictions on the use of registered trade marks by 
persons other than the proprietor. 
However, the Committee were unwilling to recommend a system of 
unrestricted licensing as such a system might result in deception and 
confusion of the purchasing public. It was considered essential that the 
right to use another's trade mark should not be obtainable merely at the 
will of the registered proprietor but should, in the public interest, be 
subject to limitation and control. 87 
The Courts proceeded from a position of disapproving 
licences to a position where unregistered licences were 
regarded legitimate under certain circumstances. Cornish 
reviews the relevant spectrum of cases thus: 
Among the earlier decisions disapproving of licensing, the most difficult is 
Bowden Wire Ltd v. Bowden Brake. The House of Lords treated a 
trademark licence as inherently deceptive in leading the public either to 
believe that goods bearing the mark were its proprietor's when they were 
not, or that the mark had come through use to indicate the licensee, not 
the proprietor. That case must now be read in the light of the Lords' 
decision in "G E" Trade Mark : a mark will be expungeable for 
subsequent deceptiveness only if its proprietor has been guilty of 
86. See Cornish Intellectual Property 471; The Report of the Goshen Committee [19341 
Cmnd 4568. 
87. Per Lloyd and Bray Kerly 7th ed. 368. 
blameworthy conduct sufficient to render it disentitled to protection in a 
Court of Justice. Possibly the Bowden case, if indeed it has any 
relevance to the law under the 1938 Act, supports the following 
proposition : where the proprietor of a mark permits another to use it 
without retaining any power to control the products that are to bear the 
mark, and there are no counte-rvailing explanations to excuse this, the 
mark will become liable to removal. This might, for instance, be so if 
both licensor and licensee continued to produce similar goods under the 
mark without any quality supervision by the former of the latter, or even 
if the owner made no real effort to enforce a quality control agreement. 
On the other hand, there are decisions upholding marks in the following 
circumstances, which in essence were treated as involving no blame : 
allowing a retailer to use the name of the supplier of goods on other 
goods during a period when the supplier was prevented from supplying 
his own; and allowing a British importing agent to use his foreign 
manufacturer's mark on goods which he himself made in Britain, the 
intent being to keep the business alive even though imports were 
prevented by war. A fortori it might now be said that there is nothing 
blameworthy in unregistered licensing under conditions of quality control, 
as in the case already mentioned. 88 
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Insofar as licensing arrangements involving trade and 
service marks entailed a change in the trade or business 
connection between the proprietor and the goods or 
services concerned - for instance from the direct link of 
manufacture to an indirect link involving a control 
relationship between the proprietor and manufacturer 
such licensed use could be regarded deceptive. 
88. Cornish Intellectual Property 471 - 472. The leading cases were: Bowden Wire Ltd v 
Borden Brake Co. Ltd [19141 31 R.P.C. 385; G.E. Trade Mark [19731 R.P.C. 297; 
Bostitch T M [19631 R.P.C. 183; Cluett Peabody & Co., Ltd. v Mcintyre Hogg Marsh & 
Co., Ltd. [19581 R.P.C. 355; Manus Aktiebolaget v R.J. Fullwood & Bland Ltd. [19481 
65 R.P.C. 329, [19491 66 R.P.C. 71. It must be remembered that the Bowden Wire 
case was decided with reference to section 22 of the 1 905 Act and section 70 of the 
1883 Act. See also Blanco White and Jacob Kerly 12th ed. 252 - 254; Norman 154 -
158. 
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Section 62 of the 1938 Act was therefore enacted 
. f . 11 d h . 89 I . d d spec1 1ca y to ren er t e matter certain. t prov1 e 
in regard to trade marks: 
62 Change of form of trade connection not to be deemed to cause 
deception 
The use of a registered trade mark in relation to goods between which 
and the person using it in any form of connection in the course of trade 
subsists shall not be deemed to be likely to cause deception or confusion 
on the ground only that the trade mark has been, or is, used in relation to 
goods between which and that person or a predecessor in title of his a 
different form of connection in the course of trade subsisted or subsists. 
In regard to services section 62 provides: 
The use of a registered se111ice mark in relation to se111ices between the 
provision of which and the person using it any form of connection in the 
course of business subsists shall not be deemed to be likely to cause 
deception or confusion on the ground only that the se111ice mark has been, 
or is, used in relation to se111ices between the provision of which and that 
person or a predecessor in title of his a different form of connection in the 
course of business subsisted or subsists. 
Whether the licensing arrangement was recorded under the 
Act or not, its essential feature had to be that the 
degree of control imposed by the licensor was such as to 
ensure that the goodwill generated by all the licensed 
use of the mark ultimately accrued to the licensor in a 
consolidated whole. 90 
7. IN SUM 
From the point of view of assignments and licensing of 
trade marks two premises underpinned early trade mark law 
in the United Kingdom: 
89. See Blanco White and Jacob Ker/y 12th ed. 255. 
90. See Gold and Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 17.1.3 Rel 0 [1991]. 
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7 .1 a trade mark indicated to the public that the goods in 
connection with which it was used emanated from a 
particular undertaking; 
7.2 the public was not to be confused or deceived by the use 
of a trade mark. 
Thus, trade marks came to be firmly linked with the 
goodwill in the business in the goods in connection with 
which the trade mark was used. A break in this link 
offended the second premise. Hence, for a trade mark 
assignment to be lawful the goodwill to which the mark 
was appurtenant had to be assigned together with the 
trade mark. Still, this did not necessarily make the 
assignment lawful perse for it could still be unlawful if 
deception or confusion as to origin resulted. 
Although licences were permitted subject to equities 
under the 1883 Act in apparent conflict with the 
assignment provisions of the Act licensing was not 
provided for in the 1905 Act as it was by then regarded 
deceptive. 
The Courts moved from the position where licensing was 
regarded inherently deceptive and thus unlawful to an 
approach where licences performed under the actual 
control of the proprietor of the trade mark were 
recognised. Licences which were deceptive due to 
blameworthy conduct on the part of the proprietor were 
however regarded unlawful. 
As far as goodwill was concerned a further premise arose. 
Trade marks had no independent value. Property was to be 
found in the goodwill of the business in connection with 
which the trade mark was used and which the trade mark 
'symbolised' . 
The demands of the market place however required the 1938 
Act to recognise assignment of trade marks without 
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goodwill and to provide for trade mark licences - albeit 
with hesitation, subject to restrictions and by means of 
complex provisions. At the time of repeal of the 1938 
Act traditional approaches to assignments, goodwill and 
trade mark licencing remained under pressure. Modern 
commerce had recognised intrinsic value in trade marks 
and placed asset value upon brands. Merchandising of 
goods and services by means of trade marks had become a 
common feature in need of recognition in law. 
In my view such pressures arise from a dogmatic adherence 
to traditional functional theory and, insofar as they 
continue, indicate that legal recognition of those 
functions which modern trade marks perform in fact is 
both necessary and overdue. 
These matters are specifically considered in Chapters 15 
and 16. 
204 
CHAPTER 9 
UNITED KINGDOM: TRADE MARKS AND GOODWILL AS PROPERTY 
This chapter builds upon the discussion of the topic of 
property in trade marks in Chapter 4 of this work (which 
dealt with the position during the early part of the 19th 
century) and extends the treatment afforded to the nature 
of trade marks and goodwill in Chapter 8. 
It also contains a necessary albeit brief discussion of 
the English law of property - which differs substantially 
from the property law of civil law systems in which the 
Roman law concept of dominium prevails. This discussion 
is intended to clarify what English lawyers mean when 
they speak of "property" and to remind South African 
lawyers that their conception of property is very 
different to that of their counterparts in the United 
Kingdom. 
1. CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN ENGLISH LAW 
The law of property is "usually regarded as a highly technical and 
obscure part of English law". 1 
It features special and important classifications and 
adopts a subtractive approach. Thus property in toto minus 
2 land (realty) leaves personal property (personalty) . 
English law makes a primary distinction between real and personal 
property, the former being interests in land other than leasehold interests 
and the latter moveable property together with leasehold interests in land. 
Real property is often called realty, personal property personalty or 
chattels, leasehold being, somewhat surprisingly, called chattels real 
while all other chattels are called chattels personal. The distinction is 
1 . Lawson & Rudden Law of Property Preface v. 
2. See Bridge Personal Property 1 . 
based on historical factors which have no longer any appreciable force; 
and indeed leaseholds are now always included in books on real 
property. 3 
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The distinction between realty and personalty does not 
correspond with the civil law concepts of immovable and 
moveable property although English choice of law rules 
take cognisance of the latter classification. 4 
The deep and characteristic division in English property 
law between land and personal property came about through 
the particular historical development of land law in 
mainly three respects. 
Firstly, after the Norman Conquest all land was subject 
to feudal tenure and was thus held from or through the 
Crown. 
The major tenants-in-chief held land directly from the Crown in return for 
feudal dues and service. By a process of subinfeudation, lesser tenants 
held portions of the same land from the tenants-in-chief on similar terms 
and so on . . . The systems of tenure, expressed through the doctrine of 
estates, is very much in place today, though feudal dues as such no 
longer exist. No such structure of ownership ever applied to property 
other than land. 5 
Secondly, higher interests in land such as the fee simple 
were protected at law by the real actions which enabled 
the owner to recover the land if he were wrongfully 
dispossessed. Personal property on the other hand could 
not be recovered in rem until enactment of the Common Law 
Procedure Act, 1854. 
Thirdly, the rules relating to descent on death differed 
for land and personalty until the enactment of the 
6 Administration of Estates Act, 1925. 
3. Lawson & Rudden Law of Property 19. 
4. See Bridge Personal Property 7. 
5. See Bridge Personal Property 2. 
6. See Bridge Personal Property 2. 
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1.1 Personal Property 
Personal property is made up of chattels real which in 
the main comprise leasehold interests in land and 
chattels personal which are those items of personalty 
which are not chattels real. Chattels personal comprise 
two mutually exclusive types namely choses (or things) in 
possession and choses (or things) in action. 7 
Of this classification Lawson & Rudden state: 
Chattels personal are classified as choses ("things") in possession and 
choses in action according as they can be enjoyed by taking possession of 
them or only by bringing an action. The term chose in action was first 
applied to debts, to which alone it is completely appropriate ... 
However, the term has been extended to all other intangible forms of 
property, such as patents and copyright. It would inf act be better if the 
distinction were expressed as one between tangible and intangible things. 
But, however the distinction may be expressed, it is not always easy to 
draw. Thus documents which give a right to call for the delivery of 
tangible things which are known by the name of goods are themselves 
tangible, but their value depends not on the intrinsic value of the pieces 
of paper themselves but on the value of the intangible right they symbolise 
to call for the delivery of the goods. 8 
1.1.1 Choses in Possession 
Choses in possession are tangible moveable things which 
when they become the subject matter of mercantile 
dealings are referred to as chattels. However all 
corporeal moveables are not necessarily chattels. Thus 
documents of title to land and certain keys are regarded 
by the law as so closely connected to land as to be 
regarded appendages thereto. Similarly items which 
become fixtures to land are treated as part thereof . 9 
7. See Bridge Personal Property 3. Since the Law of Property Act, 1925 leaseholds have 
been recognised as equivalent to other interests in land. 
8. Lawson & Rudden Law of Property 20. 
9. Bridge Personal Property 3 - 4. 
1.1.2 
1.1.2.1 
1.1.2.2 
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Choses in Action 
Choses in action f orrn the residual category of personal 
property which remains after the elimination of corporeal 
chattels. The category comprises a diverse range of 
intangible property such as debts, shares in companies, 
bills of exchange and other incorporeals including 
goodwill and intellectual property. There are two 
sub-categories of choses in action namely documentary 
intangibles and pure intangibles. 
Documentary Intangibles 
Documentary intangibles are instruments or documents 
which become so identified in law with the obligation 
embodied therein that the appropriate way of performing 
or transferring the obligation concerned is through 
dealing with the document itself. Documentary 
intangibles take on the characteristics of a chattel so 
that the rights recorded therein become attached to the 
document - a tangible thing - such as bills of exchange, 
promissory notes, bills of lading, share certificates and 
insurance policies in some circumstances. 
Pure Intangibles 
Pure intangibles are incorporeal items .. to which the law 
attaches a value and which can be individually disposed 
of and used as collateral. Thus pure intangibles are 
something more than a mere contractual expectancy for 
they feature an exchange value in themselves. Examples 
of pure intangibles include debts, goodwill and 
intellectual property. 10 
In the context of the enquiry to which this work is 
1 0. See Bridge Personal Property 4 - 6 regarding choses in action from which source his 
discussion has been derived. 
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directed the species goodwil 1 and trade marks are 
classifiable as choses in action in the nature of pure 
intangibles. 
Regarding goodwill Lawson & Rudden observe 
So well established a head of property is it that its value must be taken 
into account for purposes of taxation. Yet it is an odd kind of property 
since only the person who has transferred the goodwill can be placed 
under duty to respect it. He indeed can be restrained from soliciting his 
former customers and he may also agree not to carry on a competing 
business. But no third party can be restricted from trading in such a 
way as to reduce the value of the goodwill. 11 Yet as a marketable 
object goodwill must be considered property. 12 
Lawson & Rudden treat intellectual property as monopolies 
protected by law. 
regarded as perpetual 
more than the right 
Trade marks and trade names are 
monopolies which amount to nothing 
to identify a business or its 
products and to prevent others from usurping the 
advantages which derive therefrom. As this kind of 
property does nothing to prevent or even discourage 
competitors from producing or trading lawfully there is 
no reason of public policy why they should not be 
perpetual. 
The temporary monopolies comprising the exclusive rights 
to exploit patents, industrial desgins and copyright all 
are genuine monopolies insofar as they operate to exclude 
competition in manufacture, trade or the dissemination of 
literary or artistic works. As it is the general policy 
of law to stimulate competition with a view to having 
things produced and disseminated in the best and cheapest 
way the law will not grant perpetual monopolies to 
inventors, artists, authors, composers and the like. The 
patent, copyright and design systems however grant 
temporary monopolies to such persons as an inducement to 
13 produce. 
11 . Save by tortious conduct directed at impairing goodwill. 
12. Lawson & Rudden Law of Property 33. 
13. See Lawson & Rudden Law of Property 33 - 34 regarding patents, copyright, trade 
1.1.3 
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Dealing with and Transfer of Choses in Action 
As choses in action are intangible they cannot be 
possessed physically and dealings therewith are 
to the limitations which the nature of this 
property imposes. 
subject 
kind of 
Because they were incapable of being possessed and could 
not be physically vindicated, entitlements to choses in 
action were not enforced by the early common law Courts 
and it fell to equity and the law merchant to give 
. f h' 14 meaning to property o t is type. 
In view of its intangible nature a chose in action can be 
enjoyed and exploited only through the medium of law 
which imposes a duty upon third parties to do or not to 
do something in respect of the chose in action. Although 
this property has value it cannot be enjoyed as and for 
itself physically and cannot of course be transferred 
like a chattel through physical delivery coupled with an 
appropriate intention to transfer. 
Thus choses in action are entitlements arising from 
obligations that are enforceable by legal action. In 
order to transfer a pure intangible an assignment is 
required - the law regarding which is largely a matter of 
1 . h dd' . 15 case aw wit statutory a it1ons. 
It is to be noted that the common law echewed assignments 
and it was left to equity to give effect thereto - which 
it did in two ways. Where the chose in action could be 
14. Bridge Personal Property 4. 
15. See section 136 of the Law of Property Act, 1925 which provides for the absolute 
assignment of "any debt or other legal thing in action". This does no affect goodwill or 
trade marks. According to Sheridan Rights in Security p 272 footnote 23 : "There are 
no other legal things in action beside debts, unless sums of money due under contracts 
are not counted as debts". (See however Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Marks Handbook 
16.1.3 Rel 2 [19921 for a contrary view). 
210 
asserted only in equity or exclusively in the courts of 
equity the assignee could take direct action in a court 
of equity in his own name. If the action was enforceable 
only at common law the assignee could bring an action in 
the name of the assignor unless the assignor would not 
assist. An assignor unwilling to co-operate could then 
be compelled in equity to allow the assignee to use his 
name which would entail j oinder of the assignor in the 
proceedings. All parties could thereby be placed before 
the court and effect given to the law both at common law 
d . . 16 an in equity. 
It was not necessary in equity to record an equitable 
assignment in writing and consideration was not required 
to support a valid equitable assignment. 17 Anderson 
suggests that as section 205 of the Law of Property Act, 
1925 provides that property includes "anything in action, and any 
interest in real or personal property" that an assignment of a trade 
mark should be recorded in writing. Furthermore if the 
transaction embodies any contractual rights consideration 
18 
will be necessary to perfect the agreement. 
2. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND OWNERSHIP 
In English law, property rights involve a relationship 
between an individual and a thing (corporeal or 
incorporeal) , and the effect of this relationship upon 
the world at large. 
The relation between a person and a thing is called by lawyers a real 
relation, or relation in rem (from the Latin word res meaning thing) and 
is distinguished from a personal relation or relation in personam. 1 9 
16. See Bridge Personal Property 4, 112 - 113 in this regard. 
1 7. See Bridge Personal Property 114 - 116. 
18. See Anderson Patent World October 1990 24 - 26 and Bridge Personal Property 116. 
Insofar as this would be under section 136 which relates to the absolute assignment of 
"debts" or other legal things in action Anderson is not necessarily correct unless a trade 
mark is a legal thing in action. See footnote 1 5 p 209 supra. 
19. Lawson & Rudden Law of Property 2. "The law of property deals with the legal 
relations between people with regard to things. " (At p 1 ) . 
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Property rights are characterised by their universality 
and it is said that they can be asserted against the 
world at large - which distinguishes them from personal 
rights which can be asserted against limited individuals 
1 h . 20 on y, sue as a contracting party. 
This does not mean that property rights are invincible 
for the remedies available in the event of infringement 
of property rights are subject to limitations. 21 
In the case of registered trade marks there is of course 
the special statutory infringement action available 
against an inf ringer whilst in the case of an impingement 
upon goodwill the common law passing off action is 
available against the tortfeasor. 22 
When it comes to the protection of property interests in 
English law the approach of the common law is different 
to that of the civil law because the common law does not 
feature a notion of ownership in the sense of absolute 
title as does the civil law. 23 
From the point of view of trade marks the terms "owner" 
and "proprietor" are often used in the statutes and in 
the parlance of practice to denote the person other than 
a licensee who is entitled to the rights in both 
registered and unregistered trade marks. 24 
This gives rise to the question whether a trade mark can 
be the subject of ownership strictu sensu under the law of 
the United Kingdom. 
20. See Lawson & Rudden Law of Property 2 - 3; Bridge Personal Property 8. 
21 . See Bridge Personal Property 8 - 9. 
22. See Chapters 7 and 8 in this regard. 
23. See Bridge Personal Property 35. 
24. See for instance Blanco White & Jacob Kerly 12th ed. paragraphs 1-04, 2-12, 4-05, 
5-07, 6-02, 13-17 and section 17(1) of the 1938 Act. 
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In order to answer the question some clarification as to 
the concept of ownership in the common law is neccesary. 
In his celebrated article concerning ownership Honore 
proceeds by giving an account of what he terms the 
standard incidents of ownership which ordinarily apply to 
a person who has the greatest interest in a thing 
admitted by a mature legal system. By this method he 
analyses the "liberal" concept of "full" individual 
ownership. 25 Honore defines ownership "provisionally" as 
the greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature 
system of law recognises and states: 
Ownership comprises the right to possess, the right to use, the right to 
manage, the right to the income of the thing, the righ to the capital, the 
right to security, the rights or incidents of transmissibility and absence 
of term, the prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution, and the 
incident of residuarity; this makes eleven leading incidents. Obviously, 
there are alternative ways of classifying the incidents; moreover, it is 
fashionable to speak of ownership as if it were just a bundle of rights, in 
which case at least two items in the list would have to be omitted. 
Honore observes that ownership may be present though some 
of the incidents are absent. He proceeds thus: 
No doubt the concentration in the same person of the right (liberty) of 
using as one wishes, the right to exclude others, the power of alienating 
and an immunity from expropriation is a cardinal feature of the 
institution. Yet it would be a distortion -and one of which the 
eighteenth century, with its over-emphasis on subjective rights, was 
patently guilty - to speak as if this concentration of patiently garnered 
rights was the only legally or socially important characteristic of the 
owner's position. The present analysis, by emphasising that the owner 
is subject to characteristic prohibitions and limitations, and that 
25. A M Honore, "Ownership" in Guest Oxford Essays 215 - 255. It is clear that Honore 
regarded the law of the United Kingdom a "mature legal system" which renders his 
article relevant to our discussion. The article is also relevant to the law of the U.S.A.: 
See Becker and Kipnis (eds) Property 69 - 70. 
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ownership comprises at least one important incident independent of the 
owner's choice, is an attempt to redress the balance. 26 
Insofar as all the incidents mentioned by Honore are not 
necessarily self-evident the following is to be noted. 
The right to use refers to the owner's personal use and 
enjoyment of the thing owned whilst the right to manage 
refers to the right to decide how and by whom the thing 
owned shall be used. The right to capital indicates the 
power to alienate the thing and the liberty to consume, 
waste or destroy it in whole or in part. The right to 
security refers to the owner 1 s prospects of remaining 
owner indefinitely in the absence of insolvency whilst 
the incident of absence of term refers to the prospect of 
an indeterminate term of ownership in the absence of a 
decision to determine the ownership by the owner. The 
prohibition of harmful use refers to the stricture upon 
ownership preventing use of the thing owned 
which is harmful to other members of society. 
in a way 
Liability 
to execution is the liability of the owner's interest to 
be taken away from him by execution of a judgment debt or 
on insolvency whilst the residuary character of ownership 
refers to the reversion to the owner of the rights 
concerned when limited interests in the thing owned are 
determined. 27 
Although it by no means excludes the conclusion, Honore•s 
approach does not provide an immediate objective answer 
as to whether a trade mark can be owned in a strict legal 
sense. It is not clear how many incidents can be 
discarded in testing for ownership or which legal 
fictions can be made to operate so as to render certain 
of the incidents applicable to trade marks. 28 
26. See Honore 221. 
27. See Honore 221 - 236. 
28. Trade marks cannot of course be "possessed" like chattels whilst the view that the trade 
marks are accessory to goodwill introduces complications: does the owner of a trade or 
service mark own the goodwill to which the mark is appurtenant and which it 
symbolises or the registered statutory right (in the case of a registered mark), or both in 
a commixed whole? See also p 515 infra. 
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Honore has no conceptual difficulty with the ownership of 
incorporeal objects such as copyright, goodwill and 
patent rights to which cases he regards the analogy with 
the ownership of external material objects close. In the 
case of copyright - which is a sort of right to exclude 
others - the notion of ownership applies "in an extended 
and somewhat weaker sense than that in which it applies 
to material objects and interests in them whilst in the 
case of choses in action ownership is to be understood in 
a still weaker sense". 29 
Lawson & Rudden in considering what meaning, if any, can 
be given to the word ownership in English law state: 
It must be said at the outset that the word is not very often used in the 
professional literature of English law, that is to say, in authoritive 
writings such as enactments and reports of decided cases; and that 
where the word owner is sporadically used in statutes it has been given 
many different meanings, sometimes in the definition sections of the 
statutes. 30 
They also state: 
The value of a thing is inf erred from what can be done with it and it is 
the sum of all that can be done with it that constitutes the content of 
h . 31 owners ip. 
Regarding the thing owned Honore observes: 
'To own' is transitive; the object of ownership is always spoken of as a 
'thing' in the legal sense, a res. There is, clearly, a close connection 
between the idea of ownership and the idea of things owned, as is shown 
by the use of words such as 'property' to designate both. We ought, 
apparently, to be able to throw some light on ownership by investigating 
'things'. 
29. See Honore 237, 239. 
30. Lawson & Rudden Law of Property 114 and see p 114 - 117. 
31 . Lawson & Rudden Law of Property 8. 
However that may be, it is clear that to stare at the meaning of the word 
'thing' will not tell us which protected interests are conceived in terms 
of ownership. When the legislature or courts think that an interest 
shouUJ be alienable and transmissible they will rei-fy it and say that it 
can be owned, that it is property. They will not say that it can be 
owned and is a res because of a prior conviction that it falls within the 
appropriate defi.nition of 'thing'. The investigation of 'things' seems to 
peter out in a false trail. 32 
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It therefore appears that insofar as the concept of 
ownership has no gestalt in the common law we must 
attribute a specific common meaning to the concepts of 
"owner" and "proprietor" in the trade mark law of the 
United Kingdom at the time of the 1938 Act and before, 
namely, those entitlements and limitations afforded by 
the statutes and by the cases to those parties labelled 
trade 
the 
or service mark owners 
accepted nomenclature 
(proprietors) according to 
of the time. These 
entitlements and limitations are discussed in the next 
paragraph. 
3. THE GE CASE : PROPERTY IN TRADE MARKS PRIOR TO THE 1938 ACT 
The following points in the speech of Lord Diplock in the 
G 33 h' . . . E Case are germane to t is investigation: 
3.1 Legal recognition of trade marks as a species of 
incorporeal property was first recognised by the Courts 
of Chancery during the first half of the 19th century in 
Millington v Fox. 34 
32. Honore 236, 238. 
33. G ETrade Mark 1973 R.P.C. 297. 
34. Millington v Fox [1838] 3 My & Cr 338. Per Lord Diplock at 325 of the report in the 
G E case; See p 26-27 supra for a discussion of Millington v Fox. 
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3. 2 The right of property in a trade mark was a monopoly in 
that it was a right to restrain other persons from using 
the mark. 35 
3. 3 Property in a trade mark was however an adjunct of the 
goodwill of a business incapable of separate existence 
dissociated from that goodwill. 36 
3. 4 The property was assignable, transmissible and di visible 
but only along with the goodwill of the business in which 
. d 37 it was use . 
3.5 Before it could be the subject-matter of property a trade 
mark had however to be distinctive i.e. recognisable by 
the purchaser of goods featuring it as indicating the 
same origin as other goods bearing the mark and whose 
quality had engendered goodwill. 38 
3. 6 Because of its appurtenance to goodwill property in a 
trade mark could only be acquired by public use whilst 
the property would be lost by disuse of the mark. 39 
3.7 An accommodation was required between the conflicting 
interests of the owner of the monopoly, the general 
purchasing public of goods to which the mark was affixed, 
and with other traders. This accommodation required that 
the general public should not be deceived by a mark. Two 
main deceits were misrepresentation as to the character 
of the goods bearing the trade mark and misrepresentation 
as to the origin of such goods. 
As far as other traders were concerned their vested 
rights were protected by the doctrine of honest 
concurrent user which came about as follows. 
35. See p 325 of the report. 
36. See p 325 of the report. 
37. See p 325 of the report. 
38. See p 325 of the report. 
39. See p 326 of the report. 
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It was recognised that in the circumstances of mainly 
local trade, conflicting trade marks could be honestly 
adopted and could acquire goodwill in a particular area 
yet conflict when the product came into competition in a 
larger non-localised market. This could result in public 
confusion. 
Similarly, possible confusion could result where a 
division in a partnership or the division of an 
undertaking with more than one outlet meant that the 
trade marks associated therewith devolved upon more than 
one person. 
Nevertheless, and despite the risk of public confusion, 
the doctrine of honest concurrent user would afford a 
proprietor equitable protection if he had clean hands 
i.e. if the events leading to the risk of confusion were 
not the result of dishonesty or unlawful conduct on the 
part of the proprietor and the use of his trade mark has 
not been deceptive from the start. 
Thus concurrent owners could not resist mutual honest 
concurrent use but could prevent other usurpers or 
. f . 40 in ringers. 
Although it had not been fully worked out at the time the 
distinctiveness requirement for trade marks to qualify as 
suitable subject-matter for proprietary rights further 
accommodated the rights between rival traders as one 
trader could not, by adopting them as trade marks, 
pre-empt the use of ordinary or descriptive words by 
other traders to honestly describe their own products. 41 
3.8 The advent of the 1875 Act did not change the common law 
rule of acquisition of trade marks. Thus a mark did not 
become a trade mark until its proprietor had publicly 
used it. There was no other way by means of which a 
first proprietor could acquire a trade mark and marks not 
40. See p 326 of the report. 
41 . See p 327 of the report. 
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d 1 . ld b . d 42 yet use or no onger in use cou not e registere . 
The 1875 Act did not treat the right to the exclusive use 
of a trade mark as conferred by statute but as a common 
law right vested in the proprietor and of which right his 
· · 'd d 'd 43 registration provi e evi ence. 
3. 9. The 1905 Act effected a basic change: registration of a 
person as the proprietor of a trade mark became the 
source of his title to the exclusive right to the use of 
the trade mark and not mere evidence of a title acquired 
at common law by actual public use of the mark. The 
exclusive right so confirmed by the statute was subject 
to the limitations of its provisions including the 
protection of concurrent rights of other traders. A 
further innovation was that trade marks could not be 
44 
registered prior to actual user. 
The basic change was reflected in Section 41 of the 1905 
Act insofar as it rendered registration the only way in 
which a trade mark could be the subject of proprietary 
rights. After a mark had remained on the register for 
seven years a court could not hold that it was not of 
such a character as to be the proper subject-matter of 
proprietary rights unless registration of the trade 
mark had been obtained by fraud. Thus Section 41 vested 
substantive rights in whoever was for the time being 
validly registered as proprietor, provided there had not 
been blameworthy conduct on the part of a proprietor 
after the mark had been registered which rendered it 
1 . bl 1 f h . f d . 45 ia e to remova rom t e register or eceit. 
42. See p 327 of the report. 
43. See p 330 of the report. 
44. See p 331 of the report. 
45. See p 332 - 333 of the report. 
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4. PROPERTY IN TRADE MARKS UNDER THE 1938 ACT 
This paragraph concerns the position at the time of 
repeal of the 1938 Act. 
The approach to property in trade marks and to the link 
between goodwill and trade marks was still governed at 
that time by the confirmed principle in Spalding v 
Gamage, namely that trade marks are appurtenant to the 
goodwill of the business in the trade in which the mark 
is used and there is no property in the trade mark 
itself. Unauthorised use of the indicia of goodwill such 
as a trade mark injures the goodwill and not the trade 
mark. 46 
Goodwill generated through use of a trade or service mark 
is a recognised species of personal property. 47 Thus once 
an unregistered mark had been used it acquired goodwill 
and could be transferred as part of the business in the 
goods or services in relation to which it had been used. 
The mark itself as distinct from any registration 
thereof or any goodwill which it symbolised was not 
property as such unless and until it was registered. 48 
Insofar as Section 22 of the 1938 Act provided that a 
registered mark could be assigned as an independent form 
of property separate from the property in the goodwill it 
may have come to represent and Section 64 ( 2) provided 
that equities in respect of a registered mark could be 
enforced in like manner as in respect of any other 
49 personal property - it was implicit under the 1938 Act 
that a registered trade or service mark was personal 
property at law. 
46. Spalding v Gamage [19151 32 R.P.C. 273. Confirmed in Erven Warnick B V and anr. v 
V. J. Townsend & Sons (Hull) Ltd and anr [19801 R.P.C. 31. 
4 7. See Drysdale and Silverleaf Passing Off 14; Wadlow Law of Passing Off 40. 
48. See Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 16.1.2 Rel 2 [19921. 
49. Subject to the provisions of the Act: see section 64(2). 
220 
Hence a registered mark even if unused became 
b . f . . . 50 property y virtue o its registration. 
Thus Lord Westbury's conception of property in the trade 
mark itself which underpinned the statutes from the 
outset - remained discernable also in the provisions of 
the 1938 Act. 51 
Property in a registered mark is determined in various 
ways non-payment of renewal fees, expungement on 
available grounds and unenforceability by virtue of the 
fact that the mark has become non-distinctive, 
descriptive or generic. 
As the property rights of goodwill connected to an 
unregistered trade mark can be enforced only by an action 
for passing off these rights are determined when the 
circumstances necessary for success in a passing off 
action no longer exist, such as disuse of the mark with 
concomitant extinction of goodwill. The same result will 
follow deceptive or fraudulent use of both registered and 
unregistered marks. 52 
5. IN SUM 
Gold & Nicholls point out that it is characteristic of 
choses in action that such property is recoverable from a 
"debtor". Insofar as a property of a registered mark is 
said to recover the exclusive right to use of the 
registered mark from an inf ringer by means of the 
infringement action the registered mark has been regarded 
as a chose in action. 
The authors however pref er to regard a registered mark as 
sui generis personal property without being either choses in 
. h . . 53 action or c oses in possession. 
50. See Benjamin Brooke & Co v Inland Revenue Commissioners [18961 2 Q B 356 359; 
Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 16.1.2 Rel 2 [1992]. 
51. See p 29-30, supra. 
52. See Naranyanan Trade Marks 25 - 26. 
53. See Gold & Nicholls (eds) Trade Mark Handbook 16.1.3 Rel 2 [19921. 
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The approach of proceeding from the perspective of global 
concepts such as ownership of trade or service marks in 
order to determine the content of the trade or service 
mark right delivers little reward under the Common Law. 
Thus, in the law of the United Kingdom at the time of the 
1938 Act, the nature and content of the entitlements of 
the trade mark 'proprietor' or 'owner' and the 
limitations upon trade mark rights were to be found in 
the legislation and cases without recourse to a priori 
concepts and labels such as 'ownership', 'proprietorship' 
and 'choses in action'. 
The following part considers the trade mark law of South 
Africa prior to the coming into force of the current Act. 
It will be shown that the bedrock of the law of trade 
marks in South Africa is provided by the trade mark law 
of the United Kingdom prior to the advent of the 1994 UK 
Trade Marks Act. The development of a common law of 
trade marks in South Africa prior to the 1993 SA Act 
based upon clearly different indigenous concepts of the 
nature of rights and property derived from the civil law 
was thereby restricted. 
The future impact of civil law concepts upon the law of 
trade marks in the United Kingdom following upon the 
interposition of the European Community and the reception 
of European trade mark law remains to be seen. These 
historical events, in my view, require the South African 
law of trade marks to develop henceforth in congruence 
with the fundamental principles of its own legal system 
which are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the 
international trend towards the modernization and 
harmonization of trade mark laws. 
PART3 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF TRADE MARKS 
222 
CHAPTER 10 
THE BEDROCK OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF TRADE MARKS 
This chapter considers the origins and sources of the 
South African law of trade marks and the relevance of 
the trade mark law of the United Kingdom in relation 
thereto. These matters were considered by the Appellate 
Division in the Pentax case. 1 The judgment of Grosskopf 
J A. affords the history of South African trade mark law 
(both at civil law2 and under statute) treatment in some 
detail and therefore features prominently in this 
chapter. 
1. EARLY CASES 
1.1 Mills v Salmond3 
This case, reported in 
older cases mentioned 
1863, 
by 
is the earliest 
Grosskopf J A. 4 
of the 
The 
plaintiff's action was for damages on account of use of 
a trade mark and for an interdict. The plaintiff, a 
miller who dealt in flour, had for many years sold flour 
in bags under the trade mark "D. Mills Steam-Mill, 
Castle Bridge, Cape Town". He sometimes added the word 
"new" to the mark to indicate certain special kinds of 
flour. The defendant had sold flour under the mark 
"Mills, Steam-Mill, Cape Town" NEW. 
1 . Protective Mining & Industrial Equipment Systems (Pty) Ltd v Audiolens (Cape) Pty Ltd 
1987 (2) SA 961 (Al 
2. In order to maintain clarity the common law of South Africa (as distinct from the 
Common Law of the United Kingdom and the common law of Anglo-American systems 
in general) will be referred to as the civil law. 
3. Mills v Salmond (1863) 4 Searle 230. 
4. See p 983 of the report in the Pentax case. 
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Counsel for the parties 
argument including Blafield 
and Farina v Silverlock7 . 
relied on English cases in 
v Payne5 , Blanchard v Hill, 6 
Bell J without citing authority found that the "putting 
on of the word "Mills" " was intended to and did deceive 
and there had been a fraud committed on the plaintiff: 
"A fraud is committed on traders and on the public by 
the selling of inferior flour with a brand calculated to 
deceive". The plaintiff was awarded a small amount of 
damages (for want of proof of specific damages) an 
interdict and costs. 8 
1. 2 Rose & Co v Miller9 
The plaintiff manufactured and sold lime juice cordial 
in bottles and the defendant had dexterously imitated 
the label and sold cordial thereunder in bottles which 
were the same shape as the plaintiff's. The evidence 
showed that confusion had resulted and the defendant had 
sold an inferior product. It was argued that as trade 
marks were not registrable in the country and the Local 
Law gave no protection to trade marks the defendant 
could do as he pleased until legislation intervened. 
Kotze C J, without referring to authority, granted a 
perpetual interdict, holding10 : 
I am of the opinion that Rose & Co have an exclusive right to the use 
of a certain label for the sale of "Limejuice Cordial", and that Miller 
has infringed such right by imitating the label of Rose & Co in such a 
5. Discussed at p 25 supra. 
6. Discussed at p 22-23 supra. 
7. Farina v Silverlock (1987) 26 LJ (NS) Eq 11 discussed at p 232 infra. 
8. P 234 of the report. It needs be recalled that it had been decided in Blafield v Payne 
that the plaintiff was not required to prove that the defendant's goods were inferior to 
succeed in a passing off action. 
9. Rose & Co v Miller (1891) 4 S A R 123. Discussed at p 983 of the report in the 
Pentax case. 
10. Atp125. 
way that the public may easily be deceived thereby to the damage and 
inconvenience of Messrs. Rose & Co. To allow such a practice is to 
countenance a fraud both on Rose & Co and the public. It is a case of 
injuria or infringement of right. 
1.3 Other Early Cases 
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In Lewis v Holt and Holt11 the Respondents were 
interdicted from applying labels they had bought at a 
sale by the court featuring the trade mark THE NOTED 
CAMP CIGARETTE without indicating thereon that they were 
the manufacturers of the cigarettes sold under the mark. 
The respondents were restrained from holding out to the 
public that the goods were made by the applicant who had 
been associated with the trade mark previously. 
The following early cases decided under the 1895 Cape 
Act illustrate further early activity by the courts in 
trade mark matters. 
In Ruffel v The Registrar of Deeds 12 the court held 
CUTINE, TUSSO and DIARRHOL to be registrable invented 
words whilst DOLORINE, ELIXIR and DIGESTIVE were denied 
registration. 
In Peek, 13 Frean and Co. v Carr and Co. the mark CAFE 
NOIR was regarded not registrable in respect of biscuits 
because those words were held to have reference to the 
character or quality of the goods. 
k 14 . d' . d . In Fran au v Pope an inter ict was issue against use 
of a trade mark comprising the letters R. R. R. placed 
triangularly in a triangle as a colourable imitation of 
the applicant's mark, the letters B. B. B. placed 
triangularly in a diamond. An interdict was also granted 
11. Lewis v Holt and Holt 4 C.T.R. 115; 11 S.C. 106 
12. Ruffel v The Registrar of Deeds 9 C.T.R. 100; 16 S.C. 141. 
13. Peek, Frean and Co. v Carr and Co. 8 C.T.R. 207; 15 S.C. 172. 
14. Frankau v Pope 4 C.T.R. 210; 11 S.C. 209. 
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on the basis of infringement involving conflicting marks 
comprising ships in full sail. 15 
It was however held in Reiners, Von Laer and Co. v 
Fehr16 that no general rule could be laid down as to 
what would amount to an infringement of a trade mark. 
Every case was to be decided on its own merits. 
2. EARLY APPROACHES AND AUTHORITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND 
SOUTH AFRICA 
An overview of the approach to trade marks in the South 
African law during the late 19th century is provided by 
17 
an article in Volume 9 of the Cape Law Journal of 1892. 
The purpose of the article and the background to its 
writing was stated thus: 
There is a prevalent idea among the public, and our South African 
community must not be excluded, that a trade mark, or trade name, as 
such, has no existence in a country where no legislation has taken 
place for the special protection of trade marks and devices in 
connection with diverse trades, or where such legislation has been 
passed, unless these marks or devices have gone through the formal 
process of registration. It is to dispel this erroneous idea that the 
present article has been written. Infringements of the rights of trade 
marks and devices occur almost daily among us, and as premised 
above, commercial prosperity is an extra inducement for these 
malpractices. It thus becomes a matter of importance to inquire into 
the remedies and protection which the common law affords to the 
general public and to the tradesman whose articles of commerce are 
being simulated in the market. 18 
15. See Price Patent Candle Co. v Everitt and Co. 4 C.T.R. 211; 11 S.C. 213. 
16. Reiners, Von Laer and Co. v Fehr 2 C.T.R. 135. 
17. De Bruyn 9 CLJ 18. 
18. De Bruyn 19. 
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The author then proceeded to consider the nature of 
trade marks, names and devices, rights thereto under the 
common law and equity and the remedies afforded, cession 
of trade marks and the rights of peregrini in regard to 
trade marks . 19 
According to the author, De Bruyn, title or rights in a 
trade mark were obtained by invention. Trade marks, 
trade names and designs (meaning devices) are 
incorporeal rights or interests incident to tangible 
movable subjects of property things personal in the 
nature of incorporeal chattels. 20 
A manufacturer applying a trade mark to his goods had no 
exclusive right or ownership in the symbols which 
constituted the mark. He had, however, the exclusive 
right to apply such symbols which were protected at law 
and in equity as a quasi-right of property akin to 
copyright. This right came into being once the mark was 
used - provided the mark was original and distinctive. 
The right became. exclusive once the mark was used to 
indicate where, by whom and at what manufactory the 
goods bearing it were made. The right was not therefore 
created by statute alone and was conveniently considered 
as an evolution of the right acquired by occupation. 
The special statutory provisions 21 regarding trade 
marks were only the outcome of a right already 
recognised under the common law. 
19. For the purposes of this work only De Bruyn's discussion of the nature of trade marks 
and the rights thereto and his comments regarding assignments are relevant. 
Regarding infringement we need only note that with reference to English cases the 
author observed that for the purposes of granting an injunction the court could decide 
whether a spurious mark was likely to deceive the public without evidence of actual 
deception being required. (See De Bruyn 26). 
20. De Bruyn 20. But see p 228-229 infra. 
21 . The 1883 Act (United Kingdom) and the Trade Marks Registration Act of 1 877 (Cape 
Colony). 
All that the Statute law did was to impose the method of applying trade 
symbols to marketable articles, to grant greater protection to the 
manufacturer and the public, and to inaugurate an accurate register of 
all recognised trade marks. 22 
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Whether or not the right to a trade mark an 
incorporeal chattel - could be assigned or ceded like 
other incorporeals and without notice could not be 
answered without reservation. Much would turn upon the 
nature of the mark and the manner in which it had been 
used. The question of lawful assignment was one of 
fact. 23 As an accessory of property a trade mark could 
be transferred and sold upon the sale and transfer of 
the manuf actory of the goods on which the trade mark had 
been used provided that this did not perpetrate a 
fraud upon the public. 24 
The strong influence of English law upon the mind of the 
author is in evidence throughout the article. 
A sharp retort to the argument of Counsel in Rose & Co. 
v Miller (supra) that no Roman-Dutch authorities had 
dealt with the subject of trade marks was soon provided 
by an anonymous source in the Journal. 
TRADE MARKS. - In the last number of the Cape Law Journal the 
remark appears (p.24): "It was contended that no Roman-Dutch 
authorities treated on the subject" of trade-marks. This contention 
was founded upon a misapprehension. It would have required no very 
diligent search for anyone to discover at least the following authorities 
on the subject: Van den Berg's Nederlandsch Advijsboek, I., Cons. 
68, p. 161; and, in connection therewith, Zurek Codex Batabus, sub 
voe. "Wapenen, " 4, note 1. As regards the criminal aspects of the 
subject, the following may be consulted: Zurek, sub voe. "Falsiteit," 
10; "Garen," 1; "Messen, "5; 
22. See De Bruyn 21. 
23. De Bruyn 27. 
24. Relying upon Leather Cloth Co., Ltd. v American Leather Cloth Co., Ltd. 4 De G.J. & 
S. 137, 11 H.L.C. 523. 
"Papieren," 2; "Thee," 1; Carpzovius, Praxis Rer. crim., 2,93,89 
allli 90; Voet, 48, 10, 6; allli commentators generally on Digest 48, 
10, 30. It may be added that on the allied subject of Patents, an 
interesting case may be found in Koren's Observatien op Oordeelen 
van den Hoogen Raad, No. 27. 25 
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As will be seen however the common law and United 
Kingdom statutes were to exert the stronger influence 
and prevail as the de facto bedrock of the South African 
law of trade marks. 
26 In this context Grosskopf J A states: 
"I tum now to the law of trade marks in the Netherlalllis allli South 
Africa. In the passage which I have quoted from the judgment in 
Policansky Bros Ltd v L & H Policansky (supra) Wessels CJ referred 
to an opinion quoted in Van den Berg's Ned Advijs Boek vol 1 adv 68 
at 161. The facts in that opinion were that one Pieter Meffert was a 
'Caartemaker' (apparently a manufacturer of playing cards - see Van 
Zurek Codex Batavus. sub voe 'Wapenen' at para 4 note 1 (which 
refers to the same case) who, during his lifetime, printed certain 
'teekens, merken en namen' on his cards allli their covers. After his 
death his widow and heirs continued the business, allli also continued 
using the same 'teekens, merken en namen' on the cards produced by 
them. Other manufacturers of cards then commenced using the same 
distinctive words allli marks on their own cards. The advice given to 
Meffert's widow allli heirs was that it was impermissible to use such 
names, marks and signs as another person had previously used allli 
was still using on similar articles, if the infringing use would enure to 
the loss or disadvantage of the first inventor or user of the names, 
marks or signs. 
The death of Meffert had not altered this situation, since his widow 
allll heirs, so they were advised, were entitled to the benefit of the 
25. Anon 9 CLJ 127. 
26. P 982 of the report in Protective Mining and Industrial Equipment Systems 
(Pty) Ltd v Audiolens (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1987(2) SA 961 (A) (the Pentax case). 
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names, marks and signs which the deceased had used in his lifetime. This 
opinion was given on 15 January 1667. The widow and heirs instituted 
proceedings and on 1 February 1667 an infringer was ordered by the 
schepenen of The Hague to pay 'een amende van 60 ponden' and 
furthermore 
'om in het toekomende naar te laten het drukken ende gebruyken van 
sodanige teekens, merken ende namen, op haare Caarten, als Pieter Meffert 
zoo fang voor haar eerst heeft gevonden ende gebruykt welke hem en zyne 
Erfgenamen alleen toekomen '. 
The ground for this decision was stated to be 'ratione falsi commissi 
utendo signis et nomine Petri Meffert in suis mercibus '. 
The jurists who gave the above opinion relied mainly on a passage from 
the Tractatus de Insigniis et Annis by Bartolus (1314-1357). The full 
passage reads as follows: 
' ... pone fabrum quendam esse doctissimum, qui in gladiis, et aliis suis 
operibus tacit certa signa, ex quibus opus ipsius magistri esse cognoscitur, et 
per hoc tales merces melius venduntur, et avidius emuntur, tune puto quod si 
alius faceret tale signum, possit prohiberi quia ex hoc populus /ederetur, 
acciperetur enim opus uni us pro opere alterius. r rr 
Grosskopf J A goes on to state at 982-983: 
"These authorities leave no doubt that in our common law a trade 
mark served the same purpose as in England, viz to identify the goods 
of the trade mark owner and to distinguish them from the goods of 
others. A trade mark was considered to be infringed if it was used on 
goods which were not those of the person whom we would call the 
trade mark proprietor. This was regarded as a fonn of deception 
whereby the goods of the infringer were passed off for the goods of the 
trade mark proprietor, and was punishable under the crimen falsi (see 
also Voet Commentaries 48.10.6, Van Zurek (op cit) sub voe 
'Falsiteit', para 10; 'Garen', para 1; 'Messen', para 5; 'Papieren', 
para 2; 'Thee', para 1; and also Cmpzovius Praxis Rer Crim 2.93.89 
and 90. It should be noted, however, that many of these passages 
ref er to specific enactments on trade marks in respect of particular 
articles). " 
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Then, in his discussion of the Rose case at 983 he ends 
his discussion of the civil law authorities thus: 
"Although no authorities were quoted in the judgment, the report 
(printed in 1908) contains a footnote mentioning Roman-Dutch 
authorities on the subject of trade marks. These appear to have been 
derived from an anonymous note in the Cave Law Journal of 1892 
(9CLJ 127) and include the authorities which I have discussed above. 
See also Mills v Salmond (1863) 4 Searle 230." 
3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICAN AND UNITED KINGDOM 
TRADE MARK LAW 
Grosskopf J A commences that part of his judgment in the 
Pentax case concerning the link between South African 
and United Kingdom trade mark law with the dicta of Kotze 
C J in Policansky's case in which it was said that the 
general principle that one trader could not filch the 
trade of another by imitating the names, marks or 
devices in which the latter had acquired a reputation, 
was known to Roman Dutch law. The learned Chief Justice 
had found, however, that the aforegoing class of wrong 
had not, by the end of the 18th century, developed its 
d d . 27 mo ern- ay importance. 
28 Hence, he went on to say: 
As our Roman-Dutch authorities do not deal with the various aspects 
of passing-off actions that modern conditions have evoked, we in 
South Africa have followed the principles enunciated by the English 
and American Courts where such principles are not in conflict with 
either our common law or our statute law. 
Grosskopf J A advances the matter through the 
observation that the law of trade marks has its origin 
27. See Policansky Bros. Ltd. v L & H Policansky 1935 AD 89 97. 
28. See p 98 of the report. 
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in the law of passing off and that South African 
statutory trade 
patterns". 29 
mark law has followed "English 
Although the judgment does not hold that English trade 
mark law is the applicable law in South Africa the 
learned Judge of Appeal clearly regarded the trade mark 
laws of the two systems at the time as being congruent: 
subject to the rider of Kotze C J that the principles of 
United Kingdom law are only to be followed insofar as 
they do not conflict with South African civil and 
statute law. 
Dealing with the extent of the trade mark right in 
English law Grosskopf J A states with reliance upon the 
historical overview of the law in the GE case30 : 
"The use by manufacturers of distinctive marks upon goods which they 
have made is of very ancient origin, but legal recognition of trade 
marks as a species of incorporeal property was first accorded by the 
Court of Chancery in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
The right of property in a trade mark had special characteristics. 
One, which it shared with patents and with copyright, was that it was 
a monopoly, that is to say, it was a right to restrain other persons 
from using the mark. To be capable of being the subject-matter of 
property a trade mark had to be distinctive, that is to say, it had to be 
recognisable by a purchaser of goods to which it was affixed as 
indicating that they were of the same origin as other goods which bore 
the same mark and whose quality had engendered goodwill. Property 
in a trade mark could therefore only be acquired by public use of it as 
such by the proprietor and was lost by disuse. 
I have stated above that the right in a trade mark was a right to 
restrain other persons from using the mark. What types of use could 
29. See p 978 of the report of the Pentax case. 
30. GE Trade mark 1973 R.P.C. 297. 
be thus restrained at common law? The answer to this question 
appears from the following discussion by Lord Cranworth in Farina v 
Silverlock (1987) 26 LJ (NS) Eq 11. Lord Cranworth was dealing with 
'the right to have a particular trade mark to designate a commodity' 
(ibid at 12). The right, he said, was of this nature: 
'It is not properly described as a copyright, because it is no right at all, 
unless it is a right which can be said to exist only, and to be tested only, 
by its violation. The right is a right on the part of any person designating 
his wares or commodities by a particular trade mark, as it is called, to 
prevent anybody else from_ selling wares, which are not those 
manufactured by the plaintiff, with that trade mark, in order to mislead the 
public, and so incidentally to injure the person who is owner of the trade 
mark .... / apprehend the law is perfectly clear that anybody, who has 
acquired a particular mode of designating his particular manufacture, has a 
right to say, not that other persons shall not sell exactly the same article, 
better or worse, or looking exactly like it, but that they shall not so sell it 
as to steal the plaintiff's trade mark, and make purchasers believe it is the 
manufacture of somebody else'. 
(ibid at 12-13). II 
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It had however been contended in England that the advent 
of the 1875 Act in the United Kingdom had changed the 
law in Farina v Silverlock (supra) bringing about a 
substantial expansion of the rights of the registered 
proprietor. A review of the purpose and essential 
provisions of the 1875 Act led the learned Judge of 
Appeal to a consideration of the Heidsieck case. 31 
The case concerned parallel importation and the argument 
of the plaintiff is summed up thus by Clauson J at page 
338 of the report: 
"It was, however, contended that the effect of s 3 of the Act of 1875 
(which enacted that the registration of a trade mark, orima facie, gave 
31. Champagne Heidsieck et Cie Monopole Societe Anonyme v Buxton (1930) 47 R.C.P. 
28. 
the registered proprietor the right to the exclusive use of such trade 
mark) was, not merely to give that proprietor by virtue of registration 
a statutory title in respect of his mark to the same rights which, before 
the Act, he could have obtained only by proving that the mark had 
become his trade mark, but had the further effect of vesting in the 
owner of a trade mark the right to object to any person selling or 
dealing with goods produced by the owner of the trade mark with the 
trade mark affixed, except on such terms and subject to such 
conditions as to resale, price, area of market, and so forth, as the 
owner of the trade mark might choose to impose. It was, in effect, 
suggested that, whereas before 1875 a trade mark, if established as a 
trade mark, was a badge of the origin of the goods, the effect of s 3 of 
the Act of 1875 was to make a registered trade mark a badge of 
control, carrying with it the right in the owner of a registered trade 
mark to full control over his goods, into whosoever hands they might 
come, except in so far as he might expressly or by implication have 
released this right of control. " 
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The contention was rejected thus at pages 338-339 of the 
report: 
I do not so read the section. Nor am I aware that, until the present 
case, any such construction of the section or of corresponding sections 
in subsequent Acts has been adopted by any tribunal; or indeed that, 
until very recent times, any such construction has been propounded to 
any tribunal. It would be astonishing, if in an Act to establish a 
register of trade marks, such a remarkable extension of the rights of 
owners of trade marks were intended to be enacted by the use of such 
terms as appear in the section. The section appears to me to mean 
that the proprietor of a registered trade mark is to have the right 
exclusively to use such trade mark in the sense of preventing others 
from selling wares which are not his marked with the trade mark. I do 
not believe that the Legislature intended to say, or can fairly be held 
to have said, that the registration of a trade mark had the wide 
consequences suggested by the plaintiffs. 
It then fell to be considered whether subsequent 
amendments to the 1875 Act (in 1876 and 1977) or the 
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following acts in 1883 and 1905 had brought about the 
changes proposed. It was found that the later 
amendments and enactments had also not expanded the 
trade mark right to full control by the proprietor over 
the goods once they featured his trade mark. In the 
words of Clauson J at page 339 of the report: 
It was, indeed, at first suggested that this remarkable alteration in the 
law (ie the alteration contended for by the plaintiff - see the above 
quotation from 338) took place when s 39 of the Act of 1905 was 
enacted, but a comparison of the language of that section with s 3 of 
the Act of 1875 led at once to a recognition of the fact that, if the 
change in the law did take place, it must have taken place in 1875 and 
not in 1905. Indeed, in my view, if there had been any possible doubt 
as to the construction of s 3 of the Act of 1875, the doubt must 
necessarily vanish when the Act of 1905, which supersedes that of 
1875 and the intermediate Acts, is examined. In the Act of 1905 the 
word "trade mark" is defined as a mark used upon goods for the 
pwpose of indicating that they are the goods of the proprietor of the 
mark, and reading this definition into s 39 it appears to me quite clear 
that the exclusive right to use the mark conferred on the registered 
proprietor by that section is the right to use the mark as a trade mark -
ie as indicating that the goods upon which it is placed are his goods 
and to exclude others from selling under the mark wares which are not 
his. 
The Heidsieck case was held by the Court of Appeal to be 
good law in Revlon Inc and Others v Cripps & Lee Ltd and 
Others (1980) FSR 85 (CA) and Grosskopf J A at page 985 
of his judgement held it to be a correct reflection of 
the law in all provinces of the Union of South Africa 
prior to Act 9 of 1916. 
4. EARLY TRADE MARK LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA32 
Shortly after the advent of the 1875 Act in the United 
32. The sources for the discussion which follows are Webster and Page Trade Marks 2nd 
ed. 4; De Bruyn 21-22; p 983 - 984 of the report in the Pentax case. 
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Kingdom similar legislation was passed in the colonies 
of the Cape and Natal. 
The first statute providing for trade mark registration 
in South Africa was the Trade Marks Registration Act 22 
of 1877 (Cape Colony) . This enactment contained 
provisions based on the 1875 United Kingdom Act and 
provided for a trade marks register to be kept by the 
Registrar of Deeds. With reference to our discussion 
under the Heidsieck case regarding the ambit of the 
trade mark right indicated by a proper interpretation of 
section 3 of the 1875 United Kingdom Act, it needs be 
mentioned that section 3 of the Cape Act repeated 
section 3 of that Act and this remained the case despite 
subsequent amendments to the Cape statute. The Cape Act 
contained no so-called essential particulars of which a 
trade mark was to comprise in order to qualify as a 
trade mark as provided for by section 10 of the 1875 
United Kingdom Act. This was however introduced 
subsequently by Act 12 of 1895 (Cape Colony) . 
Essentially, the Cape legislation following the British 
enactment upon which it was based provided that 
registration would be prima facie evidence of the right of 
the registrant to the exclusive right to use such trade 
mark, the entry becoming conclusive proof of this right 
after five years of registration. Certain trade marks 
were however not to be registered without special leave 
of the court, namely, trade marks similar to registered 
trade marks for the same class of goods. Trade marks 
were to be denied registration in respect of goods 
covered by resembling registered trade marks. Deceptive 
marks which would be denied protection in a court of 
equity in England and scandalous designs were denied 
registration, also. 
In Natal, Law 4 of 1885 (Natal) established a register 
of trade marks kept by the Registrar of the Supreme 
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Court. Section 16 of that act corresponded to section 3 
of the 1875 United Kingdom Act (although a misprint 
occurred in the Natal Law) and the enactment as a whole 
corresponded substantially to the 1875 United Kingdom 
legislation. 
In the Orange Free State similar provisions to those in 
the 1875 British Act were enacted but, as in the Cape, 
no "essential particulars" were specified leading to a 
provision introducing essential particulars under Law 13 
of 1893. 
The Orange Free State enactment contained in Chapter 
CXIII of the Wetboek was entitled "De Wet over het 
Registreeren van Handelsmerken". This legislation 
introduced the Register of Trade Marks to be kept by the 
Registrar of Deeds. Section 3 of that Act was a direct 
translation of section 3 of the United Kingdom Act of 
1875. 
In the Transvaal civil and criminal remedies for 
infringement of a trade mark were introduced by Law 6 of 
1892. Marks were registered by the State Attorney and, 
essentially, the legislation was substantially similar 
to the enactments in the other South African 
territories. The Act recognised the exclusive right of 
the registrant to use of the registered mark. 
The Act was repealed by Proclamation 23 of 1902 which 
created a trade marks register under the care of a 
Registrar of Trade Marks. This proclamation saved 
vested rights and contained provisions substantially 
similar to those of the 1875 British Act. 
5. UNION LEGISLATION 
I have observed that the pre-Union legislation closely 
followed the 1875 British Act. The legal position 
immediately prior to the enactment of the Union 
legislation the Patents Designs Trade Marks and 
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Copyright Act 9 of 1916 of the Union of South Africa 
(the 1916 Act) - was summarised thus by Grosskopf J A in 
the Pentax case: 33 
Before I turn to this Act, it will be convenient to summarise what the 
relevant legal position was before its promulgation. At common law, 
both here and in England, a trade mark served to indicate the origin of 
goods in the proprietor of the trade mark,, and infringement occurred 
when the trade mark was used in respect of goods which were not 
those of the proprietor of the trade mark. There is nothing in our 
common law or that of England to suggest that the proprietor of a 
trade mark was entitled by virtue of trade mark law to control the sale 
or distribution of his goods which he had marked with his trade mark. 
The British Act of 1875 introduced a system of registration of trade 
marks. The purpose of the Act, according to the GE case supra. was 
to make it easier for the proprietor of a trade mark to prove his 
ownership, and to enable interested persons to find out whether a 
particular trade mark was in use and by whom. Its purpose was not to 
change the main characteristics of trade marks at common law. And 
in the Champagne Heidsieck case supra the Court held that the 
proprietor's 'exclusive right'of which the 1875 Act spoke was the 
right which had existed at common law to prevent others from selling 
wares which were not his marked with his trade mark. 34 
The 1916 Act repealed the pre-Union enactments and dealt 
with trade marks under sections 96-140 in chapter III. 
The enactment was based on the 1905 United Kingdom Act 
and was couched in identical terms in many instances. 
It established a Trade Mark Off ice and Register for the 
Union which incorporated the registers created under the 
earlier enactments, saving rights already vested 
thereunder. 35 
Section 98 of the 1916 Act defined a trade mark in almost 
33. At p 984. 
34. In the United Kingdom the Heidsieck's case remained authoritative.See Cornish 
Intellectual Property 482. 
35. Webster & Page Trade Marks 2nd ed. 4. 
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identical terms to that of the United Kingdom Act and 
following the British example it provided that 
registration of a trade mark afforded prima facie evidence 
of the proprietor's right to use the trade mark 
exclusively - which right became conclusive seven years 
after date of registration. 
Section 125 of the 1916 Act made specific provision for 
. f . . . h . . d d 36 in ringement - an innovation. T e section provi e 
125.- What constitutes infringement of rights acquired by registration. 
- The rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be deemed 
to be infringed by the use (other than permitted use) in respect of the 
goods in respect of which it is registered, of a mark substantially 
identical with the trade mark or so nearly resembling is as to be likely 
to deceive. 
In an action for the infringement of a trade mark the court, in trying 
the question of infringement, shall admit evidence of the usages of the 
trade in respect to the get-up of those goods and of any trade marks or 
get-up legitimately used in respect of them by other persons. 
The Patent, Designs Trade Marks Amendment Act No. 19 of 
1947, went on to introduce provisions similar to those 
of 1938 British Act in making provision for registered 
users and assignments without goodwill. This was done 
through the insertion of section 131 bis into the 1916 
Act. Section 131 bis (2) provided that use of a trade 
mark by a registered user was "permitted use". This 
required the infringement section to be amended 
correspondingly to the form set out above. "Permitted 
use" was made non-infringing conduct by the amendment 
reflecting the general rule in the common law both in 
South Africa and in the United Kingdom that consent by 
the proprietor to user of a trade mark whether 
"permitted use" or otherwise provided a defence to the 
d k . f . . 37 tra e mar in ringement action. 
36. In amended form. See regarding "permitted use" below. 
37. See p 986 of the report of the Pentax case. 
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6. THE CHOWLES COMMITTEE 
6.1 
A committee under the chairmanship of Victor Chowles, 
Registrar of Trade Marks at the time was constituted in 
1960 to study and report upon a new Trade Marks Bill 
framed by the Registrar to replace the trade mark 
provisions of the 1916 Act. The report of this 
. d d 38 committee was ate 2 May 1961. 
The Draft Bill recommended the following major 
· · h' h h 'd d 39 innovations w ic t e Report consi ere : 
Division of the Register into parts A and B. The 
recommendation of the Report in this regard was 
implemented and was contained in section 31 (2) of the 
1963 Act. 40 
6.2 Permitting registration of distinctive containers for 
goods as trade marks without affording protection to the 
utilitarian or functional features thereof. This 
recommendation was implemented under sections 2 and 10 
of the 1963 Act. 
6. 3 The extension of infringement rights which were 
subsequently implemented under section 44(1) of the 1963 
Act. 41 
In the latter regard the committee gave serious 
consideration to extending infringement rights to goods 
of the same description as the goods for which a trade 
mark was registered or to all cases - whatever the goods 
- if the use complained of would indicate a connection 
in the course of trade with the proprietor's goods. In 
regard to these aspects the committee concluded: 
38. See p 1 and 19 of the Chowles Report. 
39. See p 2 of the Chowles Report. 
40. The Trade Marks Act No 62 of 1963. 
41. This extension is discussed in broader terms at p 269-271 infra. 
39. In all the circumstances the committee does not favour the 
extension of infringement rights to goods in respect of which the mark 
is not registered. The Committee feels that other persons in the trade 
are entitled to know the precise ambit of the statutory rights conferred 
by registration and that the proposed extension could only bring about 
if . 42 a state o uncertainty. 
6.3.1 The Yeast-Vite Case43 
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As recorded in chapter 7, the 1938 United Kingdom Act 
broadened the definition of a trade mark and through 
section 4(1) effected a substantial expansion of the 
rights of trade mark proprietors - mostly in response to 
the Yeast-Vite case. 
In the Yeast-Vite case, decided prior to the enactment 
of the 1938 Act, the registered proprietor of the trade 
mark "Yeast-Vite" failed in all courts and in the House 
of Lords to restrain use of "Yeast tablets a substitute 
for Yeast-Vite" by another trader on goods of similar 
composition to those of the plaintiff on the basis of 
infringement because the defendant had not used 
"Yeast-Vite" as a trade mark to indicate the defendant's 
goods were the genuine article. 
In contrast 
advertising 
hereto, in 
contrasting 
the 
the 
Bismag 
price 
44 . 
case comparative 
difference between 
"Bisaturated Magnesia Tablets" and "Bismuthated Magnesia 
Powders" in a list of products - the word "bismuthated" 
having been substituted for "bisaturated" in respect of 
the substitute goods - was held to be an infringement 
under the extended section 4 of the 1938 Act by the 
Court of Appeal. 
42. P 8 - 9 of the Chowles Report. 
43. Irving's Yeast-Vite Ltd. v Horsenail [19341 51 R.P.C. 110. See p 981 - 982 of the 
report of the Pentax case. See also p 149 supra. 
44. Bismag Ltd. v Amblins (Chemists) Ltd. (1940) 57 R.P.C. 209. 
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6.3.2 Yeast-Vite : recommendations of the Chowles committee 
In regard to the Yeast-V:i.:te case the Chowles committee 
considered particularly the following passage of the 
speech of Lord Tomlin which indicated the limitation of 
the property right conferred by the trade mark law of 
the time: 
The distinction between the cases in which a remedy for infringement 
of a trade mark and the remedy for passing off are, respectively, 
appropriate have often been stated and are not in doubt. The first 
remedy is available where there has been violation of the specific 
property right conferred by the trade mark law. What is the property 
right of the appellants that has been infringed? The phrase "exclusive 
right to the use of such trade mark" carries in my opinion the 
implication of use of the trade mark for the purpose of indicating in 
relation to the goods upon which or in connection with which the use 
takes place the origin of such goods in the user of the mark by virtue 
of the matters indicated in the definition of "trade mark" contained in 
section 3. 45 
In contrast to the approach which had been adopted by 
the 1938 British Act the committee addressed the problem 
posed by section 3 of the 1905 Act (as amended) thus: 
It is generally agreed that the protection afforded the registered 
proprietor of a trade mark should be wider than the mere prohibition 
of the unauthorised use by others of the trade mark as a trade mark 
that is to say for the purpose of indicating origin in the user and the 
problem is to know how best to extend the right. 
It will be noted from paragraphs (a) and (b) of sub-clause (1) of clause 
46 that the committee has sought to draw a distinction between those 
cases where there has been unauthorised use of a trade mark as a 
trade mark and those cases where there has been unauthorised use 
whether as a trade mark or not and where the use is likely to cause 
injury or prejudice to the proprietor of the trade mark. In doing this 
the committee has tried to overcome the basis of the decision in the 
"Yeast Vite" case viz. that the right is only infringed by use of the 
trade mark as a trade mark that is to say for the purpose of indicating 
45. See p 116 of the report of the Yeast-Vite case. 
in relation to the goods upon which the mark is used the origin of such 
goods in the user. 
The committee can see no objection in principle to stating in general 
terms that the trade mark proprietor will be entitled to redress if he 
can show that use by another, in relation to or in connection with the 
goods for which the mark is registered is likely to cause him injury or 
prejudice. It may be argued that the right is not defined with sufficient 
certainty and that competitors will be left in the dark as to what 
precisely is prohibited but the prohibition is clear viz. that the mark 
may not be used, in the course of trade, in relation to or in connection 
with goods in circumstances likely to cause injury or prejudice. What 
those circumstances are will in due course be defined by the courts; in 
the meantime competitors will use the mark in relation to the goods for 
which it is registered at their peril. 46 
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These recommendations of the committee were implemented 
in section 44 (1) (b) of the 1963 Act which, as we have 
seen, adopts a different approach to the turgid section 
enacted in the British Act - albeit with the benefit of 
h . d . h 47 1n s1g t. 
6.4 Defensive registration of trade marks which was 
subsequently provided for in section 53 of the 1963 Act 
and which afforded wider protection than that of the 
corresponding provision in the British Act48 in that 
defensive registration in South Africa was not confined 
. d d 49 to 11 1nvente wor s". 
7. ACT 62 OF 1963. 
The most important innovations of this Act and their 
origin in the Draft Bill considered in the Chowles 
Report have been discussed. 
46. Chowles Report 10 - 11. 
4 7. See p 143-1 51 supra for a discussion of section 4 of the 1 938 United Kingdom Act. 
48. See section 27 of the 1938 Act as amended. 
49. Also recommended were a number of non-substantive changes including the vesting of 
jurisdiction in the Registrar of matters previously vested in the Minister or the Supreme 
Court, registration of marks in the name of holding companies about to be formed and 
the introduction of informal opposition proceedings: See p 2,5-8 of the Chowles 
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Attention will be given briefly to that innovation 
concerning the broadening of the infringement action in 
South Africa which differed from the United Kingdom 
approach in the 1938 Act and which was analysed thus by 
Grosskopf J A in Pentax case (referring to section 44(1) 
of Act 62 of 1963) as originally promulgated: 50 
... the rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be deemed 
to be infringed by -
(a) unauthorized use as a trade mark upon or in relation to 
goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered, of 
the identical trade mark or of a trade mark so nearly 
resembling it as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion; 
or 
(b) unauthorized use in the course of trade, whether as a trade 
mark or not, of the identical trade mark or of a trade mark 
so nearly resembling it as to be likely to deceive or cause 
confusion, if such use is in relation to or in connection 
with goods for which the trade mark is registered and is 
likely to cause injury or prejudice to the proprietor of the 
trade mark. 
It seems clear that ss (b) was inspired by the Yeast-Vite case and 
served to extend the concept of infringement beyond the mere use of 
the mark as a trade mark. The effect of ss (b) in its original 
formulation was, however, that trade mark infringement could be 
committed in this extended sense by the use of a mark 'whether as a 
trade mark or not'. Unlmeful use of a mark as a trade mark could 
thus fall under either ss(a) or (b). See the Dan River case supra at 
703C-704A. After the decision in the Dan River case, and presumably 
as a result thereof, the section was amended by Act 46 of 1971 to make 
it clear that ss(a) applied to the use of a trade mark as a trade mark, 
and ss(b) only to use otherwise than as a trade mark. The section then 
reads as follows (I quote it in full because it is the relevant text for the 
purposes of the present appeal): 
50. At p 116 of the Report of the Pentax case. 
the rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be 
infringed by - (a) unauthorized use as a trade mark in relation to 
goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered, of a 
mark so nearly resembling it as to be likely to deceive or cause 
confusion; or (b) unauthorized use in the course of trade, otherwise 
than as a trade mark, of a mark so nearly resembling it as to be likely 
to deceive or cause confusion, if such use is in relation to or in 
connection with goods or services for which the trade mark is 
registered and is likely to cause injury or prejudice to the proprietor of 
the trade mark. ' 
In passing it should be noted that the reference to the 'identical mark' 
was also removed by Act 46 of 1971 from ss(a) and (b). 
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In the Dan River51 case it was held that sub-sections 
41(1) (a) and (b) could both apply to unlawful use of a 
trade mark as a trade mark: Ogilvie Thompson J.A. had 
found as follows in relation to section 44 as first 
promulgated: 
As Chowles & Webster at pp. 138 et seq. of their useful work (South 
African Law of Trade Marks) point out, the interpretation of the 
expression "whether as a trade mark or not" occurring in sec. 44(l)(b) 
is - especially when regard is had to the terms of the proviso to sec. 
44(1) - not wholly free from difficulty. Mr Franklin submitted that the 
expression in question should be read as "otherwise than as a trade 
mark". Use "as a trade mark" is - so the submission ran -
exhaustively covered by sec. 44(l)(a) and thus has no place in sec. 
44(l)(b). I am unable to agree. To accede to Mr. Franklin's 
submission would, in my opinion, be to ignore the plain grammatical 
meaning of the expression "whether as a trade mark or not" ("hetsy as 
'n handelsmerk of nie "). In my opinion, that expression clearly 
indicates that sec. 44(l)(a) was not intended to deal exhaustively and 
exclusively with use "as a trade mark". Mr Franklin sought to derive 
51. Shalom Investments (Pty.) Ltd. and Others v Dan River Mills Incorporated 1971 (1) S A 
698 (A). 
some support for his submission from the inclusion in sec. 44(1)(b) of 
the words "in the course of trade". In my view, however, the absence 
of those words from sec. 44(1)(a) is readily explicable inasmuch as 
they form part of the definition of "trade mark" in sec. 2 of the Act. 
Their presence in sec. 44(l)(b) is rendered necessary since that section 
refers to unauthorised use of a mark both (i) as a trade mark and (ii) 
othenvise than "as a trade mark". In either case - and here again 
differing from sec. 44(1)(a) - the "injury or prejudice" referred to in 
the concluding portion of sec. 44(l)(b) must, as already mentioned, 
also be proved in order to establish infringement under this 
last-mentioned section. 
In the light of the aforegoing, it becomes, I think, apparent that in 
enacting secs. 44(l)(a) and 44(1)(b) the Legislature deliberately 
departed from the earlier concept, as exemplified by the Yeast-Vite 
case, supra, that there cou/,d be no infringement unless the infringer 
used the mark "as a trade mark" and, adopting the principle embodied 
in sec. 4 of the 1938 English Act, designedly distinguished, in relation 
to infringement, between use "as a trade mark" and other uses. This 
last-mentioned distinction - happily achieved without the "dark and 
tortuous prolixity" of sec. 4 of the English Act - is reflected in 
sec. 44(l)(a) and 44(l)(b) and is underscored by the specific inclusion 
in the latter section, of the expression "whether as a trade mark or 
not". 
The considerations urged upon us by Mr Franklin to the effect that a 
registered trade mark shou/,d not be permitted to become a "badge of 
control" and that the rejection of appellants' submissions would be to 
confer an unwarranted, if not, indeed revolutionary, extension of the 
exclusive rights of the proprietor of a registered trade mark which 
wou/,d be oppressive to traders, are, in my view, likely in practice to 
be effectively answered by the concluding portion of sec. 44(1)(b). 
For as already stated, but as must again here be emphasised, it is -
differing in this respect from sec. 44(1)(a) - a condition precedent of 
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establishing infringement pursuant to the provisions of sec. 44(1) (b) 
that the proprietor of the trade mark should prove that the use 
complained of "is likely to cause injury or prejudice" to him. In any 
event, even if some validity may rightly be accorded to the 
aforementioned considerations, they must perforce yield to the wording 
of the Act. 
I accordingly conclude that, on a proper construction of sec. 44(1)(b) 
of the Act, once the various requirements of that section are shown to 
exist, and none of the qualifications stated in the opening words of the 
section obtain, infringement is established whether the registered trade 
mark was used "as a trade mark" or not. 50 
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The Trade Marks Amendment Act, no. 46 of 1971 amended 
the section to indicated that sub-section 44(1) (a) 
applied to use of a trade mark as a trade mark only and 
section 44(1) (b) use of a mark otherwise than as a trade 
mark, only, removing the references to "identical mark" 
from the sub-sections at the same time. This does not 
lead to a position where use of an identical mark is not 
. f . d h . 53 an in ringement un er t e section. 
8. SERVICE MARKS 
Pursuant to the report of the Schoeman Committee which 
was set up under the chairmanship of the Registrar of 
Trade Marks during 1968 the provisions of the 1963 Act 
were extended to service marks by the Trade Marks 
Amendment Act, no. 46 of 1971, which came into operation 
on 1 January 1972. This Act also extended the concept 
of use of a trade mark in the Act to audible use thereby 
extending the proprietors infringement action at the 
. 54 
same time. 
52. P 687 - 688 of the report. See also p 269-271 infra. 
53. See p 987 of the report of the Pentax case. 
54. See Webster & Page Trade Marks 2nd ed. 5 and section 2(2) of the Act, as amended. 
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9. FURTHER AMENDMENTS AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
Finally it is to be noted that no further amendments to 
the 1963 Act were enacted save for the Trade Marks 
Amendment Act, no. 37 of 1979, which provided for the ad 
hoc appointment of persons to perform Registrar's duties 
and the Trade Marks Amendment Act, No 65 of 1991 which 
inter alia introduced "services" to the definition 
section 2 in order to extend protection to retail and 
wholesale services. 55 
The transitional provisions in section 81 of the 1963 
Act saved vested rights under earlier enactments. 
10. IN SUM 
That marks could serve to identify and distinguish goods 
and that deceptive use thereof was to be punishable in 
certain circumstances was recognised by a number of old 
writers. 
It is however in the common law concerning trade marks 
and the trade mark statutes of the United Kingdom where 
the fundamental principles of the South African law of 
trade marks prior to the Trade Marks Act No 194 of 1993 
are to be found. 
This is not to say that the trade mark laws of the two 
jurisdictions are or were identical in all respects. 
Indeed the Trade Marks Act No 62 of 1963, as amended, 
featured South African innovation and avoided a number 
of the obscurities of the Trade Marks Act, 1938. 
The trade mark laws of the two countries (at least prior 
to the enactment of the Trade Marks Act No 92 of 1993 
and the Trade Marks Act, 1994) are better seen as 
congruent, subject however to the qualification that the 
trade mark law of the United Kingdom was followed only 
where the rule concerned did not conflict with the civil 
or statute law of South Africa. On this basis guidance 
could be sought also in the trade mark law of the U.S.A. 
55. See p 255-256 infra in this regard. 
248 
Those aspects of South African trade mark law under the 
1963 Act most relevant to the topic of this work are 
considered in the next chapter. At the same time 
attention will be given to those instances where there 
are apparent differences between the trade mark laws of 
the United Kingdom prior to the enactment of the 1994 
Act in the latter jurisdiction and the law under the 
1963 SA Act. 
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CHAPTER 11 
SOUTH AFRICA: THE 1963 ACT 
This chapter builds upon the preceding chapter and 
considers the trade mark law of South Africa as it stood 
immediately prior to the enactment of the Trade Marks 
Act, 1993. 1 The law was then governed by the Trade 
Marks Act no. 62 of 1963 as amended by the Trade Marks 
Amendment Act no. 46 of 1971, the Trade Marks Amendment 
Act, no. 3 7 of 1979 and the Trade Marks Amendment Act 
No. 65 of 1991. 
I proceed to consider the provisions of the 1963 Act, as 
amended and supplemented, which are most relevant to the 
central enquiry of this work - the nature of the trade 
mark right. References to the 1963 Act are, henceforth, 
references to the Act as so amended. 
The chapter first considers those provisions which 
defined a "mark" and a "trade mark" and which determined 
which marks were registrable - including the concepts of 
"distinctiveness" and "use". 
An examination of the rights and remedies afforded by 
registration and relevant aspects of the assignment and 
licensing of trade marks follows. 
Detail will not be afforded to those approaches and 
principles common to the trade marks laws of the United 
Kingdom and South Africa. The approach will rather be 
to concentrate upon relevant aspects of the law 
particular to South Africa. 
1. The Act came into force on 1 May 1995. 
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1. OBTAINING REGISTRATION 
As in the United Kingdom under the 1938 Act, a South 
African applicant for registration of a trade mark was 
required to satisfy and overcome a four tier set of 
requirements and obstacles provided by the 1963 Act. 
The onus was upon the applicant to show that: 
1.1 the subject of his application was a "mark" as defined; 
1.2 the mark comprised a "trade mark" as defined; 
1.3 the trade mark was sufficiently distinctive in terms of 
the Act to quality for registration; 
1. 4 the trade mark was not disqualified from registration 
for some other reason provided for in the Act. 
Thus, the 1963 Act set out a series of positive 
requirements for registration which the applicant had 
the onus of overcoming before the trade mark would be 
registered. 
I deal briefly with each requirement in turn in the 
paragraphs which follow. 
2. "MARK" 
The definition of a "mark" in section 2 (1) (vii) of the 
1963 Act, provided: 
"Mark" includes a device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, 
signature, word, letter, numeral, or any combination thereof, or a 
container for goods. 
This definition follows the definition of "mark" in the 
1938 U.K. Act but goes further in including a container 
for goods in the definition. 
It will be recalled that in the Coca-Cola 2 case 
2. Coca-Cola Trade Marks [19861 R.P.C. discussed at p 101-102 (supra). 
it was 
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held in the House of Lords that a container for goods 
was not registrable under the 1938 U.K. Act, whether or 
not it was distinctive in fact. 
In the United Kingdom the Goshen Committee3 found that 
it would be undesirable to grant trade mark protection 
to a container, despite that a container could be 
adapted to distinguish, because the effect of this would 
be to grant an indefinite monopoly in a design. The 
right of the public to use a design of which the period 
of protection had expired would thus be taken away. 
The Chowles Committee pointed out that the nature of the 
monopoly which would be afforded a design under the 
proposed Trade Marks Act would only confer a monopoly 
in the registrant in relation to the goods for which the 
container was registered as a trade mark and for no 
other purpose. The difficulty contemplated by the 
Goshen Committee could be overcome by having the 
legislation preserving the right to utilise any 
utilitarian or functional features embodied in the 
container in favour of the public and by the inclusion 
of a special provision for expungement of container 
k . . 1 . 4 mar s in specia circumstances. 
This led to the enactment of sections 10 ( 2) and ( 3) 
which in their ultimate form after amendment provided: 
10(2) No registration of a container in terms of sub-section (1) shall 
prevent the bona fide use by others of any utilitarian or functional 
feature embodied in such containers. 
10(3) The registration of a container in terms of sub-section (1) may, 
upon application to the court, or at the option of the applicant and 
subject to the provisions of section sixty-nine, to the registrar by any 
person interested, be expunged by the court or the registrar, as the 
3. See par 13 of the Report of the Goshen Committee (1934) Cmnd 4568. 
4. Paragraph 22-24 of the Chowles Report 2 May 1961. 
case may be, if it is established that the registration is or has become 
likely to limit the development of any art or industry. 
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In the Weber registrability case5 it was held that the 
shape and configuration of the appellant's grill was not 
a "mark" within the contemplation of the definition 
thereof in the Act. Eloff J P stated: 
In my opinion it follows from these definitions and provisions that a 
mark has to be something different from the thing marked. And it is 
clear that the appellant cannot, under the aegis of trade mark 
protection, seek monopolistic rights in its design of the shape of its 
product, no matter how distinctive it might be. There is authority of 
long standing in support of these views. 6 
Earlier, in the Faber-Castell case7 , Preiss J emphasised 
that the distinction between the container itself and 
the goods it contained must not be overlooked. 
held: 
It was 
On the evidence furnished by the affidavits before me, I am of the view 
that any member of the public who purchases the Respondent's 
highlighter does so for the purpose of using it as an integral 
instrument and not for the purpose of acquiring the Respondent's 
highlighting fluid. In brief terms, the Respondent is trading in 
highlighters, not in highlighting fluid. Consequently his container 
mark does not relate to the goods, which is what the Trade Marks Act 
requires. 8 
Thus, in terms of the 1963 Act a distinctive container 
for goods was registrable as a trade mark subject to the 
provisions of the Act and particularly sections 10(2) and 
( 3) • 
5. Weber-Stephen Products Co v Registrar of Trade Marks 1994(3) SA 611 (T). 
6. At p 7 of the report. The court approved Lord Lindley's apothegm (see p 99 supra) in In 
re Jame's Trade Mark (1886) 33 Ch D 392 395 and Coca-Cola Trade Marks [19861 
R.P.C. 421 (at p 7-9, 11 of the report). 
7. A.W. Faber-Castell (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd v Schwan - Stabilo Schwanhauser G.m.b.H. & Co 
and the Registrar of Trade Marks, Patent Journal, August 1981 227. 
8. At p 228. See also Cointreau Et Cie SA v Pagan International 1991 (4) SA 706(A) 712. 
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Regard must also be had to section 2(2) of the 1963 Act 
which provided: 
2(2) References in this Act to the use of a mark shall be construed as 
references to the use of a printed or other visual representation of the 
mark, and in addition, in the case of a container, use of such 
container and, in the case of a mark which is capable of being audibly 
reproduced, the use of an audible reproduction of the mark. 
In sum, it can be said that the 1963 South African Act 
followed the approach of the 1938 U.K. Act in providing 
a non-exhaustive list indicating the nature of the 
matter which could serve as a mark. In South Africa, 
however, a container for goods could be registered as a 
trade mark subject to the provisions of the Act. For 
the purposes of the Act an audible reproduction of a 
mark qualified as use of a mark capable of being audibly 
reproduced. The 1938 UK Act restricted use of marks to 
visual representations thereof . 9 
The concept of visual representation received a wide 
interpretation in South Africa as is illustrated by the 
finding that a magnetic signal recorded on a video tape 
which became a visual representation once an electronic 
process converted the magnetic signal to a display on a 
screen comprised a visual representation of the mark in 
1 . h 10 re at1on to t e tape. 
3. "TRADE MARK" 
A "trade mark" was defined in section 2(xxi) of the Act 
which provided: 
"trade mark", other than a certification mark, means a mark used or 
proposed to be used in relation to goods or services for the purpose of -
9. See section 38(2) of the 1938 UK Act. 
10. See Esquire Electronics and anr v D Roopanand Bros (Pty) Ltd 1986(2) SA 576 
(A). 
(a) indicating a connection in the course of trade between the goods 
or services and some person having the right, either as proprietor or 
as a registered user, to use the mark, whether with or without any 
indication of the identity of that person; and 
(b) distinguishing the goods or services in relation to which the mark 
is used or proposed to be used, from the same kind of goods or 
services connected in the course of trade with any other person. 
Section 3(1) of the Act provided: 
(a) References in this Act to the use of a mark in relation to goods 
shall be construed as references to the use thereof upon, or in physical 
or other relation to, goods. 
(b) References in this Act to the use of a mark in relation to services 
shall be construed as references to the use thereof in any relation to 
the peiformance of such services. 
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It will be observed immediately that the definition 
differs from that contained in the 1938 United Kingdom 
. b . 1 11 F" 1 h S h Act in two su stant1a respects. irst y, t e out 
African legislation deals with trade marks and service 
marks in a single definition drawing little 
distinction between the two concepts. The corresponding 
United Kingdom legislation, on the other hand, comprised 
two different enactments, one relating to trade marks 
and the other to service marks in which a number of 
12 distinctions between the two concepts were set out. 
Secondly, pursuant to the view of the Chowles Committee 
that the traditional view of the trade mark as a badge 
of origin was in need of revision, section 2(xxi) (b) was 
added to the definition. 
The Committee found in paragraph 50 of its report: 
11. See p 102 for the definition of 'trade mark' and 'service mark' in the 1938 
United Kingdom Act. 
12. See p 93-94 supra. 
The Committee is of opinion that the idea that a trade mark is 
primarily a mark of origin is outmoded; it is in the Committee's view 
really a mark of quality in relation to price; the public does not in 
fact concern itself with the origin of goods but it does associate the 
trade mark with certain standards of quality in relation to the price 
paid. The trade mark is, in that sense, designed to distinguish goods 
from the same goods manufactured by competitors. For this reason 
the Committee feels that this purpose viz. "to distinguish goods" 
should be embodied in the definition. 1 3 
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Section 2(b) of the Trade Marks Amendment Act No. 65 of 
1991 introduced the following to section 2 (the 
Definitions section) of the 1963 Act: 
"services" includes the offering for sale or the sale of goods in the 
retail or wholesale trade. 
Thus no comprehensive definition of services was 
provided by the legislation. The definition of a trade 
mark under the Act however implied that it contemplated 
a limitation on services to those rendered in the course 
of trade. 14 
The reference to "services" inserted in the definitions 
section by Act no. 65 of 1991 was introduced after 
Corbett J A had said the following obiter in the Miele 
case: 
And, in my view, it is artificial and incorrect to regard the selling of 
goods, even if they all emanate from a single manufacturing source, as 
h . . if . 15 t e provision o services. 
It was then held in Action Bolt 16 that the selling of 
goods whether on a wholesale or retail basis was not a 
13. Report of the Chowles Committee 2 May 1961. 
14. See Webster & Page Trade Marks 3rd ed. 23. 
15. Miele et Cie & Co v Euro Electrical (Pty) Ltd 1988(2) SA 583 (A) 599. 
16. Action Bolt (Pty) ltd v Tool Wholesale Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1988(4) SA 752(T). 
service contemplated by the 1963 Act. 
h ld b h A 11 D. . . 17 up e y t e ppe ate i vision 
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The decision was 
whereaf ter the 
legislature intervened by means of Act 65 of 1991. 
Thus, in this instance also the position was different 
to that in England where the service had to be for 
"money or moneys worth" and the test for a connection in 
the course of business required payment for the service 
itself. 18 
The concepts "proposed to use" and "connection in the 
course of trade" never obtained a clearer or different 
definition in the South African law than they did in the 
law of the United Kingdom and require no further 
exposition in the context of the enquiry at which this 
work is directed, save to note that the latter was one 
of the means by which the dominance of the origin 
f . . . d 19 unction was maintaine . 
4. DISTINCTIVENESS 
The 1963 Act divided the register into two parts - Part 
A and Part B - an innovation of the 1919 UK Act. 20 
An applicant, having satisfied the requirements of the 
definitions section of the Act (section 2) concerning 
the definitions of "mark" and "trade mark" had to show 
further that his mark was sufficiently distinctive for 
Part A registration or possessed the capability of 
becoming so distinctive for Part B registration. 
A mark could not be placed in Part A of the register 
unless it complied with the terms of section 10 of the 
Act. 
17. Tool Wholesale Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Action Bolt (Pty) Ltd and Anr 1991 (2) SA 80(A); 
See Visser & Pretorius 1991 (108) SALJ 606-613. 
18. See 'provision' under section 68 of the 1938 UK Act. 
19. See also p 105-107 supra. 
20. See p 62 supra. 
Section 10 provided: 
Essential particulars of trade marks registrable in Part A of the 
register. 
(1) In order to be registrable in Part A of the register, a trade mark 
(other than a certification mark) shall contain or consist of a 
distinctive mark. 
(IA) A mark which is reasonably required for use in the trade shall 
not be registrable. 21 
(JB) The name of a company, individual or jinn not represented in a 
special or particular manner, a signature other than that of the 
applicant for registration or of some predecessor in his business, or a 
word being in its ordinary signification a surname, shall not be 
registered unless it is proved that it is distinctive. 
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Thus, in order to qualify for Part A registration a 
trade mark had to be distinctive. The concept 
"distinctive" was defined as follows in section 12 of 
the Act: 
Meaning of "distinctive" 
(1) For the purposes of section JO "distinctive" means adapted, in 
relation to the goods or services in respect of which a trade mark is 
registered or proposed to be registered, to distinguish goods or 
services with which the proprietor of the trade mark is or may be 
connected in the course of trade from goods or services in the case of 
which no such connection subsists, either generally or, where the trade 
mark is registered or proposed to be registered subject to limitations, 
in relation to use within those limitations. 
21 . "The principle behind the prohibition (and this applies to the exclusion of laudatory 
terms as well) is that a grant of a trade mark monopoly should not be allowed to 
unduly limit the rights of others to the free choice of language in describing and 
extolling their goods and services.": per Nestadt J A in Sportshoe (Pty) Ltd v Pep 
Stores (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1990(1) SA 722(A) 728. 
(2) In determining whether a trade mark is distinctive as aforesaid, 
regard may be had to the extent to which -
(a) the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish; and 
(b) by reason of the use of the trade mark or of any other 
circumstance the trade mark is or has become adapted to distinguish. 
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It will be observed immediately that the 1963 Act moved 
away from the traditional approach in the United Kingdom 
embodied also in its 1938 Act (and in the 1916 South 
African Act) that for a mark to be registrable it had to 
contain or comprise at least one of a number of 
essential particulars set out in the Act together with a 
catch-all category ("any other distinctive mark"). 
The underlying intention of the earlier South African 
and the equivalent United Kingdom legislation (including 
the 1938 Act) was that a mark should be distinctive if 
it were to be registrable and the categories which were 
mentioned were those categories which were regarded as 
being distinctive subject to the qualifications or 
limitations which the enactment imposed. 22 Section 
10(1) of the 1963 SA Act simplifies the approach stating 
specifically that a trade mark must be distinctive in 
order to qualify for Part A registration, without 
. d . 1 . f d . . . k 23 prov1 ing a ist o ist1nct1ve mar s. 
It is to be noted that like section 9(1) (e) of the 1938 
U.K. Act, section 10(1) (B) of the 1963 Act in South 
Africa in its ultimate form provided that marks 
comprising the name of 
not represented in a 
signature other than 
a company, 
special or 
that of 
individual or firm and 
particular manner, a 
the applicant for 
registration or some predecessor in his business, or 
22. Seep 107-121 supra. 
23. See Webster & Page Trade Marks 3rd ed. 32. 
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words being in their ordinary signification a surname, 
would not qualify for Part A registration unless proved 
to be distinctive. 
Unlike those categories of section 9 of the U K Act 
which comprised a word or words having a "direct 
reference to the character or quality of the goods" (or 
services in the case of service marks) or marks which 
were a geographical name according to their ordinary 
signification and which required evidence of 
distinctiveness before Part A registration would be 
allowed, the South African equivalents thereof were not 
subject to special requirements under the 1963 Act. 24 
Having regard to the provisions of section 12 of the Act 
it is clear that in order to qualify as distinctive a 
trade mark had to have that property which would enable 
it to distinguish the goods or services connected in 
trade with its proprietor (and in respect of which its 
registration was sought or obtained) from those of 
others. Such a mark would be adapted to distinguish 
such goods or services and would be distinctive in terms 
of the Act. 
In terms of section 2 of the Act a mark could be 
inherently adapted to distinguish or it could derive 
this property through use or 
(factual distinctiveness) . 
other circumstances 
A mark which presented those inherent characteristics 
which rendered it inherently adapted to distinguish perse 
was registrable under the Act without anything more 
being required of it. 
A mark which featured characteristics which rendered it 
24. See Webster & Page Trade Marks 3rd ed. 34. 
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possessed of a discernible inherent adaptability to 
distinguish but with insufficient quantum to qualify it 
as inherently adapted to distinguish perse, could attain 
distinctiveness if the factors mentioned in section 
12(2) (b) were present in the mark in a sufficient 
measure to supplement its want of inherent adaptability 
to distinguish to a degree where it was rendered 
distinctive by virtue of all of the circumstances 
appertaining thereto. 
Where, however, a trade mark featured no degree of 
inherent adaptability to distinguish at all, it could 
never qualify for registration no matter how distinctive 
. . h b . f 25 it mig t e in act. 
Finally, it can be observed that the specific categories 
of marks historically incorporated in the United Kingdom 
legislation under the distinctiveness sections received 
no different or expanded treatment in the South African 
law and thus did not take on any particular significance 
or South African character under the 1963 Act. 26 
5. PART B OF THE REGISTER 
Section 11 of the Act provided the following regarding 
the registration of trade marks in Part B of the 
register: 
11 Requisites for registration of a trade mark in Part B of the register 
(1) In order to be registrable in Part B of the register, a trade mark 
shall, in relation to the goods or services in respect of which it is 
proposed to be registered, be capable of becoming registrable, through 
use, in Part A of the register in respect of such goods or services. 
25. Seep 107-121 supra. Heublin Inc v Golden Fried Chicken (Pty) Ltd 1982(4) SA 
84 (T). Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v S.A. Breweries Ltd 1976 (3) SA 514(A) 
552-553. 
26. See Webster & Page Trade Marks 3rd ed. 38-53. 
(2) A trade mark may be registered in Part B of the register 
notwithstanding the registration in Part A of the register in the name 
of the same proprietor of the same trade mark or any part or parts 
thereof 
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Thus, the requirements for obtaining Part B registration 
in the United Kingdom and in South Africa were 
different. In the United Kingdom the matter turned on 
whether a mark earmarked for Part B registration was 
"capable of distinguishing" the goods or services 
concerned, which involved a similar kind of enquiry to 
that adopted in testing for Part A registrability, save 
that in the latter event the touchstone was whether the 
mark concerned was "adapted to distinguish" goods or 
. 27 
services. 
The requirements for registration of marks in Part B of 
the South African Register under section 11 was less 
stringent and involved an enquiry as to whether a mark 
which did not have the necessary measure of 
distinctiveness contemplated by section 12 could, with 
the passage of time, acquire it through use. 
It follows that marks without a discernible degree of 
adaptability to distinguish could never qualify for 
registration in either Part A or Part B of the Register. 
6. REMAINING DISQUALIFICATIONS 
The applicant for registration of a mark which satisfied 
the definitions of "mark" and "trade mark" under the Act 
and which satisfied also the distinctiveness 
requirements for either Part A or Part B registration, 
could expect his mark to proceed to registration 
provided it was not deceptive in the sense that it was 
identical or closely similar to the mark of another 
party or was in some other way likely to deceive or 
cause confusion. 
27. Seep 121-126 supra; Webster & Page Trade Marks 3rd ed. 58-62. 
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This brings me to a consideration of sections 16(1) and 
17(1) of the Act where the restrictions on registration 
are to be found. Section 16 (1) bears a significant 
resemblance to section 11 of the 1938 U. K. Act whilst 
section 17(1) is clearer, in my view, than its British 
counterpart in the 1938 U.K. Act, section 12(1) . 28 
6.1 Marks offending section 16(1) 
Section 16(1) of the 1963 Act, provided: 
It shall not be lawful to register as a trade mark or part of a trade 
mark any matter the use of which would be likely to deceive or cause 
confusion or would be contrary to law or morality or would be likely 
to give offence or cause annoyance to any person or class of persons 
or would otherwise be disentitled to protection in a court of law. 
The history of the section is to be found in the Common 
Law prior to the 1875 U.K. Act and the decisions of the 
courts in England decided under section 11 of the 1938 
U.K. Act afforded substantial guidance to the 
interpretation of section 16(1) of the 1963 S.A. Act. 29 
The prohibition against matter which would be likely to 
deceive or cause confusion in use referred to both 
confusion resulting from inherent properties in the mark 
sought to be registered and the external resemblance of 
such marks to other registered or unregistered trade 
marks, business names and trading styles and other signs 
in respect of which it could be shown that they had 
established a commercial reputation. 30 The onus was on 
the applicant to show the absence of a reasonable 
probability that the likelihood of deception or confusion 
28. See p 126-135 supra where the disqualifications under sections 11 and 12 of the 
1938 UK Act are discussed. 
29. See p 126-128 supra regarding the history of the section in the UK. 
30. See Wm. Penn Oils International (Pty) Ltd 1966(1) SA 311 (A) (decided under section 
140 of the 1 91 6 SA Act which was of the same import); Webster & Page Trade Marks 
3rd ed. 99-111. 
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contemplated by the section would not arise - indeed the 
onus was on the applicant throughout to show that his 
d k l 'f' d f . . 31 s . 6(1) tra e mar qua i ie or registration. ection 1 
relates to matters extant at the time of registration 
and not to matters arising thereafter. 32 
The latter part of the section which prohibited the 
registration of marks likely to give offence or cause 
annoyance or which were otherwise disentitled to 
protection in a court of law received little judicial 
comment in South Africa and will not be discussed as 
nothing of substance to the thrust of this work will be 
derived therefrom. 
Section 16(1) was often invoked in conjunction with 
section 10(1) (A) which rendered marks reasonably 
. d f . h d ' bl 33 I require or use in t e tra e not registra e. n 
particular, sections 10(1) (A) and 16(1) were invoked in 
conjunction 
epithets and 
to prevent 
geographical 
registration of laudatory 
names
34 
whereas in the UK, 
geographical names were not registrable under the 1938 
Act save as specifically provided for therein. 35 In 
South Africa, no similar specific limitation was taken 
up in the 1963 Act. Nevertheless, registration of a 
geographical name could be declined where the mark 
contained non-distinctive matter, matter common to the 
trade or matter within the ambit of section 10(1) (A) . 36 
31. See The Upjohn Company v Merck 1987 (3) SA 221 (T) 224; But see also Bristol 
Laboratories Inc. v Ciba Ltd 1960(1) SA 864(A). 
32. United Bank Ltd and anr. v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1991(4) SA 810 819-820. See 
also Adcock-Ingram Laboratories Ltd v SA Druggists Ltd; Adcock-Ingram Laboratories 
Ltd v Lennon Ltd 1983(2) SA 350(T). 
33. See Webster & Page Trade Marks 3rd ed. 36-38. 
34. See Sportshoe (Pty) Ltd v Pep Stores SA (Pty) Ltd 1990(1) SA 722(A)728. See also 
Star Shirt and Clothing Factory Natal (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks 1972(1) SA 
502(T) 566-567. 
35. See p 113-115 supra. 
36. Kentucky Tobacco Corp v Registrar of Trade Marks 1984(2) SA 335(T) 340. 
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In testing for a likelihood of deception or confusion 
under section 16 (1) a realistic rather than a narrow 
technical approach was required. 37 
6.2 Marks offending section 17(1) 
Section 17(1) of the S.A. Act provided: 
Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), no trade mark shall be 
registered if it so resembles a trade mark belonging to a different 
proprietor and already on the Register that the use of both such trade 
marks in relation to goods or services in respect of which they are 
sought to be registered, and registered, wouUJ be likely to deceive or 
cause confusion. 
The section was akin to section 12 read with section 
68(2) (B) of the 1938 U.K. Act. 38 
Section 17 (1) was narrower than section 16 (1) in the 
sense that its operation was confined to deceptive or 
confusing similarity between the trade mark applied for 
and an existing registered mark yet wider in the sense 
that the registered mark was not required to have a 
market reputation. 
The provisions of section 17(1) were peremptory and the 
Registrar was bound to refuse registration of a mark 
which was struck by the provisions of the section. In 
the discharge of that duty the Registrar was concerned 
with preserving the purity of the Register in the public 
interest. The onus was on the applicant to show that his 
1 . . k b h . 39 app 1cat1on was not struc y t e section. 
Although the words "likely to deceive or cause 
confusion" were common to both sections 16(1) and 17(1) 
a different test for the presence thereof applied under 
the two sections. The test under section 17(1) was 
37. Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd and anr 1988(3) SA 290 (A) 318. 
38. See p 130-135 regarding section 12 of the 1938 UK Act and the legislative history 
thereof which reveals the ancestry of section 17(1) of the 1963 SA Act. 
39. See Registrar of Trade Marks v American Cigarette Co. 1966(2) SA 563(A) 571-572. 
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confined to a comparison of notional user of the mark 
applied for in respect of the goods or services for 
which registration was sought with notional fair use of 
the registered mark in respect of the goods or services 
covered by the registered specification. The test under 
section 16(1) was a comparison based upon notional fair 
use of the trade mark applied for in respect of the 
goods or services for which registration was sought 
compared with actual use of the prior mark or commercial 
sign - which had to have a reputation. 40 
In the case of honest concurrent use or other special 
circumstances section 17 (2) afforded the Registrar the 
discretion to allow side by side registration of 
identical or resembling marks subject to limitations if 
necessary and by way of an exception to section 17(1) . 41 
Section 17(3) provided for the .situation where there was 
a conflict between pending applications. The Registrar 
was empowered to refuse both applications until the 
applicants' rights had been determined by him or settled 
by an agreement between the parties in a manner approved 
by him. In the absence of prior user by the later 
applicant the prior application usually prevailed. 42 
An applicant who satisfied the requirements of section 2 
relating to "mark" and "trade mark" and the 
distinctiveness sections (section 10 for Part A 
registration or section 11 for Part B registration) , and 
who overcame the obstacles of sections 16(1) and 17(1), 
was entitled to obtain registration and the protection 
afforded registered marks under the Act. 
7. INFRINGEMENT 
40. See Webster & Page Trade Marks 3rd ed. 101-102. 
41. See section 17(2). See also p 135-137 supra regarding the corresponding section 
12(2) of the 1938 UK Act and its legislative history. 
42. See section 17(3) and Webster & Page Trade Marks 3rd ed. 125-127. 
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Registration of a trade mark under the 1963 Act 
conferred upon the registrant the exclusive right to use 
the trade mark in South Africa, subject to the 
provisions of the Act. 43 
The origins of the modern law of statutory trade mark 
infringement under the 1963 Act were to be found in the 
common law action for passing off. The Act recognised 
that the underlying principle of passing off, namely, 
that the use of an identical trade mark or a trade mark 
so similar as to be calculated to deceive or cause 
confusion was an improper infringement of the rights to 
the original mark. The differences between the rights 
of the proprietor of a registered mark and the 
"proprietor" of a trade mark at common law in regard to 
the statutory infringement action afforded the first in 
contrast to the passing off action afforded the second 
were: 
(a) the proprietor of a registered trade mark did not have 
to prove a reputation in the trade mark; 
(b) the right to exclusive use of the trade mark as a badge 
of origin flowed from its registration. 
Nevertheless, the underlying principle of passing off 
set out above applied also to an action in which the 
registered proprietor sued an unauthorized user of a 
deceptively or confusingly similar mark for trade mark 
infringement. 
The aforegoing as set out in the Beecham case accorded, 
it was said, with the same general approach which was to 
be found in English law. 44 
43. Shalom Investments (Pty) Ltd v Dan River Mills Inc. 1971 (1) SA 689(A) 706. 
44. Per the judgment of Corbett CJ in Beecham Group PLC v Southern Transvaal 
Pharmaceutical Pricing Bureau (Pty) Ltd and anr. 1993(1) SA 546(A) 554-555 (the 
Beecham case). 
267 
Section 44 of the Act provided for two forms of 
infringement. The first, under section 44 (1) (a) 
comprised the traditional or "passing off" form - the 
only form statutorily recognised prior to the 1963 Act. 
The second form, under section 44 (1) (b) of the Act, 
introduced a new and different form of infringement 
which contemplated use of the offending sign "otherwise 
than as a trade mark" . 45 
The extent of the registered trade mark right was 
indicated by the infringement actions provided for in 
the Act which indicated what others were not to do in 
relation to the registered trade mark. 
Section 44 provided: 
44. Infringement. - (1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and 
(3) of this section and of sections 45 and 46, the rights acquired by 
registration of a trade mark shall be infringed by -
(a) unauthorised use as a trade mark in relation to goods or services 
in respect of which the trade mark is registered, of a mark so nearly 
resembling it as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion; or 
(b) unauthorised use in the course of trade, otherwise than as a trade 
mark, of a mark so nearly resembling it as to be likely to deceive or 
cause confusion, if such use is in relation to or in connection with 
goods or services for which the trade mark is registered and is likely to 
cause injury or prejudice to the proprietor of the trade mark: 
Provided that in the case of a trade mark registered in Part B of the 
Register, no interdict or other relief shall, for purposes of paragraph 
(a) of this subsection, be granted if the defendant establishes to the 
satisfaction of the court that the use of which the proprietor of the 
registered trade mark complains is not likely to be taken as indicating 
a connection in the course of trade between the goods or services and 
45. See p 555 of the report of the Beecham case. See also p 240-242, 243-246 
supra. 
some person having the right either as proprietor or as registered user 
to use the trade mark. 
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The elements which were to be present for infringement 
under section 44(1) (a) of the Act were, therefore, the 
following: 
7.1 Section 44(1)(a) Infringements 
7.1.1 Unauthorized use, 
7.1.2 as a trade mark, 
7.1.3 in respect of the registered goods or services, 
7.1.4 of a mark so nearly resembling the registered mark, 
7.1.5 as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion. 
The characteristic element of section 44(1)(a) 
infringements was that the infringing use of the mark 
complained of had to be use "as a trade mark". This 
meant that the infringing use had to be in accordance 
with the definition of a trade mark in section 2 of the 
Act. Section 2 contemplated use of the trade mark in 
relation to goods or services for the purposes of 
indicating a connection in the course of trade between 
the goods or services and the proprietor of the mark (or 
those of a registered user) and to distinguish these 
goods from the same kind of goods or services elsewhere 
connected in the course of trade. 46 
The unauthorized use had to be upon or in relation to 
goods or services covered by the letter of the 
. d . f. . 47 reg1stere spec1 icat1on. 
46. Berman Bros v Sodastream Ltd and anr 1986(3) SA 209 (A) 236. 
47. Webster & Page Trade Marks 3rd ed. 270-271. 
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The af oregoing having been established, the party 
asserting the infringement was required to discharge the 
residue of the onus which was to prove a probability of 
deception or confusion arising from the resemblance of 
the marks concerned. The section contemplated side by 
side comparison of the marks on the basis of notional 
fair use which required use of the registered mark to be 
postulated in connection with the registered goods or 
services and use of the infringing mark to be postulated 
in relation to the same goods or services. 48 
7.2 Section 44(1)(b) Infringements 
The elements which were to be present for an 
infringement under section 44(1) (b) of the Act were: 
7.2.1 Unauthorised use, 
7.2.2 in the course of trade, 
7.2.3 otherwise than as a trade mark, 
7.2.4 of a mark so nearly resembling the registered mark 
7.2.5 as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion, 
7.2.6 if such use was in connection with the registered goods 
or services 
7.2.7 and was likely to cause injury or prejudice to the 
registered proprietor. 
I have already dealt at length with the origin of section 
48. John Craig (Pty) Ltd v Dupa Clothing Industries (Pty) Ltd 1977(3) SA 144(T). Metal 
Box SA Ltd Midpak Blow Moulders (Pty) Ltd 1988(2) SA 446(T). But see also Plascon 
- Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1988 (3) SA 623 (A) 641. In 
regard to the infringement of container marks see Cointreau et Cie SA v Pagan 
International 1991 (4)SA 706(A); In regard to infringements in circumstances of 
parallel importation see Protective Mining and Industrial Equipment Systems (Pty) Ltd v 
Audiolens Cape (Pty) Ltd 1987(2) SA 961 (A); Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v A Roopanand 
Brothers (Pty) Ltd 1987(3) SA 165(0). 
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44(1) (b) infringements in the Chowles report pursuant to 
the decision in the Yeastvite case49 and recorded that 
the South African version was clearer than the 
corresponding section in the 1938 U.K. Act which was 
enacted in response to Yeastvi te. 50 This was 
particularly so after the 1971 amendment to the 1963 
S.A. Act. 51 
In the Beecham case Corbett C. J. found that because of 
the different wording in section 4 of the 1938 U.K. Act 
and section 44 of the 1963 S A Act, English cases were 
of limited value as authority in regard to the extended 
infringement action 
Insofar, however, as 
provided by 
the extended 
section 44(1) (b). 
action under both 
enactments were derived from a desire to provide a 
remedy in circumstances such as those which came about 
in the Yeastvite case both the English decisions and the 
South African decisions indicated a resolve to keep the 
extended action within reasonable bounds and to limit it 
to cases where the infringer was a trade competitor. 52 
Corbett C.J. reiterated his words in the Miele case 
where he said: 
(g)eneral guidance may no doubt be derived from the apparent object 
of section 44(1)(b) which has to extend the scope of infringement to 
cases where the infringer's use of the mark, though not use as a trade 
mark, was in order to prey upon or take advantage of the reputation 
and goodwill of the proprietor of the mark. 53 
It was, therefore, held that the history of the 
legislation and the above-stated general object must be 
borne in mind in interpreting and determining the scope 
49. Irving's Yeast-Lite Ltd v Horsenail [19341 S1 R.P.C. 110. 
50. Section 4(1 )(b) of the 1938 UK Act. 
51 . See p 243-246 supra. See too the discussion regarding the background to section 
48(1 )(b) with reference to UK law in the Beecham case at p 556-668 of the judgement. 
52. P 557-558 of the report of the Beecham case. 
53. Miele et Cie GmbH & Co v Euro Electrical (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 583(A) 600. See p 
558 of the report of the Beecham case. 
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of section 44 ( 1) (b) . 54 It was held further that the 
words in the section "in the course of trade" meant 
trading goods falling into the classes for which the 
trade mark was registered or goods which were so closely 
associated therewith that use of the trade mark by the 
infringer in a manner otherwise 
would enable the inf ringer to 
advantage of the reputation 
proprietor of the mark. 55 
than as a trade mark 
prey upon or take 
or goodwill of the 
The word "injury" in section 44(1) (b) referred to 
patrimonial loss whilst the word "prejudice" was "a 
wider concept which would included an impairment of a 
person's rights and interests not necessarily resulting 
. . . 1 . 1 56 1n patr1mon1a or pecuniary oss". 
7.3 Infringement of Part B registrations 
Reference to the proviso to section 44 of the Act57 
reveals that, as in the 1938 UK Act, 58 the same acts 
infringed a Part B registration as infringed a Part A 
registration, save that the defendant was released from 
liability if he could discharge the onus placed on him 
by the proviso. In other words a defendant, in order to 
escape, had to prove that the use complained of was not 
likely to be taken as indicating a connection in the 
course of trade between the infringing goods or services 
and the registrant or a registered user of the 
registered trade mark. 
The essence of the proviso was, therefore, that the 
infringer had to show on the probabilities that there 
had not been a passing off. This could be done by 
showing that the infringed mark did not have the 
requisite reputation or that the manner in which the 
54. P 558 of the report of the Beecham case. 
55. See p 559 of the report of the Beecham case. 
56. Per Corbett JA in Miele Et Cie GmbH & Co v Euro Electrical (Pty) Ltd 1 988 (2) SA (A) 
583-600. 
57. Section 44 is set out in full at p 267-268 supra. 
58. See p 152-154 supra. 
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infringer had used the infringing mark would not bring 
about a likelihood of a connection in the course of 
trade with the complainant. 59 The proviso to section 44 
did not relate to a comparison of the marks side by side 
but referred to the manner in which the. infringing mark 
was actually used i.e. the use complained of . 60 
8. ASSIGNMENT 
Following section 22 of the 1938 UK Act, the common law 
rule that the assignment of trade marks leads to public 
confusion and is, therefore, to be prohibited was 
statutorily modified by means of an amendment in 1947 to 
section 130 of the 1916 Act. Section 49 of the 1963 Act 
retained the substance of the section aforementioned. 61 
Under the 
transferable 
1963 Act registered trade marks were 
(assignable and transmissible) with or 
without the goodwill in the business in all of the goods 
or services in respect of which the trade mark was 
registered or in respect of some 
thereof . 62 
(but not all) 
Assignments without goodwill were considered in the 
Grand Prix case in regard to which Nestadt J A held: 
The submission would seem to be that the effect of an assignment 
without goodwill is that the assignee acquires no goodwill in the trade 
mark; this remains with the assignor; after assignment the assignee has 
to cultivate his own goodwill or reputation in the mark ab initio. This 
59. Sportshoe (Pty) Ltd v Pep Stores (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1990(1) SA 722 (A) 733. 
60. Tri-ang Pedigree (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Prima Toys (Pty) Ltd 1985(1) SA 448 (A) 472, 
474. 
61. See p 187-193 supra regarding section 22 of the 1938 UK Act. See also 
section 130 of The Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright Act No. 9 of 
1916 as amended by the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Amendment Act No. 
19 of 1947 and Webster & Page Trade Marks 3rd ed. 241. 
62. See sections 49(1) and (2) of the 1963 Act. Associated marks could not be 
transferred separately (see section 38(1 )). 
is not so. Assignments of traJie marks are regulated bys 49(1) of the 
Act. It permits an assignment of a registered traJie mark 'without the 
goodwill of the business concerned in the goods . . . for which it has 
been registered'. In so providing, it (or rather its predecessor, s 130 
of the 1916 Act, as amended in 1947) altered the previously existing 
position that a traJie mark could only be transferred in colljunction 
with the assignor's business. The theory was that the public regarded 
a traJie mark as indicating that the goods bearing the mark emanated 
from a particular business exclusively, and that, if the link between the 
mark and the business was broken, it would be contrary to public 
policy to recognise the continuance of any exclusive right to the mark 
(Kerly (op cit para 13-02)). Later, however, it was accepted that the 
rights under a traJie mark are severable from the business in which it 
is used. Section 49(1) of the Act gives effect to this. The public must, 
however, not be deceived or corifused by an assignment without 
goodwill. This would occur where the traJie mark has continued to 
identify the goods of the assignor. It would then not distinguish the 
goods of the new registered proprietor. In this event, the mark can, it 
would seem, be expunged (Kerly (op cit at paras 13-11); Webster and 
Page (op cit at 242 and 246)) as a mark wrongly remaining on the 
register. But Sportshoe aJiduced no evidence that after the 
assignments without goodwill of Grand Prix to Shoe Corporation, 
Pepkor and Pep, the mark still distinguished the goods bearing it as 
those of the respective assignors. And, to return to the point of 
Sportshoe 's argument, the use of the mark over the years enabled a 
reputation in it to be built up which enured to the benefit of the 
respective assignees despite them not acquiring the goodwill of the 
assignor's business; in particular, Pep's use of the mark during the 
period 1982-86, far from leaJiing to any corifusion, was by reason of 
Pepkor's quality control and its relationship with Pep, indicative of a 
,~,/ . . h . h . 63 truue connection wzt zt, as t e propnetor. 
Section 49(3) permitted the assignment of 
unregistered trade marks when: 
8 .1 the unregistered trade mark was used in the same 
business in respect of which a registered trade mark 
was used at the date of the assignment; and 
63. Sportshoe (Pty) Ltd v Pep Stores (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1990( 1) SA 722(A) 733-734 
(the Sportshoe case). 
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8.2 the unregistered trade mark was assigned 
simultaneously with the registered trade mark to the 
same assignee or transferee; and 
8.3 the assignment was in respect of the goods or 
services for which the unregistered mark was used 
and for which the registered mark simultaneously 
. d . d 64 assigne , was registere . 
Transfers which would lead to confusion or deception 
by virtue of the fact that exclusive rights to use 
identical or closely resembling trade marks in 
respect of goods or services were thereby vested in 
more than one person were unlawful subject to the 
proviso of section 49(4). 
following: 
This proviso was the 
Provided that where a trade mark is, or has been, assigned or 
transmitted in such case as aforesaid, the assignment or transmission 
shall not be deemed to be, or to have been, invalid under the 
sub-section if the exclusive right subsisting as a result thereof in the 
persons concerned respectively are, or were, having regard to the 
limitations imposed thereon, such as not to be exercisable by two or 
more of those persons in relation to goods to be sold, or otherwise 
traded in, or services to be formed, within the Republic (otherwise 
than for export therefrom) or in relation to goods to be exported to the 
same market outside the Republic. 65 
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An applicant for transfer could make representations 
with a view to obtaining a certificate from the 
Registrar to the effect that the proposed assignment was 
not invalid under section 49 (4), which certificate was 
generally conclusive unless it was obtained by fraud or 
. . 66 
misrepresentation. 
64. See section 49(3). 
65. See section 49(4). 
66. See section 49(5). 
Section 
that an 
49 ( 6) required the 
assignment which 
Registrar 
involved 
to 
a 
275 
be satisfied 
geographical 
division of rights within the Republic would not involve 
use of the trade marks contrary to the public interest. 
Section 49(7) provided for the transfer of a trade mark 
application pending registration and for the 
substitution of the transferee as the applicant. 
Section 49(8) specifically provided that decisions of 
67 the Registrar in terms of section 49 were appealable. 
The procedure for registration of transfer of registered 
trade marks was provided for in section 51. 68 
9. LICENSING 
The necessity for a controlled form of trade mark 
licencing perceived 
. d . d 69 Unite King om was 
SA Act. 70 
by the Goshen committee in the 
taken up in section 48 of the 1963 
According to Webster & Page, section 48, in common with 
section 28 of the 1938 UK Act, sought to protect the 
public from deception or confusion resulting from the 
licensing of trade marks by: 
9.1 Requiring licences to be recorded in the register so as 
to give public notice thereof; 
9. 2 requiring the Registrar to be fully appraised of the 
control to be exercised by the licensor over the licence 
(the permitted use) and to be fully appraised of the 
relationship between the licensor and the licensee (the 
registered user) . This represented an endeavour to 
ensure that the goods and services assured by the mark 
were of the same quality whether they derived from the 
registered proprietor or a registered user; 
67. See sections 49(6) (7) and (8). 
68. See section 51 . 
69. Seep 169-170 supra regarding the Goshen committee. 
70. See Webster & Page 3rd ed Trade Marks 221 . 
9.3 
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requiring the 
permitted use 
interest. 71 
Registrar 
would not 
to 
be 
be satisfied that the 
contrary to the public 
In the Adcock-Ingram case a formalistic approach to 
trade mark licences under the Act was adopted. 
held: 
It was 
The language of s 48 is clear and unambiguous. In terms of ss (2) it is 
"the permitted use" of a trade mark which is deemed to be use by the 
proprietor thereof for the purposes of s 36. "Permitted use" is defined 
in ss (1) fJ2l as "the use of a trade mark by a registered user thereof". 
Whether a person is a registered user can be ascertained in only one 
way, namely by reference to the register of trade marks. If a person 
has not been registered as such he is not a registered user either de 
facto or at all. 72 
In the Sportshoe case Nestadt J A dealt with the 
traditional argument against trade mark licensing thus: 
This is what is known as the licensing of a trade mark and the issue 
raised by Sportshoe 's argument is whether it is permitted, and if so, 
under what circumstances. It is a controversial issue. According to 
one view, the answer is in the negative. This is because, so it is said, 
a licensed user of a trade mark leads to public deception or confusion; 
either the mark is regarded as the licensee's or else the public would 
think that the licensee's goods were those of the proprietor. In either 
event the origin function of a trade mark is impaired. The result is 
that by reason of the proprietor's conduct the mark ceases to be 
distinctive. And since distinctiveness is the very essence of a trade 
mark, the mark is vitiated. The only way to validly grant a licence to 
use a trade mark is for the user to be registered. 
Authority in English law for this approach is the Bowden Wire case 
71. See Webster & Page Trade Marks 221-222 and sections 31 (1 )(a) and 48(4) and (5) of 
the Act. 
72. Per Nicholas J in Adcock-Ingram Laboratories v S A Druggists and anr. 1983(2) SA 
350 (T) 354. In Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd and anr. 1988(3) SA 290 (A) 
316 Nicholas JA observed that the decision in Adcock-Ingram that use of a trade mark 
by a wholly owned subsidiary of the registered proprietor was not use by the 
proprietor might have to be reconsidered. 
(Bowden Wire Ltd v Bowden Brake Co Ltd [1913] 30 RPC 580 (CS); 
[1914] 31 RPC 385 (HL)). 73 
The court, however, favoured the modern approach: 
Jn more recent times, however, starting with Bostitch Trade Mark 
[1963] RPC 183 (Ch), a more lenient view has been taken (see Kerly's 
Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names 12th ed para 13.24 et seq; 
Webster and Page ((op cit at 224 et seq)). It is that, subject to 
certain conditions, the informal licensing of trade marks is permitted. 
it rests on the postulate that, provided a link in the form of a trade 
connection between the proprietor and the goods is maintained, 
deception is avoided and there is, therefore, no loss of distinctiveness. 
The fact that the proprietor controls the quality of the goods on which 
his trade mark is allowed to be used would constitute a sufficient trade 
connection. In this way, the proprietor imposes his identity upon the 
user's product and thus saves it from being fairly regarded as the 
product of another maker. 
This was the approach which the Judge a quo adopted. He stated: 
So long as the proprietor of the trade mark controls the quality of the 
goods on which this trade mark is used by another. rights in the trade 
mark are not vitiated and it matters not . . . whether or not there is a 
formal entry of the use on the register. 
I endorse this statement. Despite the reservations expressed in this 
regard by Webster and Page (op cit at 232), I do not think that s 48 
should be regarded as exhaustive of the circumstances in which the use 
of a trade mark, by someone other than the proprietor, may take 
place. Where there is quality control by the proprietor, providing as it 
does a trade connection, this would be in accordance with the 
definition of a trade mark as contained ins 2(1) of the Act. 74 
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The matter involved, inter alia, use of a trade mark by a 
wholly owned subsidiary in accordance with an 
unregistered arrangement (as was the case in the 
Adcock-Ingram case) . In this regard it was held: 
73. P 729 of the report of the Sportshoe case. 
74. P 729-730 of the report of the Sportshoe case. 
Above all, this Court in Protective Mining & Industrial Equipment 
Systems (Pty) Ltd (formerly Hampo Systems (Pty) Ltd) v Audiolens 
(Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1987 (2) SA 961 (A) would seem to have favoured the 
view that an arrangement between a registered proprietor of a trade 
mark and a party concerned to use such mark does not require to be 
registered; the enquiry is whether the authorised use of the mark is 
such as to deprive it of its very reason of existence, namely, as a mark 
which should distinguish the proprietor's goods from the goods of 
other makers. This is the ratio of Bostitch which (at 989/-990B) is 
referred to by Grosskopf IA with apparent approval. 
I turn then to the factual enquiry as to whether, during the years in 
question, a trade connection, in the form of quality control, was 
maintained between Shoe C01poration and Pep and then later between 
Pepkor and Pep. If it was, the public would, in accordance with the 
principles I have referred to, be taken not to have been deceived and 
the mark would therefore have retained its distinctiveness. 75 
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Clearly, however, it was advisable for licensees to be 
recorded as registered users under the 1963 Act. The 
registered user could then institute an action in own 
name for infringement of the registered trade mark if 
the registered proprietor failed to take action after 
two months' notice by the registered user calling on him 
d 76 h . d f h to o so. Furt ermore, perm1 t te use o t e 
registered trade mark by the registered user was deemed 
to be use by the registered proprietor for all purposes 
77 both under the Act and at common law. This provided a 
defence against removal of the registration for non-use 
under section 36(1) of the Act. 
Finally, it is to be noted that section 48(6) authorised 
the Registrar to refuse to record a registered user 
arrangement if it appeared to him that the grant thereof 
would tend to facilitate trafficking in a trade mark. 
75. P 730-731 of the report of the Sportshoe case. 
76. See section 48(3). 
77. See section 48(2). 
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In the Football World Cup78 case Joffe J granted judicial 
approval to licensing in the form of character 
merchandising of the kind reluctantly eschewed by the 
House of Lords in the Holly Hobbie case. 79 
Character merchandising is defined as being the business of 
merchandising popular names, characters and insignia in order to 
enhance the sales of consumer products in relation to which such 
names and characters are used. 80 
In this fashion judicial 
to the advertising and 
mark. 81 
recognition was accorded also 
selling functions of a trade 
10. THE COURTS AND PROPERTY IN TRADE MARKS 
This paragraph discusses a number of cases decided prior 
to the enactment of the Trade Marks Act No. 194 of 1993 
which reflected upon the establishment and nature of the 
property right to a trade mark in South Africa. 
A number of these cases concerned the claims of a 
foreign party to a mark of which the claimant was a 
proprietor elsewhere than in South Africa after its 
unauthorized adoption in South Africa in connection with 
a local undertaking. 
In the Slenderella case, 82 which provided the authority 
upon which a number of subsequent decisions were based, 
the U.S. corporation (Slenderella) alleged passing-off. 
In order to establish that it had a right of property in 
South Africa which could found a passing-off Slenderella 
adduced evidence that -
78. Federation Internationale de Football and ors. v Bartlett and ors. 1994(4) SA 722(T). 
79. Holly Hobbie TM R.P.C. 329. See also Ex Parte Ziman and ors. 1970(1) SA 164(T). 
80. Per Joffe J at p 736 of the report of the Football World Cup case. 
81. See p 482-485 infra regarding these functions. 
82. Slenderella Systems Inc. of America v Hawkins and anr. 1959(1) SA 519(W). 
10.1 
10.2 
10.3 
10.4 
280 
the name Slenderella had been widely used and become 
distinctive of its business of providing slimming and 
weight-reducing treatments in the U.S.A. and in certain 
other countries (but not in South Africa) ; 
the name Slenderella had appeared in advertisements of 
its treatments in various magazines published outside 
South Africa but widely circulated in this country. 
The evidence also showed that Slenderella -
had registered the trade mark Slenderella in South 
Africa in respect of foodstuffs and paper goods (but no 
serious case for trade mark infringement was made out) ; 
at the date of commencement of the application 
Slenderella had not conducted any business or introduced 
any goods to the South African market. 
The court held against Slenderella as it had, in the 
view of the court, not established the requisite 
goodwill or reputation to found a right of property 
which could be infringed in South Africa. 
The court relied upon the English cases of Robineau83 
and Poiret84 which decided that in order to establish a 
right of property in England a peregrinus did not 
necessarily have 
It 
to 
was 
carry on 
sufficient 
business in 
if the sale of 
that 
his jurisdiction. 
goods there gave rise to a right of property in 
name or goodwill attaching to the goods reputation, 
a 
or 
b . 85 us1ness. 
Williamson J held: 
83. Robineau v Charbonnel 1876 W.N. 160. 
84. Poiret v Jules Poiret Ltd and A.F. Nash [19201 37 R.P.C. 177. 
85. In other words, it was not necessary for the peregrinus to have an undertaking in the 
jurisdiction. A business in the goods concerned was however required. The law in the 
UK developed a less stringent approach over time. See p 184-185 supra and 607-608 
infra. 
In the present case the petitioners, in my view, have wholly failed to 
establish that they have any right of property in South Africa in the 
name "Slenderella" as applied to the carrying on of what has been 
termed "the slenderising business". The fact that they carry on such a 
business in other jurisdictions and that journals or magazines from 
overseas containing their advertisements have perchance been 
circulated in this country and read by persons in this country, cannot 
by itself confer on them any right of property within this country 
cognisable by a Court of law. 86 
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The ST. MICHAEL case87 re-introduced an issue to the line 
of cases involving the trade marks of peregrini which was, 
in my view, to become a significant distraction from the 
proper basis upon which such cases should have been 
brought, namely, the establishment of a protectable right 
(not necessarily in the form of goodwill) within the 
territory of South Africa. The element to which I refer 
is the attack by the peregrinus based upon want of morality 
on the part of the local party in the appropriation of the 
f . k 88 ore1gn mar . 
The trade mark ST MICHAEL was registered by GREATERMAN Is 
in numerous classes in the then Federal Trade Mark 
Registry. 
The mark had, however, been devised by MARKS & SPENCER and 
registered in the United Kingdom as a trade mark for 
clothing during 1928. Thereafter, it had been registered 
in numerous classes both in the United Kingdom and in many 
other countries. 
MARKS & SPENCER had used the mark extensively and it was 
well-known by British immigrants to the then Federation as 
the trade mark of MARKS & SPENCER. GREATERMAN'S, on the 
other hand, was a subsidiary of GREATERMAN'S SOUTH AFRICA 
86. At p 521-522 of the report of the case. This is not to say that advertisements of the kind 
have no relevance, as the discussion of the K Mart case below illustrates. 
87. Greaterman's Stores (Rhodesia) Ltd v Marks & Spencer (Southern Rhodesia) (Pvt) Ltd 
1963 (2) SA 58 (F.C.) (the St. Michael case). 
88. This ground was brushed aside in the Slenderella case (at p 522). 
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which had decided to adopt the mark and register it in 
South Africa in 1943. 
At all relevant times the South African company knew of 
the registration of the mark by MARKS & SPENCER in the 
United Kingdom. 
The Rhodesian subsidiary of the South African company had 
obtained twenty-one registrations of the mark in various 
classes since 1954. At all relevant times this company 
knew of the registration of the trade mark by MARKS & 
SPENCER in the United Kingdom. 
The court found that as at 1954 most British immigrants 
considered the mark to be that of MARKS & SPENCER whilst 
most South African immigrants at the same time associated 
the mark with GREATERMAN'S. 
The court expunged the registration on the basis that use 
of the mark by GREATERMAN' S was likely to cause public 
confusion and deception. 
The court however held that it could not expunge the mark 
on the further ground that the registration was contrary 
to morality because of the manner of adoption of the mark 
by GREATERMAN'S. 89 
During 1963 two judgments considered the nature of the 
right to a trade mark. 
In Rembrandt 
regarded the 
(Edms) Bpk v Gulf Oil Corporation the court 
registered trade 
created by statutory registration. 
mark as a right 
Steyn CJ held: 
in rem 
In terms of sec. 132 (1) read with sec. 4 of the Act, the register of 
trade marks is kept at the trade marks office in Pretoria. That register 
reflects not only the title of a proprietor of a trade mark, but also such 
89. See p 67-68, 75 of the report of the case. 
transactions and proceedings in respect of it as are expressly dealt 
with in the Act. There is provision for renewal of registration (sec. 
128), for removal of a trade mark from the register (secs. 129, 133 
(1), 136), assignment transmission, apportionment and permitted use 
of a trade mark (secs. 130-131 Im), disclaimer (secs. 132(1) (b), 133 
(1) (e)), the striking out of goods or classes of goods from those in 
respect of which a trade mark is registered (sec. 133 (1) (d)), 
alterations of and additions to a trade mark (sec. 134), the expunging 
of wrong entries and the insertion of any exception or limitation 
affecting the registration of a trade mark (sec. 135). After the 
expiration of seven years from the date of registration, the 
registration, in the absence of fraud, becomes conclusive evidence of 
the validity of the registration, and subject to the other provisions of 
the Act, of the proprietor's right to the exclusive use of the trade mark 
(sec. 123(3)). According to sec. 124, registration is a condition 
precedent to proceedings to prevent infringement of a registrable trade 
mark or to recover damages for infringement. It is apparent from 
these provisions that generally speaking, the existence of an exclusive 
right to a trade mark flows from and is dependent upon registration, 
and the nature and extent of such a right is determined by the entries 
in the register. The right to a registered trade mark is effectively 
assigned, transferred, modified, partly divested of its exclusiveness, or 
terminated, by such entries. It follows, I think, that it is situated 
where the register is kept. (Cf. Boyd v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue, 1951 (3) S.A. 525 (A.D.) at p. 533; Lamb v. Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue, 1955 (1) S.A. 270 (A.D.) at p. 278). It is not 
contended that such a right is not a right in rem. 
It is correct, of course, as submitted by counsel for the appellant, that 
the respondent does not claim any right of property or title to the 
appellant's trade mark in respect of the goods in question; but it does 
claim the extinction, by the expungement of the relevant entry, of the 
appellant's exclusive right to this trade mark ex facie the register in 
respect of these goods, i.e. the termination pro tanto of its existing 
right in rem, by the severance from it of so much as relates to these 
goods. This claim cannot be satisfied in any other way than by a 
deletion of the relevant entry in the register, to be effected by the 
Registrar, and is not in the nature of an actio in personam against the 
appellant. 90 
90. Rembrandt Fabrikante en Handelaars (Edms) Bpk v Gulf Oil Corp. 1963(3) SA 
341 (A) 348-349. 
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In the Everglide case91 (which concerned the adoption of 
the trade mark Everglide) the court considered the concept 
of dominium in regard to trade marks. Trollip J held: 
An important object of registering a trade mark is undoubtedly to 
record in the public register the name of the person who is the 
proprietor thereof, and the effect of registration is to corifirm (subject 
to the dejeasance provisions in the Act) the registeree's proprietary 
rights, especially his right to the exclusive use of the trade mark (sec. 
123). This right to exclusive use is, of course, an important incident 
of dominium in respect of all things, but in regard to trade marks it is 
a fundamental characteristic of proprietorship. It is true that sec. 110 
provides that any person "claiming to be proprietor of a trade mark" 
may apply for registration of "his" trade mark. I think that that 
provisions is cast in that form mainly to enable the applicant to apply 
for registration and (if there is no challenge to his title) to obtain 
registration without the Registrar's first having to be satisfied that he 
is actually the proprietor of the trade mark. For this pwpose it is 
sufficient that he merely claims to be the proprietor. But if his 
proprietorship of the trade mark is challenged, either before or after 
registration, then the issue to be determined is whether or not he is or 
was the proprietor in actual fact at the relevant time, the onus of proof 
being on the applicant before registration and on the aggrieved person 
after registration (if. Vitamins Ltd. 's Application. 1955 (3) A.E.R. 
827 at p. 834). 92 
The court went on to say regarding the acquisition of the 
right: 
The usual way in which a person becomes the proprietor is by 
acquiring, inventing or otherwise originating the mark and actually 
using it. It is not clear whether intended user instead of actual user is 
sufficient. Sec. 96 of the Act defines a trade mark as including a mark 
not only used but also "proposed to be used" which seems to indicate 
91. Broadway Pen Corporation and anr. v Wechsler & Co. (Pty) Ltd and ors. 1963(4) 
SA 434(T). 
92. At p 444 of the report of the case. 
that intended user would be sufficient, but that is not beyond doubt 
and I shall merely assume, without deciding, in respondents' favour 
that that is so. 93 
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In regard to ownership of incorporeal rights in relation 
to trade marks the court held: 
Generally, no one can become the owner of any incorporeal right 
without having the necessary animus possidendi and that applies with 
equal force to trade marks (cf. New Atlas Rubber Co. Ltd .. (1918) 35 
R.P.C. 269 at p. 275). Indeed, another way of looking at the matter 
is that without that intention, the mark itself would not be a "trade 
mark" as defined in sec. 96 because it would not be one 
''proposed to be used upon or in connection with goods for the purpose of indicating 
that they are the goods of the proprietor, etc. " 
and it would therefore not be capable of being registered in the name 
of the person claiming proprietorship (if. New Atlas Rubber Co. Ltd .. 
ibid). The fullest and most illustrative application of these principles 
are to be found in cases of the user or intended user of the mark by an 
agent for his principal in regard to which Halsbury, (3rd ed. vol. 38 
para. 891 p. 356), summarises the effect of the numerous cases it cites 
as follows: 
"Registration may also be refused where it is shown that, although the mark has been 
used by the applicant, such use was as agent for some other person, and that the 
mark really indicated the goods of the latter. " 
That, of course, is not confined to cases where the relationship is 
technically and strictly that of principal and agent; it would also apply 
whenever the user or intended user of the mark is for or on behalf of 
another and not exclusively for the benefit of the person using it. 94 
Thus, in the Everglide case, the court regarded the right 
of the proprietor of a registered trade mark - subject to 
the provisions of the Act as an incorporeal right 
capable of ownership and over which the proprietor could 
exercise dominium. In order to do so the necessary animus 
possidendi had to be present. 
93. At p 444 of the report. 
94. At p 445 of the report. 
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I have some discomfort with the attribution of the concept 
of ownership and dominium to incorporeal things in a manner 
akin to the application of those concepts to things. I 
have been led to the conclusion, set out fully in chapter 
16 of this thesis, that the right to a trade mark is an 
independent subjective right with entitlements derived 
from the functions which trade marks perform. This 
construction of the trade mark right is in my view well 
suited to the nature of the property which trade marks 
. 95 
comprise. 
In the Burger King case in the court of the Registrar of 
Trade Marks an attack based on the approach that the local 
adoption of a foreign mark in the particular circumstances 
of the case was tainted with unlawfulness, was upheld. 96 
The case involved inter alia opposition by the BURGER KING 
CORPORATION of the U.S.A. to the registration of the trade 
marks Burger King and Kingsburger in relation to 
hamburgers, sandwiches, bread rolls and related goods by 
WIMPY. 
The U.S.A. corporation had neither registered nor used the 
Burger King trade mark in South Africa and the Registrar 
found that it had not established a reputation in the mark 
in South Africa. Nevertheless, because the managing 
director of WIMPY had known of the reputation of the 
Burger King mark in the United States and had deliberately 
proceeded with the application despite this, the Registrar 
found bad faith and a deliberate misappropriation of the 
Burger King mark by WIMPY. Registration by WIMPY was, 
therefore, denied. (Registration was also denied on other 
grounds namely that WIMPY had sought to register a service 
mark under the guise of a goods mark) . 
This case, in holding that adoption of a foreign mark with 
knowledge of its overseas registration tainted the 
95. Seep 213-215 supra and 515-516, 558-564 infra. 
96. SA Wimpy (Pty) ltd v Burger King Corporation. Patent Journal September 1978. 166. 
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applicant to such a degree that registration was therefore 
to be denied, was not followed. 
However, registration could have been denied a local 
applicant in such circumstances where such conduct would 
have led to public confusion as contemplated by the ST 
MICHAEL case. 97 
A line of cases was, however, developing upon the basis 
provided by the Slenderella case which required a peregrinus 
to prove reputation or goodwill in South Africa in the 
trade mark concerned in local adoption of foreign trade 
mark cases and passing-off cases based upon a foreign mark. 
In Rhodesia, Davies J relied upon the Slenderella case in 
the Pick-'n-Pay case and stated: 
I conclude, therefore, that since the applicant has never traded in this 
country and has acquired no goodwill in this country, it has not 
established a reputation here within the meaning of that word as used 
in passing-off actions, and that accordingly it has no right the relief 
sought. 98 
In the Dallas case99 Van Dijkhorst J referred to this 
principle thus: 
In my view the decisions overwhelmingly support the requirement of a 
reputation or goodwill on the part of a plaintiff in a passing-off action. 
This does not mean that a party will be without relief should he have 
. 100 
no reputation. 
97. Seep 74 of the report of the St. Michael case. 
98. Pick-'n-Pay Stores Ltd v Pick-'n-Pay Suprette (Pvt) Ltd 1973(3) SA 564 (R) 571. 
99. Lorimar Productions Inc v Sterling Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd, Lorimar 
Productions Inc. v OK Hyperama Ltd, Lorimar Productions Inc. v Dallas Restaurant 
1981 (3) SA 1129 (T) (The Dallas case). 
100. P 1139-1140 of the report of the Dallas case. 
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A cogent assessment of the significance of this case is 
provided by Rutherford: 
The case of Lorimar Products Inc v Sterling Clothing Manufacturers 
(Pty) Ltd involved an alleged concealed misappropriation of the 
advertising value in the absence of any confusion of sponsorship, ie the 
products in question were unrelated. The manufacturers of the Dallas 
television series applied for an interdict to restrain respondents from 
using in respect of their business, clothing and other goods any of the 
characters and names such as Dallas, Southfork and JR depicted in the 
Dallas television series. The court first considered whether 
respondent's conduct amounted to passing off. As the applicant could 
not establish that the names and characters had acquired any 
reputation, an interdict was refused. The parties were not competitors 
and the products involved were not related. Therefore there could be 
no question of passing off, unlmeful competition or, for that matter, 
confusion as to sponsorship. Presumably the question which the court 
was actually addressing under the guise of passing off was whether the 
respondent had infringed the plaintiff's right to goodwill by 
misappropriating the advertising value of its names and characters. 
All that the applicant should have been required to prove, was that its 
marks, names or characters had acquired a reputation or advertising 
value in relation to its own products, which reputation has been 
misappropriated and exploited by the respondent. As the applicant 
could not establish the required reputation or advertising value, it is 
submitted that the interdict was correctly refused. 
The court then proceeded to consider whether the respondent's conduct 
amounted to unlmeful competition. As the parties were not 
competitors and there could, therefore, be no question of unlmeful 
competition, one must assume that the question which the court was 
actually considering was whether the applicant had acquired some 
right in the characters and names which was worthy of protection. 
The court then applied the boni mores test for unlmefulness. Various 
factors were taken into account, including the protection already 
afforded by statute and established common law remedies, the ethics of 
the business community concerned, an inherent sense of /airplay and 
honesty, the importance of a free market and strong competition in the 
economy, the question whether the parties were competitors, 
conventions with other countries and the law of the UK and USA. The 
court came to the conclusion that the unauthorised use of the 
applicant's characters and names by the respondent was not contra 
bonos mores. In reaching this conclusion, the court decided by 
implication that the applicant had not established any protectable right 
. . nd h 101 m its names a c aracters. 
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h 102 f . l' h In t e K Mart case a South A rican app icant soug t to 
expunge the K Mart trade mark registrations of the U.S. 
corporation in South Africa on the basis of non-use 
thereof under the 1963 Act. 
I 
The court found that the U.S. corporation had, for many 
years, had an active interest in markets outside the 
U.S.A. (including South Africa) and in establishing 
trading outlets and other business connections in South 
Africa. It had for instance promoted its interests by 
means of extensive advertisement of its goods and services 
in magazines and periodicals which were distributed also 
in South Africa. 
Furthermore, it had actively pursued business connections 
and negotiated the establishment of trading outlets in 
South Africa, it had purchased goods in South Africa and 
had on a few occasions supplied goods to purchasers in 
South Africa who responded to its advertisements. At all 
relevant times the goods advertised were available for 
delivery in South Africa. 
The court found that the U.S. corporation had used its 
trade mark during its communications with certain South 
African companies and, during the promotion and 
advertisement of its business services and goods, had used 
the trade mark K Mart in respect of all the services and 
goods covered by its registrations. 
101. Rutherford - Misappropriation of the advertising value of trade marks, trade names and 
service marks - in Neethling (ed) Onregmatige Mededinging 55-69 62-63. 
102. K Mart (Pty) Ltd v K Mart Corporation TPD 15 December 1987 (unreported) (the K Mart 
case). 
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Further use of the trade mark was found in correspondence 
with interested parties in South Africa, in representative 
samples of its private label merchandise in other 
catalogues, and in pricelists distributed in South Africa 
and the offer for sale of certain goods here. The court 
agreed with the proposition that where a registered 
proprietor commences a series of advertisements featuring 
a mark as part of an introductory campaign prior to 
putting goods on the market under the mark and before they 
were actually on the market, such use was use of the trade 
mark in the course of trade. The court held that such use 
was sufficient to refuse expungement of the marks. 103 
Although the court was testing for use to defeat an 
expungement application on the basis of non-use and not 
for use establishing a right of property, it is notable 
that a limited measure of peripheral use of the mark 
coupled with minimal actual trading activity and the 
intention to establish trading outlets 
South Africa was held to confirm the 
registered trade mark rights. 
in the future in 
validity of the 
The Ruffles case 104 was an application for an interdict 
based on passing-off and unlawful competition by PEPSICO 
to restrain the Respondent from using the name Ruffles in 
relation to snack foods in general and potato chips in 
particular. The facts were the following: 
PEPSICO had presented a new type of potato chip to members 
of the snack food trade which they proposed to market 
under the name Ruffles in South Africa. 
The Ruffles brand was one of the largest selling brands of 
potato chips in the U.S.A. and elsewhere. 
The Respondent obtained knowledge of the imminent public 
103. Seep 22 of the typed report of the judgment of Eloff Dep. JP. 
104. Pepsico Inc and ors. v United Tobacco Co Ltd 1988(2) SA 334 (W). 
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launch of the chip in South Africa by PEPSICO and 
immediately entered the market ahead of PEPSICO with a 
similar chip named Ruffles. 
The court held that al though a product could only have a 
reputation if it had entered the market in the territory, 
there was sufficient proof of such a reputation of the 
mark in South Africa because South African traders were 
well aware of its international reputation by virtue of 
the PEPSICO presentations already mentioned. 
It did not matter in these circumstances that the product 
had not gone through to the final consumer as the mark had 
become associated with the product in South Africa. A 
reputation had been acquired by demonstration. 
off had taken place. 105 
A passing 
Although, in my view, the decision was in need of testing 
on appeal it serves to show a willingness on the part of 
some courts to find the presence of the requisite 
reputation where the court's sense of justice appears to 
require it. In the Ruffles case the court found sharp 
. . . 1 f 1 . . 106 practice constituting un aw u competition. 
In the Tie Rack case, 107 a United Kingdom applicant for 
relief had successfully established the business of 
selling men's ties and other clothing accessories in well 
located outlets in London and this business had been 
extended to other cities in England, North America, Europe 
and Australia. The business was conducted under the sign 
Tie Rack and a distinctive logo had been devised for its 
shops. 
No such business was conducted in South Africa, however, 
and the applicant had no plans to extend its business to 
South Africa. Nevertheless, the shops were well-known to 
many South Africans who travelled overseas. 
105. See p 350 of the report of the case. 
106. See p 349 of the report. 
107. Tie Rack pie v Tie Rack Stores (Pty) Ltd and anr 1989(4) SA 427(T). 
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The trade mark Tie Rack was registered in South Africa by 
a South African company during 1985 and these rights were 
subsequently assigned to the Respondent in the case during 
1987. 
The Respondent commenced business under the name Tie Rack 
in South Africa and an artist was instructed to design a 
logo for the Respondent business. The artist was 
furnished with one of the Applicant's carrier bags as an 
indication of the kind of logo that the Respondent had in 
mind. What resulted was a logo very similar to that of 
the Applicant. 
The Applicant sought relief on the basis of passing-off, 
unlawful competition generally, expungement of the 
Respondent's trade mark registration and copyright 
infringement. 
The court held that copying is not . ff 108 pass1ng-o . 
Furthermore, as the Respondent had never traded in South 
Africa it had no goodwill in this country. Thus, as no 
assailement of goodwill had been established the 
passing-off claim failed. 109 The Slenderella case was 
applied. 11 O 
That many people in South Africa might know of the 
Applicant's business abroad and may have been misled into 
believing that the Respondent's shops were in some way 
associated with the United Kingdom operation did not 
afford the Applicant a proprietary right in South Africa. 
The Applicant had no business of any kind in South Africa 
and nothing the First Respondent had done or was likely to 
do could harm the Applicant in a patrimonial sense in 
S h f . 111 out A r1ca. 
108. P 441 of the report of the case. 
1 09. P 445 of the report. 
110. See p 443-445 of the report. 
111 . P 445 of the report. 
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Similarly, the claim based on unlawful competition failed. 
The parties had never been in competition since the 
Applicant had no business in South Africa and had no 
. . f d . b . . h' 112 intention o oing usiness in t is country. 
The trade mark registration was challenged on the basis 
that the Respondents were not the proprietors of the trade 
mark within the meaning of the 1963 Act. In the view of 
the court an applicant could rightly claim to be the 
common law proprietor of a trade mark if he originated, 
acquired or adopted it and either had used it to the 
extent that it had gained a reputation as connecting the 
goods in relation to which it was used to the claimant, 
or, if the mark had not been used at all or to the 
aforegoing extent, that the claimant proposed to use it. 
As trade marks operate on a territorial basis the use 
contemplated must, therefore, have been use within the 
. . 1 b d . f h f . 113 territoria oun aries o Sout A rica. 
An applicant for a trade mark could be regarded as the 
author of the trade mark in South Africa even if he had 
copied 
goods 
or selected or adopted it in respect of 
from a trade mark registered and used 
certain 
even 
extensively - in respect of the same goods in a foreign 
country. The only proviso would be that there must have 
been no prior use of the trade mark by the overseas party 
. s h f . 114 in out A rica. 
As in the instant case there had been no use of the mark 
by the United Kingdom company in South Africa, it could 
not, the court held, attack the registrant's 
. h. 115 proprietors ip. 
Other attacks on the registration based on allegations of 
trafficking, public deception and confusion, want of a bona 
112. P 445-446 of the report. 
113. P 446 of the report. 
114. P 44 7 of the report. 
115. P 447 of the report. 
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fide intention to use the mark on the part of the original 
applicants and a specific attack on the registration of 
the mark in class 42 failed. 116 
The court did, however, hold for the Applicant on the 
basis of an infringement of copyright. 117 
In the 
settled 
Victoria's 
the law 
118 Secret case the Appellate Division 
under the 1963 Act relating to the 
appropriation of foreign trade marks. Nicolas A J A held 
regarding proprietorship of trade marks under the Act: 
By the words "claiming to be the proprietor of a trade mark" in 
s. 20(1) is meant "asserting a claim to be the proprietor of a trade 
mark". The word ''proprietor" (which is not defined in the Act) is not 
here used in relation to a common law right of property. Nor does it 
import ownership of the "mark" as such. 119 
It was also stated: 
In terms of s 20(1) one can claim to be the proprietor of a trade mark 
if one has appropriated a mark for use in relation to goods or services 
for the purpose stated, and so used it. (I use the verb appropriate in its 
meaning of 'to take for one's own'. It is a compendious expression 
which comprehends the words favoured by Mr Trollip in the Moorgate 
judgment, namely originate. acquire and adopt.) 
Section 20(1) applies not only to a person claiming to be the 
proprietor of a trade mark used by him, but also to a person claiming 
to be the proprietor of a trade mark proposed to be used by him. 1 20 
Registration and extensive use of a trade mark in a 
country outside of South Africa did not in itself 
constitute a bar to its adoption and registration by some 
116. See p 447-449 of the report. 
11 7. P 449-450 of the report. 
118. Victoria's Secret Inc v Edgars Stores Ltd 1994(3) SA 739(A). 
119. At p 744 of the report of the case. 
120. At p 744-745 of the report. See Moorgate Tobacco Company Limited v Philip Morris Inc. 
R.T.M. 21 May 1988. 
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other person in South Africa. That copying of this kind 
was regarded by some as being morally reprehensible did 
not affect the issue. There was no legal bar to the 
adoption of a foreign trade mark in South Africa in 
relation to which no one else had asserted a similar right 
' h ' 121 in t e territory. 
Where, however, the adoption of the foreign trade mark is 
"attended by something more" such as dishonesty, breach of 
confidence, sharp practice and the like, which vitiated or 
tainted the right or title to proprietorship, a different 
1 ' h b ' 122 resu t mig t o tain. 
The court declined to relinquish the territoriality 
principle in order to rely upon a reputation established 
by the Applicant in the U.S.A. which, on the facts, had no 
counterpart in South Africa. The Applicant had not 
established that the mark was well known or had 
established the requisite degree of reputation in the 
trade mark in South Africa to obtain relief. 123 
Thus, in all cases involving disputes concerning foreign 
trade marks whether in regard to the true proprietorship 
thereof or in situations of passing-off or unlawful 
competition an essential question is whether the peregrinus 
has an established right to the trade mark in the 
territory of South Africa. 
The enquiry into this question in the cases has been 
largely limited to whether the peregrinus has a reputation 
or goodwill in the mark in South Africa. 
In the McDonald's case Southwood J 124 held in relation to 
the passing-off aspect of the matter: 
121. P745-746ofthereport. 
122. Seep 747 of the report. 
123. P 748, 755 of the report. 
124. McDonald's Corporation v Joburgers Driver-Inn Restaurant (Pty) Ltd and anr; Dax Prop CC 
v McDonald's Corporation and anr; McDonald's Corporation v Joburgers Drive-Inn 
Restaurant (Pty) Ltd and Dax Prop CC as yet unreported TPD judgment dated 5 October 
1995, 102-103 (henceforth the McDonald's case). 
McDONALD'S has to prove not only that it has acquired a reputation 
in South Africa but that it has a goodwill in South Africa (Slenderella 
Systems Inc of America v Hawkins 1959 1 SA 519(2) at 521A-522E; 
Pick 'n Pay Stores Limited v Pick 'n Pay Suprette (Pvt) Limited 1973 3 
SA 564(R) at 566A-571H; 1974 1 SA 597(RA) at 600A; Tie Rack plc v 
Tie Rack Stores (Pty) Limited 1989 4 SA 427(T) at 442F-445D; 
Haggar Company v SA Taylor's Craft (Pty) Limited 1985 4 SA 569(T) 
at 574B-C; Lorimar Productions Inc v Sterling Clothing Manufacturers 
(Pty) Limited 1981 3 SA 1129(T) at 1139E-1140A; Hy_perama (Pty) 
Limited v OK Bazaars (]020 Limited unreported judgment, Lesotho 
Court of Appeal case number 20188 (12 June 1990); Philip Morris Inc 
v Marlboro Shirt Co SA Limited supra at 732G-733C. Goodwill is 
incapable of subsisting by itself. It has no independent existence apart 
from the business to which it is attached. In the case of perigrini, it 
has been held that it is not necessary that the peregrinus should 
actually carry on business in South Africa. As appears from the 
judgments quoted the minimum requirements for protection of a 
peregrinus against passing off in South Africa are first, the selling or 
marketing of his goods or services in the Republic and second, the 
acquisition of a reputation. McDONALD'S has not done business in 
South Africa nor have any of its goods or services been offered for sale 
in South Africa. McDONALD'S therefore has no goodwill in South 
Africa. With regard to the question of a requirement of reputation this 
must extend to a substantial number of members of the public (Adcock 
Ingram Products Limited v Beechams SA (Pty) Limited 1977 4 SA 
434(W) at 436H-437A. I have already found that McDONALD'S has 
not established that it has such a reputation in South Africa. 
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It appears to me that the commixure often apparent between 
the concepts of "reputation" and "goodwill" can exclude 
peregrini from relief where a basis for relief might indeed 
be present. In my view, reputation in relation to trade 
marks is indicative of the possibility that a trade mark 
has acquired distinctiveness in a territory whilst the 
presence of goodwill in relation to the mark indicates 
that the trade mark has taken on a particular attractive 
force (goodwill) in the territory indicating the presence 
of a business in relation to the mark in the territory. 
The crucial question is whether the presence of a 
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reputation alone in a territory is able to establish a 
right to the trade mark there for the existence of which a 
business in the mark in the territory to which goodwill 
has accrued is not prerequisite. 
In the Delta case Curlewis J 125 said: 
A person can obtain a reputation in a name, and, if he does so, it 
becomes property in his hands and he can protect it. What is 
protected is not the name, since there is no monopoly in a name, but 
the goodwill which is attached to that name. The reputation is this, 
that the public associate the name with the plaintiff's business or 
goods. In regard to 'goods', this means that the public when it sees 
the name used in relation to goods, believe that the goods come from a 
particular source. In the case of a business, it means that the public 
identify the plaintiff's business by that name or a particular business 
by that name, even though they do not know the plaintiff's full name. 
The concepts of goodwill and reputation are not, however, 
congruent. Goodwill is not merely a particular quantum of 
reputation. 126 The distinction is aptly drawn by Wadlow: 
Goodwill as a form of legal property is to be distinguished from 
reputation, which is a matter of fact. The two are very closely related 
and a business with goodwill (at least in the sense in which it is used 
in passing-off) can hardly fail to have a reputation. The converse, 
however, is not true, and the existence of a reputation associated with 
a person, product, name or mark does not necessarily imply the 
existence of goodwill: "[T]hat, as it seems to me, is to confuse 
goodwill, which cannot exist in a vacuum, with mere reputation which 
may, no doubt, and frequently does, exist without any supporting local 
business, but which does not by itself constitute a property which the 
law protects." 
Reputation can be relevant to the passing-off action in three respects. 
The most important is that proof of misrepresentation often turns on 
the reputation of the plaintiff's mark in the sense of its being 
125. Delta SA (Pty) Ltd and anr. v Delta Motor Corporation) (Pty) Ltd 29 April 1987 
(unreported) at p 2 of the typed judgment. 
126. See the discussion regarding goodwill at p 170-187 supra. 
recognised as distinctive by a sufficiently large proportion of the 
public. The other two are that the plaintiff's reputation, in a 
somewhat different sense, will suffer if the goods passed off by the 
defendant are inferior; and that the existence of reputation may go 
some way to proving the existence of goodwill. It is unfortunately not 
uncommon to find the word "reputation" used interchangeably in the 
various senses of widespread repute, perceived high quality, 
distinctiveness, and goodwill in the strict sense. Likewise "goodwill" 
. >ft d h . . . 127 is o en use w en reputation m some sense is meant. 
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It is my thesis that there is an independent right to the 
trade mark as a distinguishing sign which is in the nature 
of a subjective right with entitlements derived from the 
functions of the trade mark. The trade mark as the object 
of this subjective 
connected with its 
right exhibits a range 
functions in relation to 
of values 
which the 
value of distinction (which means that the trade mark 
functions to distinguish between enterprises or between 
the product of different enterprises) is both invariable 
and characteristic. The presence of goodwill related 
values which are not a sine qua non for the existence of the 
trade mark and which may or may not be present in 
connection with a particular trade mark (in a particular 
territory for example) is a question of fact. It follows 
that a mark with a reputation in a part'icular territory 
might have taken on the value of distinction there as a 
consequence of its reputation. In this instance, in my 
view, the trade mark right is present in the territory and 
can be infringed. The absence of goodwill in a particular 
territory does not vitiate a trade mark with a reputation 
which has rendered it distinctive there. The matter is 
127. Wadlow Passing Off (2nd ed) 50. The words quoted in the text are per Oliver L.J. in 
Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejoricky Budvar N.P. [19841 F.S.R. 413. See also p 183-184 
supra regarding goodwill and reputation. My comments relate to the establishment of the 
presence of a trade mark right and not to the requirements for passing off. See further 
Hyperama (Pty) Ltd v OK Bazaars (1929) Limited (Lesotho Court of Appeal, case no. 
28/88, 12 June 1 990) (unreported) and the leading Australian case of Conagra v Mc Cain 
Foods (1992) 23 l.P.R. 193 (FA) where the reputation of a peregrine's mark was found to 
be sufficient for a passing off without the presence of goodwill. See further Wadlow 
Passing Off (2nd ed) 98-99. 
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f d . . . d d . 11 128 one o ist1nct1on an not of goo w1 . 
The question then arises: if there is no business in the 
territory to what does the distinction relate? The 
answer is to the enterprise which is well known or famous 
in the territory to the degree that the trade mark is 
associated in the public mind with the peregrinus in the 
territory and can distinguish the enterprise or product of 
the peregrinus from the local adversary or its products. 
This is not to say that the enquiry is then completed if 
the peregrinus alleges a common law wrong. The evidence 
must satisfy all the elements of delictual liability - and 
damage or prejudice in particular - in order for relief to 
be obtained. 
11. IN SUM 
The substantial influence of the law of the United Kingdom 
and the 1938 UK Act upon the South African law of trade 
marks and the 1963 SA Act is well established. The 
underlying principles of the United Kingdom trade mark law 
underpinned the statutory and common law of trade marks in 
South Africa prior to the enactment of the Trade Marks Act 
No. 194 of 1993. 
The South African legislature, with the benefit of 
hindsight and the input of the Chowles committee, was able 
to avoid some of the obscurities of the 1938 UK Act 
especially in regard to the infringement provision relating 
128. Reference to the likelihood of association test in Benelux law is particularly instructive in 
this regard (see p 612-616 infra). It will be indicated that Benelux law was a significant 
influence in the formulation of the EC Directive regarding trade marks. The Directive, in 
turn, has determined the innovations of the Trade Marks Act No 194 of 1993 to a 
significant degree. See p 338-340 infra regarding the Regulation. See also Van Heerden 
& Neethling Unlawful Competition 1 80-1 83; The essence of the trade mark is its 
distinctiveness. It would be extraordinary not to attribute a protectable value, i.e. the 
value of distinction, to its essence. Not to do so would also deny protection to the 
essential and invariable trade mark function, the distinguishing function (see p 498-500 
infra). In this instance it is the distinctiveness of the trade mark, from which its 
distinguishing value/value of distinction derives, which is protected - not the repute which 
evidences it. 
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to use of an infringing mark otherwise than a trade mark, 
service marks, the definition of trade marks and certain 
aspects of the registrability provisions 
provisions presenting bars to registration. 
and the 
The territorial nature of trade marks was firmly 
maintained and limited conceptions of the nature of the 
right to a trade mark derived from common law concepts 
relating to passing off largely denied protection to the 
trade mark peregrini. The concept of an independent right 
to a trade mark in South Africa derivable from the civil 
law heritage of the South African legal system had not 
established itself by the time of the enactment of the 
1993 SA Act. 
In the part that follows I deal with the interposition in 
the United Kingdom and South Africa of European trade mark 
law in the form of EC trade mark law which, I subsequently 
suggest, has provided an opportunity for South African 
trade mark law to develop more flexible solutions and 
justifiable extended protection to trade marks derived 
from concepts of its own legal system, modern trade mark 
law in Europe, new developments in the United Kingdom and 
comparative references to the trade mark laws of the 
U.S.A .. 
PART4 
THE INTERPOSITION OF THEE C 
301 
CHAPTER 12 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
Fundamental changes to the trade mark law of the United 
Kingdom were brought about when it fulfilled its 
obligations to harmonise its trade mark law with other 
member states of the European Community (EC) under 
Council Directive 89/104/EEC1 by means of the enactment 
of the Trade Marks Act, 1994. 2 
Essentially, a reception of EC trade mark law has taken 
place in the United Kingdom through the medium of the 
Directive and a similar reception is anticipated 
degree in South Africa under the Trade Marks Act, 
which followed upon the Trade Marks Bill. 4 
to a 
1993 3 
Generally speaking South African trade mark lawyers are 
not familiar with the basic concepts of the EC and its 
policies and legal system which provide the background 
to Directive 89/104/EEC. 
This Part therefore deals with relevant aspects of EC 
law and policy in general and with the trade mark law of 
the EC in relation thereto in order that the reception 
of EC trade mark law in the United Kingdom and its 
immediate and prospective influence upon the law of 
trade marks in South Africa might be regarded in proper 
perspective. 
1 . First Council Directive of 21 December 1 988 to approximate the laws of the Member 
States relating to trade marks (89/104/EEC) OJ L 40/1 of 11 February 1989 (hereafter 
referred to as "the Directive"). 
2. The Trade Marks Act, 1994 which came into force on 31 October 1994. 
3. Trade Marks Act No 194 of 1993. 
4. Trade Marks Bill [8178-93 (GA)]. 
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This is essential because policy considerations 
particular to the EC have required the United Kingdom to 
harmonise its trade mark laws with other Member States 
of the EC so as to implement the freedoms and policies 
of the internal market. 5 
The legal and policy arrangements applicable to the 
internal market of the EC have no direct connection with 
the law of South Africa. Insofar as the new trade mark 
legislation incorporates rules of trade mark law derived 
from that system into the law of trade marks in South 
Africa, it becomes necessary to distinguish between 
those rules of EC trade mark law which meet the 
particular requirements of the internal market and serve 
to advance EC freedoms and policy, and those which are 
less particular and which are able to serve the call for 
modernisation and harmonisation of the trade mark laws 
of South Africa with other modern systems in order to 
give effect to the developing functions of the modern 
trade mark. 
This chapter proceeds with a brief and general overview 
of the EC and those aspects of its policy which are 
relevant to trade mark law. In the next chapter 
specific attention is afforded to the particular: trade 
mark law under the Directive, the Regulation on the 
Community trade mark, 6 the Protocol to the Madrid 
Arrangement and the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Justice. 7 
The nature of Community law must be constantly borne in 
mind. It is a complex sui generis system law - a separate 
legal order - in a perpetual state of flux and 
5. See p 331-332 infra. 
6. Council Regulation of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (EC No 40/94) 
OJ L 11 /37 of 14 January 1994 (hereafter referred to as "the Regulation"). 
7. The Protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement concerning the International 
Registration of Marks of 28 June 1989. 
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development which serves the needs of a supra-national 
organisation of Member States advancing towards full 
political and economic integration in the face of 
numerous obstacles and national reservations. 8 
1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EC 
1.1 The University Speeches 
The EC is rooted in the devastation visited upon Europe 
during the second world war. On 19 September 1946, 
Winston Churchill in a speech at Zurich University 
called for a sovereign remedy to resolve still extant 
antagonisms in Europe - a remedy which would re-create 
the European family and build "a kind of United States 
of Europe". The first step would be a partnership 
between France and Germany. 9 Soviet Russia was seen as 
a potential partner. This led to the foundation of a 
number of intergovernmental organisations - the Council 
of Europe (1949), The European Convention on Human 
Rights (1950), The Brussels Treaty Organisation (1948) 
and the Western European Union (1956) . 10 
In a speech at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, 
General Marshall the U.S.A. Secretary of State proposed 
substantial American aid for Europe - provided European 
countries would join together for the purpose of 
preparing a co-ordinated programme for its utilisation. 
The of fer was accepted and the intergovernmental 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) 
comprising most European countries, but excluding Russia 
and its Eastern European satellites, was founded in 1948 
to implement the Marshall plan. 11 
8. See Hartley Foundations EC Law 85-86; Mathijsen Community Law 304-305. 
9. See Gilbert Churchi/1872-873; Mathijsen Community Law 6. 
10. See Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P 1-P 2. 
11. Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P 2; Mathijsen Community Law 6. 
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1.2 The ECSC 
Franco-German rivalry and tension concerning coal and 
steel in the Saar and the Ruhr led Robert Schuman the 
Franch Foreign Minister to propose on 9 May 1950 that 
France and Germany place their iron and steel industries 
under a joint High Authority with supra-national 
character as the first stage of European federation. 
Other European nations were invited to join the 
12 
arrangement. 
This led to the conclusion of the ECSC Treaty (the 
Treaty of Paris) which was signed on 18 April 1951 and 
which came into force during September 1952. The treaty 
established the European Coal and Steel Community in 
order to direct and control output, markets, supply and 
demand of coal and steel in the member states. 
Substantively, the treaty set up a common market in coal 
and steel by eliminating customs duties and other trade 
restriction thereon and facilitating the movement of 
workers in the specialised fields of coal and steel in 
Member States. It was provided that the ECSC was to be 
financed through levies on member states in coal and 
steel production and the institutions of this Community 
were vested with powers to borrow and lend monies on 
capital markets with a view to reconstruction and 
modernisation of the coal and steel industries in Member 
States. 13 
The Treaty created four institutions to oversee the ECSC 
namely the High Authority, Common Assembly, the Special 
Council of Ministers and the Court of Justice. 14 
The preamble to the Treaty of Paris made it clear that 
integration in the narrow but highly significant area of 
12. See Mathijsen Community Law 6-7; Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P 3. 
13. See Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P 4; Medhurst Guide to EC Law 3. 
14. A fifth Institution - the Court of Auditors - was added by the Union Treaty 
subsequently: see p 320 infra. 
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coal and steel was chosen as a first endeavour to avoid 
future European conflict. The time was not opportune 
for more ambitious projects but the way towards a shared 
European destiny was left open. 15 
1.3 Euratom and the EEC 
Whereas the Korean war had added momentum to the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, the end of the war on 
27 July 1953 preceded by the death of Stalin on 5 March 
1953 diminished the perceived need in Europe for joint 
action. This, coupled with reasserted notions of 
national sovereignty prevented the establishment of a 
European Defence Community and a European Political 
C . h . 16 ommunity at t at time. 
Undaunted, the Benelux proposed a less expansive step to 
political and defense community to its ECSC partners 
during 1955. A "common market", analogous to that in 
coal and steel but extending to all goods was suggested. 
Despite that France was inclined towards integration 
only in certain specific sectors the Treaties of Rome 
were concluded on 25 March 1957 with effect from 1 
January 1958. This was pursuant to the "Spaak report" 
fallowing upon a meeting Foreign Ministers at Messina 
during June 1955 and subsequent negotiations amongst the 
Member States of the ECSc. 17 
The Treaties of Rome were modelled largely on the ECSC. 
It was the stated intention of Euratom to contribute to 
the raising of the standard of living in Member States by 
15. See Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P 3. 
16. See Mathijsen Community Law 7-8 and Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P 4-P 5. 
17. The Euratom Treaty (Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 25 
March 1957) and the EEC Treaty (Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community 25 March 1957). See Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P 5, Mathijsen 
Community Law 7-8 and Lasok & Bridge Law and Institutions: EC 14-1 7. 
306 
creating conditions necessary for the establishment and 
growth of nuclear industries. Articles 92 to 106 set up 
a nuclear common market. 18 
The EEC Treaty contemplated a market in which goods, 
persons and capital could move freely without government 
bars in the nature of customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions and private barriers such as restricted 
trade practises, intruding. It extended the common 
market concept to all goods and services (excluding coal 
and steel and nuclear products for which the ECSC and 
Euratom provided) . 19 
1. 4 The EC Treaty20 
The EC Treaty is drafted in simple language according to 
continental European practice. It comprises six Parts, 
sub-divided into Titles, Chapters, Sections and 
Articles. No elaborate definition of terms appear as in 
British and South African legislation and its articles, 
sub-sections, paragraphs and sentences are short. 21 
In the following review only those provisions of the EC 
Treaty which are of relevance to the substance of this 
work are mentioned. 
The preamble to the treaty contemplates the foundation 
of a closer union amongst the peoples of Europe, 
economic progress through action to eliminate barriers 
1 8. Mathijsen Community Law 8. 
1 9. Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P 7. 
20. The EEC Treaty - also referred to as the Treaty of Rome (singular) - was amended in 
important respects by the Single European Act (see p 309-31 0 infra) and extensively 
remodelled by the Union Treaty (see p 312-313 infra) which also changed the name of 
the EEC to the European Community (EC). In the discussions which follow references 
to Parts, Titles and Articles will refer to the Treaty as amended. 
21. Medhurst Guide to EC Law 5. 
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which divide 
conditions and 
Europe, the improvement of living 
the abolition of restrictions upon 
international trade. 
Part I (Articles 1 - 7c) deals with general principles. 
Article 3 contemplates the establishment of the common 
market inter alia through the elimination between Member 
States of customs duties and quantitative restrictions 
upon the import and export of goods, a common commercial 
policy, an internal market characterised by abolition of 
obstacles thereto, freedoms of movement, a common policy 
on agriculture and transport and by ensuring competition 
. d' d 22 1s not 1storte . 
Part III 
policies. 
(Articles 
Title I 
9 130y) 
(Articles 9 
deals 
37) 
with community 
concerns free 
movement of goods. Article 30 prohibits quantitative 
restrictions. Title V deals with competition and 
contains Article 85 which prohibits as incompatible 
with the Common Market those agreements which restrict 
or distort competition within the Community and 
Article 86 which prohibits abuses via a dominant 
position in the market. Part V deals with the 
institutions of the Community and makes detailed 
provisions for the powers and constitution of the 
Institutions in Articles 137 - 192. Article 189 deals 
with the various subsidiary forms of legislation within 
the Community, namely, regulations, directives and 
d . . 23 ec1s1ons. 
In sum, from the point of view of the law of the economy 
the Treaty establishes four freedoms of movement, 
namely, goods, persons, services and capital, and 
establishes common policies for agriculture, fisheries, 
transport and commerce. 
22. Medhurst Guide to EC Law 5-7; Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P 8-P 9. 
23. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 8-9. 
308 
1.5 Further Developments 
A number of steps in the unification process have been 
taken subsequent to the conclusion of the Treaty. The 
Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the 
European Communities signed on 25 March 1957 merged the 
Assembly (now the European Parliament) the Court of 
Justice and the Economic and Social Committees of the 
. . . 24 
various communities. 
A Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single 
Commission of the European Communities (also known as 
the Merger Treaty) was signed on 8 April 1965 and came 
into force 1 September 1967. 25 The Customs Union on 
which completely abolished tariff and quota restrictions 
between Member States and replaced national external 
tariffs with a common external tariff became fully 
26 
operative by 1 July 1968. 
On 1 January 1971 the Community's Own Resources replaced 
financial contributions from Member States. This 
rendered the community financially independent to a 
large degree. 27 
The Member States in Council on 20 September 1976 agreed 
upon conditions for direct elections. An act giving 
effect thereto which was subsequently ratified by all 
Member States was signed and the first Community 
elections giving the European Community democratic 
legitimacy followed during June 1979. 28 
On 19 June 1983 ten Heads of State and Government of 
24. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 8-9. 
25. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 8-9; Mathijsen Community Law 8. 
26. Mathijsen Community Law 9; Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P11 P 11. 
27. Mathijsen Community Law 9; Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P 12. 
28. Act concerning the Election of the Representatives of the Assembly by Direct Universal 
Sufferage OJ 1976 L 278/1 . See Mathijsen Community Law 11 . 
309 
Member States signed the Solemn Declaration on European 
Union expressing a determination to achieve European 
U . 29 h . . . n1on. T en, during June 1985, the Commission 
published a Paper entitled "Completion of the Internal 
Market" proposing that this should be achieved by 1992. 
The document set a programme and time-table for the 
abolition of barriers of all kinds in inter-state trade, 
harmonisation of rules, approximation of tax structures, 
the strengthening of monetary co-operation between 
Member States and the removal of physical, fiscal and 
technical barriers between them. This led to sign~ture 
of the treaty known as the Single European Act. 30 
1. 6 The Single European Act31 
This treaty was signed at Luxembourg on 17 February 1986 
and at The Hague on 28 February 1986 and came into force 
on 1 July 1987. 
The underlying philosophy of the Treaty is to be found 
in the first paragraph of its preamble, namely to 
initiate a change in the relations between Member States 
towards a European Union. The prime object of the 
Treaty was to provide an accelerated programme to render 
the internal market contemplated by Article 7a 
(previously 8a) of the EC Treaty an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured. 
The Treaty made extensive amendments to the basic 
community legislation including provisions affording the 
29. Mathijsen Community Law 12. 
30. See Mathijsen Community Law 12-13. 
31. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 10-11; Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P 26-P 27; 
Mathijsen Community Law 13. 
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European Parliament greater influence over the Community 
legislative process, albeit by a complicated means, and 
the creation of a Court of First Instance attached to 
the European Court of Justice to deal with competition 
and staff cases particularly. 
Article 2 created the European Council bringing 
together the Heads of Government of Member States at 
least twice a year - formalising the regular meetings of 
this kind which were already taking place. 
1. 7 The United Kingdom and the Ec32 
At the time of the conclusion of the Treaties of Rome 
notions that the Communities would pose a threat to 
Parliamentary sovereignty and trade commitments to the 
Commonwealth prevented the United Kingdom from 
participating therein. 
The United Kingdom eventually acceded to the EC under 
the first accession treaty signed on 22 January 1972. 
This treaty was ratified by the United Kingdom on 18 
October 1972. 33 
The United Kingdom joined the EC under the European 
Communities Act, 1972 on 1 January 1973. Under section 
32. See Smit & Herzog Laws of the EEC P 6, P 12, P 29; Mathijsen Community Law 
10-12. The first Member States of the EC were France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy. The following countries were known as the outer 
seven: United Kingdom, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden. The United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Greece, Spain and Portugal 
have since acceded to the EC Treaty. Sweden, Finland and Austria acceded to the EU 
during 1995 whilst the accession of Norway is pending and Turkey has applied to join. 
33. The Treaty concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the 
Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
Norway did not ratify the Treaty. 
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2 (1) of this Act the system of law arising out of the 
Community treaties was introduced to the United Kingdom. 
The subsection provides: 
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from 
time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such 
remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or under 
the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further 
enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall 
be recognised and available in law, and be mforced, allowed and 
followed accordingly; and the expression "enforceable Community 
right" and similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to 
which this subsection applies. 
Under section 2(2) of the Act, Ministers or Departments 
are enabled to make regulations for the purpose of 
implementing any Community obligation. Subordinate 
legislation made under section 2 (2) to implement 
Community obligations can be used to repeal or amend any 
provisions of an Act of Parliament which are 
incompatible with Community law, subject however to 
specific limitations on this power defined in Schedule 2 
to the Act. 34 Implementation of Community law by means 
of subordinate legislation under section 2 (2) must be 
done either by Order in Council or by Regulation made by 
a Minister or department designated for this purpose by 
Order in Council. In both cases the measure must be in 
the form of a Statutory instrument and must be approved 
b 1 . 35 y Par iament. 
1.8 The EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION (EMU) 
34. See Lasok & Bridge Law and Institutions: EC 416. 
35. Hartley Foundations EC Law 240. 
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Pursuant to a European Counci136 held at Hannover on 28 
and 29 June 1988, a Committee was appointed (the Delors 
Committee) to make proposals for closer economic and 
monetary co-operation within the EC. The report of this 
committee proposed a system of currencies with permanent 
exchange rates leading ultimately to a single community 
currency. Again perceiving a threat to its sovereignty 
the United Kingdom objected to the report. 
Nevertheless, there is a determination to proceed to 
Economic and Monetary Union in the Community circles 
which has support in some quarters in the United 
. d 1 37 King om, a so. 
1. 9 The Union Treaty 
The Treaty on European Union38 was signed at Maastricht 
on 7 February 1992 pursuant to a meeting of the European 
Council there on 9 - 11 December 1991. The Treaty came 
into effect on 1 November 1993 after ratification by all 
Member States. 
From the perspective of policy the Member States 
resolved to establish an economic and monetary union 
with a single currency and a citizenship common to 
nationals of member countries. The European Union was 
established39 with the objectives of promoting 
sustainable economic progress, protection of the rights 
of nationals through citizenship of the Union, 
development of close co-operation on justice and home 
36. The European Council is a meeting of the Heads of State or Government of Member 
States and the President of the Commission. Of uncertain constitutional status within 
the EC the European Council is nevertheless a key forum for major political decisions in 
the EC. See Weatherill & Beaumont EC Law 73-78. 
37. The Delors Report on Economic and Monetary Union. See Smit & Herzog Law of the 
EEC, P 29, P 30.2-P 30.3. 
38. Union Treaty (Maastricht) (1991) (OJC 224 31 August 1992 p1 ). Although 
commonly called "Maastricht" this work will refer to the Union Treaty henceforth. 
39. Under Title 1 Art A. 
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affairs and maintenance of the established law and 
. f h . . c . 40 practice o t e Community - the acquis ommunautaire. 
Under the Treaty the twelve Member States of the 
Community resolved to form a European Union founded on 
the existing European Communities. The Treaty of Rome 
was amended and renamed the Treaty Establishing the 
E C . 41 h . c . uropean ommunity. T e European Economic ommunity 
(EEC) was renamed the European Community (EC) and 
underpins the Union together with a common foreign and 
security policy based on inter-governmental 
. 
42 d . . h ff . d co-operation an provisions on ome a airs an 
. . 
43 
. b d . 1 . Justice again ase on inter-governmenta co-operation 
outside the existing treaties. In the new arrangement 
the EC occupies a central position with the ECSC and 
Euratom taking up positions of lesser importance. The 
Union Treaty clearly contemplates implementation of the 
final phases of economic and the monetary union by the 
turn of the century according to Smit & Herzog. 44 
The union Treaty has inserted Article 3a into the EC 
Treaty which requires Member States to include the 
irrevocable fixing of exchange rates so as to lead to 
the introduction of a single currency, the ECU. Article 
4 of the EC Treaty is amended to elevate the Court of 
Auditors to the five institutions which perform the 
k f h . d h . 45 tas s o t e Community un er t e Treaties. 
1.10 Subsidiarity 
The United Kingdom had insisted that the word "federal" 
40. Title I Art B. 
41. See under Title II. Title Ill amends the ECSC Treaty and Title IV the Euratom Treaty. 
42. Title V. 
43. Title VI. 
44. See Smit & Herzog Law of the EEC P 30.4 - P 30.8. 
45. Medhurst Guide to EC Law 5. See also p 11-14 for the author's succint discussion of 
the Union Treaty which has afforded the writer substantial assistance. 
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present in early drafts of the Treaty be excluded from 
the Union Treaty and sought to emphasise the principle 
of subsidiarity as the key to the future development of 
the Community as it apparently evolves teleologically 
towards complete political and economic union. 46 
Title II Article 3b of the Union Treaty introduces the 
concept "subsidiarity" formally to a Community treaty 
for the first time. The concept is not defined with any 
clarity in the Treaty or in the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice and is a political rather than a legal 
notion as such hardly justicable according to 
Weatherill & Beaumont. 47 It is directed at reserving 
for the Member States that which is more efficiently 
dealt with at national level and confining Community 
involvement to those instances where community action 
would be more efficient. Ultimately it is a determining 
principle as to whether a matter is one of national or 
48 
of community competence. The second paragraph of 
Article 3b of the EC Treaty inserted by the Union Treaty 
introduces the subsidiarity principle as follows: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objective of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved_ by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the community. 
Pursuant to this article the Commission will review 
pending Community legislation with a view to 
applicability of the principle of subsidiarity thereto. 
The most significant factor flowing from the formal 
introduction of the principle to the Treaties is 
expected to be the impact thereof on Community 
46. See Weatherill & Beaumont EC Law 23,28. 
47. See Weatherill & Beaumont EC Law 423, 541, 571. 
48. See Weatherill & Beaumont EC Law 457, 468, 536. 
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institutions having to consider the principle 
systematically before embarking upon new legislation 
which will always be 
review in the light of 
J . 49 ust1ce. 
subject to interpretation and 
the principle by the Court of 
2. INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITIES 
We have observed that under the Merger Treaty50 the 
Institutions of the Communities were merged whilst the 
Court of Auditors was added to the Institutions of the 
EC under the Union Treaty. 51 Thus the Institutions of 
the EC are presently the European Parliament, the 
Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the 
Court of Auditors. Each is considered briefly hereunder. 
2.1 European Parliament52 
Previously known as the European Assembly and renamed 
the European Parliament under the Single European Act 
the procedures involving the European Parliament in the 
Community legislative process are complex. Essentially 
it receives proposed legislation from the Commission 
which it considers and furnishes an opinion upon to the 
Commission. 
A co-operation procedure was introduced by the single 
European Act to the EC Treaty which is now set out in 
Article 189c of the EC Treaty after its amendment by the 
Union Treaty. In terms of this procedure the European 
Parliament can amend, reject or oppose a common position 
adopted in the Council. The Council can, however, 
ignore the position taken by the European Parliament if 
it decides to do so unanimously. 
49. See Weatherill & Beaumont EC Law 79 - 782. 
50. See p 308 supra. 
51. Seep 312 supra. 
52. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 17-18; see also Mathijsen Community Law 16-34; 
Lasok & Bridge Law and Institutions: EC 247-266; Hartley Foundations EC Law 23-36. 
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Under the co-decision procedure introduced by the Union 
Treaty to Article 189b of the EC Treaty the President of 
the Council and the President of the European Parliament 
must convene a conciliation committee in those instances 
where the Council and the European parliament cannot 
resolve their differences. If a compromise cannot be 
arrived at by this means the European Parliament can 
ultimately reject the proposed legislation. 
Under the assent procedure important decisions relating 
to international agreements which set up institutions, 
which have substantial financial implications, which 
require amendment of acts adopted under co-decision, 
legislation concerning the uniform electoral system, 
citizenship, the role of the Central Bank and structural 
funds cannot be made without the assent of the European 
Parliament. 
The European Parliament can presently claim at best the 
de facto role of a co-legislature. As Lasok & Bridge 
point out the political will is still clearly lacking to 
transform the European Parliament into a full 
parliamentary legislature although far-reaching 
proposals have been made which would, if implemented, 
ultimately lead to the taking of this step. 53 
2.2 The Council54 
This institution is a Council of Ministers of the Member 
States. The Ministers participating in any particular 
Council meeting are determined according to the nature 
of the business to be conducted. Thus, if agriculture 
53. See Lasok & Bridge Law and Institutions: EC 266. 
54. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 18-19; see also Mathijsen Community Law 34-52; 
Lasok & Bridge Foundations and Institutions: EC 227 - 246; Hartley Foundations of 
EC Law 13-20. The Council of the European Communities is not to be confused with 
the European Council. See Lasok & Bridge Law and Institutions: EC 242-246; Hartley 
Foundations of EC Law 20. 
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is to be discussed it will be the Ministers charged with 
agriculture in the Member States who will meet. 
The Council is the closest Institution approximating to 
a legislative body in the traditional sense in the 
Community. It makes laws and seals laws proposed by the 
Commission. Where the Treaty concerned requires it the 
Council must consult the European Parliament and in some 
instances also the Economic and Social Committee55 . 
The votes of Member States are weighted and most 
decisions of the Council are therefore taken by 
qualified majo~ity. 
2.3 The Commission56 
In the words of Medhurst: 
The duties and powers of the Commission are set out in article 155 of 
the EC Treaty, namely: To ensure that the provisions of the Treaty 
and measures taken by the institutions are applied; to formulate 
recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in the 
Treaty; to have its own power of decision and participate in the 
shaping of measures taken by the Council and the European 
Parliament and to exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council 
for the implementation of the rules laid down by the Council5 7 . 
In the legislative procedure the Commission functions in 
a number of ways. It proposes legislation which is 
then passed on to the European Parliament for an opinion 
which it then considers and passes on to the Council. 
It also proposes policy ad legislation which it passes on 
55. Seep 308 supra. 
56. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 19-21; See also Mathijsen Community Law 52-68; 
Lasok & Bridge Law and Institutions: E. C. 213-226. Hartley Foundations EC Law 8-13. 
57. Medhurst Guide to EC Law 20. 
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to the Council for discussion and implementation and 
carries out decisions taken by Council. 
Through the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice the 
Commission has acquired 
like the Council make 
legislative 
regulations 
power. 
and 
It can 
d . . 58 irectives 
subject however to the qualification that its power is 
executive and its legislation must therefore implement 
and not go beyond the basic regulation to which it is 
giving effect. 
The Commission has quasi-judicial powers for it can 
respond to complaints by taking interim measures - which 
have the effect of an injunction - although it will not 
so act unless a 
also has the 
. 59 instances. 
Community principle is at 
power to impose fines 
stake. It 
in limited 
The Commission is manned by Community civil servants who 
are independent of the Member States and who must act in 
the general interest of the Community and not in the 
national interest of any particular Member State. 
2.4 Coreper and the Economic and Social Committee 
Coreper (the Committee of Permanent Representatives) is 
a subordinate organ of the Council comprising Permanent 
Representatives - civil servants from Member States with 
the rank of Ambassador - who assist the functions of the 
C 'l . b . 60 ounci on an ongoing asis. 
The Economic and Social Committee plays a consultative 
role under the EC Treaty in community decision making. 
It is consulted in various instances by the Council, the 
European Parliament and by the Commission. The members 
58. See p 321-323 infra regarding regulations and directives. 
59. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 20-21. 
60. See Mathijsen Community Law 39-41. 
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of the Committee represent various economic and social 
. . h' h . 61 groupings wit in t e Community. 
2.5 The Cowt of Justice62 
The Court of Justice is a creature of the Community 
Treaties and derives it jurisdiction solely and 
exclusively therefrom. This includes actions against 
Member States where a member state has failed to fulfil 
a Treaty obligation, actions for the annulment of acts 
done by community institutions, actions in instances of 
a failure to act on the part of the European Parliament, 
the Council or the Commission when the terms of a Treaty 
require action, the award of compensation for damages in 
non-contractual disputes involving Community 
Institutions, staff cases, appeals against penalties, 
arbitrations and interim measures and referrals from the 
Courts of Member States for rulings under article 177 of 
the EC Treaty upon matters of Community law. 
The Court comprises thirteen judges unanimously elected 
by the Governments of the Member States. The judges 
appoint a President of the Court from amongst their 
number. 
Two officers of the Court - the Advocate General and luge 
Rapporteur fulfil import functions which have no 
counterpart in British or South African courts. The 
Advocate General acts independently and impartially in 
the delivery of an opinion to the Court once it has been 
addressed by the parties and an adjournment for the 
consideration thereof has been taken. The opinion 
serves to assist the Court in determining the matter and 
is authoritative in the event of the Court agreeing with 
the opinion. 
61. See Mathijsen Community Law 100-101. The role of the Committee is purely 
advisory. See Weatherill & Beaumont E .C. Law 129-130. 
62. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 43-55; See also Mathijsen Community Law68-98; 
Lasok & Bridge Law and Institutions: EC 281-322; Hartley Foundations EC Law 49-82. 
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The luge Rapporteur studies the papers filed by the parties 
and prepares firstly a preliminary and then a full 
report which serve to prepare the Court concerning the 
facts and submissions of the parties prior to the 
hearing. 
In order to alleviate the burdens of the Court of 
Justice relating to staff and competition cases a new 
Court of First Instance came into being during September 
1989. At first it dealt only with cases of the 
aforegoing kind but its jurisdiction was extended in 
August 1993 to all actions brought by private litigants 
under the EC Treaty. Appeals from the Court of First 
Instance lie to the Court of Justice on points of law 
only and the Council has the authority to extend the 
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance should the 
Court of Justice request this under article 168a of the 
63 Treaty. 
2.6 The Court of Auditors 
The Court of Auditors examines and 
accounts of the Community and ensures 
legally kept. 64 
3. COMMUNITY LEGISLATION AND DIRECT EFFECT 
regulates the 
that they are 
Community legislation comprises the Community Treaties 
and Community Acts in the nature of regulations, 
directives and decisions. 
Of importance is whether Community legislation is 
directly applicable or has direct effect. 
According to Mathijsen a measure is "directly 
applicable" in a Member State when it does not require a 
national measure to render it binding upon Community 
Institutions, Member States, and legal and natural 
63. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 43. 
64. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 17. 
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persons. National authorities and national legal or 
administrative measures taken before or after the 
directly applicable Community Act cannot prevent its 
application and in this instance the Community law takes 
precedence over national law. Direct applicability and 
"direct effect" must not be confused. The latter is a 
Community measure which creates rights for those who 
are subject to Community law and refers to those cases 
where a Community rule imposes an obligation upon a 
Member State, Institution or a natural or legal person. 
He states: 
The beneficiaries of those obligations can invoke them in the national 
courts and tribunals and the latter are under Treaty obligation to 
uphold them. This applies even where these obligations conflict with 
. l h h . . 65 natwna measures w et er antenor or postenor. 
Whether or not a measure has direct effect· turns upon 
whether or not it confers individual rights. To give 
direct effect a measure must be justicable in the sense 
of being amenable to enforcement by a Court, it must 
impose a clear, precise and unconditional obligation and 
must not leave a substantial discretion to the Member 
State. The measure must be complete in itself in that 
its application by national courts does not require the 
adoption of a subsequent measure of implementation 
either by the Member State or the Community. Whether 
the measure is contained in a treaty, regulation or 
directive the aforegoing test for direct applicability -
which is derived from the jurisprudence of the Court of 
. l' 66 Justice - app ies. 
Regulations, which are issued by the Council and the 
Commission, have general application and are binding in 
65. See Mathijsen Community Law 113. But see Hartley Foundations EC Law 195-196 
and Parry & Dinnage EEC Law 93-94 who see little purpose in maintaining a distinction 
between "direct applicability" and "direct effect". I shall maintain Mathijsen's 
distinction. 
66. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 27. 
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their entirety they are directly applicable in all 
Member States. Whether or not a regulation is of direct 
effect must be ascertained through the interpretation of 
h 1 . 1 . 67 t e egis ation. 
Directives of the Council or of the Commission are 
directed at Member States and not individuals. Although 
directives are not usually of direct effect they are 
under the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice binding 
in favour of citizens upon Member States. In other 
words directives can have direct effect between an 
individual and the Member State. Directives with direct 
effect operate vertically - between citizen and Member 
State and not horizontally between private 
individuals. This principle of vertical effect is 
however liberally interpreted in favour of individuals 
by the Court of Justice. In determining whether a 
Directive has direct effect regard must be had to the 
general scheme and wording of the Directive, which must 
impose a clear, complete and precise obligation on the 
Member State. It must not impose any conditions other 
than those precisely defined therein and the Member 
State must not obtain any margin of discretion in the 
performance of its obligations thereunder. 68 
Directives are addressed to Member States and bind the 
Member State addressed therein regarding the results to 
be achieved. It is however left to the national 
authorities of the Member State concerned to choose the 
form and method of implementation 
Mathijsen sums up thus: 70 
67. Medhurst Guide to EC Law 22, 25. 
68. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 22, 25. 
69. See Medhurst Guide to EC Law 8, 22. 
70. Mathijsen Community Law 114. 
f . . 69 o a Directive. 
Directives can be issued by the Council and by the Commission. They 
constitute the appropriate measure when existing national legislation 
must be modified or national provisions must be enacted. The Member 
States are free to decide, e.g. whether these measures will be 
legislative or administrative in nature. 
Although directives are not directly applicable, since they normally 
require implementing measures, their provisions can nevertheless have 
direct effect. This must be ascertained on a case by case basis, taking 
into account their nature, background and wording. According to the 
Court those provisions are capable of producing direct effect in the 
legal relationship between the addressee of the act, i.e. the Member 
State and third party. This is what is referred to as "vertical direct 
effect of a directive" as opposed to "horizontal direct effect". The 
latter would occur if two third parties could claim rights, under a 
directive, in their bilateral relationship. This effect was rejected by 
the Court. In other cases, however, where a question concerning the 
interpretation of a directive was raised in a case between a natural 
and a legal person, pending in a national court, the Court did not 
hesitate to give the requested intapretation. By doing so, the Court 
seems to admit that the directive could be relied upon in the 
relationship between two "third parties". 
Decisions are issued by the .Council and by 
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the 
Commission. Normally of an administrative nature 
implementing other community rules, decisions are 
binding in their entirety upon those to whom they are 
directed. Thus, as decisions are binding in their 
entirety, they can have direct effect. 71 
Finally, cognizance needs be taken of recommendations 
and opinions by Community institutions. Recommendations 
are directed at obtaining an action or behavioural 
response from the addressee whilst an opinion expresses 
a point of view usually pursuant to a request for an 
opinion. Recommendation and opinions have no binding 
force and cannot therefore have direct effect. 72 
71. Mathijsen Community Law 115. 
72. See Mathijsen Community Law 115. 
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4. COMMUNITY LAW 
4.1 Nature of Community Law 
Although the Communities were set up by international 
agreements the Treaties have not merely set up mutual 
treaty obligations amongst Member States by 
international agreement. The Treaties have transferred 
sovereign rights of Member States to the Institutions of 
the Community over which the Member States have no 
direct 
beyond 
control 
those 
treaties have 
and which have been vested with powers 
of the Member States themselves. The 
involved not only the Member States but 
also their citizens who have obtained citizenship also 
of the Community. The treaties have created an own 
legal system which is neither international .law nor 
national law but supra-national law. Community law 
cannot as a general rule yield to varying domestic laws 
within Member States without jeopardising attainment of 
the objectives of the treaties. Community law therefore 
prevails over national law. 
Community law is different to and independent of 
national law yet it is common to all Member States. 
Community law therefore comprises 
supra-national legal system. 73 
4.2 Sources of Community law 
a sui generis 
The sources of EC law applied by the Court of Justice 
and national Courts are: 
4. 2 .1 the European treaties setting up the ECSC, Eura tom and 
the EC, successive texts implementing and amending the 
basic texts, Protocols, Conventions on the Institutions 
common to the Communities, decisions 
Community's own resources, budgetary 
creating the 
and financial 
73. See Mathijsen Community Law 1-2; See also Lasok & Bridge Law and Institutions: EC 
82-111. 
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treaties and decisions, amending treaties, accession 
treaties, the Single European Act and the Union Treaty; 74 
4.2.2 community legislation made thereunder; 
4.2.3 the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice including the 
principle of direct effect; 
4.2.4 the fundamental principles of Community Law expressed in 
the EC Treaty including the four freedoms and policies; 
4.2.5 general principles of law derived from the Treaties and 
under the acquis Communautaire and general principles common 
to the laws of Member States including the concepts of 
fundamental human rights, legal certainty, retroactivity 
and vested rights, protection of legitimate 
expectations, equality, proportionality, natural justice 
and legal professional privilege. 75 
4.3 Interpretation of Community Law 
Community law proceeds 
and community 
from the general to 
legislation follows 
the 
this particular 
76 
approach. The preamble of Community legislation will 
ref er to the article of the Treaty under which the act 
resorts and will set out the policy or the intention of 
the measure from which it is derived. Hence the 
preamble will refer to and give reference to outside 
sources which explain the legislation and which can be 
consulted in its interpretation such as the 
deliberations and opinions of Community Institutions or 
74. See Mathijsen Community Law 2. 
75. See Hartley Foundations EC Law 129-151; Medhurst Guide to EC Law 38-40. 
76. See Medhurst Guide to Community Law 34-35. 
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the Economic and Social Committee. The Treaty from which 
the act derives is therefore a guide to the purpose of 
the measure and assistance in its interpretation is to 
be gleaned from the paragraphs of the preamble. When 
the wording of the measure conflicts with that of the 
preamble it is the preamble which prevails. 77 
The approach is therefore purposive: the broad purpose 
or object of the measure in considered. The plain 
meaning of the words of the Act will be taken into 
account but if they conflict with the general scheme and 
context of the legislation it is the general which will 
prevail over the particularity of the words. The 
British and South African approach to the interpretation 
of enactments which seeks to determine the intention of 
the legislator through an inquiry 
consideration of 
enactment is 
the meaning of the 
not attributed the 
confined 
wording 
same 
to a 
of the 
primary 
significance by Community law in the interpretation of 
C . 1 . 1 . 78 ommun1ty eg1s at1on. 
Furthermore Community law does not feature the doctrine 
of stare decisis. Community lawyers seek to discern the 
development of a clear line of authority or principle 
but accept that no previous rule is immutable. Also, it 
is to be borne in mind that not only decisions of the 
Court of Justice are significant for regard must also be 
had to the decisions of the Commission in competition 
cases which appear in the Official Journal of the 
C . 79 ommun1ty. 
5. THE EUROPEAN UNION 
It is clear that the EU is neither a federation nor a 
confederation of states but a supra - national 
77. See Medhurst Guide to Community Law 35-36. 
78. See Medhurst Guide to Community Law 36. 
79. See Medhurst Guide to Community Law 40-41. 
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organisation of states with its own 
proceeding towards political and economic 
Lasok & Bridge put it: 
legal system 
union. As 
It is common ground that if, and when, a sufficient degree of 
integration and unity has been achieved, national sovereignty will lose 
much of its emotional glamour and practical importance. At that stage 
a new constitution of the Community will emerge either through the 
process of adaptation or a solemn proclamation. Only time will tell 
whether the Community shall continue as an organisation of states 
albeit a close one, or graduate into a federal structure. Political 
developments, both internal and external, will, no doubt, influence the 
process. 80 
Political developments in the Community during the 
recent past have brought about changes in nomenclature 
which require clarification. It has been seen that the 
Union Treaty set up a European Union (EU) founded upon 
the three previously legally distinct but now 
politically and constitutionally unified communities, 
the EEC, ECSC and Euratom, supplemented by the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and Co-operation on Justice 
and Home Affairs. Prior to the Union Treaty the EC 
indicated the EEC, ECSC and Euratom as a whole. Under 
the Union Treaty the EEC was renamed the EC and in this 
work EC is so used. 
Under the European Economic Area (EEA) Treaty which came 
into force on 1 January 1994 the acquis communautaire was 
extended to the EFTA countries (excluding Switzerland 
and Liechtenstein) with specific adaptations, 
transitional provisions and derogations. In time the 
EEA is expected to be an integrated market of European 
countries initially comprising the Member States of 
the EC with Norway and Iceland. 
It is hoped that complexities in the nomenclature of the 
Union, Communities, the Association and the attendant 
80. Lasok & Bridge Law and Institutions: EC 27. 
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tapestry of interwoven law will be resolved in the 
future. In this work EU indicates the political, 
constitutional and territorial union of the Member 
States of the Communities - to the degree that the Union 
Treaty has effected this. The EC indicates the European 
Economic Community as renamed by the Union Treaty and EC 
law the corpus of law attributable to that community -
which includes the competition and trade mark law of the 
EC. There is no competition or trade mark law of the 
EU. Community law, which includes EC law, means the 
whole of the law attributable to the communities. This 
is the body of law which has been extended to the EEA -
and excludes the corpus of EU law which is largely 
. . 1 1 81 const1tut1ona aw at present. 
IN SUM 
The advent of the European Communities and the 
introduction and development of the common market has, 
in my view, been the most significant event in the 
external history of trade mark law since the Industrial 
Revolution. This is particularly so for the law of 
trade marks in the United Kingdom and South Africa 
albeit for different reasons. 
As will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, the 
United Kingdom has been obliged to harmonize its trade 
mark laws with the European Directive regarding trade 
marks. The Directive is, however, but one of the 
pillars of the European trade marks system of which the 
United Kingdom is a part. It is the primary instrument 
reflecting upon the internal rules of the law of trade 
marks in Member States. Of fundamental importance also 
are the Regulation regarding community trade marks and 
the Madrid system and Protocol thereto. The latter 
81. See European Communities Trade Mark Association (ECTA) Newsletter No 25 May 
1994 53 - 56 for a helpful discussion of terminology issues after the Union Treaty. 
See also Linklaters & Paines - Internal Market Reporter - February 1994, in this regard. 
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institutions reflect upon both the national and 
trans-national rules of trade mark law in the United 
Kingdom. There has been an interposition of the 
European system and a reception of the law of the EC 
concerning trade marks in the United Kingdom. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 17, the 1993 SA Act has 
been significantly infuluenced by the Directive. At one 
time it was suggested that South Africa too should 
harmonize its trade mark laws with those of Europe. 
This chapter is intended to provide the proper context 
against which the changes in the laws of the United 
Kingdom and South Africa under the 1994 and 1993 Acts, 
respectively, must be seen. 
In the case of the United Kingdom a supra-national legal 
system is involved and the policies of the European 
Union especially the free movement of goods and 
competition policies of the EC are determinant. In 
the case of South Africa the changes are a response to 
the need to modify the internal rules of trade mark law 
- a different matter entirely. 
The historical fact of the break with the past 
occasioned by the interposition of EC trade mark law in 
the United Kingdom affords the opportunity of developing 
the South African system as independant and not 
appurtenant to that of the United Kingdom or the EC as a 
whole. Solutions can be provided by the resilient and 
elastic South African legal system with reference to 
helpful sound learning elsewhere. 
Bearing the aforegoing in mind it becomes clear that EC 
legislation in its various forms and the jurisprudence 
emanating from the Court of Justice and the courts of 
the United Kingdom in trade mark matters henceforth, 
must be treated with circumspection by South African 
jurists seeking guidance therein in the application and 
interpretation of South African trade mark law both old 
and new. 
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The following chapter proceeds to the specific and 
considers the internal history EC trade mark law 
relevant to the enquiry at which this work is directed. 
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CHAPTER 13 
EC TRADE MARK LAW 
1. THE UNDERLYING POLICY 
It was observed in the preceding chapter that the first 
Treaty of Rome, which founded the European Economic 
Community (the EEC now renamed the EC) , contemplated a 
single integrated European market amongst Member States. 
This common market was to be facilitated amongst other 
means by a system of fair and undistorted competition 
within the market whatever the respective economic 
1 strengths of the Member States might be. 
Pursuant to the perception that it would be a logical 
further step for there to be a unitary trade marks 
system for the Community the Preliminary Draft 
Convention for a European Trade Mark came into being 
during 1964. The Convention aimed at introducing 
European trade mark rights as a means by which 
restrictions on the free movement of goods resulting 
from the territorial nature of trade mark rights could 
be avoided and a uniform standard for the protection of 
trade marks throughout the Common Market achieved. 2 
Al though Articles 9-3 7 of the Treaty contain detailed 
provisions for the dismantling of economic barriers 
between Member States from the point of view of the free 
movement of goods3 differences between the trade mark 
1. See Larkin 82 TMR 634-650 (1992) 634. 
2. See Domanski XXV CILSA 1-19 (1992) 14. 
3. See Lasok and Bridge Introduction to the Law and Institutions of the European 
Communities 2nd ed. 288 - 289. 
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systems of the national states can, despite these 
provisions, produce barriers to inter-state trade within 
the market. 4 The Community, in seeking to recognise the 
existence of individual trade mark rights in Member 
States with varying national systems alongside the need 
for a unified trade mark system required by a single 
market, built tension into the system apriori. 5 
According to Larkin the European Court of Justice has 
approached the matter of national rights as against the 
goal of market integration heavily in favour of the 
latter essentially on the basis of distinguishing 
between the existence of national rights (which the 
court recognises) and their exercise (which the court 
seeks to curtail) . 6 The Court has however held that 
Member States may set up barriers to imports under 
national laws - provided they are not used to restrain 
competition and free movement of goods amongst Member 
States contrary to the provisions and outside of the 
7 
exceptions of the EC Treaty. 
Imports from non-Member States are not affected at all. 8 
2. HISTORY OF THE REGULATION AND DIRECTIVE 
The first initiative to harmonise and unify Community 
intellectual property law was taken during 1959 when the 
commission urged the Ministers of the then Member States 
to set up a working group on the harmonisation and 
unification of intellectual property law within the 
community. 
4. Larkin 636; See also Reform of Trade Marks Law CM 1203 (September 1990) 4 
(hereafter the White Paper); Groves (and others) IP and the Internal Market 1, 4. 
5. Larkin 635. 
6. See Larkin 636 - 637. But see the recent decisions of the ECJ discussed below. 
7. See Larkin 640 - 644. The jurisprudence of the ECJ in relation to trade marks is 
discussed at paragraph 7 p 359-380 infra. 
8. See Larkin 644 - 645. 
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The working group subsequently completed a preliminary 
) 
draft convention for a European trade mark system. It 
proposed that Member States would have the right to 
maintain their national trade mark legislation for the 
time being alongside a single community trade mark which 
would however supersede national rights eventually. 
The draft enjoyed a limited circulation at first and it 
was not until 1973 that it obtained a wide circulation 
through publication in full. 
Further discussions followed publication, resulting in 
the issue during 1976 of a Memorandum on the Creation of 
a European Community Mark. The essence of the Memorandum 
was that a European trade mark system could have 
advantages for it would establish a free market for 
trade-marked goods and services and also ensure fair 
competition in regard thereto as required by the EC 
Treaty. A community system of trade mark law, it was 
said, would lead to the approximation of the legal 
conditions affecting competition between the 
manufacturers of goods bearing Community trade marks. 
The protection afforded a Community trade mark would be 
the same throughout the Community and would not vary 
from one Member State to another. This would contribute 
substantially to the establishment of a system of 
undistorted competition within the Common Market which 
the Treaty required. Nevertheless, the Memorandum 
implicitly recognised the need to maintain national 
trade mark rights and for the first time proposed the 
simultaneous introduction of a unitary Community trade 
mark. This was to be introduced by way of a Regulation 
which would be coupled with a Directive to harmonise 
national laws in order that they might resemble each 
other closely. 9 
9. See Molijn 9 ECTA [1993] 15 - 24 15 and Tatham 9 ECTA [1993] 107 - 116 108 
regarding the aforegoing. 
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The first draft of the Directive was roundly condemned 
when first circulated to interested 
Regulation and 
parties. 
a further Nevertheless, a first draft 
draft of the Directive were published with an 
explanatory Memorandum in Supplement during 1980. The 
Economic and Social Committee gave its opinion on the 
draft during 1981 and the European Parliament suggested 
changes during 1983. A further revised Directive was 
submitted to the Council of Ministers during 1985 and 
after several Member States had submitted remarks 
regarding the proposal, 
published during 1986. 
appointed to revise the 
a new text of the Directive was 
A working group was then 
new text of the Directive as 
well as the revised Regulation which in 1984 had 
followed publication of draft implementing regulations 
during 1981. This working group published a final text 
of the Directive during 1987 which was approved the 
following year by the Economic and Social Committee. 10 
After the opinion of the European Parliament had been 
obtained during 1988, as well, the First Directive of 
Harmonisation of Trade Marks with an implementation date 
of 31 December 1991 was adopted by the Council on 21 
December 1988. This implementation date was 
subsequently extended to 31 December 1992. On 4 March 
1991 the latest version of the proposed Regulation with 
55 footnotes containing reservations by one or more 
Member States about specific Articles was published. 11 
3. THE DRAFT REGULATION 
It was intended that the Draft Regulation, when adopted, 
would establish a new property right the Community 
trade mark (CTM) - having a unitary effect throughout 
the Common Market. A CTM was to be obtained through 
10. Gielen [1992] 14 EIPR 262 - 269 262; Molijn 15; Tatham 108; Larkin 634. 
11. See Gielen 262; Tatham 108. 
335 
registration in the Community trade marks Office (CTMO) 
which would be set up under the Regulation. When 
adopted the Regulation would have direct application in 
Member States. 12 
The right obtained through registration of a trade mark 
under the Community trade marks system was to provide 
the registrant with the right to exclusive use of the 
mark throughout the Common Market. National trade mark 
systems would exist side by side with the community 
system. Prior registration in any Member State was to 
present a bar to CTMO registration. 13 
Although the European Community achieved a Single Market 
from 1 January 1993 onwards the Regulation had still not 
been implemented by that time. 14 
Delays in the implementation of the Regulation emanated 
at first from disputes concerning the site of the CTMO 
and which official languages were to be used by the 
Office. In addition thereto four categories of obstacles 
12. Both the Council and the Commission can make Regulations in order to carry out their 
tasks under the Community Treaties. They must rest upon Treaty authority and 
indicate their purpose, the reasons which justify them and the outlines of the system 
they propose. They are binding in their entirety and are directly applicable in Member 
States ie they have the force of law in Member States without the need for municipal 
legislation or other national action to give them the force of law or to give individuals 
rights thereunder which are enforceable before municipal courts: See Walker Oxford 
Companion 361, 1053. 
13. See White Paper 4; Rothstein & Rosenblatt 24 The John Marshall Law Review 145 -
208 [1990] 180. 
14. The Treaty of Rome, even after the Maastricht, sees the reason for the European 
Community as providing free movement of goods, capital, persons and services: 
Tatham 114. According to a report submitted by the EC Commission at the Edinburgh 
summit of Community Heads on 11-12 December 1992, the EC Council of Ministers 
had by June 1993 succeeded in adopting 95% of the 285 Single Market laws deemed 
essential to ensure the free flow of goods, capital and services across the borders of 
member states: See [ 19931 1 98 ITMA 1 . 
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were apparent: political problems, institutional 
questions, technical matters and financial claims. 
Amongst the political problems the major question 
turned upon differences between Member States as to the 
legal basis for the establishment of the CTMO. The 
choices were introduction of the CTMO by means of a 
Regulation based upon Article 235 of the EC Treaty, 
alternatively, by means of an inter-governmental 
conference concluding a Convention. 
Institutional questions included the matter of a budget 
for the CTMO, the legal remedies against decisions of 
the CTMO concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice to review decisions of the proposed Boards of 
Appeal of the CTMO and the kind of legal remedies which 
should be available against decisions of the Boards of 
Appeal. 
Technical problems concerned searching and the 
protection of earlier rights, licensees' powers of 
appeal, protection of collective marks and the position 
of geographical indications serving as Collective Trade 
Marks. 15 Further technical problems surrounded the 
appointment of officers (the President and 
Vice-President) of the CTMO and the appointment of the 
Chairmen and Members of the Boards of Appeal. 
Then, financial questions intruded in that some Member 
States required financial compensation for the expected 
fall-off in revenue from national applications which it 
was argued would result from preferred registration of a 
Community trade mark at the CTM0. 16 
15. Collective trade marks are not considered in this work. 
16. See Maia regarding the problem areas: the Chairman's Address at the Eleventh Annual 
Conference of the European Trade Mark Association (ECTA), Lisbon, May 27 to 30, 
1992 reprinted in 9 ECTA (1993) 12 - 14, and Tatham 109 - 116. 
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The series of problems led to concern in a number of 
quarters that developments regarding the Regulation had 
lost momentum to a degree that implementation might not 
take place and the Regulation might become obsolete. As 
Larkin put it: 
The premise of the Treaty of Rome was to create a single integrated 
market among the member nations of the European Community. The 
territorial nature of Trademark laws existing in the individual nations 
stands as a barrier to such a fully integrated market. The case law 
which evolved among the member states proves that such territorial 
laws may co-exist, in what may be a discordant harmony, within such 
a framework. The Commissions' plan to implement a Community 
Trademark is the next step to improve upon present situation under the 
decisions of the European Court of Justice. It is now crucial that the 
Commission, with proper interpretation by the Court of Justice give 
substance to the plan in the coming years. 1 7 
3.1 Implementation of the Regulation 
Despite all the reservations Regulation No. 40/94/EC of 
the Council of the European Union dated 20 December 1993 
came into force on 14 March 1994 giving legal effect to 
the Community trade mark (CTM) and the CTMo. 18 
The Regulation introduces trade mark protection valid 
throughout the territory of the fifteen Member States of 
the EU, obtainable under a single application and 
registration at the CTMO to be established at Alicante, 
Spain. This off ice will be known as the Off ice for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market. It has legal 
personality under Article 111 of the Regulation. At the 
time of writing the Off ice had not yet accepted 
applications. It was, however, to be functional by 1 
January 1996. 
17. Larkin 650. 
18. The Regulation was published in 370J No. L 11 on 14 January 1994. 
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3.2 The CTM System 
The CTM System contemplates a single registration 
obtained by a single procedure in the CTMO which will be 
valid and enforceable in all Member States of the 
Community. 
A CTM registration affords the proprietor19 exclusive 
rights in his mark which entitles him to prevent 
unauthorised use by third parties of an identical mark 
or similar mark which is likely to cause confusion or 
damage to the distinctive character or reputation of the 
. d k 20 reg1stere mar . 
In this regard Article 9 (1) provides: 
ARTICLE9 
Rights conferred by a Community trade mark 
1. A Community trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive 
rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third 
parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade: 
(a) any sign which is identical with the Community trade mark in 
relation to goods or services which are identical with those for 
which the Community trade mark is registered; 
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with or similarity to the 
Community trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods 
or services covered by the Community trade mark and the sign, 
there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public; the 
likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association 
between the sign and the trade mark; 
19. The English text of the Regulation speaks of a "proprietor" and "proprietors" of 
Community trade marks. 
20. Art. 9. 
It 
(c) any sign which is identical with or similar to the Community trade 
mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to 
those for which the Community trade mark is registered, where the 
latter has a reputation in the Community and where use of that 
sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental 
to, the distinctive character of the repute of the Community trade 
mark. 
is apparent from Article 9 (1) (a) that 
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an 
infringement is immediately established in the case of 
use of an identical mark in relation to goods or 
services covered by the CTMO registration. 
In the second place an infringement under Article 
9(1) (b) is established where identical or similar trade 
marks are used upon goods or services covered by the 
CTM, or are used upon similar goods or services in a way 
which brings about a likelihood of confusion on the part 
of the public which includes the likelihood of 
association between the marks. 
The third category of infringement provided for under 
Article 9(1) (c) is new to some jurisdictions (including 
the United Kingdom) . It protects the integrity of the 
mark itself in its distinctive character as well as in 
its penumbra - the repute of the mark. Provided the CTM 
concerned has a reputation within the Community the 
third category of infringement provides a protection 
which is not as with the first two categories of 
infringement restricted to the goods or services in 
respect of which the CTM is registered or to goods or 
services similar thereto. 
Hence Dworkin states of the Regulation: 
The scope of protection for the Community Trade Mark will be 
extremely, perhaps unpredictably, wide. The traditional rights of the 
trade mark proprietor, designed to protect the origin function of trade 
marks, have been extended to deal with a broader range of 
unacceptable business uses of trade marks. Unfair competition 
concepts have been injected into trade marks law in a major way. 
Some of these provisions, adapted in many respects from Benelux trade 
mark law, are not familiar to trade mark practitioners and courts in 
all Member States. There may well be a reconsideration of the roles 
of, and relationship between, trade marks and unfair competition laws 
(including the common law action for passing off in the UK and 
Ireland). 21 
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The writer will propose in the final parts of this work 
that the so-called economic functions of trade marks can 
be protected under the general Aquilian action and the 
action based upon unlawful competition in South Africa, 
so affording trade marks cumulative protection with the 
specific trade mark infringement actions provided for by 
Statute. 22 
The Regulation recognises the limitation upon the 
proprietor's rights in parallel import situations laid 
down in the jurisprudence of the ECJ. Under Article 13 
the proprietor of a CTM may not prohibit the use of a 
mark in relation to goods which have been put on the 
market in the EU by the proprietor or with its consent, 
except where the proprietor has legitimate reasons to 
oppose further commercial exploitation of the goods 
such as in instances where the condition of the goods is 
changed or impaired after they have been placed on the 
market. Application of a CTM registration to prevent 
parallel importation of goods emanating outside the 
territory of the EU is not impaired by the Regulation. 
21. Per Professor Gerald Dworkin in a paper entitled "Effects of the Community 
Trademark" presented at an International Seminar - Alicante: Community Trademark 
and Design - held at Alicante, Spain on 29 - 31 May 1994 (unpublished). 
22. This has always been the common law position. Historically the specific tort approach 
of the Common Law has, however, in the UK and to a large extent in South Africa, 
limited the relief obtainable outside of statute to passing off. See also p 555-574 infra. 
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Thus, the Regulation recognises the theory of exhaustion 
of rights under which the proprietor of a registered 
trade mark has the exclusive right to introduce a 
product featuring the trade mark to the market. 
However, once the product has been introduced to the 
market by the proprietor or with his assent, the 
proprietor cannot prevent third parties from using the 
mark. 23 The Regulation takes further cognizance of the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice insofar as the 
proprietor is able to prohibit use of the mark by third 
parties after its initial commercialisation where the 
state of the product has been changed or altered in a 
way prejudicial to the legitimate rights of the trade 
k . 24 mar proprietor. 
3. 3 The Provisions of the Regulation 
3.3.1 Signs of which a Community trade mark may consist 
3.3.2 
A CTM may comprise any sign capable of being represented 
graphically, particularly words, personal names, 
designs, letters, numerals and the shape of goods or 
their packaging, provided that such signs are capable of 
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking 
from those of other undertakings. 25 
Thus any sign which has a distinctive character will in 
principle be capable of registration as a CTM. 
Persons who can be proprietors of Community trade marks 
Under Article 5: 
23. See Batalla Volume XXIX No 4 /es Nouvelles [1994] 207 - 211 208 and paragraph 7 p 
359 infra. 
24. See Hoffman - La Roche v Centrafarm (Case 102/77) [ 1978] ECR 1139 and 
Centrafarm v American Home Products Corporation (Case 3/78) [1978] ECR 1823; 
Batalla 208 - 209. 
25. Art. 4. 
342 
3.3.2.1 nationals of EU Member States or of other states that 
are parties to the Paris Convention; 
3.3.2.2 or those who are domiciled or have their seat or have 
an industrial or commercial establishment in the 
territory of a state of the aforegoing kind; 
3.3.2.3 or citizens of non-Paris Convention states in which 
citizens of EU Member States are afforded the same 
treatment as nationals in regard to trade marks and 
which recognise registration of Community trade marks 
as proof of registration in the country of origin of a 
EU national, 
3.3.3 
3.3.4 
are entitled to make application for and obtain 
registration of a CTM. 
Assignment of Community trade marks 
A CTM may be assigned separately from the undertaking 
with which it has been associated for all or some of 
the goods and/or services in respect of which it is 
registered. Where the assignment is not pursuant to a 
judgment it must be in writing and signed by both the 
assignor and the assignee. An assignee must record the 
assignment in the CTMO if he is to be entitled to 
enforce the rights afforded a CTM under the Regulation. 
The CTMO can refuse to register assignments which will 
be likely to mislead the public concerning the nature, 
quality or geographical origin of the goods or services 
. f h. h . . . d 26 in respect o w ic it is registere . 
Licensing 
Licensing is permitted and may be recorded under Article 
26. See Art. 17. 
3.3.5 
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22 of the Regulation. 
Community Policy. 27 
Licenses must however conform to 
Applications 
Applications are filed in 
CTMO English, French, 
Where the application is 
official languages the 
one of the languages of the 
German, Italian or Spanish. 
not filed in one of the 
CTMO will translate the 
application 
applicant. 
into an official language chosen by the 
At the time of filing the applicant must 
choose a second language for possible use subsequently 
· · · · · l 'd · d' 28 in opposition, revocation or inva i ation procee ings. 
Applications are examined as to the absolute grounds 
f f 1 . . 1 f h 1 . 29 or re usa set out in Artie e 7 o t. e Regu ation. 
The CTMO will conduct a search of prior marks or 
applications which may furnish relative grounds for 
refusal, and will transmit the results of the search to 
the applicant along with the result of any searches 
d d . 11 30 0 d h 1 . . con ucte nationa y. nee accepte t e app ication 
is published for opposition which must be introduced 
within three months. The application culminates in 
31 grant or refusal. 
Under Article 108 of the Regulation, the applicant or 
proprietor of a Community trade mark may request 
conversion thereof into a national mark or application 
if the CTMO application is refused, withdrawn, deemed 
to be withdrawn or if the Community mark ceases to have 
effect. If a national application or mark results it 
enjoys the date of priority or seniority of the 
Community application or mark. 
27. See Batalla 209 - 21 0. 
28. See Art. 115. 
29. Art. 38. The absolute grounds for refusal are almost identical to the absolute grounds 
for refusal in the Directive (see p 594 infra). 
30. Art. 39. 
31. See Arts. 41 - 45. 
3.3.6 
3.3.7 
3.3.8 
3.3.9 
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Duration of protection and renewal 
A CTM registration endures for ten years and it will be 
renewable for further ten year periods ad infinitum. 32 
Revocation 
A CTM registration will be susceptible to revocation if 
the proprietor has not put the mark to genuine use in 
the EU within five years of registration or has 
suspended use for an interrupted five year period 
unless the non-use can be justified. 33 
Appeals from CTMO decisions 
Decisions 
Divisions, 
from CTMO examiners or 
Administration of Trade 
its 
Marks 
Opposition 
and Legal 
Divisions or Cancellation Divisions may be made the 
subject of an appeal to the CTMO Board of Appeal. 
Appeals must be filed within two months of the decision 
appealed against. Board of Appeal decisions are 
reviewable by the ECJ. 34 
Community Trade Mark Courts 
Within three years of the entry into force of the 
Regulation on 14 March 1994, each Member State of the 
EU is required to designate as limited a number as 
possible of national Community Trade Mark Courts of 
first and second instance which are to have exclusive 
jurisdiction over actions involving infringement and 
validity disputes involving a CTM. In the normal 
course actions of this kind are to be brought in the 
courts of the state where the defendant is domiciled or 
32. Arts. 46 - 47. 
33. Art. 50. 
34. See Arts. 57 - 63, 130. 
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has a business establishment or where the infringing 
. h d 35 act occurs or is t reatene . 
It will be noted immediately that the Regulation will 
be applied by the CTMO in the application phase and by 
national Community Trade Mark Courts where invalidation 
and infringements are in issue. Different approaches 
and conflicting decisions are to be anticipated and, 
unfortunately, it is only in the long term that uniform 
interpretation thereof is to be anticipated under the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ after it has considered 
disputes under the Regulation. In this regard it is 
not to be overlooked that the ECJ will apply the 
provisions of the Regulation as a means of implementing 
Community Policy. 
3.4 The Community trade mark as property 
Article 16 of the Regulation deals with Community trade 
marks as objects of property. Article 16 provides: 
ARTICLE 16 
Dealing with Community trade marks as national trade marks 
1. Unless Articles 17 to 24 provide otherwise, a Community trade 
mark as an object of property shall be dealt with in its entirety, and 
for the whole area of the Community, as a national trade mark 
registered in the Member State in which, according to the Register of 
Community trade marks, 
(a) the proprietor has his seat or his domicile on the relevant date; or 
(b) where subparagraph (a) does not apply, the proprietor has an 
establishment on the relevant date. 
35. See Arts. 91, 92, 93 and 143. 
2. In cases which are not provided for by paragraph 1, the Member 
State referred to in that paragraph shall be the Member State in which 
the seat of the Office is situated. 
3. If two or more persons are mentioned in the Register of Community 
trade marks as joint proprietors, paragraph 1 shall apply to the joint 
proprietor first mentioned; failing this, it shall apply to the subsequent 
joint proprietors in the order in which they are mentioned. Where 
paragraph 1 does not apply to any of the joint proprietors, paragraph 
2 shall apply. 
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Thus although a CTM derives its protection from the EU 
legislation which regards it as an object of property -
the trade. mark law which governs the CTM as property is 
the law of the Member State designated according to the 
formula provided in the Article. In regard to the 
United Kingdom this Article seems to cause some 
difficulty in that prior to the 1994 Act trade marks 
were not regarded as discrete property in that legal 
system but as appurtenant to goodwill in the business in 
the goods and/ or services in respect of which the mark 
was used. Insofar, however, as registered trade marks 
are seen property in certain circumstances they were 
regarded as either choses in action in the nature of 
pure intangibles or as a sui generis species of property. 36 
Of particular interest in the context of the enquiry of 
this work is Article 19 which provides: 
ARTICLE 19 
Rights in rem 
36. See p 219-221 supra. See p 607-608 infra regarding the position under the 
1994 Act. 
1. A Community trade mark may, independently of the undertaking, 
be given as security or be the subject of rights in rem. 
2. On request of one of the parties, rights mentioned in paragraph 1 
shall be entered in the Register and published. 
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It is to be noted that both the Regulation and the 
Directive were greatly influenced by Benelux law. 
Tatham states of the Regulation: 
The Regulation is a little masterpiece. It has been admired in many 
quarters for its consummate blending of Civil Law and Common Law 
concepts of Trade Mark rights. 37 
Insofar as it is hoped that the Directive would 
harmonise national law also with the Regulation it would 
be interesting from a South African perspective if the 
application of the Directive and Regulation in tandem 
leads to the dominance of civil law over Common Law 
concepts in the trade mark law throughout the EC: so in 
the end through its influence leading also the South 
African law in regard to trade marks towards a civil law 
orientation after its past sojourn for the most part 
under the auspices of the common .law and statutes of the 
United Kingdom. 
4. THE DIRECTIVJi38 
4.1 General Import 
The Directive is a first directive: strictly speaking 
this means it is not necessarily final and further 
directives could follow. 39 It is to be noted that the 
Directive is independent of the Regulation. 40 The 
Directive has been finalised and adopted. 41 
37. Tatham 111. 
38. Council Directive 89/104 EEC [1989] O.J. L40/1. 
39. Molijn 21. 
40. Larkin 180. 
41. Seep 334 supra. 
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As the diverse trade mark laws of Member States feature 
disparities which may impede the free movement of goods 
and provision of services and so distort competition 
within the Community, it is necessary, according to the 
Directive, to approximate national laws for the 
establishment and function of the Common Market. 42 
The Directive is not however aimed at the complete 
approximation of the trade mark laws of Member States. 
Rather, it is limited to harmonisation of those 
provisions of national law which most directly affect 
the functioning of the internal market. 43 
The Directive applies to all national, Benelux or 
Madrid Agreement registrations or applications whether 
the marks relate to goods or services. 44 
Under the Directive the conditions for obtaining and 
holding a registered trade mark must, in general, be 
identical in all Member States if the objectives of the 
. ' b . d 45 I . d d Directive are to e attaine . t is regar e 
fundamental for free circulation of goods and services 
to obtain that registered trade marks enjoy the same 
basic protection under the legal systems of Member 
States. 46 The Directive is intended to be entirely 
consistent with the provisions of the Paris Convention47 
but does not affect the obligations of Member States 
thereunder. 48 
42. See Recital I of the Directive. 
43. See Recital 3 of the Directive; Molijn 16; Gielen 262 - 263. 
44. Article 7; See Armitage and Davis Directive Regulation and UK Law 5; The Directive 
will have the effect of harmonising national law and the Regulation. 
45. See Recital 7 of the Directive. 
46. See Recital 9 of the Directive. 
4 7. For a concise note regarding the Paris Convention including a brief discussion of South 
African law in relation thereto under the Trade Marks Act No. 62 of 1963, see 
Domanski 3 - 10, See also Rutherford (1992) 4 SA Mere L J 278 - 291 283 - 285. 
48. See Recital 12 of the Directive. 
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4.2 Structure of the Directive 
The Directive proceeds from the premise that national 
trade mark laws will continue to exist. It aims at 
harmonising these laws and thus obliges Member States to 
bring their national laws into line with the Directive. 49 
The Directive contains seventeen articles of which 
fifteen deal with substantive matter. Taking the 
sub-paragraphs and sub-divisions of the substantive 
paragraphs into consideration the Directive has a total 
of sixty-nine provisions. 
Certain of the provisions are peremptory (introduced by 
the imperative "shall") whilst others 
(introduced by the permissive "may") . 
are optional 
Thus, the 
Directive sets a minimum peremptory standard with which 
all Member States must comply. Compliance with such 
standards only is termed the "minimalist" approach. On 
the other hand, compliance with all the provisions of 
the Directive both peremptory and optional, is termed 
the "maximalist" approach. 50 Member States can, 
therefore, 
Directive: 
approach, 
compliance 
adopt 
the 
one of 
maximalist 
three approaches to the 
approach, the minimalist 
or something in 
with all of 
between which 
the peremptory 
together with some of the optional provisions. 
represents 
provisions 
It is to be noted that the points covered by the 
Directive are exhaustive (whether contained in the 
mandatory or optional provisions). In other words, the 
Directive leaves no room for state manoeuvre. National 
law must adhere to the requirements of the Directive but 
go no further by way of qualification thereof unless 
h . . . f. 11 . d 51 t lS lS spec1 lCa y perm1tte . 
49. Gielen 263. 
50. Molijn 17; Gielen 264. 
51. Armitage and Davis Directive Regulation and UK Law 5. 
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In general terms the Directive covers primarily the 
following substantive subjects -
4.2.1 its scope (art. 1); 
4. 2. 2 a definition of the sign of which a trade mark may 
consist (art. 2); 
4.2.3 grounds for refusal of invalidity (arts. 3 and 4); 
4.2.4 rights conferred by a trade 
limitations on and exhaustion 
mark, 
of trade 
infringement, 
mark rights 
(arts. 5, 6, 7 and 9); 
4.2.5 licensing (art.8); 
4.2.6 use and sanctions for non-use (arts. 10 and 11); 
4. 2. 7 matters relating to revocation, refusal and invalidity 
(arts. 12, 13 and 14); 
4.2.8 matters relating to collective, 
certification marks (art. 15) . 52 
guarantee and 
The Directive, on the other hand, does not cover the 
following issues: 
4. 2. 9 matters relating to the protection by Member States of 
trade mark rights acquired through use relations 
between such marks and registered marks aside; 
4.2.10 questions of procedure concerning the registration, 
nullity and invalidity of trade marks; 
4. 2 .11 laws, other than trade mark laws, applicable to trade 
marks such as laws relating to unfair competition, 
consumer protection and delict; 
52. See Gielen 263 - 164. 
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4. 2 .12 rules relating to the transfer or assignment of trade 
marks, and licensing formalities; 
4.2.13 grounds for invalidation based on matters not covered by 
the Directive such as procedural or fee violations; 
4.2.14 procedural rules relating to the assessment of the 
likelihood of confusion between marks; 
4.2.15 additional grounds for nullification of the registration 
of collective, guarantee or certification marks to those 
provided for in the Directive where the function which 
marks of the af oregoing kind fulfil require such 
53 grounds. 
It is to be emphasised that insofar as the Directive 
sets out the grounds upon which registration may be 
refused or invalidated Member States may not introduce 
grounds for refusing or invalidating registrations which 
are not provided for in the Directive. Similarly, the 
Directive defines the right afforded by registration of 
trade marks and Member States may not confer registered 
trade mark rights which go beyond the provisions of the 
Directive. Essentially, the Directive concentrates on 
substantive law and not upon procedural law - which is 
left to Member States. 54 
4.3 Implementation of the Directive 
Article 17 provides that the Directive is addressed to 
the Member States whilst Article 16 calls upon them to 
comply with the Directive not later than 2 8 December 
1991. Article 16(2) empowers the Council to defer the 
date of implementation to not later than 31 December 
1992. 
53. See CM 1203 5. 
54. Tatham 110; Latham and Clark - Jervoise 198 ITMA [ 19931 1-3 1. 
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There have been varied and mixed efforts by Member 
States to implement the Directive despite that January 
1993 saw the advent of a Single Community Market. 55 
It appears from a report submitted by the EC Commission 
to the Edinburgh summit during 1992 that the EC Council 
of Ministers had succeeded in adopting ninety-five per 
cent of the two hundred and eighty five Single Market 
laws deemed essential to ensure the free flow of goods, 
capital and services across the EC's internal borders. 56 
Nevertheless, on 1 January 1993 only the trade mark 
laws of Denmark, France, Italy and Greece could be said 
to have been in substantial 
Directive. The United Kingdom, 
h . . h d . 57 t erew1t ur1ng 1994. 
4. 4 Non-Compliance with the Directive 
compliance with the 
of course, complied 
It must be noted for the sake of completeness that the 
following options arise regarding possible action which 
can be taken where a Member State has not complied with 
the Directive timeously: 58 
4.4.1 At Community Level 
4.4.1.1 The deadline could be extended by means of the Council 
adopting a further Directive. 
4.4.1.2 The Commission could bring an enforcement action before 
the European Court against a defaulting State at the 
instance of the Commission or at the request of a 
Member State or private individual. 
55. See 198 ITMA [19931 1. 
56. See 198 ITMA [1993] 1 - 3. 
57. The Trade Marks Act, 1994 came into force in the United Kingdom on 1 October 
1994. 
58. See Molijn 23; Latham and Clark - Jervoise 3. See also cases C-6 and 9/90 
Francovich v Italy [19911 1 ECR5357; [19931 2CMLR 66(ECJ) regarding state liability 
in damage to an individual for failing to implement a Directive. 
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4. 4. 2 At National Level 
4. 4. 2 .1 An individual could seek to invoke the provisions of 
the Directive against a Member State which is 
according to an established doctrine of Community law 
whereby an individual who has been deprived of legal 
rights due to a Member States' failure to implement a 
Directive can rely upon and apply the Directive against 
the Member State concerned. 
4.5 The Provisions of the Directive 
Although this chapter is hardly complete without a 
discussion of the subs tan ti ve provisions of the 
Directive it appears expedient to place that discussion 
in a later chapter which deals also with the provisions 
of the Trade Marks Act, 1994 and the new South 
African Act. 
This approach will prevent repetition and curtail 
length whilst considering the provisions of the 
Directive in the context in which it is most relevant 
to this work: the degree to which the new South African 
statute has maintained common ground with the trade 
mark law of the United Kingdom and whether, in so doing 
or otherwise, has adopted fundamental principles of EC 
trade mark law. 59 
5. THE MADRID AGREEMENT 
The considerations which led to the conclusion of the 
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International 
Registration Marks (MTA) is aptly stated thus by Kunze: 
It is generally recognised that trade marks have become a key factor in 
international trade and that many manufacturers and traders need 
international protection for their trade marks and service marks in 
59. See chapter 17 infra. 
countries all over the world. However, as a rule, the only means of 
achieving such protection is to apply for registration of the trade mark 
in all countries of commercial interest. As is well known, the 
procedures for registration differ widely from country to country, 
different languages must be used and there are different ways of 
protection resulting from registration. 60 
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An additional consideration is the high cost of 
obtaining registration of a trade mark separately in a 
number of jurisdictions. 
National trade mark rights are territorial in effect. 
With the growth of international trade during the 19th 
century a need was perceived for co-operation concerning 
trade mark law at an international level. The approach 
was adopted to create a body of international trade mark 
law which would grant to trade mark proprietors uniform 
rights when they traded in different countries. The 
Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial 
Property which was signed on 20 March 1883 represents 
a significant attempt to create such a body of trade 
mark law. The Convention came into effect on 7 March 
1884. Signed by one hundred countries it has since 
undergone a revision on six occasions whilst a seventh 
revision commenced in Geneva during 1980 was never 
f . 1. d 61 ina ise . 
The MTA is a special arrangement under and flows from 
the Paris Convention. Membership is restricted to 
member states of the Paris Convention and current 
members are bound either by the text of the agreement 
revised at Nice during 1957 (when the International 
Classification of Goods and Services came into being) or 
at Stockholm during 1967. Like the Paris Convention, 
the MTA is administered by the World Intellectual 
60. Kunze [19941 6 EIPR223 - 226 223 (hereafter Kunze (EIPR)). 
61. See Domanski 3 - 10. 
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Property Organisation (WIPO) , an agency of the United 
Nations based in Geneva. 62 
The MTA extends the general principles of the Paris 
Convention by enabling trade marks to be protected 
through the intermediacy of a Central Registration 
Bureau in Geneva. 
Essentially, under the MTA the proprietor of a 
registered mark in a contracting country can obtain 
registration of the trade mark in all other member 
countries for a period of twenty years by filing a 
single application for registration of the mark. The 
application in French, is filed at the Central 
Registration Bureau and designates the member countries 
of the MTA in which registration is sought. 
Upon registration the mark is protected only in such 
countries as have been designated and the registration 
is renewable for further twenty year periods ad infinitum 
in such of the designated countries as the registrant 
chooses. 
Registrations in the International Register are notified 
to the registries of the designated member countries 
where they are subject to the national trade mark laws 
of such countries both before registration and 
thereafter. Upon registration they are deemed to have 
been registered under the national laws of each state 
concerned. 
Prior to registration the registry of a designated 
member state receives the application from the Bureau to 
consider in terms of its national laws. The designated 
state then has a period of twelve months in which to 
reject the application failing which the mark is 
deemed to be registered there. 63 
62. See Groves (and others), IP and the Internal Market 47, 48 - 49. 
63. See Groves (and others) IP and the Internal Market 47 - 49; Kunze 223. 
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Before an application for registration of a mark can be 
registered internationally, it must have been registered 
nationally by the national office of the applicant's 
country of origin. In terms of the MTA the country of 
origin of the mark is that member country where the 
applicant has a real and effective industrial or 
commercial establishment, failing which, that member 
country in which the applicant has its domicile or 
headquarters, and failing either, the member country 
h h 1 . . . 1 64 w ere t e app icant is a nat1ona . 
It is important to note that the fate of the 
international trade mark is dependent on the basic 
national trade mark registration in the country of 
origin for a period of five years from the date of the 
international registration. Thus, where the home 
registration falls away or is in any way limited during 
the period aforesaid, the MTA registration will then 
also fall away or be limited accordingly, as the case 
may be. Thus, a successful "central attack" upon the 
basic national trade mark during the prescribed time 
period will vitiate the international registration and 
11 . . b d . 65 a MTA registrations ase on it. 
Regarding the merits of the MTA Kunze has the following 
to say: 
In summary, the MTA is very popular amongst trademark owners in 
the contracting states, and it is widely used 
- because it is extremely cost-effective and 
- because it cuts down considerably on the administrative paperwork in 
the contracting states of the agreement by offering protection in up to 
29 countries by a single registration without any special formalities, 
64. See Kunze 82 TMR 58 - 88 (1992) 59 (Hereafter Kunze (TMR)). 
65. See Kunze (TMR) 61 - 62. 
such as notarial attestation and legalisation; it makes it possible to 
record name changes and assignment in some or all of the countries to 
which protection is extended by one single administrative act; and it 
makes it possible to renew the trademark in all countries to which the 
protection extend simply by paying the renewal fees without further 
formality. 66 
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Nevertheless, Kunze is compelled to concede that despite 
all the advantages it provides the MTA has not enjoyed 
the widespread accession of states and its membership 
has remained relatively low. Important trade mark 
countries such as the USA and Japan - and in Europe, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and the Northern European 
countries are not parties to 
unlikely to take on membership 
h . . h 67 s ortcom1ngs in t e MTA system. 
6. THE MADRID PROTOCOL 
6.1 Underlying reasons for the Protocol 
the agreement and are 
because of perceived 
The Madrid Protocol came about primarily at the instance 
of WIPO and was directed at overcoming the stumbling 
blocks which had led to non-accession of important 
trading states to the MTA and to link the Madrid system 
to the CTM system. Non-acceding states based their 
objections primarily upon the need for a basic 
registration as an a priori requirement for international 
registration and the concept of central attack. It was 
hoped that participation in the Madrid systems by the 
USA and Japan might be effected by means of the Madrid 
Protocol which, it was hoped, would also lead to the 
inclusion of the four member states of the EU who were 
not parties to the MTA - the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Denmark and Greece. 68 
66. Kunze (TMR) 62 - 63. 
67. Kunze (EIPR) 223. 
68. See Kunze (EIPR) 223; Kunze (TMR) 63 - 64; Kunze, Managing Intellectual Property, 
March 1994 50. (Hereafter this article will be referred to as Kunze MIP); Groves and 
others IP and the Internal Market 51 . 
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Various revisions of the Madrid system under the MTA 
suggested by WIPO from time to time culminated in the 
Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Marks (the Madrid 
Protocol) which was adopted by 27 countries (including 
the United Kingdom) at a Diplomatic conference during 
June 1989 at Madrid. 69 
The USA withdrew from participation on 9 May 1994 after 
an initial show of great interest. This disappointed 
supporters of the Madrid Protocol greatly. 70 
Membership of the Madrid Protocol is open to contracting 
parties to the Paris Convention and - with the specific 
intention of enabling EU membership of the Protocol 
also to organisations of which at least one Member State 
is a contracting party to the Paris Convention and which 
has a regional office for registering trade marks with 
ff . h . f h . . 71 e ect in t e territory o t e organisation. 
By allowing the EU to become party to the Protocol, the future link 
with the CTM system has been provided for. The Protocol is expected 
to enter into force in 1995, and quickly to enjoy a large membership 
far beyond the present membership of the Agreement since it provides 
for the necessary changes of those provisions of the Agreement which 
b l . fi . 72 were o stac es to accession or so may countries. 
6.2 Links between the MTA and the Protocol 
The systems contemplated by the MTA on the one hand and 
the Madrid Protocol on the other are interlinked through 
both administrative as well as substantive provisions in 
69. See Groves and others IP and the Internal Market 51. See Kunze (TMR) 64 - 66 for a 
full discussion of the background to the Protocol. 
70. See Kunze MIP 51 - 53 regarding early USA participation. 
71. Art. 14. See Kunze (EIPR) 223; Kunze MIP 50. 
72. Per Kunze (EIPR) 223. 
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the Protocol . 73 Common regulations serve both treaties 
and International 
both treaties by 
will operate as 
system. 
registration can be obtained under 
means of a single application which 
follows with reference to the MTA 
The Protocol does not apply between states which are 
also contracting parties to the MTA. In these instances 
only the MTA applies to those states. Hence, an 
international application from a member state of both 
the MTA system and the Protocol which designates member 
countries of both treaties in some instances and member 
countries of the Protocol only in other instances, will 
be governed exclusively by the MTA in the first category 
and exclusively by the Protocol in the second. 74 
Hence the Madrid Protocol is a self-contained treaty and 
member countries of the Protocol alone can for all 
purposes rely 
75 Protocol. 
exclusively 
7. TRADE MARK LAW AND THE ECJ76 
upon the text of the 
It must be observed at the outset that the focus of the 
European Court of Justice regarding trade mark law has 
been to resolve conflicts and tensions between the 
provisions of national laws and the commercial policy of 
the EC. Thus far the Court has not directed its 
attention to the specific rules of national trade mark 
law which has been a matter for the national courts. 77 
73. See Arts. 1, 9 sexies, 10 of the Protocol and Kunze MIP 50. 
74. Kunze (EIPR) 223; Kunze MIP 50; See Kunze (TMR) 79 - 87 for a full discussion of the 
relationship between the systems. 
75. Kunze (EIPR) 223; Kunze MIP 50. 
76. The writer has derived much assistance in preparing a discussion of trade marks and 
the ECJ from a paper delivered by David T Keeling entitled "Trade Marks and the 
European Court of Justice" at the Thirteenth Annual Conference of ECTA held at 
Luxembourg from 25 to 28 May 1994 (Keeling 11 ECTA (1994) 41 - 54). 
77. Keeling 54. 
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It has already been noted however that under the CTM 
system the ECJ will be called upon to rule upon the 
substantive provisions of the Regulation which is 
itself intended to harmonise with the harmonised laws of 
the National States under the Directive. This will, it 
is anticipated, give rise to a body of jurisprudence 
emanating from the ECJ concerning the substantive 
provisions of the Directive and Regulation which, with 
the passage of time, will affect the interpretation of 
the specific provisions of the harmonised trade mark 
laws of national states. 78 
At present national trade mark laws impact upon EC 
Policy in two areas, namely in regard to the principle 
of the free movement of goods (Articles 30 - 36 of the 
EC Treaty) and competition policy (Articles 85 - 86 of 
the EC Treaty) . 
7.1 Trade Marks and Free Movement of Goods 
Articles 30 36 of the EC Treaty are directed at 
securing the free movement of goods throughout the 
Community. The concept underpinning these provisions is 
that goods placed in the market in one Member State must 
not be prevented from circulating freely in the 
territory also of other Member States. 79 
National trade mark rights are territorial in effect. A 
trade mark registration in a particular Member State 
affords exclusive protection against the use of the same 
or similar trade mark upon related goods or services to 
those for which the mark is registered in the territory 
of the state of registration. Hence the application of 
national trade mark laws can prevent the free movement 
of goods and services in the Community insofar as goods 
78. See p 575-576 supra. 
79. See Arts. 30 - 36 of the EC Treaty. 
or services 
identical 
registered 
emanating from 
or confusingly 
trade mark in 
a Member 
similar 
another 
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State featuring an 
trade mark to a 
Member State may be 
excluded by the national laws of that state from entry 
to or participation in the market there. 
Article 36 of the Treaty recognises a number of 
exceptions to the basic principle of free movement which 
includes restrictions justified on the grounds of 
industrial and commercial property including trade 
marks - provided such restrictions are not a means of 
arbitrary discrimination in trade or a disguised 
restriction upon trade between Member States. 80 
7.2 Competition Policy 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty contain the basic 
provisions of Community competition law. Article 85 
prohibits agreements affecting trade between Member 
States which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or 
within the common market . 
undertakings which occupy a 
or in a substantial part 
. . 81 pos1t1on. 
distortion of competition 
Article 86 prohibits 
dominant position in the EC 
of it from abusing that 
The application of trade mark rights through use, 
licensing, assignment or 
trade marks can off end 
where such applications 
other agreements relating to 
Community competition policy 
bring about a restrictive 
practice or the abuse of a dominant position. 
7. 3 Leading Cases 
This paragraph deals with the leading cases in which the 
ECJ has applied and developed Community law at the 
interface between the application of national trade mark 
law and Community policy. 
80. See Art. 36. 
81. See Arts. 85 - 86. 
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7.3.1 Consten and Grundig v Commission82 
Grundig had granted Consten the sole right to sell goods 
emanating from Grundig featuring the trade mark GINT in 
France. Grundig sought to secure exclusivity for Consten 
in the French market by allowing Consten to register the 
trade mark GINT in respect of the goods in France in 
order that Consten might exclude goods featuring the 
mark emanating from another Member State from the French 
market by relying upon its registered trade mark rights 
in respect of GINT there. 
The ECJ took the view that this arrangement offended 
Article 85 of the Treaty as it restricted trade. The 
court distinguished between the existence of national 
trade mark rights and their exercise and found that the 
main purpose of the agreement was to partition the 
market by means of the improper exercise of such rights. 
That the exercise of the rights concerned were struck by 
Article 85 of the Treaty did not however affect the 
existence of those rights. 
The existence/exercise distinction has often been criticised by 
practitioners because of its artificiality. The right to exercise a 
monopoly (existence) is pointless unless it is in fact exercised. 
Anyway, where is the line to be drawn between existence and exercise 
of the right? A right consists of nothing more than the ability to 
. . 83 
exercise it. 
Despite criticism of the af oregoing kind the 
existence/exercise principle is established in the 
. . d f h 84 JUrispru ence o t e Court. 
The Consten case also established the exhaustion 
principle in the jurisprudence of the ECJ which it 
82. Consten SARL and Grundig - Verkaufs - GmbH ECC v Commission {Cases 56 and 
58/64) [19661 ECR 299. 
83. See Groves {and others) IP and the Internal Market 6 - 7. 
84. See Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v Metro SB Grossmarkt GmbH and 6 KG {Case 
78/70) ECR487. 
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derived from German jurisprudence. According to this 
principle, whenever goods featuring a trade mark are 
placed on the market in the territory of a Member State 
by the proprietor or with the consent of the proprietor 
of the trade mark he cannot thereafter rely on the trade 
mark to prevent resale of such goods in the territory of 
another Member State. 
Keeling sums up the implications of the exhaustion 
principle thus: 
The principle of exhaustion has important implications for 
manufacturers who wish to establish exclusive distribution networks by 
granting exclusive trade mark licences to their distributors in the 
various Member States or by assigning their trade marks to 
distributors. If we apply the principles established by the Court of 
Justice in the Nungesser judgement, it seems that the licensor and the 
licensees may lawfully agree not to pursue an active sales policy in 
each other's territory. That degree of territorial protection appears to 
be acceptable. But what they cannot do, and must not attempt to do, 
is to exclude parallel imports. Such an attempt would be contrary to 
Article 30 and would not - because of the principle of exhaustion - be 
saved by Article 36. Moreover, an agreement whereby the licensor 
and licensee undertook to impede parallel imports would be void under 
Article 85 (2) and would have no hope of exemption under Article 85 
(3). 85 
7.3.2 Sirena v Eda86 
An American company registered its trade mark in Italy 
and assigned it to Sirena during 1937. Sirena used the 
trade mark in Italy in connection with shaving cream for 
many years. The American company also licensed the mark 
to Eda, a German company, for use in Germany. Eda began 
exporting shaving cream under the trade mark to Italy 
85. Keeling 47. The judgement referred to is in Nungesser (LC) KG and Kurt Eisele v EC 
Commission (Case 258/78) [1921 ECR 1025. 
86. Sirena Sri v Eda Sri and ors. (Case 40/70) [1971 l ECR 69. 
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during 1960. Sirena commenced infringement proceedings 
in that territory. The matter was referred to the ECJ 
which had to decide whether assuming national law 
recognised the right of a trade mark owner to impede 
imports from other Member States this right was 
affected by EC Community law. 
The court answered the question in the affirmative as 
follows: 
In the sphere of provisions relating to the free movement of products, 
prohibitions and restrictions on imports justified on the grounds of 
protection of industrial and commercial property are allowed by 
Article 36, subject to the express condition that they "shall not, 
however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States". Article 36, although it 
appears in the Chapter of the Treaty dealing with quantitative 
restrictions on trade between Member States, is based on a principle 
equally applicable to the question of competition, in the sense that 
even if the rights recognised by the legislation of a Member State on 
the subject of industrial and commercial property are not affected, so 
far as their existence is concerned, by Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 
their exercise may still fall under the prohibitions imposed by those 
provisions. 
The exercise of a trade mark right is particularly apt to lead to a 
partitioning of markets, and thus to impair the free movement of goods 
between states which is essential to the Common Market. Moreover, a 
trade-mark right is distinguishable in this context from other rights of 
industrial and commercial property, in as much as the interests 
protected by the latter are usually more important, and merit a higher 
degree of protection, than the interests protected by an ordinary 
trade-mark. 87 
The Court proceeded to find that Article 85 of the 
Treaty prevented Sirena from relying on its national 
87. At p 81-82 of the report of the case. 
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trade mark rights in Italy to exclude Eda from the 
market in that territory despite that the relevant 
agreements 
Treaty. 
were concluded prior to the advent of 
Article 86 would not however strike 
the 
the 
exercise of national trade mark rights unless they 
afforded the proprietor the power to impede the 
maintenance of effective competition over a considerable 
part of the relevant market. 
Keeling makes the following apt remarks regarding the 
decision in the Sirena case: 
I make no secret of the fact that I think that Sirena v Eda was wrongly 
decided. Sirena purchased an Italian trade mark in 1937 by a 
contract valid at that time under Italian law, the only law against 
which its validity could have been tested. It had undisturbed use of the 
trade mark for 20 years and doubtless invested considerable resources 
in building up the reputation of its product. Then along came the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957 and 14 years later a judgement of the 
European Court saying, in effect, that the assignment was contrary to 
Article 85 of the Treaty and that Sirena was compelled to share the 
trade mark in Italy with any other firm that had acquired the right to 
use it, by virtue of an assignment or a license, in any other Member 
State. But a trade mark that must be shared, within the same 
territory, rapidly becomes worthless. Thus, with one stroke of the 
judicial pen, Sirena 's goodwill was wiped out. 88 
The principle concerning the retroactive effect of 
Article 85 was subsequently modified by the Court when 
it required concerted practice between the persons 
involved for Article 85 to be so applied. 89 
7.3.3 HAG 190 
The trade mark HAG was registered by its German owners 
in respect of coffee in Germany during 1907 and in 
88. Keeling 43-44. 
89. See EMI Records Ltd v CBS United Kingdom Ltd (Case 51/75) [1976] ECR 811. 
90. Van Zuylen Freres v Hag AG (Case 192/73) [1974] ECR 731. 
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Belgium and Luxembourg during 1908. The latter 
registrations were sequestered as enemy property during 
1944 and sold. Van Zuylen held these rights when HAG of 
Germany began selling coffee under the mark HAG in 
Luxembourg during 1970. Van Zuylen instituted 
infringement proceedings. 
The Court stated that the exercise of trade mark rights 
tended to contribute to the partitioning of markets and 
thereby affected the free movement of goods between 
Member States to a greater extent than other rights of 
industrial and commercial property because trade mark 
rights are not subject to limitations in point of time. 
The Court could not allow the holder of a trade mark to 
rely upon the exclusiveness of his right as a means of 
prohibiting the marketing in a Member State of goods 
legally produced in another Member State under an 
identical trade mark having the same origin. A 
prohibition of this kind would legitimise the isolation 
of national markets and collide with the essential 
objects of the Treaty which was to unite national 
markets into a single market. The court ruled: 
To prohibit the marketing in one Member State of a product legally 
bearing a trade mark in another Member State for the sole reason that 
an identical trade mark, having the same origin, exists in the first 
State is incompatible with the provisions for the free movement of 
goods within the Common Market. 91 
According to Groves: 
HAG I was widely criticised, not least because it sat uneasily with the 
concept of exhaustion of rights, which requires the owner's consent. 
Secondly, if both marks can move freely to the Community in such 
circumstances, the goodwill in each is undermined. Thirdly, the 
parentage of the doctrine was highly doubtful. 92 
91. At p 745 of the report. 
92. Groves and others IP and the Internal Market 13. 
7.3.4 
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According to Keeling the Court in HAG I failed to 
analyse the basic function of trade marks and 
unwittingly destroyed Van Zuylen's properly constituted 
intellectual property rights. The court also failed to 
indicate why it attached so much importance to the 
common origin of the trade marks. 93 
The doctrine of common origin introduced by the ECJ in 
HAG I is to the effect the where similar or identical 
trade marks having 
different persons in 
of one of the marks 
owner of the other 
a common origin are owned by 
different Member States the owner 
cannot rely on it to prevent the 
from importing goods lawfully 
marketed thereunder from the one Member State to the 
other. 
This would be contrary to the provisions of the EC 
Treaty concerning the free movement of goods. 94 
The doctrine of common origin was confirmed by the ECJ 
in Terrapin v Terranova. 95 In that case the Court held 
that territorial trade mark rights could be applied to 
prevent the importation of products bearing a 
confusingly similar trade mark registered in another 
Member State in the absence of legal or economic ties 
between the parties and underlying agreements 
restricting competition, provided that the rights of the 
parties arose independently of each other. 
Deutsche Grammophon96 
This decision introduced the key concept of "specific 
subject matter" to the trade mark jurisprudence of the 
ECJ and it has, together with the concept of the 
93. Keeling 49-50. 
94. See Groves and others IP and the Internal Market 13. 
95. Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd v Terranova lndustrie CA Kopfrerer & Co (Case 119/75) 
[19761 ECR 1039. 
96. Deutsche Grammaphon GmbH v Metro - SB - Grossmarkte GmbH & Co (Case 78/70) 
[19711 ECR48. 
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essential function of a trade mark, played a central 
role ever since. The Court held that Article 36 of the 
Treaty only permitted derogations from the basic 
prohibition against interference with the free movement 
of goods contained in Article 30 to the extent to which 
such derogations relating to industrial and commercial 
property were justified for the purpose of safeguarding 
rights which constitute the "specific subject matter of 
such property". The Court did not however define the 
concept "specific subject matter" in relation to trade 
marks until Centrafarm v Winthrop. 97 The "specific 
subject matter" was there defined as the guarantee that 
the owner of a trade mark would have the exclusive right 
to use the trade mark for the purpose of putting 
products protected by it into circulation for the first 
time. It is intended to protect the trade mark holder 
against competitors wishing to take advantage of the 
status and reputation of the trade mark by selling 
product illegally featuring the mark. 
Keeling makes the following point of note regarding 
specific subject matter: 
It must be remembered that the Court drafts its judgements in French. 
The French for "specific subject matter" is objet svecifique: and there 
is, I think, something of a double meaning in the word objet. On the 
one hand, it has a purely descriptive meaning ref erring to the core of 
essential rights granted to the proprietor of a trade mark, a patent or a 
registered design, or to a copyright-holder and so forth. On the other 
hand, it has a final meaning ref erring to the underlying purpose of the 
intellectual property right in question: the objective or raison de'etre 
of the right, the reason for granting someone an exclusive right. This 
second meaning is certainly present in the French word objet; it is not 
present in the English expression "subject matter". 98 
97. Centrafarm BV v Winthrop (Case 16/74) [19741 ECR 1183. 
98. Keeling 45. See p 557-574 infra for a discussion of the trade mark as the 
object of the subjective right to a trade mark. 
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7.3.5 Hoffman-La Roche v Centrafarm99 
This case introduced the concept of the "essential 
function" of a trade mark as a supplement to the 
definition of its specific subject-matter. The Court 
held that the essential function of a trade mark is to 
guarantee the identity of the origin of the trade-marked 
product to the consumer or ultimate user thereof by 
enabling him to distinguish that product from products 
of another origin without any possibility of confusion. 
Thus the ECJ subscribes to the origin function of trade 
marks - regarding the trade mark as a guarantee not of 
quality but of origin - as well as the distinguishing 
function of trade marks which requires the mark to 
distinguish the product emanating from one source from 
those emanating from other sources without the 
possibility of confusion. This in turn implies that a 
trade mark must be distinctive. 
Keeling observes: 
It will be immediately apparent to anyone who knows anything about 
trade marks that these two concepts - the specific subject-matter and 
the essential function of the trade mark - are really two sides of the 
same coin. The former contemplates the trade mark from the 
viewpoint of the proprietor; the latter looks at the trade mark from the 
consumer's viewpoint. There is of course no conflict here between the 
interests of the trade mark proprietor and those of the consumer; both 
rely on the trade mark for the pwpose of avoiding corifusion about the 
commercial origin of goods. 1 OO 
99. Hoffman - La Roche & Co AG v Centrafarm VPE GmbH (Case 102/77) [19781 ECR 
1139. 
100. Keeling 46. 
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7.3.6 HAG //101 
The successors in title to the HAG mark in the Benelux 
commenced sale of coffee under the mark in Germany 
- a reversal of the direction of export to the situation 
in HAG I. The matter again reached the ECJ which 
reversed its earlier decision in finding that where 
trade marks come into separate ownership because of 
expropriation each owner is allowed exclusive use of the 
trade mark in the territory in which he is registered 
owner. 
The decision marked a change in the regard the Court 
afforded to trade marks. 
Advocate-General Jacobs argued thus in his opinion: 
Like patents, trade marks find their justification in a harmonious 
dovetailing between public and private interests. Whereas patents 
reward the creativity of the inventor and thus stimulates scientific 
progress, trade marks reward the manufacturer who consistently 
produces high quality goods and they thus stimulate economic 
progress. Without trade mark protection, there would be little 
incentive for manufacturers to develop new products or to maintain the 
quality of existing ones. 102 
The Court responded positively stating: 
Trade mark rights are, it should be noted, an essential element in the 
system of undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish 
and maintain. Under such a system, an undertaking must be in a 
position to keep its customers by virtue of the quality of its products 
and services, something which is possible only if there are distinctive 
marks which enable customers to identify those products and services. 
For the trade mark to be able to fulfil this role, it must offer a 
101. CNL - Sucal NV v Hag G F (Case C-10/89) [19901 ECR I - 3711. 
102. At p 3731-3732 of the report of the case. 
guarantee that all goods bearing it have been produced under the 
control of a single undertaking which is accountable for their 
quality. 1 03 
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The Court therefore endorses what has come to be known 
as the abstract origin theory of trade mark functioning 
in its modern guise: the trade mark guarantees that the 
goods or services in relation to which it is used 
emanate from and under the control of a single 
accountable source. 
The Court confirmed its earlier approach that the 
specific subject matter of the trade mark right is to 
ensure that the owner of the trade mark has the right to 
use it first in the marketing of a product and to afford 
protection against competitors who wish to take 
advantage of the status and the reputation of the mark 
by illegally selling products featuring it. 
This was a consequence, the court found, of the role 
played by a trade mark in that it must constitute a 
guarantee that all products featuring it have been 
manufactured under the control of a particular 
enterprise to which responsibility for quality could be 
attributed. 
The essential function of a trade mark, it was 
reasserted, is to guarantee the identity of origin of 
the trade marked product to consumers or final users in 
order that they could, without confusion, distinguish 
such product from product having another origin. The 
marks of the different proprietors had, the Court found, 
fulfilled their essential function independently within 
the territorial limits of each registration. 
It is to be borne in mind that the decision in HAG II is 
restricted to cases of expropriation. Thus the decision 
does not treat with those instances where the trade mark 
103. At p 3758 of the report. 
7.3.7 
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owner voluntarily disposed of his trade mark rights in 
one or more countries of the EC either before the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Rome or thereafter. HAG II 
deals with cases of expropriation where the consent of 
the proprietor to the disposal of trade mark rights is 
absent. Thus, the question as to the disposal of trade 
mark rights within the EC with the consent of the 
. . d b d . d d 104 proprietor rema1ne to e ec1 e upon. 
Ideal Standard v IHT105 
The French owners of the French trade mark registration 
for the trade mark IDEAL-STANDARD manufactured heating 
equipment in France and exported it under the trade mark 
to Germany. The proprietors of the German trade mark 
registration for the trade mark IDEAL-STANDARD who used 
the mark in relation to sanitary fittings sought to 
exclude the French product featuring the mark from 
Germany on the basis of the German registration of the 
mark. The original owner of the mark in both 
territories had assigned it voluntarily to different 
unconnected parties in France and Germany. 
The German company 
sufficiently similar 
argued that its products were 
in type to heating equipment for 
confusion regarding the trade mark to arise in Germany 
if the French company was allowed to use the mark there 
as well. 
The ECJ did not consider the question of confusion as 
this was considered a matter for national law. It did 
however confirm that trade mark protection could extend 
beyond the products for which the trade mark was 
registered if the infringing products were similar to a 
degree where consumers would conclude that they emanated 
from the same source. 
104. See Kunze, Trademark World, December 1990/January 1991 21 - 22 21 . 
105. IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v Ideal-Standard GmbH ECJ 22 June 1994. 
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The court found it to be established law that: 
7. 3. 7. 1 A national trade mark registration in a Member State 
could be enforced against products imported from 
another Member State under the same or a confusingly 
similar mark if the marks had been independently 
. d b h . 106 acquire y t e parties. 
7. 3. 7. 2 Where trade marked products were marketed in certain 
Member States by the same trade mark owner or with 
his consent the national home registration of the trade 
mark could not be enforced against goods imported to 
the Member State of the home registration from another 
Member State. 107 
In the instant case there was no link of any kind 
between the parties and the court had to decide whether 
the isolation of markets permitted in HAG II where the 
same trade mark was owned in two Member States by 
different and unconnected undertakings after a division 
of ownership had taken place involuntarily was to be 
extended to the case at hand where a voluntary division 
of ownership had taken place. The essential question 
was whether the principle of the free movement of goods 
had to prevail over the territorial rights of the trade 
mark owner of the German registration, so permitting 
the assignee of the French registration to export goods 
to Germany under the identical mark. 
The ECJ held that a trade mark registration in one 
Member State can be enforced against products imported 
from another Member State featuring the same trade mark 
even though the trade mark was originally owned by the 
same party in both territories and the separation 
resulted from voluntary assignment. 108 
106. See in this regard per Terrapin v Terranova discussed at p 367 supra. 
107. See in this regard also Merck v Stephan [ 1981 J ECR 2063. 
108. At p 1-14 of the typed report of the case. 
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The Court assessed the function of national trade marks 
with reference to their territorial nature which in the 
circumstances of the case prevailed over the free 
f d . . 1 109 movement o goo s princip e. 
In a paper presented at the ITMA Annual Conference, 
1995, Gygell provided an apt and concise assesment of 
the Ideal Standard case thus: 
The court applied the reasoning in Hag II and confirmed that: 
a. the specific subject matter of a trade mark must be determined 
having regard to its function; 
b. the essential function of a trade mark is to give consumers a 
guarantee of the identity of the origin of the marked product by 
enabling consumers to distinguish the product from others of a 
different provenance; and 
c. the free movement of goods principle would undermine that 
essential function of a trade mark and consumers would no longer be 
able to identify for certain the origin of the marked goods. 
The narrow view of the judgment would be that the Ideal Standard 
case merely applies and extends the decision in Hag II to the situation 
where the trade mark in question is subdivided by virtue of a voluntary 
assignment as opposed to the situation in Hag II where the trade mark 
was subdivided by compulsory sequestration. 
The decision in Hag II was, in my opinion, a landmark for trade mark 
owners in particular and, at least, a positive omen for intellectual 
property owners in general. I say this because the court in Hag II 
specifically recognised that trade marks "constitute an essential 
element of the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty aims 
to establish and maintain". This passage was cited with approval in 
the Ideal Standard case and it can now be assumed with considerable 
confidence that trade marks will no longer be viewed as monopolistic 
icons of anti-competitive behaviour. 
109. At p 1-6 of the report. 
The court in Ideal-Standard, however, went further than Hag II in so 
far as, throughout the judgment, the court returned to and emphasised 
the territorial nature and independence of trade mark rights. It is trite 
to state that trade marks are the creature of national legislation and 
that the proprietor's rights extend only to the national frontiers of the 
country in which registration has been obtained. However, the court 
relied on this truism in holding that this feature of trade mark rights 
(which can also be applied to all intellectual property rights), all other 
things being equal, effectively means that the free movement of goods 
principle must take a back seat to the principle of undistorted 
competition. The court ref erred grandly to the "principle of 
territoriality 11 and the ''principle of the independence of trade marks 11 
emphasising (as indeed is the case) that these principles are well 
recognised under international Treaty law, citing Article 6 quater of 
the Paris Treaty and Article 9 ter(2) of the Madrid Agreement as 
examples. 11 0 
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This is not to say that assignments which partition 
markets in the EC cannot be challenged under Article 85 
of the Treaty. Such a challenge is not however a 
necessary consequence of 
property rights in the 
transactions. 111 
7. 3. 8 Deutsche Renault v Audi 11 2 
the assignment of intellectual 
course of ordinary commercial 
In this case it was held that national law determines 
the criteria upon which a risk of confusion between 
conflicting marks is established. As it is the national 
systems which provide protection for the exclusive 
registered trade mark right and the extent of this right 
is delimited by the enquiry as to its confusing 
110. At p 5-6, 7 of the unpublished paper entitled "European Court of Justice Decisions 
affecting Trade Marks". 
111. See Linklaters and Paines Intellectual Property News Issue 22, July 1994. 
112. Deutsche Renault v Audi AG [19931 ECR 1 - 6227; See Wurtenberger [19941 7 EIPR 
302 - 306; See also Worth and Warburton [19941 6 EIPR 247 - 249. 
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similarity with another mark, the law which provides the 
source of the right the national legal order - must 
also determine its extent. 
This approach - I have observed - was adopted also in 
the Ideal Standard case. 
I have also noted, however, that this approach must 
necessarily change as soon as the ECJ is called upon to 
interpret the subs tan ti ve provisions of the Directive 
and the Regulation. 
7. 4 Ovaview of the Cases 
Built-in tension exists between national trade mark laws 
and those provisions of the Treaty which deal with the 
free movement of goods in the EC and competition law -
particularly with reference to the partitioning of 
markets and the abuse of a dominant position. 
Generally speaking, Article 3 6 in derogating from the 
fundamental principle of the free movement of goods, 
must be interpreted strictly. In this regard the ECJ 
applies the principle of proportionality thus: 
restrictions upon free movement of goods must be 
necessary to attain the aim in question. If the aim can 
be achieved by means less restrictive than impeding free 
movement the alternative means must be applied. 
On the specific level in relation to intellectual 
property rights, Article 36 only authorises restrictions 
on free movement which are necessary to protect the 
"specific subject matter" of the intellectual property 
. h . . 113 rig t in question. 
113. Keeling 3. 
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The ECJ applies the exhaustion doctrine to ameliorate 
tension between the free movement principle and 
. . 1 d k . h 114 G th terr1tor1a tra e mar rig ts. roves assesses e 
role of the ECJ in relation to intellectual property in 
the EC as follows: 
In the absence of harmonised intellectual property systems in the 
Community, the Commission and the Court between them have done a 
good job of adapting the existing rules of the Treaty, of competition 
and on free movement, to minimise the effects on interstate trade of 
differences in national law. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that this 
process has obviated the need for harmonisation: but harmonisation 
provides a more complete solution. 
If one were to rely solely on the case law in intellectual property, even 
with so many decided cases, there would be a lack of legal certainty. 
If another person has a registered intellectual property right valid 
throughout the Community, he would know what he could and could 
not do so much more clearfy than if you had to consider the specific 
subject matter of that person's national rights and decide (possibly 
without the benefit of a decision directly on the point) whether what he 
were proposing to do would be actionable. 
Harmonised IP laws and Community-wide systems are the future of 
intellectual property law in the Community. 11 5 
From the perspective of the United Kingdom: 
This is all yet to come. At the moment UK trade mark law is a mixture 
of international agreements, Community treaties and secondary 
legislation made under those treaties, together with the case law of the 
European Court of Justice and UK trade mark legislation, case law 
and patent office practice and procedure. 116 
8. IN SUM 
Part 4 of this work has considered -
114. Larkin 636 - 637. 
115. Groves (and others) IP and the Internal Market 15. 
116. Groves (and others) IP and the Internal Market 45. 
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8.1 The history, structure, law, institutions and the 
political and constitutional development of the EU; 
8.2 The Community legislation, jurisprudence of the ECJ 
applicable to Community trade mark systems and the 
substratum of Community policies applicable to the law 
of trade marks in the Community; 
8.3 The Madrid system of international registration of trade 
marks under the patronage of WIPO in terms of the Madrid 
Union and Madrid Protocol and the linking of these dual 
systems to each other and to the CTM. 
The excursus in relation to the aforegoing topics is a 
necessary part of this work because -
8.4 The new South African Trade Marks Act - as will be shown 
later is intended to modernise South African trade 
mark law according to present trends in the United 
Kingdom and the European Community at large; 
8. 5 The new Act is also intended to maintain close links 
with the trade mark systems of those territories which 
South African trade with the United Kingdom and the EU 
requires. 
In this regard Rutherford writes: 
The member countries of the EC are the most imponant trading 
panners of the Southern African region, and the Republic of South 
Africa in panicular. If foreign trade and investment are to be 
encouraged, it is essential that any uniform law should follow 
the European Directive on Trade Marks as far · as possible. 
Harmonisation with Community law, in accordance with the European 
Directive, will enable European traders to obtain protection for their 
trade marks within the Southern African region more easily. 
Furthermore. they will be familiar with the basic principles of the 
trade-mark system and can readily be reassured of the effect of 
379 
. ,£ h . ,~,I ,,, • h 117 protectwn oJ t ezr truue marl\, ng ts. 
The progressive path of an international approach 
towards trade mark law in South Africa will obtain an 
additional impetus from the participation of the RSA in 
the TRIPS agreement of GATT. All of this will in turn 
require an international perspective on the part of 
South African trade mark lawyers regarding trade marks 
in general and the nature of trade mark rights in 
particular. 
On the other hand Part 4 of this work is also intended 
to provide a caveat: It is clear that the trade mark 
law of the EC and the new trade mark laws of the United 
Kingdom are part of the larger tapestry of EU policy and 
its single market. It has been shown that the 
Regulation and Directive are directed at affirming 
Community policy. The new United Kingdom Trade Marks 
Act, 1994, is based squarely upon the Directive, and the 
White Paper from which the British Act is derived has 
exercised a great influence upon the new South African 
Act. 
Now it is so that the substantive rules of the 
Regulation and Directive embody modern approaches (not 
present in the old British and South African systems) 
which can be followed to advantage in the context of the 
requirements of modern commerce. Nevertheless, in 
dealing with the rules of the Community and new United 
Kingdom systems their underlying ratio the single 
market - must not be overlooked. 
Furthermore, the concepts of "specific subject matter" 
and "essential function of trade marks" which underpin 
much of the trade mark related jurisprudence of the ECJ 
are tools of the court directed at a balancing of 
national trade mark laws and Community Policy. They are 
not therefore generally applicable concepts of national 
11 7. Rutherford 291 . 
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law and are hardly progressive in that they maintain the 
primacy of the origin function of trade marks (albeit in 
its modern abstract form) in the face of a pressing need 
for the full range of trade mark functions to be 
recognised and given effect at law. 
This need is apparent also in the law of the U.S.A. 
which the following Part considers. 
PART 5 ' 
MODERN TRADE MARK LAW IN THE U.S.A. 
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CHAPTER 14 
MODERN TRADE MARK LAW IN THE U.S.A. 
The U.S.A. has the largest domestic free market of any 
country in the world and against this background ongoing 
consideration has been afforded to the trade mark law 
which is constantly examined and debated in relation to 
contending theories concerning the proper basis of trade 
mark protection. 
The debate is relevant to this work as theoretically 
valuable in the macro sense and in the micro sense 
because South African courts are entitled to consider 
American authority where the Roman Dutch law is silent1 
and in view of the fact that the dilution doctrine 
which is of American origin - was introduced to South 
African law under the Trade Marks Act, No 194 of 1993, 
on 1 May 1995. 
This chapter considers the general themes underpinning 
U.S. trade mark law which include formalist versus 
realist approaches, whether trade mark protection is 
monopolistic or competitive, the central position of the 
confusion standard and the protection afforded trade 
marks under the Lanham Act, the common law and the state 
dilution statutes. The conflict between property and 
public policy approaches to trade mark protection and 
the new and developing rationales relating thereto are 
included in the discussion. 
The dilution doctrine, as will be seen, requires 
recognition of the advertising function of trade marks 
and is underpinned, according to some, by the thought 
that there is property in a trade mark. It is 
essential, therefore, to examine the doctrine briefly in 
1. See p 230 supra regarding Policansky Bros Ltd v L H Policansky 1935 AD 89. 
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this chapter as to its content and context, and to its 
success or failure in the U.S. trade mark system as this 
will be relevant background to any endeavour to apply 
the doctrine in its American guise within the South 
African system. 
This chapter also concludes 
investigation in this work 
the 
of 
brief 
U.S. 
historical 
trade mark 
legislation and considers relevant aspects of the Lanham 
A . . 1 2 ct in particu ar. 
The chapter regards U.S. trade mark law mainly from the 
perspective of trade mark function as the writer's 
examination of the law has led him to conclude that 
functional theory provides a useful perspective from 
which to approach the trade mark law of the U.S.A. and 
its developing themes. This also provides a useful 
underlay to the theoretical chapters of Part 6 which 
follows. 
The functions which trade marks fulfil are universal. 
The manner in which the various legal systems deal 
therewith, however, differ. The discussion of U.S. 
trade mark law in this chapter in relation to trade mark 
functioning and related concepts is directed at 
universal issues of central importance to this work. Of 
part,icular relevance is the recognition of new trade 
mark functions and the need for their legal protection. 
This is revealed clearly by the paragraphs which deal 
with the debate concerning trade mark economics in the 
U.S.A .. 
My investigations concerning the trade mark law of the 
U.S.A in the aforementioned context has precipitated 
five premises which I suggest are true of the 
development of trade mark law as a whole. These 
premises, which are developed upon in later chapters, 
are: 
2. The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) 15 USC 1072. See chapter 3 at p 64-69 
supra regarding earlier legislation. 
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a The functions performed by a trade mark have diversified 
with the passage of time in response to the demands and 
innovations of the market place. 
b Trade mark functions vary and trade marks can fulfil one 
or more of a number of functions which often overlap and 
commix. These include: 
b(i) to identify and distinguish goods and services; 
bffO to indicate ownership, origin, actual source, anonymous 
source, and quality; 
b(iii) 
b(iv) 
b(v) 
b(vi) 
b(vii) 
to advertise merchandise and to sell goods and services; 
to serve as property and provide security; 
to symbolise goodwill; 
to convey information; 
to fulfil so-called economic functions positive or 
negative such as promoting competition, providing 
market language, reducing search costs, or constituting 
barriers to entry. 
c From its beginning trade mark law has been called upon 
to respond to the functions performed by trade marks 
which have developed in commerce with the passage of 
time. 
d The need to protect new and often improperly defined and 
misunderstood functions has given rise to a number of 
new and of ten overlapping rationales for protection such 
as dilution and the misappropriation of various aspects 
of trade marks. 
e the law has been unable to respond consistently or 
uniformly to the demands for protection of newly 
perceived functions 
satisfactory and all 
because of the want of a 
embracing theory of trade mark 
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protection. This is particularly so in the U.S.A. where 
the dichotomy of competition versus monopoly which 
underlies U.S. competition law manifests itself in laissez 
faire versus monopoly and public protection versus 
property theories of trade mark protection. 
1. FORMALISM v REALISM 
1.1 Formalism 
During the late nineteenth century a formalistic and 
elaborate doctrinal system based upon etymology 
developed in the law of trade marks and unfair 
. . 1 3 competition at common aw 
This approach was a consequence of the conception that 
trade marks are property and arose at a time where 
property rights were regarded as conferring exclusivity 
against the world at large. Property, therefore, 
afforded monopoly and hence the trade mark owner was 
conceptually able to prevent even innocent infringement 
of the trade mark without considerations of fraud 
intervening. Provided a mark qualified as a technical 
trade mark the proprietor was afforded property therein 
to which competitors had no claim. 4 On the other hand 
there was no property in descriptive or geographical 
words which were required by competitors and no monopoly 
could, therefore, be obtained therein. In response to 
the argument that trade marks afforded a monopoly it was 
argued that words used as trade marks afforded only a 
limited right to the owner, which was to prevent use 
thereof as trade marks by others in relation to certain 
goods. Thus, no monopoly in language resulted which 
would prevent use of the word in ordinary 
discourse. 
3. McClure 69 TMR 305-356 (1979) 319. 
4. It will be recalled that technical trade marks (a term of art) referred to marks which 
were inherently distinctive. See p 68 supra. 
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Essentially, trade marks merely protected property. 
Hence, no economic monopoly was created thereby because 
the rights of others to sell or manufacture the goods 
d . d . 5 concerne was not restraine in any way. 
The theory that trade marks comprise property and 
indicate origin gave rise to a series of rules directed 
at defining and limiting the property right concerned. 
Absolute protection was granted upon infringement of 
technical marks but descriptive and generic marks 
which were not able to indicate origin did not 
constitute property. Where such marks however acquired 
a "secondary meaning" i.e. came to indicate origin 
through use over time, they were afforded limited 
protection. 6 "Suggestive marks" were afforded 
protection in order to obtain an equitable result where 
the formalistic test for technical marks, when strictly 
applied, brought about a severe result. Suggestive 
marks were protected because they merely alluded to the 
general nature or character of the goods and were 
therefore not to be regarded descriptive. 7 
According to McClure, formalism was typical of American 
law during the period 1870 to 1930 and rendered the 
property right approach congruent with monopolist 
theory. He states of this phenomenon: 
In trademark law once the balance of exclusive rights versus competition 
was struck to the satisfaction of prevailing interest groups, the balance 
was frozen and rigidified by the creation of objective rules which were 
made to appear neutral and apolitical by a conception of law as 
science. Those economic interests which had succeeded in the 
competitive struggle of the nineteenth century could consolidate and 
5. McClure 318-319. 
6. See McClure 319-320. 
7. McClure 323. Both "secondary meaning" and "suggestive marks" were terms of 
art. 
preserve their gains by having property rights conferred on the 
competitive advantage they enjoyed. Trademark rights were a way of 
creating safe harbors against the ravages of competition, a place where 
their economic power was securely protected. 8 
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During the 1930' s, legal realism came to the fore and 
the conceptual formalism of the past era came under 
realist attack. 9 
According to McClure, the culmination of formalist 
conceptualism in 
in the U. S . A. 
trade mark and unfair competition law 
was reached with the decision in 
International News Service v Associated Press (INS), 
whilst the writings of Schechter during 1927 represented 
the furtherest extension of thought regarding the 
protection of trade marks as property. 10 
1.2. INS 
In this case Associated Press (AP) and International 
News Service (INS) were competitors in the gathering and 
distribution of news and its publication for prof it in 
newspapers throughout the U. S . A. . AP was so organised 
that under its by-laws its members agreed that news 
received through the AP news service was received for 
exclusive publication in member's newspapers only. AP 
alleged that INS had pirated news gleaned by AP in a 
number of ways, including the copying of AP news from 
bulletin boards and early edition newspapers of AP 
members which INS then sold with or without rewriting to 
its own customers. The Supreme Court was ultimately 
called upon to decide the dispute and Mr. Justice 
Pitney delivered the opinion of the court. 11 It was 
8. McClure 321-322. 
9. McClure 326-327. 
10. McClure 323-324, 324-325. International News Service v Associated Press 248 U.S. 
215 (1918). Seep 439 infra regarding Schechter. 
11 . See Pattishall and Hilliard Trademarks and Unfair Practices 1 5-50. I deal with the 
decision of the court fully in view of the universal importance of the case. 
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held that the case was not to be decided upon the 
general question of property in news matter under common 
law or upon the application of the copyright act. The 
case turned upon the question of unfair competition in 
business. The parties were competitors in the business 
of making news known to the world. 
That business consists in maintammg a prompt, sure, steady, and 
reliable service designed to place the daily events of the world at the 
breakfast table of the millions at a price that, while of trifling moment to 
each reader, is sufficient in the aggregate to afford compensation for the 
cost of gathering and distributing it, with the added profit so necessary 
as an incentive to effective action in the commercial world. The service 
thus peiformed for newspaper readers is not only innocent but extremely 
useful in itself, and indubitably constitutes a legitimate business. The 
parties are competitors in this field; and, on fundamental principles, 
applicable here as elsewhere, when the rights or privileges of the one 
are liable to conflict with those of the other, each party is under a duty 
so to conduct its own business as not unnecessarily or unfairly to injure 
that of the other. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v Mitchell, 245 u. s. 
229,254. 
Obviously, the question of what is unfair competition in business must 
be determined with particular reference to the character and 
circumstances of the business. The question here is not so much the 
rights of either party as against the public but their rights as between 
themselves. See Morison v Moat, 9 Hare, 241, 258. And although 
we may and do assume that neither party has any remaining property 
interest as against the public in uncopyrighted news matter after the 
moment of its first publication, it by no means follows that there is no 
remaining property interest in it as between themselves. For, to both of 
them alike, news matter, however little susceptible of ownership or 
dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in trade, to be gathered at the 
cost of enterprise, organization, skill, labor, and money, and to be 
distributed and sold to those who will pay money for it, as for any other 
merchandise. Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of 
which both parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in 
the same field, we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and 
as between them, it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of 
the rights of either as against the public. 1 2 
Mr. Justice Pitney went on to say: 
The right of the purchaser of a single newspaper to spread knowledge of 
its contents gratuitously, for any legitimate purpose not unreasonably 
inteifering with complainant's right to make merchandise of it, may be 
admitted; but to transmit that news for commercial use, in competition 
with complainant - which is what defendant has done and seeks to justify 
- is a very different matter. In doing this, defendant, by its very act, 
admits that it is taking material that has been acquired by complainant 
as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and 
money, and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is 
endeavouring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to 
newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members is 
appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown. Stripped of 
all disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized inteiference with 
the normal operation of complainant's legitimate business precisely at 
the point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material 
portion of the profit from those who have earned it to those who have 
not; with special advantage to defendant in the competition because of 
the fact that it is not burdened with any part of the expense of gathering 
the news. The transaction speaks for itself, and a court of equity ought 
not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair competition in 
business. The underlying principle is much the same as that which lies 
at the base of the equitable theory of consideration in the law of trusts -
that he who has fairly paid the price should have the beneficial use of 
the property. Pom. Eq. Jur., par 981. It is no answer to say that 
complainant spends its money for that which is too fugitive or 
evanescent to be the subject of property. That might, and for the 
purposes of the discussion we are assuming that it would, furnish an 
answer in a common-law controversy. But in a court of equity, where 
the question is one of unfair competition, if that which complainant has 
acquired fairly at substantial cost may be sold fairly at substantial 
profit, a competitor who is misappropriating it for the purpose of 
disposing of it to his own profit and to the disadvantage of complainant 
12. P 219 of the judgement. 
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cannot be heard to say that it is· too fugitive or evanescent to be 
regarded as property. It has all the attributes of property necessary for 
determining that a misappropriation . of it by a competitor is unfair 
. . b d . 13 compet1t10n ecause contrary to goo consczence. 
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A defence based on the want of palming off was disposed 
of thus: 
Regarding news matter as the mere material from which these two 
competing parties are endeavouring to make money, and treating it, 
therefore, as quasi property for the purposes of their business because 
they are both selling it as such, defendant's conduct differs from the 
ordinary case of unfair competition in trade principally in this that, 
instead of selling its own goods as those of complainant, it substitutes 
misappropriation in the place of misrepresentation, and sells 
l • I d • 14 comp amant s goo s as zts own. 
Thus, the property conception was extended to afford the 
complainant relief based upon quasi - property rights in 
material upon which labour, skill and money had been 
invested. According to McClure, although the court was 
obviously moved by considerations of fairness and equity 
15 it based its decision on concepts of property. 
In the lengthy dissent by Justice Brandeis the seeds of 
destruction of formalism were, however, sown. 16 
Justice Brandeis denied that the fact that a product of 
the mind has cost its producer money and labour and has 
a value for which others are willing to pay is 
sufficient to vest it with the legal attribute of 
property. The general rule of law, he found, is that 
knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions and ideas 
( 11 the noblest of human productions 11 ) became publici iuris 
f 1 . . h 17 a ter vo untary communication to ot ers. 
13. P 221 of the judgement. 
14. See p 222 of the judgement. 
15. See McClure 325. 
16. See McClure 325-326. 
17. P 225 of his judgement. Justice Holmes also dissented. 
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Nevertheless, INS has come to stand for a general common 
law property right against 
commercial value even though 
"misappropriation" 
it has not 
of 
been 
particularly well received and has not found general 
1 . •· . d k 18 app icat1on in tra e mar cases. 
1.3 Realism 
The realists: 
1. 3 .1 stressed discretionary choice rather than formalism on 
the part of judges; 
1. 3. 2 stressed the importance of providing law with a social 
context; 
1.3.3 required the investigation of empirical facts; 
1.3.4 considered law as a means of social change and developed 
a jurisprudence which stressed the social function of 
law and legal policy. 19 
In the field of trade mark law conceptualist approaches 
to trade marks were attacked as was to be expected. 
McClure assesses the realist impact as follows: 
The result of the realist attack brought about changes in the rhetoric of 
judges arul commentators, though the doctrinal changes were less 
dramatic. The property justification of protection was replaced by 
arguments in favour of protecting business good will or value resulting 
from use. Protecting the public from confusion arul deception became a 
more prominent rationale than protecting property. The distinction 
between trade marks and trade names narrowed. Unfair competition 
torts exparuled to various novel sorts of commercial wrongdoing, though 
both the dilution statutes and the I.N.S. doctrine met with stiff 
resistance. The basis of unfair competition seemed to be grounded more 
18. See Ginsberg, Goldberg and Greenbaum Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 
144; Hanson and Walls 81TMR 480-533 [19911 502-504. 
19. McClure 327-328. 
in general principles of equity, fairness, and urljust enrichment than in 
property rights. 
The key development in trade mark analysis, spurred by the legal realist 
insistence on factual and scientific enquiry, was the examination of the 
economic consequences of trademarks using modem tools of social 
. 20 
sc1ence. 
2. TRADE MARKS AND ECONOMICS 
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A discourse upon the policy considerations underlying 
U.S.A. competition law, with particular reference to the 
role of trade marks, provides a necessary context within 
which to consider the trade mark law of the U.S.A. when 
regarded as a whole. It appears to the writer that the 
still unresolved conflict between monopoly and 
competition theories in relation to trade marks provides 
a essential backdrop to the law. 
Two schools of economic thought have vied for 
acceptance. Firstly, during the 1930's economists of the 
"Harvard school" curtailed 
trade marks suggested by 
economists propounded 
the broader 
21 Schechter. 
protection for 
The Harvard 
that in differentiating 
standardised products by means of trade marks and by 
achieving consumer brand loyalty through advertising, a 
producer could insulate his market share from 
competition and create 
market. This school 
high barriers to entry in the 
of economic thought remained a 
force into the 1980's. Secondly, and by way of 
contrast, the "Chicago school" suggested that branding 
and brand advertising reduces the cost of searching for 
goods, fosters quality control and promotes entry into 
markets. The latter view has only recently prevailed. 22 
20. McClure 329. 
21. Schechter 60TMR 334-352 (1970) reprinted from 40 Harvard Law Review 813. 
22. See Swann and Davis 84 TMR 267-299, (1984) 271. 
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2.1 Landes & Posner23 
These authors of the "Chicago school" have sought to 
formalise the economics of trade marks, relate trade 
marks to other forms of property and have brought into 
consideration links between the economics of language 
and communication and the principal doctrines of trade 
mark law. They regard trade mark law as part of the 
branch of tort law known as unfair competition and 
conclude that like tort law in general trade mark 
1 k . ff. . 24 aw see s to promote economic e iciency. 
In discussing the economics of property rights in law 
the authors regard a property right as a legally 
enforceable power to exclude others from using a 
resource without the need to contract with them. 25 
In economic terms, trade marks reduce consumer search 
costs. Simply put, trade marks allow consumers to 
expend less time and effort in making a choice of 
product than would be the case if the product was 
unmarked. 26 
To have value, according to Landes & Posner, trade marks 
must 
will 
indicate a consistent product 
not maintain its strength by 
quality. A brand 
the investment of 
advertising resources alone. It is consistent quality 
over time which underpins the brand. In denoting 
consistent quality, trade marks require and provide an 
incentive to the producer to maintain consistency of 
quality. This the authors regard as the self-enforcing 
feature of trade marks. Inconsistent quality will 
result in a firm achieving insufficient returns for it 
to invest in promoting trade marks connected with an 
inconsistent brand. Thus, inconsistent quality 
23. William M Landes and Richard A Posner are contemporary members of the "Chicago 
school". See Landes & Posner 78 TMR 267-306 (1988). 
24. Landes & Posner 267. 
25. Landes & Posner 267. 
26. Landes & Posner 271. 
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renders the product equivalent to a non-branded good. 
Hence, a valuable trade mark renders a firm reluctant to 
lower or fluctuate product quality as the firm will 
suffer loss of brand reputation coupled with a capital 
loss on investment in the mark should product quality 
b . . d 27 not e ma1nta1ne . In sum: 
The value of a trademark is the saving in search costs made possible by 
the information or reputation that the trademark conveys or embodies 
about the brand (or the firm that produces the brand). Creating such a 
reputation requires expenditures on product quality, service, 
advertising, and so on. Once the reputation is created, the firm will 
obtain greater profits because repeat purchases and word-of-mouth 
references will generate higher sales, and because consumer will be 
willing to pay higher prices in exchange for lower search costs and 
if . l' 28 greater assurance o consistent qua ity. 
This view suggests that trade marks fulfil both an 
economic and an assurance function (also known as the 
guarantee or quality function) . That both these 
functions require protection at law is clear from the 
following: 
However, the cost of duplicating some one else's trademark is small -
the cost of duplicating a label, design, or package where the required 
inputs are widely available - and the incentive to incur this cost (in the 
absence of legal regulation) will be greater the stronger the trademark. 
The free-riding competitor will, at little cost, capture some of the profits 
associated with a strong trademark because some consumers will assume 
(at least for a time) that the free-rider's brand and the original 
trademark holder's brand are identical. If the law does not prevent it, 
free-riding will eventually destroy the information capital embodied in a 
trademark. The prospect of free-riding may therefore eliminate the 
incentive to develop a valuable trademark in the first place. 29 
27. Landes & Posner 271-272. 
28. Landes & Posner 272. 
29. Landes & Posner 272. 
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The authors also consider trademarks from the point of 
view of communication and the economics of language. 
They state that from the point of view of economics the 
goal of a communication system is to minimise the sum of 
the costs of avoiding misunderstandings and the cost of 
communication. They postulate that the cost of a system 
under which the coiner of a word would obtain a property 
right would be so large as to render such a system 
untenable. The cost of legally enforceable trade marks, 
however, are not substantial. There are infinite 
combinations of letters leading to pronounceable 
combinations for use as trade marks which implies a 
slight value in exchange. At the same time the cost of 
enforcement of trade marks are modest as is the cost of 
transfer thereof as part of a business or under a right 
1 . 30 to icense. 
The authors also consider the argument that insofar as 
trade marks foster differentiation, they also foster 
monopoly, or excessive competition, or both, which 
creates "deadweight costs". According to this approach 
the owner spends money on creating an image, often 
spurious, of high quality which deflects consumers from 
lower price substitutes to higher priced equivalents. 
This leads to rent taking through the monopoly of high 
ground. Name brand goods which command higher prices 
than identical no-name brands illustrate the power of 
advertising to mislead the public and promote monopoly. 
As branding requires trade marks they become the means 
of taking monopolistic rents. Additional costs result 
as the expenditure of one firm in promoting its mark 
cancels out that of another firm. In this way rent 
taking is transformed into costs. No monopoly profits 
then remain but confused consumers must pay higher 
prices whilst resources are wasted in sterile 
30. Landes & Posner 276. It is sometimes argued that a language comprises a largely 
limited number of words which can be depleted by appropriation thereof as trade 
marks. It must however be remembered that the word chosen as a trade mark is not 
removed from general use. What is enjoined is the right to use the word in trade to 
distinguish product. 
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competition. In other words, trade marks promote social 
waste and consumer deception rather than lowering search 
d f . 1. 31 costs an oster1ng qua ity. 
Landes & Posner answer that when their model is 
correctly applied, the proper construction is rather 
that consumers will pay a premium for brand assurances 
of the quality of the manufacture. In so doing 
consumers will spend less time searching for the quality 
required. In this event costs will be saved. 32 
The authors construct their model as follows: the full 
price of a good is its money price plus the search costs 
incurred by the buyer in obtaining information about the 
good. If search costs decline because consumers have 
more information the producer can raise its price 
without exceeding the full price the consumer is 
prepared to pay: 
A firm produces information that reduces consumer search costs in part 
through its trademark. The more resources the firm spends developing 
and promoting its mark, the stronger will its mark be and the lower, 
therefore, consumer search costs will be; so the firm will be able to 
charge a higher price. 33 
Thus, the stronger the trade mark the lower the search 
cost and the higher the money price. According to the 
authors this equation provides the incentive for a trade 
mark owner to expend resources on strengthening the 
trade mark. Spending money on strengthening a trade 
mark increases the money price of goods. Consequently 
firms with strong trade marks command higher prices for 
their brands because of lower search costs and not 
34 because of monopoly power. 
31. Landes & Posner 276-277. 
32. Landes & Posner 277. 
33. Landes & Posner 277. 
34. Landes & Posner 278. 
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The Landes & Posner model implies that the information 
provided by a trade mark has two elements. The first 
enables the consumer to identify the single (albeit 
often anonymous source) which reduces search costs. In 
this instance selection of product is enhanced via past 
selection or the recommendations of other consumers. 
Secondly, the trade mark furnishes 
the product itself. Describing 
properties of the brand also lowers 
information regarding 
or alluding to the 
search costs. 35 
According to Landes & Posner, where the trade mark 
comprises distinctive invented words the number of 
available words remaining in the language are too large 
to bring about language costs. Where however an 
undertaking seeks to impose exclusive rights upon words 
which describe the product, this increases search costs 
because other firms must then adopt a prolix message in 
order to inform, which results in less cost effective 
. f . 36 in ormat1on. 
A further aspect of the Landes & Posner model is that 
trade marks give a firm the incentive to improve the 
quality of its products. They illustrate the point 
thus: suppose that the brand of A is superior in 
quality to the brand of B. If A does not have an 
exclusive right to its trade marks B can adopt them and 
mislead consumers into concluding that brand B is the 
equivalent to the brand of A. If it were made costly 
for consumers to determine the superiority of A's brand 
this would remove A's incentive to incur the added cost 
of producing and distinguishing a better brand. The 
product as a whole would therefore be of a lower quality 
than it would be if not afforded protection by legally 
enforceable trade marks. 37 
2.2 Carter 
Aspects of the views of Landes & Posner have been 
35. Landes & Posner 278. 
36. Landes & Posner 279. 
37. Landes & Posner 279. 
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b . d . . . b 38 su Jecte to cr1t1c1sm y Carter. 
The most relevant thereof from the perspective of this 
thesis is the attack upon the view which regards trade 
marks fungible and infinite in number. According to 
Carter, some marks are 
the point of view 
indeed better than others from 
of being inherently cheaper 
information economizers than others because consumers 
respond more positively to certain marks. As Carter puts 
it "the idea that some marks are better than others 
plainly accords with intuition. (Why EXXON? Well, try 
selling gasoline under the name OXXEN. Or, for that 
matter, GRODROK.)" This construction, says Carter, 
accords with the empirical literature, which suggests 
that consumer preferences are somewhat more complex than 
the simple information model tends to assume. Moreover, 
unless some marks are better than others, firms are 
acting irrationally when they test to see which names or 
symbols will be most attractive to consumers before 
choosing marks for new products. Assuming instead that 
these firms are acting rationally, it must be the case 
that even before proceeding to advertise that is, 
before beginning to build goodwill - a firm that adopts 
one of the better marks will face lower entry costs, and 
probably lower long-run costs, than a firm that adopts 
one that is not as good. Both firms must advertise to 
build their markets, but the first firm, without regard 
to product quality, has an advantage if its mark is 
better. 39 
Carter agrees that in theory, the legal protection of 
trade marks provides incentives for firms to make 
investments aimed at gaining consumer confidence in 
their trade marks. Trade marks, therefore, fulfil an 
information function insofar as they provide packets of 
information which promote an efficient function in the 
38. See Carter 99 Yale Law Journal 759-800 (1990). 
39. Carter 770-771. This approach appears to imply that certain trade marks can have 
inherent value. 
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market by lowering consumer search 40 costs. A trade 
mark states Carter, is part of market language. When 
the law allows a firm to appropriate a mark, the size of 
the set of words (or symbols, patterns, colours and 
other signs as the case may be) then available to the 
next firm is reduced. If consumers are however able to 
use the mark as an information economising device the 
benefit of the removal of the mark will almost certainly 
outweigh the costs thereof. The cost of a good to the 
consumer is equal to the price thereof plus the cost of 
search. The greater the goodwill behind the mark the 
larger the number of consumers which will have a 
positive association to it and the better off the firm 
will be due to the increase this can bring about in 
price. At the same time the consumer is better off as a 
larger nett economy results from there being no 
additional search costs. This outweighs the monopoly 
argument 
long as 
goodwill 
against trade marks, according to Carter, 
marks which are in fact representative 
41 
are removed from the pool. 
as 
of 
Thus, according to Landes & Posner, in economic terms 
trade marks are justified protection because they lower 
consumer search costs and ensure maintenance of quality. 
If goods were not marked, potential purchasers would be 
unable to rely on any brand name, trade mark or 
distinctive trade dress to identify the source of the 
goods and would need a means of testing the product 
directly. Therefore, the more valuable a mark the 
greater the incentive for the producer to maintain the 
level of quality that creates the value and lowers the 
cost of the search. If the law were not to protect 
marks, a producer, faced with competition which is free 
to imitate the symbols and trade dress of another, would 
have no incentive to mark its goods and consumer 
search costs would therefore be raised. This in turn 
40. Carter 759. 
41. See Carter 763. But see footnote 30 at p 394 supra. 
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would lessen the incentive to maintain a high quality 
42 product. 
The economic justification for trade marks as described 
above does however not meet with Carter's full approval 
in that he argues that protection of marks that 
distinguish but convey no information to consumers 
carries significant 
According to Carter: 
but rarely discerned costs. 
The traditional economic justification for trademark law rests on the 
pre-premise that the set of available marks is virtually infinite and, in 
consequence, that the actual mark chosen by a firm to represent its 
goods is irrelevant. If that assumption turns out to be false - if even 
before the public comes to associate a mark with any particular goods 
or services, some marks are more desirable than others - in allowing 
protection of marks devoid of markets significance may raise substantial 
b . b . 43 arners to entry y competitors. 
2 3 E 'd 44 . conom1 es 
Economides observes that by means of what is termed 
perception advertising a mental image may be added to 
the quality and variety features of a trade-marked 
product which facilitates competition arising in an 
additional dimension and in connection with which three 
distortions are possible. 
as follows: 
He describes the distortions 
(a) the ability of firms to differentiate products in perceived features 
may result in more than the optimal number of brands, counteracting 
economies of scale; (b) precommitted advertising may initially create 
monopoly power and profits, which then result in the entry of more than 
the optimal number of firms and the under production of each brand; 
and (c) perception advertising may distort purchasing decisions, 
depending on whether mental images are considered valuable. 45 
42. See the discussion of Landes & Posner in paragraph 4.1 p 392 supra. 
43. Carter 760. The thrust of Carter's article is a criticism of the federal trade mark 
system and not a direct response to Landes & Posner. Carter is in turn 
subjected to criticism by Palladino. See 81 TMR 150-168 (1991 ). 
44. Economides 78 TMR 523-593 (1988). 
400 
According to Economides, however, the potential 
distortions described above are more than compensated 
for by the efficiencies which arise from the ability of 
trade marks to distinguish between goods with 
b bl . . 1 . d . f 46 uno serva e variances in qua ity an variety eatures. 
It is to be noted that the unobservable features of a 
good which consumers value can be crucial determinants 
of the total value of the good. Observable features, on 
the other hand, can often be imitated to the smallest 
detail even though huge differences remain in the 
unobservable features of the product. If goods are not 
trade marked enabling the consumer to choose between 
goods, the desirable product will only be obtained by 
chance. Thus, from the point of view of economics, 
consumers are afforded an educated choice to obtain 
desired qualities by means of trade marks. Furthermore, 
trade marks provide an incentive to quality which 
persuades firms from producing products with the 
cheapest possible unobservable qualities. But where the 
consumer has a trade mark to assist him in identifying 
the goods with the desirable unobservable qualities, a 
clear choice is provided in accordance with which the 
f . d f. d' 1 47 irm can act an pro it accor ing y. 
Economides concludes: 
I have shown that trademarks play an indispensable role in the efficient 
provision of experience goods with the variety and quality 
characteristics consumers desire. A similar role is played by trade 
marks in upholding the quality level of infrequently consumed goods. 
Frequently criticised for anticompetitive effects, trademarks make 
competition in perception advertising possible. However, distortions of 
peifect competition arising from perception advertising can occur. 
Competition in perception advertising without intertemporal effects will 
result in a higher number of brands than is optimal. However, in an 
exogenously growing market, the existence of small intertemporal effects 
46. Economides 532. 
47. Economides 526. 
of perception advertising (i.e., the existence of brand loyalty) can be 
beneficial because it restricts, through the creation of small barriers to 
entry, the number of brands towards the optimal number. The opposite 
results can occur if entry is sequential. The exact magnitude of such 
distortions is difficult to quantify. However, the benefit to the economy 
of trademarks, because of the efficient provision of variety and quality 
features, seems likely to outweigh the welfare loss caused by the 
distortions they create. 48 
2.4 !YlcClure49 
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A brief discussion of the overview of the monopoly 
versus competition conflict provided by McClure 
concludes my discussion of the debate concerning trade 
mark economics in U.S. law. 
In McClure• s 
the U.S.A., 
intellectual 
view the law of unfair trade practices 
which recognises exclusive rights 
in 
in 
with the 
property, 
body of 
remains on 
anti-trust 
a collision course 
law and economics. 
Contemporary economic thought is based upon the ideal 
and value of perfect competition achieving the most 
perfect allocation of resources. To this ideal monopoly 
is repugnant. Injury done to a competitor as a result 
of unfair competition is not, he submits, inherently 
tortuous. The difficulty lies in determining which 
conduct is sufficiently unfair to deny a competitor the 
privileged status normally given to competitive acts. 50 
Essentially, the competitive ideal promotes competition 
whilst monopoly limits it. It is for the law to balance 
the two. 
48. Economides 538-539. 
49. See footnote 3 at p 384 supra. 
50. McClure 306. 
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According to McClure, trade mark law is a compromise 
between protecting business goodwill represented by the 
trade mark, preventing misappropriation of goodwill 
through passing-off, upholding commercial morality, 
preventing confusion of the public (which provides the 
justification for trade mark protection) and furthering 
the competition ideal, which conflicts with all the 
f . 51 a orego1ng. 
Although clearly in conflict with the competition ideal, 
intellectual property monopolies in the nature of 
patents and copyrights are justified, states McClure in 
that they provide incentives to innovation and 
creativity which are worthy of protection. In trade 
mark cases, however, the only monopoly given is the 
right to prevent others from using similar marks as 
identifying symbols in relation to their products. This 
represents only a slight impediment to competition in 
that competitors are not prevented from producing 
identical or similar products. Nevertheless, modern 
economic theory holds that promotion of a trade mark by 
extensive advertising may result in product 
differentiation - which creates a barrier to entry into 
a monopolistic or oligopolistic market. This is 
. . . 52 
ant1-compet1t1ve. 
Regarded historically, the conflict between the 
competition ideal and trade mark created monopoly has 
manifested itself since the inception of the law 
relating to trade marks and, according to McClure, this 
conflict has never resolved itself at any leve1. 53 
Monopolies enforced through marks came into early 
judicial dispute in the seventeenth century and this 
found an echo during the eighteenth century in the case 
of Blanchard v Hill. Earlier royal abuses had led to 
51 . McClure 306-308. 
52. See McClure 307. The anti-competitive construction, which McClure postulates is 
derived inter alia from Chamberlin, of the "Harvard School". (See footnote 15 of 
McClure's work. See also Economides 532). 
53. See McClure 308, 309. 
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antipathy towards monopoly and it was a fear of monopoly 
which led to the refusal in 1862 of the first attempt to 
afford trade marks registration in England. 54 
The property notion of trade marks aggravated the 
conflict insofar as it appeared to grant a monopoly. 55 
I have already 
therefore, tended 
observed that 
to favour 
conceptual 
the monopoly 
formalism, 
approach 
insofar as it favoured the concept of property in a 
trade mark. 56 
The realists supported the views of Chamberlin who was 
the first to suggest (during 1933) that trade marks led 
to product differentiation through the means of 
advertising as it gave rise to consumer loyalty. 
Consumer loyalty, in turn created barriers to entry and 
monopoly. Realist support for Chamberlin's views 
revived anti-monopoly sentiment which did not, however, 
'l . h 57 prevai in t e courts. 
Theoretical resistance to the "Harvard school" came 
during 1974 when the "Chicago school" argued in favour 
of trade mark protection on two grounds. Trade marks 
were not, it was argued, barriers to entry and are in 
fact pro-competitive because they render savings on 
consumer search costs. Secondly, trade marks provide 
incentives which ultimately encourage better products. 58 
According to McClure, modern U.S. law is the story of 
realism never arriving. The Lanham Act, he states, 
54. See McClure 312-313. Blanchard v Hill is discussed at p 22-23 supra. 
55. McClure 318. "Patents, copyrights, and trade-marks excite two deeply seated feelings. 
One is the feeling of anyone who has originated anything of his right to claim an 
exclusive property in it and the trade mark growing out of it. The other is hatred of 
monopoly". See McClure 318, footnote 70. 
56. See p 384-386 supra. 
57. See McClure 330-331, 345. 
58. See McClure 346-34 7. 
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froze common law doctrine and the courts have in general 
been "nee-formalistic". There is, nevertheless, a 
general trend towards more competition the dilution 
cases excepted. 59 McClure favours the limiting rules 
which arose in law in support of anti-monopolistic views 
but eschews their application in limbo: 
When these rules are applied in a vacuum without any consideration of 
the structure of the industry or of economic policy, the result is not so 
much to benefit competition as it is to needlessly withdraw protection 
from the accumulated good will of a business and reward the 
commercial piracy of in/ringers. Openly considering economic 
consequences might indicate that only in a few cases would protection 
tend to preserve the market structures of monopolistic or oligopolistic 
industries with high entry barriers, and protection would be accorded 
unless real anticompetitive results were foreseeable. 60 
McClure is, however, constrained to concede that from a 
practical point of view it would probably be difficult 
for courts to properly consider and apply the market 
consequences of any alleged trade mark monopoly and 
unpredictable results could follow an improper 
investigation. Nevertheless, he suggests that a realist 
approach would eventually develop workable standards to 
reconcile the disparate goals of monopoly and 
competition by properly defining the measures of 
. 61 protection. 
It is interesting to note McClure's observation that the 
conflict between the morality of competitors to behave 
equitably and open competition i.e. morality versus 
policy, was typical of private law between 1800 and 
1870. The swing from monopoly to open competition made 
developmental economic sense insofar as it represented a 
response to the demands of the formative stages of the 
American economy which followed upon the Industrial 
Revolution. The advent of property formalism during 
59. See McClure 340, 344-345. 
60. See McClure 355. 
61. See McClure 354-356. 
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the period 1870-1930 however put a break upon the trend, 
as has been pointed out. 62 
As the twenty-first century approaches, the theoretical 
economics based dichotomy of U.S. trade mark law 
monopoly versus competition remains in need of 
balance, and is unresolved. 
3. THE LANHAM ACT 
I proceed to consider the specific protection afforded 
trade marks in U.S. law. In U.S. law protection is 
afforded trade marks under the Lanham Act, at common law 
and under the state dilution statutes. 
The Lanham Act is considered first. The discussion 
thereof includes the protection which the Act affords 
trade marks, the definition of a trade mark and the 
assignment and licensing of trade marks thereunder, 
which completes the historical overview of relevant 
aspects of U.S. federal trade mark statutes commenced in 
chapter 3. 
3.1 Legislative History 
At the time of the enactment of the Lanham Act on 5 July 
1946, the 1905 Act - which was amended or supplemented 
on sixteen occasions and principally in 1920 and 1938 -
' 11 . f 63 was st1 in orce. 
The 1920 Act64 enabled marks which were not registrable 
under the descriptiveness or name provisions of the 1905 
Act to be registered - provided they had been in used 
for one year and could distinguish goods. After the 
1920 amendments, registration was without limitation as 
to term unless voluntarily cancelled. Applications 
62. See McClure 315-316 and p 384-386 supra. 
63. See Pattishall 68 TMR 121-147 [19781 136. Seep 67-69 supra regarding the 1905 
Act. 
64. Act of March 19, 1920 15 USCS 121-128. 
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could not be opposed and the register could not be 
rectified even where new applications were registered in 
the face of the same or similar marks already on the 
register. This led to the register becoming a 
repository, overshadowing the original purpose of the 
Act, which was to assist U.S. trade mark owners to 
obtain foreign registration 
domestic registration was a 
local registration to be 
instances, to doing business 
concerned. 65 
in territories where 
condition precedent for 
obtained and, in some 
in the foreign territory 
The 1938 Act66 provided for registration of collective 
marks and 
obligations. 
gave effect 
Ultimately it 
concerning collective marks, 
defined in the Act. 67 
to certain 
failed in 
which were 
U.S. 
its 
not 
treaty 
purpose 
properly 
The Lanham Act had its genesis at a meeting of the 
Patent Section of the American Bar Association in St. 
Louis during 1920. It had long been perceived that the 
1905 Act was inadequate and the ABA appointed a 
committee to consider its revision. A draft bill was 
returned to the ABA during 1921 and later, as the Vestal 
Bill, was submitted to congress on a number of occasions 
. h b . 1 68 wit out ecom1ng aw. 
Thereafter, a bill drafted by 
submitted to congress by Senator F G 
without success. Similar bills 
Edward S Rogers was 
Lanham during 1938, 
were debated on 
subsequent occasions but engendered strong opposition 
particularly from the Justice Department which argued 
69 that monopolies would result. According to the Senate 
Committee on Patents: 
The purpose of this bill is to place all matters relating to trademarks in 
65. See Pattishall 136. 
66. Act of June 10, 1938 ch. 332, par 1-3, 5,52 Stat 638, 639. 
67. The Trademark Act of 1946, section 22, 1 5 USC par 1 072 (The Lanham Act); 
See McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 138-142; Pattishall 136-137. 
68. Pattishall 1 36-137. 
one statute and to eliminate judicial obscurity, to simplify registration 
and to make it stronger and more liberal, to dispense with mere 
technical prohibitions and arbitrary provisions, to make procedures 
simple, and relief against infringement prompt and effective. 70 
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The bill was ultimately passed in amended form on 5 July 
1946 and came into force on 5 July 1947. 71 
3.2 Import of the Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act created the first system of nation-wide 
protection for trade marks in the U.S.A.. The 
registrant of a trade mark under the Act became the 
national proprietor of the trade mark extending his 
protection to markets he had never entered and might 
have had no intention of entering. Thus, common law 
proprietorship of a trade mark used in one part of the 
country became, through registration, proprietorship of 
the mark throughout the U.S.A.. According to Carter, 
the trade mark owner was, therefore, given the benefit 
of more than he had invested in the mark, insofar as a 
registered mark was protected in markets where it had no 
. . f. 72 
s1gn1 icance. 
According to Carter a mark has significance only when it 
is used to identify goods, otherwise it remains in the 
market language free for any party to appropriate. He 
states: 
This background understanding, that only marks with meaning are 
protected, is the pillar of the common law of unfair competition. The 
same understanding is also the principal justification offered for federal 
protection of trademarks. It contains a critical element that needs to be 
stressed: the reason that the mark is protected is that it is being used by 
a particular firm to identify its goods. The mark can identify the firm's 
goods only if the firm is actually operating (or at least, if the firm's 
70. See McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 140. 
71 . Pattishall 137. 
72. See Carter 759-760. 
mark is known) in the market in which it is seeking to protect the mark. 
For this reason, it is often said that rights in a mark flow from its use. 73 
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According to McClure the Lanham Act was enacted 
embodying much of prior case law whilst at the same time 
it simplified registration and broadened the rights of 
trade mark owners. The anti-monopolists were rejected 
at the time when the realists were trying to overcome 
formalist views. Common law doctrine was cemented by 
the Lanham Act in the face of realist opposition. The 
Act does not, according 
despite the intention 
modernise the law. 74 
3.3 Registrability and use 
to McClure, solve key issues 
that it should restate and 
Under section 45 (15 U.S.C. 1127) of the Lanham Act a 
trade mark is defined thus: 
Trademark 
The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device or 
any combination thereof -
(1) used by a person, or 
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and 
applies to register on the principal register established by this Act, 
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, 
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of 
the goods, even if that source is unknown. 
The section defines service marks as follows: 
Service Mark 
The term "service mark" means any word, name, symbol, or device, or 
any combination thereof -
(1) used by a person, or 
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and 
applies to register on the principal register established by this Act, 
to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique 
73. Carter 766-767. 
74. McClure 333-334. 
service, from the services of others and to indicate the source of the 
services, even if that source is unknown. Titles, character names and 
other distinctive features of radio or television programs may be 
registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, 
may advertise the goods of the sponsor. 
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Service marks are registrable under section 3 of the Act 
which provides: 
SEC. 3 (15 U.S.C. 1053). Subject to the provisions relating to the 
registration of trademarks, so far as they are applicable, service marks 
shall be registrable, in the same manner and with the same effect as are 
trademarks, and when registered they shall be entitled to the protection 
provided herein in the case of trademarks. Applications and procedure 
under this section shall conform as nearly as practicable to those 
prescribed for the registration of trademarks. 
It becomes immediately apparent from the definitions 
that trade and service marks under the Lanham Act 
function to identify and distinguish the goods and 
services of different enterprises and indicate source. 
Thus, in order to be registrable a mark must be capable 
of distinguishing product and indicating source. 
Fanciful and arbitary marks, because the have the 
required capacities, are registrable whilst completely 
descriptive marks are obviously not. 
The want of registrability of trade marks with secondary 
meaning under the legislation in force at the time of 
the Lanham Act led to the introduction of provisions to 
enable trade marks with secondary meaning to be 
registered. A distinctiveness standard was introduced 
and the term "secondary meaning", long employed by the 
courts to describe marks which had become distinctive in 
f ' d 75 Th 1 . act, was not inserte . e re evant section 
provides: 
75. See Pattishall 140. 
SEC. 2 ({) (15 U.S.C.1052). Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs 
(a), (b), (c) and (d) of this section, nothing herein shall prevent the 
registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become 
distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce. The Commissioner 
may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become 
distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant's goods in 
commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as 
a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date 
on which the claim distinctiveness is made. 
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Only marks which have been used bona fide in inter-state 
commerce are registrable. Prior to the enactment of the 
TMRA76 it was necessary for a mark to have been used 
prior to the application for its federal registration. 
The TMRA enables the applicant to make application for 
federal registration if he has a bona fide intention to 
use the mark in inter-state commerce. Registration will 
not however obtain until the mark concerned has in fact 
been so used within the time constraints provided for. 77 
Bona fide use of a mark creates common law proprietorship 
in the mark. Registration under the Lanham Act does not 
confer ownership but gives constructive notice of the 
registrant's claim to ownership. At the same time 
others are prohibited from using similar marks upon 
their own goods in a way which would bring about 
confusion, deception or mistake. 78 
Thus, according to Carter, federal law has maintained 
the common law passing off model for the most part, but 
without the geographical constraints which limits such 
common law 
established a 
relief to 
79 
market. 
areas where the owner has 
regarded 
which is 
as applying 
The Act can, therefore, be 
common law principles in a market 
This, according to Carter, is national. 
76. The Trade Marks Registration Act of 1988, discussed at p 414-41 5 infra. 
77. See Carter 778. 
78. See Carter 776-777. 
79. See Carter 777. 
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justified on the grounds that a national mark is thereby 
fostered which is an important matter in the U.S.A. 
where the population is mobile, mass advertising is 
nation-wide in its scope and even if an undertaking does 
not have a national market, travelling customers can be 
assured that the familiar mark encountered in another 
area is the known mark. 80 
The Act does not contemplate the preservation of a mark 
solely to prevent its use by others. It requires marks 
to be used if rights of "ownership" are to be maintained 
h . 81 t ere1n. 
3. 4 Innovations of the Lanham Act 
Positively disposed towards the Lanham Act, Pattishall 
provides an overview of its innovations from which the 
discussion which follows is largely derived. 82 
3.4.1 According to Pattishall, the provision of the Act of the 
greatest consequence appears in section 22 which 
provides that: 
SEC. 22 (15 U.S.C.1072). 
Registration of a mark on the principal register provided by this Act or 
under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, shall 
be constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership thereof. 
The effect of this provision was considered in the Dawn 
Donut case. The Plaintiff, who was a wholesale 
distributor of doughnuts and other baked goods under its 
80. See Carter 777. 
81 . See Carter 777. He points out at footnote 70 at p 76-77 that although section 1 refers 
to the "owner" of a mark who may apply for registration no definition of ownership 
appears in the Act. 
82. Pattishall 139-142. 
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federally registered trade marks, Dawn and Dawn Donut, 
sought under the provisions of the Lanham Act to prevent 
the defendant from using the mark Dawn in connection 
with the retail sale of doughnuts and baked goods in a 
fairly limited six county area centered on the city of 
Rochester, New York State. The plaintiff had licensed 
purchasers of its mixes to use its trade marks in 
connection with the retail sale of food products made 
from the mixes but had not licensed or otherwise 
exploited the mark at retail level in the defendant's 
market area for a thirty year period. 
The court held that because no likelihood of public 
confusion arose from current use of the mark in 
connection with retail sales of doughnuts and baked 
goods in the areas which delimited the markets of the 
parties, and because there was no present likelihood 
that the plaintiff would expand retail use of its mark 
into the defendant's market area, the plaintiff was not 
at that time entitled to relief under the Lanham Act and 
the plaintiff's claim was therefore dismissed. 
The court however stated that its decision did not mean 
that the defendant had acquired a permanent right to use 
the trade mark in its trading area. Indeed, because of 
the effect of the constructive notice provision in 
section 22 
Therefore, 
activities 
of the 
should 
to the 
Lanham Act, the 
the plaintiff 
market area of 
contrary applied. 
expand its retail 
the defendant the 
plaintiff would succeed in enjoining defendant's use of 
the mark complained of upon a proper application for 
relief being brought by the plaintiff . 83 
3.4.2 A further innovation was to render a trade mark in use 
incontestable after continuous use for five consecutive 
years subsequent to its date of registration, subject to 
the specific exceptions provided for in the Act. 84 
83. See Dawn Donut Co. v Hart's Food Stores, Inc. 267 F. 2d358 (2d Cir. 1959). 
84. See Pattishall 139. 
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3.4.3 Another new feature in the Lanham Act was the provision 
therein intended to introduce a national law prohibiting 
unfair competition. Section 43 (a), which makes 
provision for the action, is more fully considered 
hereunder. 85 
3.4.4 The Act also introduced amplified protection against 
infringement, which is discussed fully below. 86 
3. 4. 5 Regarding the number of other innovations of a di verse 
nature introduced by the Lanham Act, Pattishall writes 
as follows: 
Among the other of the Act's innovative provisions were those for 
concurrent registration of marks used in separate geographical areas; 
for clearing the register of unused marks after a six year period; for 
registering service marks, collective marks, and certification marks; 
those providing a prima facie presumption of abandonment after two 
years nonuse, inclusion of equitable principles in inter partes 
registration proceedings such as oppositions and cancellations, limiting 
cancellation proceedings, with certain exceptions, to registrations less 
than five years old; recognition of use by related companies and thereby 
of licensing arrangements; and those establishing a Principal Register 
providing full rights and a Supplemental Register providing limited 
. h 87 ng ts. 
The Lanham Act has been amended a number of times since 
its enactment. The most important amendments were in 
1962 when the concept of infringement was broadened by 
the deletion of the limitation to "purchasers" of those 
likely to be confused, mistaken or deceived in the test 
f . f . 88 or in ringement. 
Further substantial amendments were brought about by the 
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (the TLRA) discussed 
. h f 11 . . 89 in t e o owing section. 
85. See p 419, 425-429 hereunder. 
86. See p 417-425 hereunder. 
87. See Pattishall 141 and the sections of the Act referred to at footnotes 112-122 of his 
article. 
88. The Act of October 9, 1962, p L 87-722 76 Stat 769. See Pattishall 141-142. 
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4. THETLRA 
The TLRA, which came into force during November 1989, 
brought about the following substantial amendments to 
the Lanham Act: 
4 .1 It introduced applications for registration of a trade 
or service mark on the basis of a bona fide intent to use 
the mark in inter-state commerce. 
4.2 The filing of applications based upon intent to use now 
established national "constructive use" priority rights 
for applicants. This is, however, subject to certain 
specific exceptions provided for in the enactment and 
the issue ultimately of a registration certificate in 
the Principal Register once actual inter-state use 
commences; 
4 . 3 Actual bona fide use of a trade mark is now required to 
obtain ultimate registration or renewal, as opposed to 
token use of marks which was acceptable previously. 
4. 4 Intent to use applications are processed and published 
for opposition like all other applications based on use. 
Notices of allowance issue if no opposition is made. 
However, a declaration of use must be filed within six 
months of allowance or within a further two year period 
upon good cause shown, before registration will issue. 
4.5 Registration and renewal periods have been curtailed 
from twenty to ten years in order to purify the register. 
4. 6 Causes of action for the infringement of unregistered 
trade marks or trade dress are expressly recognised 
together with causes of action for false advertising. 
The same relief is ,granted in such actions as that 
obtainable in respect of the infringement of registered 
trade marks. 
4.7 Trade disparagements in the nature of misrepresentations 
concerning the goods or services of the undertaking of 
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another are rendered actionable as false advertising for 
the first time. 
The TLRA also introduced further minor changes which are 
not of relevance to this work. 90 
It is immediately apparent from the above conspectus of 
US trade mark legislation and the Lanham Act in 
particular, that the statutory trade mark law of the 
U.S.A. is fundamentally different to that of the United 
Kingdom and South Africa both prior to and after the 
1994 and 1993 trade mark enactments in these countries. 
Therefore, in South Africa the doctrine in Policansky 
Bros (a passing off matter) must, in trade mark matters, 
be applied reservedly. 91 
5. ASSIGNMENT 
Section 10 of the Lanham Act provides that trade mark 
and service mark applications and registrations are only 
assignable with the goodwill of the business in which 
the mark is used or with that part of the goodwill of 
the business connected with the user and symbolized by 
the mark. 92 
Trade mark assignment theory in 
marks as property which can 
U.S. law regards trade 
be bought, sold and 
licensed. The property in trade marks has been strictly 
maintained as being in the goodwill of the business with 
which the mark is associated. 93 
Hence, the rule that trade marks are not assignable in 
gross is strictly applied. Underpinning the rule is the 
concept that the assignee in an assignment in gross 
90. See Gilson TLRA 1988 Comm 5-17 regarding all of the aforegoing. See also McCarthy 
Trademarks and Unfair Competition (Cumulative Supp. December 1991) 193-194. 
91. See footnote 1. See also Royal Beech-nut (Pty) Ltd t/a Manhattan Confectioners v 
United Tobacco Co Ltd t/a Willards Foods 1992(4) SA 118(A). 
92. See 15U.S.C. 1060. 
93. See p83 supra. McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 792-793. 
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could use the assigned mark in connection with a 
different business, goods or goodwill to that with which 
the mark was previously connected. This would break the 
continuity of association previously forged by the mark 
and work a fraud on the purchasing public who are 
entitled to assume that a mark will continue to 
symbolize the same goodwill. 94 
The effect of an assignment in gross is, as a general 
rule, that the assignment is invalid and no rights pass. 
Hence, subsequent use of the mark by an assignee means 
that he commences his own use of the mark and cannot 
rely on the prior goodwill therein acquired through its 
use by the assignor. In addition, the mark could lose 
its distinctiveness as an indicator of origin and so 
become invalidated. On the other hand, if the assignor 
ceases using the mark even though the rights purportedly 
assigned remain with him, he could be regarded as having 
abandoned the mark should the circumstances indicate 
th . 95 lS. 
A valid assignment on the other hand divests the 
assignor of all his rights in and to the mark and the 
assignee succeeds thereto together with all the 
. h . 96 properties t ere1n. 
Although recordal of assignment is not peremptory under 
the Lanham Act a failure to do so will deny the assignee 
the actions available under the Act as well as 
protection against a subsequent bonaftde purchaser. 97 
6. LICENSING 
There are no specific provisions relating to licensing in 
94. See McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 794, 800. 
95. See McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 806-810; Carter 985-986. 
96. See McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 805. 
97. See McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 802-803; See also Carter 785-787 
regarding the impact of the TLRA upon the rule against assignments in gross. 
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the Lanham Act. It is, however, clear that the Act does 
not prevent licensing for a number of its provisions 
clearly contemplate controlled licensing. 98 
According to McCarthy, whereas common law restrictions 
limited legal protection to the single function of 
indicating source only, recognition of the quality 
assurance function of trade marks during the 1930's led 
to the acceptance of trade mark licensing based upon 
control over use of the mark by the proprietor thereof. 
Simply put, if a mark indicates quality consumers can be 
assured that products featuring the same mark will be of 
the same quality. Therefore, if the proprietor ensures 
that a licensee maintains quality under the licence, the 
public will not be misled regarding the quality of the 
product. 99 
Where, however, control by the licensor is absent, one 
has to do with "naked licencing". As licensing of this 
kind leads to public deception the mark concerned can 
lose its significance and its federal registration could 
be lost. 100 
The above review of trade mark assignment and licensing 
law in the U.S.A. leads to the conclusion that whereas 
the law of trade mark licensing - which is based upon 
control over use of the mark - is established and has 
affirmed the presence of the quality assurance function 
in the trade mark law of the U.S.A., the assignment of 
trade marks is restricted because in US law trade marks 
are afforded significance as appurtenant to goodwill 
only. 
7. PROTECTION OF TRADE MARKS UNDER THE LANHAM ACT 
Under the Lanham Act trade mark infringement is a spec1es 
98. McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 829. 
99. See McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 826-829. 
100. See McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 833-835. Am Can Enterprises, Inc. 
v Renzi 32 F. 3 d 233 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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of the genus unfair competition and involves the same 
legal wrong. 
The Lanham Act was intended to codify the protection 
afforded trade marks under the common law wrong of 
unfair competition prior to its enactment albeit an 
extended form whilst at the same time providing a 
comprehensive system of trade mark registration and 
protection at federal level. The Act provides 
protection under the likelihood of confusion standard 
which applied previously in the common law unfair 
' ' ' h ' d d d' f 101 competition action t e Act was inten e to co i y. 
The infringement provisions of the Lanham Act are to be 
found in sections 32 and 43(a). 
Section 32(1), which defines the section 32 tort, 
provides: 
SEC.32 (15 U.S.C. 1114). (1) Any person who shall, without the 
consent of the registrant -
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counteifeit, copy, or colorable 
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for 
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in 
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive; or 
(b) reproduce, counteifeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark 
and apply such reproduction, counteif eit, copy or colorable imitation to 
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements 
intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or 
in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the 
registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) 
hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages 
unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation 
is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive. 
101 . See Hanson & Walls 81 TMR 480-533 ( 1991) 495-496. This article is well 
written and important in that it indicates that the functions of trade marks are 
the aspect of trade marks which the law should protect. 
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In order to succeed in an infringement action under 
section 32 (1) 
establish that: 
the the complainant must the ref ore 
7.1 the trade mark upon which he relies is registered; 
7.2 the infringer was not acting with his consent; 
7.3 the infringing mark was a reproduction, counterfeit, 
copy or colorable imitation of the registered mark; 
7.4 the infringing mark was used in commerce and was used in 
connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
distribution or advertising of goods or services; 
7.5 use of the infringing mark was likely to cause 
f . . k d . 102 con us1on, or to cause m1sta e, or to ece1ve. 
Whereas section trade marks from 
unauthorized use 
32 ( 1) 
which 
protects 
is likely to cause confusion, 
mistake or deception, section 43(a) protects trade marks 
against use by others which constitutes a false 
designation of origin or a false or misleading 
misrepresentation. 103 Section 43(a) provides: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, 
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of 
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false of misleading 
representation off act, which -
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to 
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another 
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her 
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or 
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or 
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 
102. See Hanson & Walls 486. Section 32(2) contains special provisions regarding 
innocent acts by printers, publishers and broadcasters which do not require 
treatment in this work. 
103. See Hanson & Walls 496. Section 43(b) relates to the importation of infringing 
goods and need not be considered for the purposes of this work. 
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Under both infringement provisions of the Act the 
likelihood of confusion is the central enquiry. 104 
Hanson & Walls observe that the confusion caused by 
unauthorised trade mark usage may 
forms which directly relate to the 
f . 105 . h. . unctions. In my view t is is 
take a variety of 
various trade mark 
a crucial insight. 
Unfortunately the range of functions protected under the 
Lanham Act is limited to the traditional functions. In 
the first place, the source or origin function obtains 
. 106 protection. 
In the second place, also the quality function is 
protected under the confusion rationale of the Lanham 
Act as evidenced by cases involving confusion of 
sponsorship or association: 
When a consumer has come to anticipate a specific level of quality or 
peiformance from products bearing a particular trademark, and when 
the same mark is used on certain other goods, which may or may not be 
in direct competition with the trademark owner, the consumer may be 
led to believe some type of association exits between the trademark 
owner and the marked goods. Either of the Lanham Act's infringement 
sections protects against the false associations, provided that the 
owner's mark is federally registered. 107 
Denicola affords a lucid explanation. He writes: 
The confusion generated by the unauthorised use of another's mark may 
take a variety of forms. In the simplest case, the confusion relates 
directly to source identity. The consumer who wishes to patronise a 
specific manufacturer may be deceived by the use of a counteif eit 
trademark and deal instead with the infringer. Frequently, however, a 
consumer is either uninterested or unaware of the actual identity of the 
source offering the desired product or service. Prior purchases or 
104. Hanson & Walls 496-947. 
105. Hanson & Walls 497. 
106. See Hanson & Walls 498. 
107. Hanson & Walls 498. 
advertising may have created a desire to obtain a particular brand, 
although its source may be entirely unknown. The use of a counteifeit 
mark may permit an infringer to capitalise on such brand preference by 
inducing the belief that the merchandise originates from the desired, 
though unknown, source. In still other instances, however, the 
trademark may in reality serve not as an indication of source, but rather 
of quality. The consumer may have come to anticipate a specific level 
of quality or peiformance from goods bearing a particular mark, 
regardless of their origin. Indeed, it is only from this perspective that 
the licensing of trademarks may be rationalised. Perhaps the clearest 
examples of this species of confusion are those cases recognising 
confusion of sponsorship or association as the basis of infringement. 
In its formative stage, the law of trademarks was confined to the 
problem of confusingly similar marks on directly competitive goods. 
The primary concern was plainly the wrongful diversion of trade. But 
there is an additional threat inherent in such circumstances: if the 
consumer remains mistaken about the origin of the products purchased 
from the infringer, any subsequent dissatisfaction will be at the expense 
of the senior user's reputation and good will. This latter interest may 
be jeopardised even in the absence of any threatened diversion of trade. 
The division of the two interests is apparent when the senior user's mark 
is applied by another to non-competing goods. If the public is misled, 
the trade mark owner's reputation may be endangered despite the 
b ifd . . . 108 a sence o zrect compet1tzon. 
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The confusion necessary for the infringement of trade or 
service marks registered under the Lanham Act is not 
limited to the confusion of buyers as to the source of 
goods featuring the marks but extends to any kind of 
f . . 1 d . f . b d 1 09 con us1on, inc u ing con us1on etween pro ucts. 
Clearly the Lanham Act affords extensive protection 
under the umbrella of the likelihood of confusion 
standard to both the source and quality functions of 
trade marks. Although section 43(a) affords wide 
protection against false advertising by competitors 
neither this section nor section 32 affords specific 
108. Denicola 158 Wisconsin L.R. 158-207 [19821 162-163. 
109. McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition Vol. 2 116. 
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protection to the advertising or selling functions of 
the trade mark itself. 110 
The limitations upon the range of functions protected by 
the Lanham Act is aptly illustrated by the case of Job's 
111 Daughters. 
Job's Daughters, a young woman's fraternal organisation 
established in 1921, used its name and emblem (three 
girls within a double triangle) as a collective mark. 
The fraternity had licensed at least one jeweller to 
produce jewellery on its behalf and sold some of the 
licensed jewellery to its members. Jewellery bearing 
the name and emblem was also sold by a large number of 
retailers across the U.S.A .. The retailers sold certain 
jewellery manufactured by fraternity licensees whilst 
others sold jewellery manufactured by unlicensed 
sources. One Lindeburg had made and sold fraternal 
jewellery featuring the emblem since 1954 and had sought 
to be appointed as an "official jeweller" on a number of 
occasions prior to 1973 when permission so to act was 
granted for one year only and thereafter withdrawn. 
Job's Daughters brought an action against Lindeburg, who 
continued to use the mark, during 1975 based on 
infringement of their common law trade mark rights in 
the emblem, which failed in the federal court. 
Job's Daughters 
Fletcher J held 
relied on 
that the 
the Boston 
Lanham Act 
Hockey 112 case. 
was directed at 
protecting consumers against deceptive designations of 
the origin of goods and, conversely, enabled producers 
to differentiate their products from those of others. 
The Boston Hockey decision "transmorgified" the narrow 
protection afforded by the Act into a broad monopoly by 
110. See Hanson & Walls 499. 
111. International Order of Job's Daughters v Lindeburg & Co. 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 
1980). 
11 2. Boston Professional Hockey Association v Dallas Cap Emblem 51 0 F. 2d 1 004 (5th 
Cir. 1975), discussed hereunder. 
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the application of perceptions of equity and the desire 
to bestow broad property rights upon the owners of trade 
marks. In the latter regard the Fletcher, J held: 
A trademarks is, of course, a form of business property. But the 
"property right" or protection accorded a trademark owner can only be 
understood in the context of trademark law and its purposes. A 
trademark owner has a property right only insofar as is necessary to 
prevent consumer confusion as to who produced the goods and to 
facilitate differentiation of the trademark owner's goods. The Boston 
Hockey court decided that broader protection was desirable. In our 
view, this extends the protection beyond that intended by Congress and 
beyond that accorded by any other court. 
Indeed, the court in Bos ton Hockey admitted that its decision "may 
slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose of protecting the public 
to the protection of the business interests of the plaintiffs ". 510 F. 2d at 
1011. We think that this tilt was not slight but an extraordinary 
extension of the protection heretofore afforded trademark owners. 113 
The court denied Job's Daughters relief in finding that 
use of the mark by Lindeburg did not indicate the source 
or quality of the goods and there was, therefore, no 
likelihood of confusion and hence no trade mark 
infringement under traditional trade mark doctrine. The 
mark served an "aesthetic function" and the jewellery 
was purchased to indicate an affiliation with the 
fraternity and not because it was believed by purchasers 
that the jewellery originated from Job's Daughters. 114 
In the Boston Hockey case the respondent had, without 
authorisation, manufactured and sold emblems which were 
a substantial duplication of symbols which designated 
the individual teams of the National Hockey League 
(NHL) . The marks were almost universally known to the 
public in the U.S.A. by virtue of public attendance at 
NHL games, extensive national television coverage of NHL 
fixtures and extensive national news, newspaper, magazine 
113. At p 919 of the judgement. 
114. See Hanson & Walls 510-511. 
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and television coverage of the sport. The plaintiff's 
were a number of NHL teams which had granted exclusive 
licensing rights in the symbols to various manufacturers 
which had generated very substantial revenue. The 
defendant had been denied a licence. It was found as 
fact that the defendant had deliberately reproduced 
plaintiff's marks on embroidered emblems and intended 
the consuming public to recognise the emblems as the 
symbols of the various hockey teams in order that they 
might be purchased. The plaintiffs succeeded. 
It was said regarding the law that section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act creates a federal cause of action for false 
representation of goods or service in commerce. Unfair 
competition was a broader area of the law than statutory 
trade mark 
regarded as 
infringement and was 
a question of whether 
almost universally 
the defendant was 
passing off goods or services as those of the plaintiff, 
leading to confusion on the part of potential customers. 
As a general rule, the same facts which would support an 
action for trade mark infringement would also support an 
. f f . . . 115 action or un air competition. 
The court, however, granted relief under section 32 (1) 
holding as follows regarding the confusion requirement 
of the section: 
The district court decided that there was no likelihood of confusion 
because the usual purchaser, a sports fan in his local sporting goods 
store, would not be likely to think that the defendant's emblems were 
manufactured by or had some connection with the plaintiff. This court 
has held that the findings of a district court as to the likelihood of 
confusion are factual and not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous. 
In this case, however, the district court overlooked the fact that the act 
was amended to eliminate the source of origin as being the only focal 
point of confusion. The confusion question here is conceptually 
difficult. It can be said that the public buyer knew that the emblems 
portrayed the teams' symbols. Thus, it can be argued, the buyer is not 
11 5. See p 101 0 of the judgement. 
confused or deceived. This argument misplaces the purpose of the 
confusion requirement. The confusion or deceit requirement is met by 
the fact that the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold 
them to the public knowing that the public would identify them as being 
the teams' trademarks. The certain knowledge of the buyer that the 
source and origin of the trademark symbols were in plaintiff's satisfies 
the requirement of the act. The argument that confusion must be as to 
the source of the manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, 
where the trademark, originated by the team, is the triggering 
mechanism for the sale of the emblem. 11 6 
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Thus, the leading cases concerning 11 association goods 11 
show a difference in jurisprudential approach between 
the interests of the proprietor of the mark in the 
Boston Hockey case, and the supposed interests of the 
consuming public in Job's Daughters, where there was no 
confusion in the narrow sense of the trade mark 
indicating the source of the goods, wherefore relief was 
d . d 117 en1e . 
The test for liability under the Lanham Act is therefore 
whether the public is likely to be confused or deceived 
by the similarity of the marks in connection with the 
source (Job's Daughters) or the sponsorship (Boston 
Hockey) which they designate. 
The two cases again serve to illustrate the 
contradistinction between a property oriented approach 
to trade mark protection (Boston Hockey) and an approach 
founded in the public interest whereunder the public 
must not be confused (Job's Daughters). The cases also 
serve as an apt illustration that a different approach 
brings about a different result. 
8. PROTECTION OF TRADE MARKS UNDER THE COMMON LAW 
Protection against trade mark infringement entered the 
116. See p 1012 of the judgement. 
117. See Ginsberg, Goldberg and Greenbaum Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 473. 
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common law through an action based upon deceit although 
it was the public rather than the trade mark owner who 
d . d 118 b 1 . . d d were eceive . Su sequent y, equity intru e to 
protect the owner's "title" to the trade mark without 
f h . f d . 119 re erence to t e question o eceit. 
Denicola puts it thus: 
The law of trademarks and unfair competition has its roots in the 
common law action of deceit. The gravamen of the complaint was that 
the defendant had fraudulently marketed goods by utilising an imitation 
of plaintiff's trademark. Injury to the aggrieved trademark owner was 
direct: diversion of trade through a misrepresentation of the source of 
defendant's merchandise. Purchasers who by whim or design had 
chosen to patronise the trademark owner were duped into dealing with 
an impostor. The concept of customer confusion is thus the touchstone 
of traditional trademark theory. 120 
The confusion rationale remains the principal basis of 
trade mark liability and the test for trade mark 
infringement, whether under the Lanham Act or under the 
law of unfair competition, is whether a substantial 
number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be 
misled or confused as the source of the product 
featuring the infringing mark. 121 
Section 3 of the 1920 Act, the first federal statute 
affording a cause of action against the infringement of 
a registered trade mark, adopted the legal standard of 
deceit for the grant of relief both at law and in equity 
and specifically required the infringement complained of 
f 1 d . . f . . 122 to amount to a a se esignation o origin. 
118. See p 35-38 supra regarding early trade mark protection in U.S. law. 
119. Schechter 338. 
120. Denicola 160. 
121. See Denicola 160 footnote 8. 
122. See Swann & Davis 283. 
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Prior to the Lanham Act, marks which were coined or 
words which in their primary meaning were not closely 
related to the goods were termed technical marks, as I 
have recorded. These fanciful or arbitrary marks were 
granted protection upon adoption and an infringement 
action was afforded the owner. More descriptive marks 
on the other hand were not afforded this protection as 
they did not qualify as technical marks. Where, 
however, these marks had generated a secondary meaning 
through use i.e. the owner was identified as the source 
of the goods by the mark, the common law afforded an 
unfair competition action against use of a mark in a way 
which would confuse consumers as to source. 123 It will 
have been noted that the Lanham Act was intended to 
re-enact the common law. 124 
The technical distinctions concerning marks have largely 
fallen away in modern law but the confusion rationale 
remains the principal basis for liability and the 
dominant theme both under the common law and the Act. 125 
Also the state statutes, apart from the 
provisions, merely state the confusion 
Both common law and registered trade marks 
by "confusion, mistake or deception" under 
of the Act. Under section 32 the 
anti-dilution 
. 1 126 rat1ona e. 
are inf ringed 
section 43(a) 
likelihood of 
deception (as opposed to actual deception which from an 
evidentory 
deception) 
point of view 
is the test for 
Hence, both the marks. 
indicates a likelihood of 
infringement of registered 
traditional common law and 
statutory trade mark regimes in the U.S.A. view the 
issue of consumer confusion as the sine qua non of 
. f . 127 in r1ngement. 
The introduction during the first half of the twentieth 
century of the rule that use in relation to similar 
goods rather than only identical goods could constitute 
123. Denicola 160-161. 
124. See 41 8 supra. 
125. Denicola 161. 
126. See Denicola 161. 
127. Denicola 162. 
428 
an infringement overcame the earlier approach which 
confined relief to situations of direct competition. It 
was perceived that confusion resulting from use was at 
the expense of the senior user's reputation and goodwill 
and the law therefore extended protection to goods 
sufficiently related to the goods of the complainant to 
give rise to confusion as to the source or sponsorship 
of the goods featuring the infringing mark. A diversion 
of trade was not, therefore, the sole rationale for 
protection and the owner's reputation (with reference to 
the quality of his goods) could be harmed even if no 
direct competition was taking place. 128 
According to Lunsford, the mere adoption of a trade mark 
does not create rights at common law. A trade mark 
comes into being not through its selection but through 
its use in the market place to identify goods in trade. 
Invention of the mark and 
. . 1 129 d. immateria . Accor ing 
an 
to 
intention to use it are 
this author trade mark 
rights depend on two things: priority of adoption and 
continued occupancy in the market place. Registration 
does not create rights but merely serves as public 
. f h 1 . . h. 130 notice o t e owner's c aim to proprietors ip. 
Carter expresses a different view: 
Under the Lanham Act, a firm that obtains registration of a mark 
suddenly becomes the mark's proprietor in markets that the firm has 
never entered and might indeed have no interest in entering. In other 
words, common law ownership of a mark in one part of the country can, 
through registration, become effective ownership of the mark in every 
part of the country. The effect of this approach is to give the mark's 
owner the benefit of more than has been invested, by treating the mark 
as carrying significance in markets where it has none. Under the 
TMRA, the deviation from the common law is greater still. Now, an 
128. Denicola 163-164. 
129. Lunsford 4 Georgia L R 322-340 [19701 323. (But see the discussion regarding 
the TLRA enacted during 1988 at 414-415 supra.) 
130. Lunsford 325. 
4 applicant can receive nationwide priority - effectively, common law 
ownership - in a mark that it has never used anywhere. 131 
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According 
vest in 
to Carter, trade mark rights at 
their owner by virtue of 
common law 
first user 
appropriation of the mark in a manner which clearly 
associates it with the user's goods. At common law the 
owner's rights are co-extensive with the good will the 
mark represents and this is aptly illustrated by the 
. ff . 1 32 h . f 1 d passing-o action. T e action or common aw tra e 
mark infringement in respect of 
and trade marks with secondary 
subsumed into the action for 
Carter writes: 
technical trade marks 
meaning 
unfair 
was gradually 
. . 133 
competition. 
Over the years, the common law has developed a number of doctrines, 
generally grouped under the heading "urifair competition", to protect 
the investment that the first user makes in convincing the public to 
associate quality goods with the mark. Despite decades of evolution, 
the workhorse of urifair competition remains the original common law 
action/or ''passing off" or ''palming off". 134 
9. EXTENDED PROTECTION UNDER COMMON LAW 
According to Denicola, trade mark owners continue to 
press for protection beyond traditional theory and the 
response of the courts thereto has 
grant relief by affording trade 
135 property. 
been a willingness to 
marks the status of 
The notion of trade marks as property has, however, 
never prevailed and has remained subsidiary to notions 
of deception and commercial morality. The property 
right in a trade mark is still regarded as of a 
particular kind: an instrumentality to the protection of 
131. Carter 760. 
132. Carter 764. 
133. Carter 764. 
1 34. Carter 764. 
135. Denicola 1 59. 
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d . d d · 11 136 tra e reputation an goo w1 . 
It is therefore a matter of convenience only to speak of 
the trade mark "owner". A mark is the symbol of the 
goodwill of an enterprise which makes it a valuable 
commercial asset capable of exploitation and assignment. 
Trade marks are not however owned. They are not 
property in the true sense because the right to exclude 
all others is not implied. Protection is only afforded 
when a real or immanent threat to goodwill arising out 
f f . b 137 D . 1 o consumer con us1on comes a out. en1co a states: 
Traditional trademark doctrine does not establish the general right to 
exclude others implied by the property designation. Protection is 
normally limited to instances in which there is a threatened 
appropriation or injury to good will arising through consumer 
confusion. The danger in utilising a property conception of trademark, 
however, goes beyond its inadequacy as a descriptive theory. When 
adopted, it inevitably assumes a normative role, reducing a mode of 
analysis incapable of transcending doctrine, thus precluding rational 
consideration of competing social, economic, and occasionally 
constitutional interests. 1 38 
Nevertheless, trade mark law has sometimes ventured 
beyond the confines of the confusion model and the 
proponents 
allied to 
of this 
property 
approach have championed models 
rather than tort. In Denicola' s 
view, however, the confusion standard is sufficiently 
supple to accommodate an expansion of a trade mark 
"owner's" rights. For example, in non-competing goods 
cases it has been accepted that public awareness of the 
trend toward corporate diversification engenders 
confusion in non-related goods cases and in subliminal 
confusion cases. 139 
136. Denicola 164-165. 
137. Denicola 165. This conclusions is open to doubt. 
138. Denicola 165. 
139. Denicola 166. 
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The case law regarding the application of the confusion 
standard in U.S. trade mark law is extensive and 
diverse. Denicola is of great assistance in 
categorising those cases which "undermine" the 
traditional confusion standard as follows: 
9.1 where third parties and not purchasers are confused; 
9.2 where intentional copying of descriptive marks is taken 
as proof of their distinctiveness; 
9.3 where proof of confusion is not required insofar as the 
courts regard acceptance of the likelihood of expansion 
into new markets in related goods cases as being 
sufficient; 
9.4 in the following category of cases, lip-service is paid 
to the confusion principle especially, -
9.4.1 in confusion of "association" or "connection" cases 
where confusion is found in the mechanism of recognition 
i.e. the sight of a familiar trade mark calls to mind 
the trade mark owner and consumer recognition of this is 
equated with confusion of sponsorship or affiliation; 
9.4.2 where well-known trade marks are adopted without a 
likelihood of confusion. It is to be noted that it is 
common for relief to be given on the basis of public 
recognition of celebrated marks in the U.S.A. 140 
The confusion standard is not always elastic enough, in 
my view, to resolve all of the categories of the above 
cases categorised by Denicola without a distorted or 
forced application thereof. 
In the view of Denicola, the confusion rationale will 
protect and sustain the public recognition approach in 
confusion of association or connection cases if 
consumers believe that use of the marks in commerce 
indicate participation or approval of the trade mark 
owner. This perception on the part of the public would 
be reinforced by the courts protecting marks in these 
circumstances but would dissipate if the law were to 
allow third parties to exploit such marks. Also, in his 
view, the perception is reinforced by the way owners of 
140. See Denicola 166-170. 
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celebrated marks use them in modern times. The author 
is nevertheless constrained to accept that the cases 
which protect celebrated marks, despite rhetoric to the 
contrary, recognise an exclusive right to exploit the 
commercial value or appeal of the trade mark concerned. 
He concludes that this is a specific application of the 
tort of misappropriation to which INS gave rise. He 
finds that extrapolating from the INS case, a number of 
cases expressly prohibit appropriation of the 
merchandising value of trade marks. In this regard 
merchandising 
development, 
includes sales promotion, new product 
market and manufacture co-ordination, 
effective advertising and selling and the licencing of 
established images to foster sale of the product with 
h . h h . d 141 w ic t ey are associate . 
A number of cases have challenged and struggled to keep 
trade mark rights within the traditional ambit (as the 
response in Job's Daughters to the Boston Hockey case 
1 . 11 ) 142 . . f bl apt y i ustrates . Recognition o a protecta e 
trade mark persona has also been eschewed. 143 
In my view, the need for extended protection for trade 
marks to match developments in the market place 
continues to direct the law towards fuller recognition 
of property in trade marks beyond mere appurtenance to 
goodwill. 
In their recent article, first published during 1994, 
Swann & Davis argue for protection of brand equity 
(which they define as the positive associations that 
comprise a brand) by affording the owner of the brand 
equitable relief founded in trespass upon property. 
They conclude: "We have come full cycle, and it is now 
' h ' d' f II 144 time to restore t e equity para igm o a century ago . 
141 . Denicola 1 70-1 71 . 
142. See Battersby and Grimes 76 TMR 271-307 [1986] 271 and 69 TMR 431-459 [1969]. 
143. Denicola, 174-176. See also p 436-437 infra. 
144. Swann & Davis 267, 299. For a discussion of the origin of the property approach to 
trade marks in equity see p29-31 supra. 
433 
10. MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE MARKS 
10.1 
10.2 
10.3 
Although the Lanham Act and the anti-dilution statutes 
provide the primary means 
infringement in the U. S . A. , 
the common law continues 
for preventing trade mark 
trade mark protection under 
to develop alongside the 
statutes as observed in the preceding section. 
In particular, the tort of misappropriation, the subject 
of conflicting approaches in the courts, has become 
relevant in the field of trade mark law. 
The tort of misappropriation was introduced by the INS 
case . 
145 According to McCarthy, there are three 
elements necessary to plead and prove a case of 
misappropriation, namely: 
the plaintiff must have invested time, effort and money 
in bringing the matter misappropriated into being in 
such measure that a court is able to characterise the 
matter concerned a quasi-property right; 
the quasi-property must have been appropriated by the 
defendant at little or no cost, leading to an inference 
by the court that the defendant's actions represent 
"reaping where it has not sown"; 
th · · t · t · · the 1 · t · ff 146 e m1sappropr1a ion mus inJure p a1n i . 
Although misappropriation has been applied in trade mark 
cases it has not found general application therein and 
has not been particularly well received, generally. 147 
There has been inconsistency and confusion in the 
application of the doctrine in the cases. According to 
145. Discussed at p 386-390 supra. 
146. McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 396. 
14 7. See for instance the leading case of Metropolitan Opera Association v Wagner -
Nichols Recorder Corp. (1950) 199 Misc 786, 101 NYS 2d 483, affd 279 App Div 
632, 107 NYS Ld 795; see also Hanson & Walls 502-503. 
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Hanson & Walls, this has resulted from the courts 
seeking to apply the traditional likelihood of confusion 
rationale to 
misappropriation 
matters 
148 
cases. 
which are 
In a number 
essentially 
of cases the 
courts have refused to stretch traditional doctrines to 
prevent misappropriations and, in refusing to apply the 
tort, have permitted the misappropriation of goodwill 
. d . h d k 149 associate wit tra e mar s. 
It seems clear to me that in misappropriation cases 
where no likelihood of confusion results the complainant 
will only succeed if the court adopts a property related 
approach. Insofar as the confusion standard is directed 
at protecting the public rather than the property rights 
of trade mark owner relief sought on the basis of 
traditional theory in misappropriation cases is bound to 
fail unless the court distorts the confusion standard to 
assist. 
Hanson & Walls underline the difficulties regarding the 
INS doctrine of misappropriation when it is applied to 
trade mark cases. The judge made doctrine, it is said, 
is unreliable, has been inconsistently applied in 
general, has in instances been held inapplicable to 
trade mark law and may be preempted by federal law. 
Apart from the dissenting judgements of Justices Holmes 
and Brandeis in the case itself, some courts have held 
that later Supreme court decisions have overruled INS. 
It has also been suggested that INS might be part of the 
general common law which no longer exists after Erie v 
T k . 150 omp ins. 
148. See Hallmark Cards, Inc. v Hallmark Dodge, Inc. 634 F Supp. 990,229 USPQ 882 
(WD Mo 1986), by way of example; see also Hanson & Walls 504-505. 
149. See Hanson & Walls 506-507; The Toho Co., Ltd v Sears, Roebuck & Co. 645 F2d. 
788, 210 USPQ section 47 (CA 9 1981); Universal City Studios, Inc. V Nintendo Co., 
Ltd. 746 F 2d 112, 223 USPQ 1000 (CA 2 1984) affg 578 F Supp 911, 221 USPO 
991 (SDNY 1983). 
150. Hanson & Walls 526-527; In 1938 the Supreme Court abrogated all federal common 
law in Erie R.R. Co. v Tompkins 304 U.S. 64(1938). See Pattishall 138 regarding the 
limited impact of this case on trade mark law. 
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It is, therefore, uncertain as to whether this form of 
common law unfair competition can be applied to trade 
marks, especially as a means of overcoming the 
traditional likelihood of confusion test in order to 
establish trade mark infringement. Its application to 
trade mark cases has been extremely limited and even 
those courts which purport to rely on misappropriation 
theory at the same time invoke also the more traditional 
grounds for a finding trade mark infringement as an 
dd d . . f. . f . 1. f 151 a e JUSti ication or granting re ie . 
Denicola regards INS with a jaundiced eye. In his view, 
the INS court preserved economic incentives at the cost 
of injury to competition and public access to 
information. In a trade mark sense this translates into 
accepting the promotion of trade symbols as commodities.· 
The author's criticism is clearly founded in his strong 
objections to viewing trade marks as property. Apart 
from resistance to any rationale based on recognising 
intrinsic rights in individual trade symbols, Denicola 
also raises economic arguments based upon trade marks 
comprising barriers to entry and limiting competition, 
and remedial arguments against the application of the 
misappropriation doctrine to trade marks. 152 
It is interesting to note that American lawyers have 
constructed a number of trade mark related property-type 
interests in an endeavour to extend trade mark 
protection under the ambit of the forms of protection 
available in both statute and the traditional or 
extended common law. These interests include: 
10. 4 The merchandising value of trade marks 
This interest lies in the exclusive right to exploit the 
commercial value or appeal of a trade mark. 153 
151. See Hanson & Walls 527-529. 
152. See Denicola 177-178. 
153. See Denicola 171. See also footnote 142 p 432 supra. 
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10.5 "Trademark good will" 
This is proposed by Hanson & Walls as relating to a new 
trade mark function which involves use of a trade mark 
in advertising and the like to develop an association 
linking the trade mark with a particular desirable 
status or social image. 
These associations have become central to the selling efforts of 
trademark owners who effectively use a developed association with a 
particular desirable image to enhance the appeal of their products or 
services. Once established, such associations create a type of intrinsic 
trademark value, herein termed "trademark good will". 1 54 
Al though the authors regard the misappropriation theory 
of the common law of unfair competition as an ideal 
basis for the prohibition of the misappropriation of 
"trademark good will", the fact that the doctrine has 
not been well received generally and has enjoyed limited 
application in trade mark cases has led the authors to 
call for a federal trade mark misappropriation standard 
to be introduced into either of the infringement 
sections of the Lanham Act. 155 
10. 6 The trade mark persona 
Winner defines the trade mark "persona" thus: 
A trademarks ''persona" is its identity, its quality of distinctiveness and 
uniqueness, quite apart from its function of identifying the source of 
goods and services. It is the ''persona" of a trademark which makes 
people want to identify themselves with it, such as by wearing tee-shirts 
and displaying bumper stickers and posters bearing the mark. Often, 
this personal identification with the trademark's ''persona " has only a 
tenuous connection with the goods and services upon which the trade 
154. Hanson & Walls 480. 
155. Hanson & Walls 531. (In the absence also of the anti-dilution doctrine and 
statutes providing satisfactory protection for trademark good will. See Hanson 
& Walls 515-526). 
mark was originally used. . . . The trademark, of course, also remains 
attached to the original goods and services it was designed to 
promote. 1 56 
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According to Winner, the trade mark persona is that 
aspect of the trade mark with which the consumer wishes 
to identify. 157 The right is postulated upon an analogy 
with the right of publicity afforded individuals under 
U.S. law. She regards this well accepted right of 
publicity as no more than an individual's trade mark 
. h . h' h 158 rig ts in is or er own "persona". 
In sum, Winner postulates that the right of publicity 
protects individual interests very closely analogous to 
rights in the trade mark persona. These rights are 
built up at large expense, time and creative effort. 
Both types are equally deserving of protection. The 
owners have a right of identity deserving protection as 
individuals. The law is developing towards increasing 
recognition of valuable property rights which owners 
have developed in their marks. Fad-value for instance, 
like secondary meaning, arises out of the owner's 
efforts and investments and the development of the law 
h . h ld . 159 to protect sue interests s ou continue. 
10. 7 Brand equity 
The authors Swann & Davis propose -
It is the thesis of this article that the positive associations that comprise 
a brand - a brand's equity - can rise to the level of a property right 
entitled separately to protection irrespective of confusion or the 
existence of a dilution statute. Without more, exploitation of such 
associations as the principal catalyst for the sale of goods, particularly 
156. Winner 71TMR193-214 [19811193. 
1 57. Winner 194. 
158. See Winner 196-198; See also Swann & Davis 281-282. 
1 59. Winner 214. (Winner favours the dilution rationale for protecting the trade mark 
persona: Winner p204). 
in a manner that may damage brand equity, should invoke injunctive 
and monetary sanctions; uses even for the expression of ideas should be 
carefully delineated. The likelihood of ''free ride" or "negative" 
associations with a mark should equal the likelihood of confusion as a 
basis for judicial scrutiny. 160 
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It is the "free ride" aspect of the infringement of 
so-called brand equity which lends itself to possible 
protection under the misappropriation doctrine. 
The authors suggest that: 
In both ''free ride" and "negative" association actions, the common 
denominator has been the use of the infringed mark as the "triggering 
mechanism" for the sale of defendant's goods, and in each, the court 
was offended by "a brazen [often detrimental] ... effort by the defendant 
... to capitalise on the good will created by the ... plaintiff". Given the 
current economic function and acceptance of trademarks, and 
recognition of their value and peiformance in the market place, it is 
submitted that such facts alone should mandate relief whether or not 
,£,. • 161 
conJuswn is present. 
Al though not as boldly stated as the conclusion 
requires, in order to achieve this the authors would 
afford trade marks equitable relief as established 
162 property. 
From the perspective of a civil law methodology, the 
U.S. common law of trade marks is characterised by 
casuistry and conflicting themes. It will be suggested 
in Part 6 of this work that the application of the 
principles of the doctrine of subjective rights can 
clarify, simplify and provide a remedy in the South 
African law in instances where the application of the 
tort of misappropriation might be called upon to afford 
relief in the U.S.A .. 
160. Swann & Davis 267-268. 
161. Swann & Davis 269. 
162. Swann & Davis 282-283. 
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11. FRANK SCHECHTER 
Schechter is regarded as the father of dilution 
doctrine. The significance of his views and work, 
however, extend beyond this limitation. This is 
particularly so in relation to his historical researches 
and his challenge upon the primacy of origin theory. 
Hiebert writes of Schechter: 
Undoubtedly the most influential explorer of the early development of 
trademarks in the United States was Frank I. Schechter. 
Although Josef Kohler and others had written on the subject 
before, Schechter was the first to organise a large volume of 
historical material into a systematic chronology, and was also the first 
to explore the linkages between the history of trademarks and the 
relationship of public and private trademark functions. 
Schechter' s 1925 book, reinforced by a Harvard Law Review 
article two years later, did more to shape modem thinking on the 
development of trademarks than any other work before or since. 163 
In his famous article, Schechter points out that the 
protection afforded trade marks by the courts of the 
time reflected a perpetuation of certain historical 
preconceptions which determined that the primary 
function of a trade mark is to indicate the ownership 
d . . f h d b . . 164 an origin o t e goo s earing it. 
Although some four centuries previously a trade mark had 
indicated either the origin or ownership of the goods to 
which it was affixed, in modern times the source of goods 
163. Hiebert Parallel Importation 12. See footnote 17 p 6 supra regarding the historical 
work and footnote 21 p 391 supra regarding the Harvard article. The references to the 
article hereunder are to the reprint thereof in 60TMR 1970. 
164. Schechter 334. 
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bearing a well-known trade mark is seldom known to the 
consumer. Thus, to consider a trade mark as a badge of 
origin which informed the consumer of the actual source 
or origin goods is a fiction which should be 
discarded. 165 This fiction should, Schechter wrote, be 
replaced by the concept that a trade mark indicates a 
single, albeit anonymous source, which provides a motive 
for buying insofar as customers would conclude that 
goods with the same marks come from the accustomed 
maker. It does not matter that the source is not 
. d . f . d h bl . 1 66 i ent1 ie to t e pu ic. 
This led Schechter to the "true functions of a trade 
mark" in regard to which he wrote: 
The true functions of the trademark are, then, to identify a product as 
satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming 
public. The fact that through his trademark the manufacturer or 
importer may "reach over the shoulder of the retailer" and across the 
latter's counter straight to the consumer cannot be over emphasised, for 
therein lies the key to any effective scheme of trade mark protection. To 
describe a trade mark merely as a symbol of good will, without 
recognising it in an agency for the actual creation and perpetuation of 
good will, ignores the most potent aspect of the nature of a trademark 
and that phase most in need of protection. To say that a trademark "is 
merely the visible manifestation of the more important business good 
will which is the 'property' to be protected against invasion" or that 
"the good-will is the substance, the trade-mark merely the shadow", 
does not accurately state the function of a trademark today and obscures 
the problem of its adequate protection. 1 67 
According to Schechter, the trade mark is not merely a 
symbol of business goodwill but the most important agent 
for creating goodwill. The trade mark imprints on the 
mind of the consumer a guarantee of satisfaction (albeit 
165. Schechter 335-336. 
166. Schechter 336-337. 
1 67. Schechter 337. 
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an impersonal and anonymous one) and creates a desire 
for further satisfaction. The mark sells the goods and 
the more distinctive the mark the more effective its 
11 . 168 se ing powers. 
In other words, Schechter proposes that a distinctive 
trade mark has a selling power - a goodwill - of its own 
attaching to it apart from the goodwill of the business 
in respect of which the mark is used. It is the trade 
mark which itself provides the guarantee - not the often 
anonymous business behind it. 
This is not to say, in my view, that all trade marks are 
to be denied an origin function or the function of 
symbolising a particular undertaking apart from the 
goodwill attaching to its business in whole or in part. 
In other words, a trade mark does not function solely in 
the selection process at the point of sale at the time 
of purchase. Trade marks of a particular kind can have 
a larger function, namely, to reduce to a single 
representative symbol an entire undertaking in all of 
its ramifications. A particular enterprise as a whole, 
especially if it is a large one, entails too much for it 
to be perceived and encompassed in all of its 
ramifications in a single thought, reducible to 
language. But it can be so conceived in symbolic 
thought if it is represented by the trade mark of the 
enterprise provides. Thus, a trade mark can function as 
a means through which an enterprise can be summarised 
and encapsulated in thought. As will be shown in the 
ultimate part of this work, trade marks have the 
capacity to perform multiple functions which should be 
d . 1 . f d . . bl . f 1 69 protecte in aw i iscerni e in act. 
According to Schechter, restricting the function of a 
trade mark to indicating only source or origin leads to 
1 68. Schechter 338. 
169. See p 497-499 infra. 
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the faulty conclusion in law that trade marks cannot be 
protected against use of the same or similar mark except 
in relation to the goods in in respect of which the 
complainant uses his mark. Confusion as to the source 
of two dissimilar products featuring matching marks is 
not the sole injury which can result from such use. To 
conclude this would ignore the fact that the creation 
and retention of custom and not the designation of 
source is the primary purpose of the modern trade mark. 
The preservation of the uniqueness or individuality of 
the trade mark is of paramount importance to its 
170 
owner. 
Schechter accepts the rule that a trade mark must be 
appurtenant to a going concern but denies that this 
should in any way set limits to the extent of protection 
of a trade mark when so appurtenant. Yet he does not 
eschew a limitation upon the protection of trade marks 
to the business or trade in connection with which it is 
employed. In his view, it is a matter of public policy 
that a trader who has developed a trade mark which then 
guarantees the quality of his wares is limited by his 
guarantee to such goods. In apparent conflict with this 
approach he advocates however that once a trade mark is 
established, its proprietor should have the scope to 
expand his trade thereunder naturally to other lines and 
fields of enterprise. He implies a universal and 
exclusive right to the trade mark without limitation 
thereof to its area of use. 171 
Swann and Davis point out that Schechter dismissed the 
equitable concept which regarded marks as property 
defensible against trespass. In this regard they state: 
Perhaps, however, because trademarks had not then assumed fuller 
characteristics of property - they still served to "sell goods"; they were 
170. Schechter 339. In modern US law trade marks are protected against use on 
dissimilar goods: see p 418-419 supra. 
1 71 . See Schechter 1 40-1 4 1 . 
not goods in and of themselves salable apart from the products on which 
they appeared - Schechter did not promote a full return to the 
• ~,1· 172 trespass - upon - property equzty paruuzgm. 
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Instead, Schechter proposed in regard to trade mark 
piracy cases where a diversion of custom was absent that: 
The real injury in all such cases can only be gauged in light of what has 
been said concerning the function of a trademark. It is the gradual 
whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public 
mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods. The 
more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the 
public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against 
vitiation or dissociation from the particular product in connection with 
which it has been used. At the present time the courts, misconstruing, 
as we have pointed out above, the rule that a trademark can only be 
used as appurtenant to a going business, are unwilling to base their 
protection of trademarks squarely upon the principle that "the value of 
the plaintiff's symbol depended in large part upon its uniqueness". 173 
This approach diverted trade mark theorists from 
property approaches towards a focus upon an assimilation 
of existing legal and equitable standards under section 
3 of the 1920 Act and led directly to the anti-dilution 
movement at both state and federal levels. 174 
Parks writes: 
Schechter' s work is viewed as a cornerstone of modern trademark 
theory, having originated or contributed to such non-established 
concepts as the idea that unique and arbitrary marks are "stronger" 
than their descriptive counterparts, and therefore deserving of a broader 
scope of protection against junior users, the concept of anonymous 
source; and the theory of trademark dilution. 175 
172. See Swann and Davis 284. 
173. Schechter 342. See footnote 128 p 299 infra. 
174. See Swann and Davis 285. 
175. Parks 82 TMR 531-561 [1992] 531. 
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According to Parks, also the germ for the guarantee or 
assurance function of trade marks is to be found in 
Schechter•s work. 176 
McClure 
comprised 
proposes 
the 
that Schechter•s 
furtherest extension 
famous 
of 
article 
formalist 
conceptualism in the trade mark law of the U.S.A .. He 
suggests that Schechter•s theory of extended trade mark 
protection was derived from a view of trade marks as 
h . . d 177 property. Bot propositions are overstate . 
12. DILUTION 
Dilution has become the most established and developed 
new rationale for trade mark protection in the U.S.A .. 
It was first recognised in the YALE case in which Judge 
Learned Hand held that use of Yale for flashlights and 
batteries infringed the well-known Yale mark used for 
locks and keys. 178 
Denicola agrees that Schechter• s article furnished the 
first coherent case for the new dilution theory: 
Schechter• s thesis was straight fmward; the chief value of a 
trademark is its "selling power". That power depends not only on the 
merits of the goods marketed under the trademark, but also upon the 
impression made by the mark itself. The ability to impart a favourable 
impression is dependent upon the "uniqueness" of the mark: the 
capacity of the mark to call to mind a particular product or, one may 
assume, a particular producer. The use of a similar mark by another 
vitiates this uniqueness by associating the mark with different products 
or producers. Such a loss of uniqueness or distinctiveness is often 
referred to as "dilution". The dilution rationale as conceived by 
Schechter was relatively simple: a unique or distinctive mark should 
176. See Parks 533. This function was, of course, known of marks from early times 
and became established in the medieval guild marks: see chapters 1 and 2. 
177. See McClure 324. 
178. Yale Electric Corp. v Robertson 26F.2d 972 (2d Ar 1928). 
be protected from loss of distinctiveness caused by the adoption of the 
mark by another. In holding that the use of Tiffany's by Boston 
Lounge diluted the distinctiveness of the New York jeweller's mark, 
one court characterised the nature of the irrjury as a "risk of an erosion 
of the public's identification of this very strong mark with the plaintiff 
alone, thus diminishing its distinctiveness, uniqueness, effectiveness, 
and prestigious connotations .... " Schechter himself restricted the 
theory to arbitrary or fanciful marks, although there is no apparent 
reason to distinguish such trademarks from descriptive marks that have 
acquired a degree of secondary meaning sufficient to evoke the image of 
a particular product or producer. The doctrine has found its way into 
state anti-dilution statutes in 25 states but has never been expressly 
incorporated into federal law. State protection is based upon the 
likelihood of injury to business reputation or dilution of the distinctive 
quality of a mark. 1 79 
445 
Section 12 of The Model State Trademark Bill has, 
according to Denicola, had a 
state legislative developments. 
significant influence on 
It provides: 
SECTION 12. INJURY TO BUSINESS REPUTATION: DILUTION 
Likelihood of irrjury to business reputation or of dilution of the 
distinctive quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a trade name 
valid at common law, shall be a ground for irrjunctive relief 
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the 
absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services. 1 80 
Al though not specifically so stated by Schechter, the 
dilution doctrine is a manifestation of the concept of 
trade marks as property in that it does not tie relief 
or protection to public consumers or require a showing 
f bl . f . . . 181 o pu ic con us1on or inJury. 
179. Denicola 182; He refers to Tiffany & Co v Boston Club, Inc. 231 F. Supp. 836, 844 (D 
Mars. 1964). 
180. See Denicola 182; Swann and Davis 267; The states with dilution statutes are 
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, 
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Texas, Washington. 
181. See Denicola 182-183. 
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According to Denicola, the economic arguments against 
trade mark protection apply with particular force to 
dilution theory. In his view, as there is no compelling 
consumer interest involved, dilution doctrine must 
necessarily rest entirely upon the sense of inequity 
which comes about in specific appropriations. This 
leaves dilution doctrine open to valid attack in the 
light of the overriding public interest in unrestrained 
. . 182 
competition. 
An analysis of the relevant case law in the U.S.A. by 
Denicola shows that the doctrine has met with judicial 
resistance at federal level. The best prospects for 
advancement of the doctrine is afforded by the New York 
courts. 183 
Under the state statutes, anti-dilution theory has 
developed the requirement of "a likelihood of injury to 
business reputation" as an addition to the basic theory, 
whilst the courts and academic writers have built out 
the concepts of "tarnishment" or "disparagement" of 
trade marks in relation to the doctrine. This 
introduces the threat of injury to either the commercial 
appeal of the trade mark concerned or the reputation of 
its owner as relevant to the application of the dilution 
statutes. 184 
There is some confusion between tarnishment cases where 
a mark is used in an inappropriate and unwholesome 
manner or in a way which undermines the positive image 
of a mark, and certain dilution theory cases where 
tarnishments are directed more at impingements upon the 
quality of the defendant's product than at the selling 
power of the mark. This leads Denicola to suggest: 
182. Denicola 183. 
183. Denicola 183. 
184. Denicola 185. 
Perhaps the chief deficiency evident in the development of the dilution 
theory to date, aside from its uncertain economic underpinnings, is the 
lack of thoughtful judicial analysis. Both decisions embracing and 
rejecting the doctrine too frequently offer little more than statutory 
paraphrasing. There has been little attempt to relate the facts of 
individual controversies to general principle. As a consequence the 
boundaries of both the loss of distinctiveness and tarnishment rationales 
remain largely unchartered, and even the relationship between the two 
concepts has not been significantly explored. 1 85 
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According to Denicola, the courts have rarely gone 
beyond testing whether the allegedly infringed mark is 
sufficiently distinctive to suffer dilution, seldom 
considering the factual question as to whether and how a 
loss of distinctiveness might have occurred. This has 
meant that 11 loss of distinctiveness 11 has remained 
unclear and undefined as a concept. 186 
On the positive side, the dilution concept affords trade 
marks protection beyond the likelihood of confusion 
standard when granting protection to well recognised 
185. Denicola 187. This does not mean that the doctrine has generated little writing. 
Indeed: "The doctrine has been a boon to law review editors". (per Denicola 182 
footnote 108). Useful contributions include Anon 54 TMR 184-199 [19641; Pattishall 
67 TMR 607-624 [19771; Mostert, 17 11 C 80-95 (1986); Pattishall 74 TMR 289-310 
(1984); Getzoff Trademark World, May 1992 40-47; Kera Trademark World June 1992 
38-43. This author suggests that anti-dilution protection would become rational, 
reasonable and just if there were a federal statute requiring a mark to be registered on 
a special register of the PTMO in order to be eligible for anti-dilution protection; 
Bannon 82 TMR 570-599 [19921; Leimer Trademark World, November 1993 15-19. 
This author suggests that in dilution by tarnishment, the value of the owner's mark is 
diluted not only by loss of distinctiveness but also loss of positive association value. 
Most dilution statutes only apply to marks that are of distinctive quality and the courts 
are not in agreement in regard thereto. The dilution statutes do not require wrongful 
intent and the courts are mostly silent on the point. Welkowitz 44 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 531-588 [1991]. 83 TMR 1993 is devoted entirely to dilution doctrine. I have 
found Denicola's comments the most cogent of the available sources. 
186. Denicola 189. 
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marks against use which would tarnish, degrade or delude 
the distinctive quality of the mark. The underlying 
rationale of the doctrine is that its value gradually 
diminishes as a result of unauthorised use by another. 
In particular, the public identifies a very strong mark 
with its established source. This identification is 
eroded by such unauthorised use, so diminishing its 
distinctiveness, uniqueness, effectiveness, and 
prestigious connotations. The resultant diminution in 
value of the mark is an invasion of the owner's property 
. h . h k 187 rig t in t e mar . 
Hanson & Walls point out that apart from the states of 
Idaho and Montana, state dilution statutes require a 
trade mark to have a certain level of fame or 
distinctiveness (to be "strong" or "well-known" marks) 
before anti-dilution 
According to them, the 
quality interests when 
identification of the 
protection will be 
statutes protect both 
eschewing detractions 
mark with source by 
afforded. 
source and 
from the 
means of 
actions which give rise to a dilution. The statutes do 
not protect against actions which do not have a dilutive 
effect upon the mark. 188 
Despite that no such limitations appear in the language 
of the anti-dilution statutes, the courts have often 
applied the likelihood of confusion standard in dilution 
cases, as Denicola has observed, and have refused to 
find dilution unless the standard is satisfied. This 
resort to the confusion standard then renders the 
189 provisions of the statute concerned superfluous. 
In this regard Pattishall states the following: 
1 87. Hanson & Walls 501 . 
188. Hanson & Wal1ls 501-502. 
189. Hanson & Walls 516. 
12.1 
Each statute provides for relief notwithstanding likelihood of confusion, 
yet numerous courts, especially those in New York, have stated 
stubbornly and illogically that relief from dilution requires evidence of 
likelihood of confusion. Other courts have held with similar illogic that 
when confusion is present the statutes are inoperative. Still others have 
held that since the statutes provide for relief in the absence of 
competition between the parties, if the parties are in fact competitive, 
the statute is inoperative. Thus the courts conclude that only the 
traditional confusion doctrine is applicable. These holdings seem not 
only to defy the plain terms of the statutes, but also to confound 
common sense.
190 
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In my view this approach on the part of the courts 
rather indicates a want of confidence in the doctrine 
leading to a resort to the traditional confusion 
standard. The doctrine breaks with traditional theory 
and has not developed clear principles which the courts 
have found sufficiently amenable to apply. 
In critical mode, Hanson & Walls raise the following 
objections to the anti-dilution laws found in the U.S.A.: 
The laws grant broad protection without balancing 
competing interests. The anti-dilution statutes give 
the trade mark owner a virtual monopoly over use of his 
mark: 
"Since any ef!ective use of the mark will develop associations to 
something other than the original product, any use may theoretically be 
erljoined. This gives the trademark holder even greater rights than the 
owner of a copyright". 191 
12.2 Anti-dilution law is uncertain. The theory was proposed 
to protect famous marks. The statutes however refer to 
protecting the "distinctive quality" of marks. It is 
not clear what level of distinctiveness is required for 
190. Pattishall 67 TMR 607-624 [19771 624-625. 
191. Hanson & Walls 522-523. 
12.3 
12.4 
12.5 
12.6 
12.7 
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protection and some courts have found that a showing of 
secondary meaning is sufficient. 
not correlate with "fame". 192 
This does certainly 
Further uncertainty 
results from the fact that "dilution" is not defined and 
there is no indication as to the threshold of dilution 
193 
which must be achieved prior to relief being granted. 
Not all states have anti-dilution statutes and national 
relief cannot be obtained on the basis of dilution. 
Similarly, insofar as the anti-dilution laws operate at 
state level only, proper protection of national trade 
marks cannot be obtained on the basis of a dilution. 
Different states apply different interpretations to 
anti-dilution statutes and there is, therefore, no 
guarantee of consistent state by state application of 
anti-dilution principles. Variations in the laws and 
their application from state to state results in a 
"checkerboard of jurisprudence" which disables an 
enterprise seeking to work out a uniform marketing plan 
which is to be applied in a number of states. 194 
The state statutes have been preempted by the Lanham 
Act. 195 
Despite the absence of limiting language in the 
anti-dilution statutes the courts have often applied a 
likelihood of confusion standard in dilution matters and 
have refused to find dilution unless the standard is 
satisfied. This gloss on the statutes renders them 
superfluous in effect. 
It is unfortunate that anti-dilution law in the U.S.A. 
does not feature clear definitions and guidelines and is 
characterised by disputes and uncertainties. 
192. Hanson & Walls 524. 
193. Hanson & Walls 525. 
194. Hanson & Walls 526. 
195. Hanson & Walls 517-520. 
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In my view the concept that a trade mark can lose 
distinctiveness through dilutive conduct is sound. 
In South Africa, the doctrine has been 
introduced under the Trade Marks Act No. 194 
recently 
of 1993 
which came into force on 1 May 1995. The source of the 
doctrine in the South African statute is not however 
derived from the U.S.A. but is based upon the protection 
f 1 k 1 d b h . . 1 96 o we 1-known mar s as contemp ate y t e Directive. 
In chapter 16, I suggest that in addition to the 
statutory trade mark infringement actions, recognition 
of the subjective right to a trade mark as property 
means that an impingement upon any of its functions is 
actionable also at common law. Insofar as dilutive 
conduct can be an unlawful impingement upon trade mark 
functioning, dilution theory and law in the U.S.A. will 
provide a rich source for South African jurists to 
consider in the latter context. 
13. IN SUM 
The central debate in U.S. trade mark law concerns trade 
marks as property and it is upon this theme that I have 
concentrated the chapter. The jurisprudential conflict 
between formalism and realism, the monopoly versus 
competition debate in trade mark economics in relation 
to whether trade marks obstruct or enhance competition, 
the endeavour to extend protection to trade marks beyond 
the confines of the Lanham Act and the common law 
through extensions to the latter and under dilution 
theory, all turn on property theory. The crisp question 
remains whether trade marks are merely appurtenant to 
the goodwill of the business of an enterprise or to 
aspects of that business or whether trade marks are 
property or have inherent attributes of property. The 
law regarding assignment and licensing of trade marks 
196. Council Directive 89/104 EEC : OJ 140, 11.2. 1989. See p 347-357 supra regarding 
the Directive. 
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afford a neat illustration of the prevailing attitude of 
the whole, namely entrenched resistance to the concept 
of trade marks as property. 
The extended protection sought under the common law -
particularly under the tort of misappropriation and 
other quasi-property approaches is the result of the 
restrictive effect of the predominance of the confusion 
standard with its emphasis upon preventing public 
confusion as a protectable interest above that of the 
property interests of the trade mark owner. 
The sophistication of large modern free markets and 
trade mark economics clearly require more than a rigid 
adherence to protecting only the origin function of 
trade marks. The debate regarding the economics of 
protecting trade marks in turn illustrates the 
sophistication trade marks have obtained in modern 
markets. This reveals the essential need for protecting 
new forms of trade mark functioning, such as to inform 
and distinguish beyond reference to origin alone. The 
modern trade mark distinguishes also variations in 
unobservable product features and qualities and 
communicates information of this kind and other kinds 
which is encapsulated in the trade mark. To deny legal 
recognition to such important trade mark phenomena in 
order to prevent monopolies is questionable in a modern 
system which has other means of regulating competition 
policy. 
The U.S. trade mark system under the Lanham Act, common 
law and dilution statutes is substantially different to 
the systems of the United Kingdom and South Africa 
both prior to and after the new statutes in the latter 
jurisdictions. U.S. authority must, therefore, be 
approached with circumspection before it is applied 
locally. 
U.S. trade mark law, therefore, better serves as a field 
of comparative study by South African jurists than as 
part of the legal-historical makeup of South African 
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trade mark law - despite reference to U.S. authority in 
the South African courts from time to time. 
Nevertheless, the continuous rigour of the academic and 
judicial endeavour to find solutions and to innovate -
epitomised by Frank Schechter - provides a rich harvest 
of ideas which are not always jurisdiction bound. 
In relation to the debate concerning property in trade 
marks the civil law based jurist is able to apply the 
concept of the doctrine of rights to the problem and, in 
my view, thereby arrive at an all-embracing solution 
which affords all aspects of trade mark functioning 
protection. The concluding part of the work which 
follows is directed thereat. 
PART6 
TRADE MARK FUNCTIONS, THE SUBJECTIVE RIGHT TO 
TRADE MARKS AND THE NEW LAW 
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CHAPTER 15 
TRADE MARK FUNCTIONS 
As a necessary and immediate prelude to the conclusions 
and submissions of the final chapter of this work 
specific comment regarding the functions which trade 
marks perform now becomes essential. 
This chapter reflects upon trade marks as they function 
in the market-place and considers the treatment afforded 
trade mark functions in the jurisdictions of particular 
relevance to this work South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, the U.S.A. and the EEC. 
The general postulates set out at the commencement of 
chapter 14, which concern the trade mark law of the 
U.S.A., are of general application and indicate that 
there is a universal need for trade mark law to provide 
a sound and satisfactory legal basis upon which all the 
multiple functions of trade marks can be protected. 
It is my thesis (which is amplified hereafter) that 
trade mark law should enable the holder of trade mark 
rights to assert in the market-place the full spectrum 
of functions which the trade mark concerned fulfils 
without interference or pre-emption. This implies that 
interference with or pre-emption of trade mark functions 
infringes the trade mark right. The functions trade 
marks perform are therefore central to an enquiry 
regarding the nature of trade mark rights. 
In general, the law has been slow to recognise and 
protect new trade mark functions. In remaining 
hidebound to established functional theory the law has 
applied forced constructions and fictions to the new 
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problems of trade mark law in order to ally the 
solutions arrived at to established models. This has 
underlined the inadequacy of traditional approaches and 
provided unconvincing solutions. 
The functions which trade marks perform in the 
free-market economies of the jurisdictions we have 
mentioned are the same. Trade mark functions are 
universal al though the means adopted in law to protect 
them can and does often differ from system to system. 
The views of the prominent writers vary in regard to 
which trade mark functions have been established, which 
trade mark functions are to be recognised and which 
trade mark functions are to be afforded legal 
protection. In many instances, differences arise 
because of the nomenclature adopted and the selection of 
different emphases. Different aspects of essentially 
the same function are given prominence and the same 
species of function is then given a different name or 
label by different writers, often according to arbitary 
and subjective criteria. Similarly, groups of functions 
are classified and labelled and it is then suggested 
that legal protection should be denied to certain of the 
categories. The classification 11 economic 11 and 11 legal 11 
functions, which will be referred to later, affords the 
most important example of this. 
The want of uniformity regarding trade mark functions 
amongst the writers, as is often the case also in the 
courts, is discernible both within particular 
jurisdictions as well as from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. 
This work requires the adoption of an approach to trade 
mark functioning which is capable of general 
application. In order to arrive at the postulates 
regarding trade mark functioning which are submitted at 
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the close of this chapter as universally applicable, a 
consideration of various views and sources concerning 
trade mark functions beyond the historical and 
jurisdictional confines of the earlier chapters - is now 
undertaken. 
The stuff of this chapter is therefore the views of 
writers from different eras evidencing opinions of 
different hue, the contributing elements of policy, 
legal history and the jurisprudence of the courts of 
different jurisdictions. In the precipitate of all of 
this is revealed, I submit, a model of trade mark 
functioning capable of general application in trade mark 
law. 
According to Gielen, advertising and marketing research 
has revealed that trade mark functioning has switched 
emphasis from rational to non-rational considerations 
where emotional and non-conscious aspects predominate. 
It will be seen that, in the main, trade mark law must 
still respond satisfactorily to the latter aspects of 
trade mark functioning. 1 
1. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH - LORD MACKENZIE STUART 2 
Addressing the Institute of Trade Mark Agents in London 
on 4 November 1975 Lord MacKenzie Stuart, judge of the 
ECJ, observed that the economic character of a trade 
mark had changed since the last century. It no longer 
tended to be seen as merely an adjunct to goods but as 
an item of intangible property in its own right with an 
independent value and capacity to produce its own 
economic impact. In many cases the economic value of a 
trade mark to its owner was the accumulated goodwill 
1. See Gielen Proefschrift 10-27, 310-311. This work comprises a doctoral thesis 
presented to the Rijks Universiteit te Utrecht published during 1 991 . The work deals 
with a number of topics concerning trade marks from the perspective of Benelux and 
EC law. The author is a leading practitioner in the field. Chapter II concerns the 
function of trade marks. 
2. Lord MacKenzie Stuart llC Vol 7 (1976) 27-38. Substantial changes were to take 
place in the following twenty years. 
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represented by advertising expenditure. The 
transferability of that goodwill for value had become a 
f . . 1 . 3 matter o maJor commerc1a importance. 
He continued to say that the owner of a trade mark was 
always able to invoke the law to 
circulating. This right was, 
negative one and protected what 
origin function of a trade mark. 4 
stop a counterfeit from 
however, essentially a 
had been labelled the 
In many cases the owner of a trade mark was, however, 
seeking to distinguish his trade mark in a positive 
sense - to create a preference for his product in the 
public mind. This revealed the guarantee function as 
well as a suggestive or publicity function of the trade 
mark (insofar as it served to advertise the product) . 5 
Lord MacKenzie Stuart then poses the question as to 
whether the origin function has only limited value, thus: 
As I have said there is no doubt that the law protects and from the 
beginning intended to protect the negative aspect or origin function. 
Common sense and equity, in the broadest sense of the word, require 
that a manufacturer or regular trader in goods of a certain type should 
be protected against the counteifeit and that whether the falsity be 
intentional or otherwise. In fact the law goes further. It protects the 
holder of the mark even when his connection with the product is of the 
most tenuous save that he is the registered holder of the mark. There 
is no counter obligation upon the holder of the mark to disclose 
himself. In England, at least, the goods may be manufactured by A, 
retailed exclusively by B while the mark is registered in the name of C. 
There is no obligation upon C to stand up and publicly to be counted -
there is no obligation to announce that identical, but unbranded, 
goods may be available more cheaply elsewhere, say under the mark 
of a supermarket chain. Looked at from the point of view of the 
public, may it not be said that the origin function has only a limited 
value?6 
3. Lord MacKenzie Stuart 29-30. 
4. Lord MacKenzie Stuart 31. 
5. Lord MacKenzie Stuart 31. 
6. Lord MacKenzie Stuart 31 . 
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Nevertheless, His Lordship dismisses legal protection of 
the guarantee and advertising functions of trade marks 
in the following terms: 
It is essential to distinguish between the basic right which trade mark 
law protects, the right not to have another's goods passed off as your 
own, and what I may, with no disrespect, call the adventitious aspects 
of a trade mark as suggestive of quality and as promoting the sale of 
the branded products. If it is the protection of those rights which you 
seek, you must ask yourselves whether you can justify your approach in 
terms of trade mark law or whether it is for the law under some other 
. 7 
aspect to intervene. 
The central question is ultimately this: 
Thus in any analysis you must again, or so it seems to me, always face 
the question "Am I seeking to vindicate a true function of the mark - if 
indeed there be more than one - or am I under the guise of invoking 
trade mark law seeking to protect not the mark but a system of 
marketing? 118 
I proceed to consider the various trade mark functions 
from the perspective of their historical development and 
the approach thereto in the jurisdictions of relevance, 
seeking in so doing, an appropriate answer to Lord 
MacKenzie Stuart's question. 
2. THE IDENTIFICATION AND DISTINGUISHING FUNCTIONS 
As I have already observed and as will be seen in the 
paragraphs which follow, the conception that a trade 
mark indicates the source or origin of the product which 
features it - the origin function of trade marks - still 
maintains a dominant position in trade mark law. 
However, before a mark can indicate a link between 
particular products and a source, the mark must identify 
7. Lord MacKenzie Stuart 31 . 
8. Lord MacKenzie Stuart 34. Hereunder referred to as "Lord MacKenzie Stuart's 
question." 
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the product and must in order to qualify as a trade 
mark have the capability of distinguishing such 
products from products emanating elsewhere. The ability 
required of a trade mark to distinguish goods and 
services is fundamental to trade mark law. Earlier 
chapters have shown the presence of this requirement -
known as the requirement of distinctiveness from 
earliest times in the jurisdictions of relevance. 
Earlier chapters have also shown the evolution of the 
requirement in the modern trade mark law of Europe and 
the United Kingdom to the quintessential element of the 
concept and definition of "trade mark 11 • 9 
It might be said that in distinguishing the goods or 
services of one enterprise or undertaking from another, 
a trade mark indicates the source of the products 
marked. In my view, this construction does not serve in 
all instances. A specific trade mark might indicate 
source or origin but need not necessarily do so. It 
must, however, in all instances be able to distinguish a 
particular product from other products without a 
reference to source being essential. It is essential 
that the mark is able to perform a distinguishing 
function. It follows that a trade mark must invariably 
fulfil a distinguishing function otherwise the mark 
concerned cannot qualify as a trade mark or function as 
such. Hence the distinguishing functions is an 
invariable trade mark function. 
The question arises whether the identification function 
is an invariable trade mark function - in other words 
must the identification function and distinguishing 
function always be simultaneously present? Put another 
way, is the identification function an aspect of the 
distinguishing function i.e. must a product be 
identified (rather than merely "seen")to be 
distinguished? 
9. Seep 51-57, 107-121, 256-260, 408-411 supra. See also p 583-593 infra. The 
distinguishing function was specifically recognized in South Africa under the 1983 Act, 
as well: seep 254-255 supra. 
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As a trade mark function, the concept of identification 
of the product featuring the mark must, in my view, 
entail a recognition of the product featuring the mark 
pursuant to an encounter with the mark somewhere 
previously. 
In order to distinguish product, on the other hand, a 
mark does not necessarily have to be known to the 
consumer or recognised from a prior encounter. The 
following example serves to illustrate the point. 
A consumer must choose between a product marked with 
trade mark A and a similar product marked with trade 
mark B placed alongside each other on the shelf of a 
supermarket. The consumer knows trade mark A from 
advertising and previous consumption. Trade mark A has 
therefore enabled him to identify product A (the 
identification function) and to distinguish it from 
product B (the distinguishing function) . The mark B, 
which the consumer has not encountered before and which 
is unknown to him, has however enabled the consumer to 
distinguish product B from product A, which the consumer 
has identified. This consumer would not have identified 
product B from trade mark B if a single can of product B 
stood on the shelf alone. In both instances, in 
"identifying" product Bas "not product A", trade mark B 
has not fulfilled an identification function but rather 
a distinguishing function. 
According to Giel en, a mark by means of the 
identification function enables both the purchaser and 
the seller of the product to identify it. A product -
meaning a good or service must have a name in the 
nature of an identification sign as distinct from its 
generic name. A product without a sign of this kind 
cannot be identified by either the purchaser or the 
seller. A product bearing a trade mark can however be 
identified and this process indicates the identification 
function of a trade mark. A mark (word mark or device) 
is, therefore, a sign by means of which the seller of a 
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product and the consumer identifies it in the 
market-place. The trade mark serves as the commercial 
name (as distinct from the generic name) of the product 
which enables its rational identification. 10 
Gielen has no objection to 
function provided it means 
the 
the 
term identification 
identification of a 
product per se. Similarly, he does not object to the 
concept of the distinguishing function provided it means 
distinguishing between products strictu sensu and not 
distinguishing with reference to product source. He 
recognises that a trade mark performs a distinguishing 
function but eschews use of the term in those instances 
where origin theory is incorporated therein, because he 
does not ascribe the function of indicating origin to 
the modern trade mark. 11 
In a strict sense, therefore, the identification and 
distinguishing functions can be regarded as distinct and 
it is possible to sever the identification function from 
the distinguishing function of a particular mark. In 
most instances, however, these functions appear to me to 
operate in tandem. 
Consider the following example by way of elucidation. 
Two undertakings which sell petroleum to consumers 
obtain the product from the same source. The first 
undertaking uses trade mark A and the second undertaking 
uses trade mark B. Both trade marks can identify the 
petroleum products if known. (The identification 
function strictu sensu) . That a consumer might distinguish 
between product A and product B on the basis of a 
reference to the undertaking behind either of the marks 
does not necessarily found the conclusion that in all 
cases a consumer must identify or know the undertaking 
concerned before he can distinguish product A from 
product B. 
1 0. Gielen Proefschrift 1 0-11 . 
11 . See Gielen Proefschrift 1 7, 31 0-311 . 
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Modern technology and the increasingly impersonal nature 
of modern commerce has rendered it more and more 
difficult for a personal connection to be maintained 
between a trade mark and the trade mark holder. Product 
identification might take place through a connection or 
association with origin but this is not the absolute 
rule. 
According to Hertzog, the history of trade marks in the 
socio-economic context indicates 
away from origin theory to 
a shift in emphasis 
the function of 
. d . f. . 12 i ent1 icat1on. 
Diamond analyses a trade mark by reducing it to three 
different functions of which the "identification 
function", by which he means the "distinguishing 
function" or a mix of such functions, is the first. 13 
He writes: 
First is the identification function. A trademark is the device by which a 
consumer distinguishes among similar goods or services offered by more 
than one manufacturer. It bridges the gap between the consumer and 
the manufacturer, a gap that tends to grow wider as production units 
increase in size, distribution extends to more distant markets, and 
self-service retailing takes the consumer even farther away from the 
source of supply. 14 
It is clear from Hertzog's review 
statutory provisions which deal with 
of a trade mark in terms of its 
of the general 
the basic concept 
function in the 
jurisdictions of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
South Africa, the U.S.A and EEC trade mark law, that all 
these systems regard the concept of distinctiveness 
central. 15 In terms of functional theory this renders 
12. Hertzog Functional Theory 168. Hertzog's work, published in 1979, comprises a 
doctoral thesis presented to the University of Stellenbosch during that year. It is an 
extensive discourse upon trade mark functional theory. 
13. Diamond 65 TMR265-290 (1975) 289. The other functions he mentions are the 
guarantee function and the advertising function. 
14. Diamond 289. 
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the distinguishing function of trade marks central. 
Thus, Mathely regards the distinguishing function as the 
primary and natural function of a trade mark - a view to 
which I subscribe. 16 Similarly Baumbach holds that the 
distinguishing function reflects the essence of a trade 
mark - a contention which is clearly valid. 17 
Hertzog writes as follows regarding the distinguishing 
function: 
The function of a trade mark which has been the most pervasive, is the 
so-called "distinction" function. This function, it is suggested, is wide 
enough to make allowance for distinction in terms of either origin, 
quality or any other specific factor which may have a role to play in any 
specific practical situation. The fundamental notion of this function is 
merely that the trade mark should be able to distinguish one specific 
product from another and it does not impose on the trade mark any 
further function such as pointing to an origin or indicating a quality or 
evoking a certain psychological reaction. Because of this, it is 
submitted that the heeding of any or all of these facts need not 
necessarily mean an encroachment upon the basic distinction function. 
In fact, it may only serve to point out the efficacy of the legal function 
which is wide enough to do justice to any of the manifold practical 
functions which a trade mark may fulfil. 1 8 
By the distinguishing function strictu sensu is meant the 
function of distinguishing the trade marked product 
(goods or services) from other product (marked or 
unmarked and whether similar or dissimilar) . Thus, a 
trade mark may even serve to distinguish products which 
d . f 19 may er1ve rom the same source. 
Where a trade marked product is unique in that it faces 
no competing product in the market-place (in the sense 
that there is no product in existence akin thereto) it 
16. Mathely Le droit Francais des signes distinctifs 11 (as discussed by Gielen Proefschrift 
17). 
17. Baumbach Warenzeichenrecht 25 (as discussed by Gielen Proefschrift 17). 
18. Hertzog Functional Theory 170 (author's emphasis). 
19. Hertzog Functional Theory 168. 
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might be said that the trade mark it features serves an 
identification function only. It must however be 
observed that the trade mark concerned performs a 
distinguishing function, nevertheless, in that it serves 
as a badge of the uniqueness of the product as distinct 
from other products which bear no resemblance to the 
unique product or which have no like features. 
In sum, the identifying and distinguishing function of 
trade marks are closely linked yet are capable of 
separate scrutiny if needs be. Particularly, the 
distinguishing function is distinguishable from all 
other trade mark functions in that it is the function 
which a trade mark must invariably be capable of 
performing if the mark concerned is to be able to 
function as a trade mark at all. In this sense, the 
distinguishing function is an invariable trade mark 
function distinct from all other trade mark functions 
which need not always be present and which are, 
therefore, variable. 
3. THE ORIGIN FUNCTION 
It will be noted from the paragraphs which follow that 
the so-called origin function of trade marks is for the 
most part regarded as the primary trade mark function to 
which all other functions are subservient. Origin 
theory is considered historically and critically below. 
3.1 Early History 
From earliest times certain marks upon goods - although 
not trade marks - functioned in a way which anticipated 
the functioning of modern trade marks. 20 Branding of 
livestock and other goods enabled their owner to 
identify them and in 
bearing the brand from 
so 
the 
doing 
goods 
to distinguish 
of others . 21 
goods 
These 
20. Such as to identify and distinguish products, to indicate their origin or source and their 
quality. 
21. Seep 1-2 supra. 
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marks indicated ownership. Later, marks such as Middle 
Eastern stone cutter's marks and marks such as Roman 
tile, masonry, cheese and wine marks indicated the 
origin of the goods bearing them22 as did a number of 
medieval marks. 23 Some of these marks came to be 
associated also with the quality of the goods upon which 
24 they appeared and were regarded as assets. 
It is 
goods 
noteworthy 
performed 
that the 
during 
functions which marks upon 
the Middle Ages became 
discernible again when marks began to take on the 
features of modern trade marks at the time of the 
Industrial Revolution. 
It will be recalled that the merchants personal and 
proprietary marks facilitated proof of ownership of the 
goods which featured them and later developed the 
incidental function of indicating the origin or source 
thereof. Production marks on the other hand indicated 
the source or origin of the goods - initially so as to 
police quality but later developed the incidental 
function of assuring quality. Often the same mark 
served both as merchant mark and production mark. 25 
It must immediately be said, however, that when 
considering trade mark functions from a legal/historical 
perspective the origin theory comprises the axis about 
which everything turns. In this regard trade mark law 
never departs from its own origins, which as earlier 
chapters have shown, was to guard against the 
appropriation of the trade mark of another in order to 
pass off product. The trade mark functions which the 
law has recognised have thus been confined to the 
function of indicating origin or source of product and 
functions reducible thereto including the assurance 
function - even if by way of forced construction or the 
application of fictions. 
22. See p 2-4 supra. 
23. Seep 4-18 supra. 
24. See p 3-4, 9-19 supra. 
25. Seep 7 - 11, 18 - 19 supra. See also Schechter Historical Foundations 21. 
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3.2 The U.S.A. 
In the early law of the U.S.A. and as late as 1860, 
trade marks were regarded as indicating the name of the 
manufacturer. 26 
In the first trade identity case decided by the U.S. 
Supreme 
as a 
Court, a geographical name was denied validity 
trade mark because it could not point to the 
personal origin or ownership of the articles of trade to 
h . h . h db l' d 27 w ic it a een app ie . 
Thereafter, it became a formalistic method of 
determining the validity of trade marks to establish 
whether the mark could point distinctively to the origin 
or ownership of the goods concerned. 28 
Thus, in the leading case of Hanover Star Milling Co. v 
Metcalf the "primary and proper function" of a trade 
mark was held to be that of identifying origin or 
ownership of the goods to which the mark was affixed. 29 
Schechter observes in his doctoral thesis that this 
early definition of trade mark functions was in 
unvarying use throughout the formative period of trade 
mark law to the time of his writing (circa 1925) and 
although at that time it was no longer all-encompassing, 
it was sound from a historical perspective in that it 
described the two relations which marks implied from the 
inception of trade mark law. 30 As Schechter observes, 
this judicial view of alternative trade mark functions 
rested upon the uses marks were put to during the Middle 
Ages. 31 
26. See p 37 supra. 
27. Canal Co v Clark 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 311 (1871 ). See McClure 69 TMR 305 - 306 
(1979) 317. 
28. See McClure 318. 
29. Hanover Star Milling Co v Metcalf 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916). Seep 81 - 83 supra for 
a discussion of this case. 
30. Schechter Historical Foundations 19. See p 6 footnote 17 regarding this work. 
31. Schechter Historical Foundations 20. 
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Hertzog observes that a strict adherence to the concrete 
origin theory prevailed in the early trade mark law of 
the U.S.A. and was still discernible during the 
mid-nineteenth century. A mark which did not indicate 
the owner or manufacturer of the wares featuring it 
would not be protected as a trade mark and third parties 
could use it in connection with the same goods. 32 
However, from 1920 onwards some American writers began 
to observe that in identifying the sourte of the goods, 
a trade mark was in fact distinguishing those goods from 
goods emanating from a different source i.e. the mark 
was performing a distinguishing function. 33 
In his foreword to Schechter•s work, Monroe Smith draws 
attention to the earliest functions of trade marks and 
their evolution from indicia of ownership to objects of 
34 property. He points out that the liability of the 
maker of inferior goods identified by the medieval mark 
placed thereon was subsequently supplemented with 
liability visited also upon a maker who used a 
recognised mark deceptively. In both cases the evil 
protected against was fraud on the public. The law was 
tardy in recognising protection of a mark based upon its 
status as an asset. Even when marks took on the colour 
of property in becoming transferable and transmissible 
the law remained reluctant to protect property of this 
kind and remedies in trade marks remained based upon 
fraud or constructive fraud. Anti-monopoly sentiment in 
the U.S.A. further prevented the development of remedies 
protecting the value of a trade mark to its rightful 
user. 
35 
According to Schechter, many courts were unable to free 
themselves from historical preconceptions regarding the 
function of trade marks, and legal evolution did not keep 
32. Hertzog Functional Theory 34. See p 469 infra regarding concrete origin theory. 
33. See Hertzog Functional Theory 37. 
34. Seep x of the foreword by Munroe Smith. 
35. See p x - xi of the foreword. 
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pace as the functions of trade marks changed. It was, 
however, no longer satisfactory for courts to say that 
a trade mark indicated origin or 
ignored current realities which 
ownership. To do so 
were that to the 
consuming public, a trade mark could not be said to 
indicate the specific ownership or origin of the goods 
to which it was affixed. He stated: 
Given a popular product with an international or at any rate a 
consumption through the complicated channels of modern distribution, 
a knowledge of its specific source can by no means generally be 
attributed to those who purchase it. The very courts that still describe 
trade-marks as symbols indicating "origin or ownership" at the same 
time concede the indifference of the public to the actual physical origin 
h . if h d . . 36 or owners ip o t e goo s m question. 
Even though it did not take the courts long to realise 
that a trade mark also fulfilled a quality function, the 
judges strove to preserve historical definitions intact, 
whilst at the same time seeking to keep pace with the 
demands of modern trade mechanisms. As a result, the 
courts were compelled 
"origin and ownership" 
context of modern trade 
to strain interpretations of 
h 37 . . . h to t e utmost. Writing in t e 
mark law in the U.S.A., McCarthy 
states that during the early development of trade mark 
law, trade marks were thought to represent to the 
customer only the physical source or origin of the 
product or service in connection with which the mark was 
used. From that beginning, origin theory subsequently 
developed an expectation on the part of the consumer 
that all goods featuring the same mark emanate from a 
single anonymous source. The source need not be known 
to the buyer by name, and in that a buyer does not know 
or care about the name of the corporation making or 
distributing the product, can be anonymous. A buyer is 
36. Schechter Historical Foundations 147 - 148. 
37. Schechter Historical Foundations 149. 
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however entitled to assume that all products bearing the 
same trade mark are somehow linked with or sponsored by 
h . 1 38 t e sing e anonymous source. 
It will be clear from the aforegoing that the 
theory is amenable to different interpretations. 
\ 
origin 
Where 
the trade mark is required to ref er to a specific or 
known source this is 
theory. Where the 
known as the concrete origin 
mark refers to an unknown or 
anonymous source this is known as the abstract origin 
theory - which itself discloses variations amongst its 
proponents. 39 
3. 3 United Kingdom 
Sebastian - writing about English law in the main in a 
work published in 1899 - regards the primary function of 
a trade mark to provide a satisfactory assurance of the 
make and quality of the article bought by a purchaser. 
It is on the faith of the mark being genuine and 
representing a quality equal to that which the purchaser 
previously found under a similar mark which brings the 
purchaser to make his purchase. Al though Sebastian 
regards the quality function as primary he requires a 
trade mark to perform a dual function. The trade mark 
must also indicate either the origin of manufacture or 
origin in the wider sense of indicating that the goods 
have passed through the hands of the person applying the 
mark to the goods on their way to the market. Thus, the 
source indicated can be trade hands through which the 
goods passed on the way to the market or a source which 
dealt with the goods on the way. Sebastian observes 
that use of a trade mark is not confined to designation 
of the maker of the article to which the trade mark is 
attached although this is the usual case. A trade mark 
might also indicate some other person who has expended 
labour on the article so that it owes some portion of its 
38. McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 109 - 111 . 
39. See Hertzog Functional Theory 11 . 
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value to the affixer of the trade mark. Hence, it may 
include a selector of the goods or the vendor of natural 
products who alone has the opportunity of procuring the 
goods. 40 
The modern law of trade marks in the United Kingdom both 
under the 1939 and the 1994 Acts retains the emphasis on 
origin theory. 
Under the 1939 Act, a trade mark in indicating origin 
protected the owner of the mark in his trade as well as 
consumers - in the latter case by providing an assurance 
of quality through the revelation of origin. Although 
the effect of a trade mark might have been to guarantee 
quality, the law in England under the 1939 Act did not 
. h f . 41 recognise t at unction. 
An intention that origin theory will continue to play a 
central role in the new trade mark law of the United 
Kingdom is clear from the White Paper which preceded the 
new Act. The White Paper fully endorses the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the European Commission regarding the 
types of signs which a Community trade mark may consist. 
It recognises both the origin and distinguishing 
functions as follows: 
This provision defines the types of signs of which Community 
trade-marks may consist. It is geared particularly to the question 
whether the relevant sign is capable of peiforming the basic function of 
a trade-mark. That function, in economic and legal terms, is to 
indicate the origin of goods or services and to distinguish them from 
those of other undertakings. 42 
3.4 The EC 
That origin theory is central to EC trade mark law is 
clear from the jurisprudence of the ECJ discussed in 
40. Sebastian Trade Marks 2 - 5. See p 1 05-1 07 supra regarding the connection in the 
course of trade doctrine. 
41 . See Parry and Dinnage EEC Law 190; Champagne Heidesieck et Cie Monopole SA v 
Buxton (1930) 47 RPC 421. 
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43 
chapter 12. Note must be taken also of the following 
extract from the Memorandum on the Creation of an EEC 
Trade Mark: 
68. Any regulation of trade mark law depends ultimately on the 
functions which are attributed to the trade mark. Both economically 
and legally the function of the trade mark as an indication of origin is 
paramount. It follows directly from the concept of the trade mark as a 
distinctive sign, that is serves to distinguish trade mark products 
originating from a particular firm or group of firms from the products 
of other firms. From this basic function of the trade mark are derived 
all the other functions which the trade mark fulfils in economic life. If 
the trade mark guarantees that the commercial origin is the same, the 
consumer can count on a similarity of composition and quality of 
goods bearing the trade mark; and the advertising value of the trade 
mark requires that between the trade marked goods and the owner of 
the trade mark there is a definite legal relationship. Although the 
quality function predominates in the mind of the consumer and the 
publicity function predominates in the mind of the producer, so far as 
the legal aspect is concerned the decisive criteria is the function of the 
mark as an indication of origin. Only if the proper purpose of the 
trade mark is maintained, namely to distinguish the trade marked 
goods from goods of different origin, can it fulfil its further role as an 
instrument of sale promotion and consumer information; and only 
then does the trade mark right peiform its function of protecting the 
proprietor against injury to the reputation of his trade mark. 44 
This passage clearly indicates the limitations of trade 
mark law viewed from the perspective of functional 
theory. If trade mark law is to confine itself to 
affording protection only in the passing off situation, 
in other words where there is deception as to the origin 
or source of product - in essence an impingement upon 
the origin function of the mark and is to ignore 
impingements of other functions which trade marks fulfil 
43. See chapter 1 3 par 7 p 359 supra. 
44. Memorandum on the Creation of an EEC Trade Mark (Doc. SEC(76) 2462). 
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on the basis that they are economic and not legal 
functions, aspects of the trade mark of great value to 
the holder of rights therein will be denied protection. 
Hertzog delivers the following cogent criticism of the 
passage: 
The criticism which can be levelled at this exposition, is that it is 
doubtful whether "it follows directly from the concept of the trade 
mark as a distinctive sign" that it serves to distinguish products in 
terms of their origin; it may be that it serves to distinguish products in 
terms of elements, other than origin: e.g. quality and psychological 
drawing power. It is even more doubtful whether "from this (i.e. the 
origin) basic function . . . are derived all other functions which the 
trade mark fulfils in economic life". It may be true that all other 
functions are basically derived from the distinguishing functions in that 
the advertising, quality and origin functions are all dependent on the 
distinguishing function. It may also be true that if the trade mark 
guarantees that the commercial origin is "the same" (in fact, it is 
doubtful whether, in view of the permissibility of assignments, this is 
the case), the consumer can count on a similarity of quality, but it is 
unclear why the advertising value of a trade mark requires that there 
be a "definitive legal relationship" between the owner of the trade 
mark and the trade marked goods. Surely the advertising value of a 
trade mark is derived partly from the fact that a product bearing a 
certain mark has a certain dependable quality and partly from the fact 
that the trade mark itself may inherently (i.e. apart from the qualities 
of the product) have a certain suggestive, and therefore attractive, 
value. It does not necessarily have to indicate a consistent origin for 
the trade mark to acquire "advertising value" (although it may 
conceivably also do so). The present writer is therefore in serious 
disagreement with the statement that "only if the proper purpose of the 
trade mark is maintained, namely to distinguish the trade marked 
goods from goods of different origin, can it fulfil its further role as an 
instrument of sales promotion and consumer information". 
The writer is in even more serious disagreement with the view that 
"only then i.e. under the circumstances just mentioned), does the trade 
mark right peiform its function of protecting the proprietor against 
injury to the reputation of his trade mark. "45 
473 
I have been disposed to view the origin function as a 
variable function of trade marks because realities of 
trade and market indicate that trade marks can 
distinguish product without reference to origin. 
This is not to say that I propose a ranking of trade 
mark functions in order of importance as some writers 
do. Rather, I suggest that amongst the functions a 
particular trade mark might perform, 
distinguishing function is indispensable. 
only the 
European theory would, however, render the origin 
function paramount on the basis that insofar as a trade 
mark identifies and distinguishes goods and services it 
does so solely through the means of indicating origin. 
In my view this construction is not invariably correct 
and although its historical foundations are real, it 
remains hidebound to tradition without proper regard 
being had to modern developments in trade. 
The views of modern continental writers vary. 
Gielen, although confirming that the origin function is 
recognised as the primary function of trade marks by the 
ECJ and a number of leading continental writers, would 
nevertheless deny the origin function recognition in 
modern markets. He is critical of those writers who 
posit that trade marks distinguish product solely with 
reference to the origin thereof, particularly as 
consumers in general are for the most part unaware of the 
45. See Hertzog 173 - 174. 
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identity of product sources. For Gielen, trade marks 
distinguish products and not sources from each other. 
In Gielen•s view, the origin function has diminished in 
importance to a point where it is hardly relevant any 
longer, for the following reasons: 
(a) retailers have in modern times become a conduit between 
producer and consumer unlike in the past where retailers 
branded their own products; 
(b) differences in quality between competing products have 
diminished in modern times; 
( c) emotional and unconscious (i.e. psyche related) 
considerations rather than rational criteria have come 
to dominate as far as trade marks are concerned and 
consumers are even less concerned about the origin of 
product than ever. 46 
By way of contrast the leading authority Beier posits: 
Only that function of the trademark is legally protected which 
guarantees the origin of the goods. The mark fulfils a quality function 
to the extent only that it guarantees to the consumer a constant source 
if .. 47 o origin. 
Kaufmann writes that although the consumer is not 
interested in identifying the source of the marked goods 
it is nevertheless important for the consumer to know 
that the source remains constant as this will indicate 
to him that the quality of the product remains constant 
and is thereby guaranteed. For Kaufmann, the trade mark 
is primarily an identifying means whereby in identifying 
a constant albeit anonymous source it assures the 
presence of qualities in the product which the consumer 
requires. In doing this the mark also performs a 
significant communication function. 48 
46. See Gielen Proefschrift 16. 
47. Beier [19701 1 llC 48 - 72 66. 
48. Kaufmann BIE 1980 67 (discussed by Gielen Proefschrift 15 - 16). 
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Mathely suggests that although it is an essential 
function of a trade mark to identify products, the 
matter does not end there. A mark provides the consumer 
of the identified product with the assurance that 
products marked the same have the same origin. 49 
Pfeffer forges a close link between the distinguishing 
and origin functions as well as the communication 
function of trade marks. According to him, a mark 
creates a link between the goods which feature it and a 
specific enterprise. The public knows that a product 
featuring a specific mark emanates from a specific 
enterprise. The consumer need not identify the source. 
It suffices that all products (goods and services) 
featuring the same mark are of the same kind and emanate 
from the same source. 50 
It is not my position that the origin function should be 
largely dispensed with as maintained by Gielen. I 
recognise the historical as well as the modern day 
significance of origin theory. I do, however, question 
those approaches which maintain the origin function in a 
dominant position whilst negating the importance and 
independent application of other functions. 
I do not believe that a trade mark always does or must 
invariably indicate source or origin, either in fact, or 
under one or more of the legal fictions which group 
under the abstract theory of the origin function. 
Stripped of legal fictions, the origin function of trade 
marks is, I have concluded, a variable function which 
may or may not be present in fact in any particular 
instance. 
49. Mathely Le droit Francais des signes distinctifs 11 . (Ad discussed by Gielen at p 1 7). 
50. Pfeffer Grondbegrippen par 59 (As discussed by Gielen p 15). 
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4. ASSURANCE FUNCTION 51 
The genesis of the quality function of marks is to be 
found in the medieval production marks which developed a 
link between the marks and the quality of both the 
workmanship and of the goods in connection with which 
they featured. This concept was accepted in early trade 
mark law where the mark served as a guarantee that the 
goods obtained from a particular manufacturer with whom 
the purchaser had hitherto been pleased were of the 
d 1 . 52 . 11 h f ' expecte qua ity. Essentia y, t e guarantee unction 
arose out of the origin function. Marks indicated 
source at first. When special or desired qualities 
became associated therewith, marks came to indicate the 
presence of such qualities, also. 
The quality function has been refined over time. 
According to Schechter, writing in 1927, a trade mark 
does not indicate that the marked article comes from a 
particular and definite source, the characteristics of 
which or the personalities connected with which are 
favourably known to the purchaser. Rather, a mark 
guarantees to the consumer that the goods in connection 
with which it is used emanates from the same source or 
reached the consumer through the same channels as did 
other goods with which the consumer was satisfied and 
which displayed the same trade mark. Essentially, 
therefore, the consumer does not regard a trade mark as 
an indication of origin but rather as a guarantee that 
the goods purchased under the mark have the same 
meritorious qualities as those previously noted in 
earlier purchases of goods bearing the mark. In this 
51. Also known as the "quality" or "guarantee" function. When emphasis is placed upon 
the consistent quality required of marked goods the term "quality function" is chosen. 
Where the focus is upon the guarantee of consistent quality which marks represent, 
the term "guarantee function" is chosen. The label chosen reflects different aspects of 
the same function. 
52. See James LJ in Massam v Thomley's Cattle Food Co (1880) 14ChD 748 755. 
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sense the mark "sells the goods" . 53 Hence, Schechter 
derived the abstract origin theory of trade marks 
trade marks indicate a consistent albeit anonymous 
source - and substituted a source of assured quality in 
the place of a specific undertaking as the source. This 
brings about a mix of the origin and assurance functions 
which is often evident in the market-place. 
That Schechter' s interpretations soon exercised an 
influence is clear from the remarks of McCarthy. 
According to this author, a new concept, building upon 
and expanding the source theory, arose during the 1930's 
which recognised that a trade mark does not necessarily 
have to indicate only manufacturer or merchant source, 
but could also serve to indicate a level of constant 
quality. This gave rise to the "quality" or "guarantee" 
function of trade marks. It does not however mean that 
the origin function is thereby replaced. The functions 
stand side by side and the guarantee function is really 
a facet of the old source theory broadened to include 
not only manufacturing source but also the source of the 
standard of quality of goods bearing the mark. In other 
words, a single source of quality control over the goods 
or services a unified source of quality control 
replaces the direct link previously required between the 
goods or services and the manufacturer or provider 
thereof, as the case may be. 54 It is to this 
construction of the origin function to which the ECJ 
subscribes, as I have pointed out elsewhere. 55 
Thus, in modern trade mark law a close relationship 
exits between the origin and guarantee functions. The 
modern trade mark is regarded as identifying an 
anonymous and not necessarily unitary source which 
underwrites the quality of the product featuring the 
mark and from which the product is regarded as emanating. 
5 3. Schechter Historical Foundations 1 49-1 50. 
54. McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 111-112. 
55. Seep 369, 370-371, 374 supra. 
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Guarantee theory has, therefore, become encapsulated in 
a broadening of origin theory by means of the 
application of the concept of "source of standards and 
specifications". This responds to the need for trade 
mark functions to be explained in a manner consistent 
with emerging commercial realities without abandoning 
traditional approaches altogether. 56 
The term "guarantee function" is a misnomer insofar as a 
trade mark does not provide a guarantee in the strict 
sense of the term. No legally binding warranty is 
implied or intended thereby. 57 A high quality or 
standard is also not implied. What is meant is that the 
quality level - whatever it is - will remain consistent 
and predictable. 
European writers consistently agree that the consumer 
has no right to compel the trade mark holder to maintain 
or guarantee the qualities, characteristics or 
properties of the product upon which the same mark is 
featured from time to time. 58 
Gielen observes in relation to the law in the Benelux 
that a loss of interest in the product by consumers in 
those circumstances where the assignee of a trade mark 
allows the trade marked product to deteriorate is 
regarded as an adequate sanction and no provisions 
directed at reducing consumer confusion by prohibiting 
free assignment of marks were therefore deemed necessary 
by the legislature. 59 
The sanction which the market can vest upon a 
manufacturer who changes the quality or nature of a 
trade marked product is aptly illustrated by the 
Coca-Cola example. The recipe for the product bearing 
the universally known Coca-Cola trade mark was changed 
56. Per Ladas in Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights 1128 discussed by Parks 82TMR 
531-569 (1992) 554. 
57. See McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition 112. 
58. Gielen Proefschrift 1 8. 
59. See Gielen Proefschrift 18. Benelux legislation influenced the Directive substantially. 
479 
during 1985. The new formula did not meet with consumer 
approval and the Coca-Cola Company was compelled to 
revert to the well-established recipe - to restore the 
known quality or incur substantial loss from a 
b . 1 d . . 1 60 su stantia re uction in sa es. 
Gielen observes that 
to a product 
in practice producers 
without changing the 
often make 
trade mark changes 
applied thereto. This can be used in marketing the 
product to enhance sales by creating new interest. The 
mark is maintained to apply the existing attractive 
61 force thereof to the new product. As the Coca-Cola 
example, however, illustrates, this approach is not a 
guarantee of enhanced interest. 
According to Gielen, the quality function has diminished 
in importance with reference to the modern trade mark 
for two reasons: 
4.1 The actual differences in quality between competing 
products of the same kind have diminished in modern 
4.2 
commerce; 
Trade marks, 
distinguishing 
therefore, no longer assure specific 
characteristics or consumer-desirable 
characteristics but rather, as I will discuss later in 
this chapter, perceived differences signalled by the 
associative network established about the mark. 62 
In Gielen's assessment, the properties and 
characteristics of the product still play some role but 
the expectation which the consumer develops regarding 
the subjective as well as the objective qualities of a 
product when a mark is encountered is but one of the 
aspects which enables him to decide regarding the 
60. See Gielen Proefschrift 19; Economides 78 TMR523-539 (1988) 530. 
61 . Gielen Proefschrift 1 9. 
62. Gielen Proefschrift 19. 
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product. The product image comprises numerous aspects, 
physical as well as psychic - and the consumer's choice 
when confronted with products in the market-place 
depends upon all the rational and emotional aspects 
communicated by the trade mark. Thus, the quality 
function is not an autonomous trade mark function but 
merely an element of the product image communicated by 
the mark. 63 
I have observed that the assurance (guarantee) function 
is also known as the quality function. By quality 
function is meant that each time the consumer encounters 
a marked product he will proceed from the supposition 
that the product is more or less of the same quality as 
other products featuring the same mark. This is also 
seen as the trust function of a trade mark. The public, 
through experience and advertising, are made aware of 
the specific properties and characteristics of a product 
and the mark enables the public to trust that the 
product featuring the mark has maintained the known 
properties and characteristics. This can be coupled 
with an expectation 
enhance them. 64 
that the producer will strive to 
Economides considers the guarantee function of trade 
marks from the perspective of trade mark economics. He 
distinguishes between search goods and experience goods. 
Experience goods are goods which a consumer buys often 
and in regard to which he can gather experience as to 
the features of the product from a few purchases 
thereof. This experience is subsequently applied by the 
consumer when choosing the product again. The consumer 
takes cognisance of preferred quality features, price 
and variety features such as available colours. 65 In 
the context of experience goods, therefore, trade marks 
assist persons faced with a multiplicity of trade marks 
to select a product which past experiences have shown to 
63. Gielen Proefschrift 19-20. See p 488 infra regarding the imago of trade marks. 
64. See Baumbach Warenszeichenrecht 26 discussed by Gielen at p18. See also footnote 
51 p 476 supra. 
65. Economides 525. 
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b . f 66 d . d h e sat is actory. In regar to experience goo s t e 
success of a trade mark is a function of the following, 
according to Economides: 
4.3 The consumer's ability to recall the mark and its 
associated features; 
4.4 The inability of others to use the same or a confusingly 
similar mark; 
4.5 The reluctance of enterprises to change the variety and 
quality features of the trade marked product. 67 
Search goods, on the other hand, are goods which are 
infrequently purchased and infrequently consumed by the 
same individual. Such goods include, for example, 
refrigerators, television sets, stoves and the like. 
Lacking previous consumption the purchaser is unable to 
identify the trade mark with the product in the same way 
as with experience goods. To forge an association 
between the goods and trade mark the consumer is 
therefore compelled to rely on information diffused 
informally or by way of the advertising of the product. 
In this regard Economides states: 
It is clear that, because of differences of interpretation as well as 
differences of opinion and preference across consumers, the information 
on which the choice will be based is most likely to be much more vague 
than in the case of experience goods. Most relevant information reaches 
the consumer in summary form. Information gathered through this 
process is likely to be incomplete and the consumer has little hope of 
more complete information on product features. 
However, firms may use trade names to help the consumer identify the 
quality level of product. Even though the consumer is an infrequent 
buyer of a particular kind of electronic product, he may be a frequent 
buyer of the overall category of electronic products, and thus he is likely 
to have previous experience in the consumption of goods with the same 
trade name. Choosing a high quality standard in the category of 
electronic products, a manufacturer can use his trade name to transmit 
information on quality through the direct previous experience of 
consumers. 
68 
66. See Lunsford 4 Georgia LR 322-340 (1970) 322. 
67. Economides 527-528. 
482 
Thus, in the case of search goods, the quality signalled 
by the trade mark plays a particularly important role. 
It follows from the discussion of the assurance function 
that apart from the close link which exists between the 
origin and assurance functions there are other functions 
revealed in the application of the assurance function. 
Clearly, in order to assure the maintenance of a 
consistent quality the trade mark must bear and 
communicate information to the consumer. In doing so 
the trade mark clearly functions as a advertising and 
selling mechanism. I proceed to consider those trade 
mark functions which have obtained great significance in 
commerce but which require further attention from the 
law. Again, these functions are not always clearly 
defined and commix in their operation. 
5. THE ADVERTISING AND SELLING FUNCTIONS 
The presence of a trade mark advertising function was 
first suggested by Hopkins in the U.S.A.. He proposed 
that trade marks guide the public to the goods they wish 
to buy and serve as a perpetual means of identification 
and advertisement of the goods concerned. 69 I have 
already observed that in 1927, Schechter proposed that a 
trade mark has an intrinsic selling power which enables 
it to "reach over the shoulder of the retailer" to the 
70 
consumer. 
Diamond mentions the advertising function of the modern 
trade mark in relation to the get-up which features it: 
A trademark obviously is a symbolic device that can be used in 
advertising. More specifically, the package that bears the trademark 
becomes an advertising medium itself - an advertising medium that is 
69. Hopkins Law of Trade Marks 17 (as discussed by Hertzog at page 37 footnote 
19). See also p 540-554 infra regarding the advertising function. 
70. Schechter 60 TMR 334-352 (1970) 337. 
particularly important in present-day merchandising when so many 
products are bought off the shelf in supermarkets and other self-service 
establishments. 71 
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A concise description of the advertising function of the 
modern trade mark is provided by Rutherford, who writes: 
Today, through the use of sophisticated advertising techniques, a 
manufacturer aims at promoting the sale of his product. In this regard, 
he makes use of his trade mark firstly, to identify and distinguish his 
product, and secondly, as a conduit for the transmission of the 
persuasive power of his advertising. If his advertising campaign is 
successful and the product proves acceptable to the consumer, the trade 
mark will identify the product as satisfactory and will thereby stimulate 
further sales. The trade mark actually helps to sell the product. In this 
way the trade mark creates and retains custom. A trade mark, 
therefore, not only constitutes a . symbol of the goodwill of the 
proprietor's business but is an important agent in the creation and 
perpetuation of that goodwill. 72 
According to Braun, the importance of the advertising 
function lies in the significant potential which a mark 
provides for the producer to communicate with consumers 
via the advertising media. 
means by which a product is 
A trade mark provides the 
identified and attention 
is drawn thereto. It is this phenomenon which provides 
the reason for protecting trade marks. In the view of 
Braun, a mark obtains its notoriety through advertising 
d . 73 expen iture. 
Trade marks have been widely recognised as serving a 
primary function in effective advertising which creates 
consumer demand and popularity for the particular 
trade-marked product advertised. The trade mark 
functions as an advertising and selling device with the 
power to generate sales. In this context, trade marks 
71. Diamond 290. 
72. Rutherford - Misappropriation of the advertising value of Trade Marks, Trade Names 
and Service Marks 56 in Neethling (ed) Onregmatige Mededinging 55-69. 
73. Braun Precis 22-24 (as discussed by Gielen 20). 
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are viewed as the most effective means available to 
producers who wish to establish product acceptance and 
encourage consumer loyalty. Trade marks have the power 
74 to create goodwill and consumer acceptance. 
Gielen, however, is of the 
function is not autonomous 
' ' f ' 75 communication unction. 
view that the advertising 
but lies included in the 
A trade mark certainly communicates information to the 
consumer and it cannot advertise or sell product without 
doing so. In my view, however, trade marks function in 
a "functional matrix" which recognises the possibility 
of the commixure and overlapping of trade mark functions 
evidenced by a particular mark. Little purpose is, 
therefore, served in concluding that a particular facet 
thereof (for example the advertising function) is 
necessarily absent when some other facet (for example 
the communication function) is discerned. 
According to Sanders & Maniatis: 
Recognition of advertising as a separate function of a trade mark 
merely acknowledges the goodwill which the trade mark can attract to 
itself independently of the goodwill of the product or its maker. 
Good branding is a prerequisite to successful marketing. 76 
The authors describe the concept of the "brand" in which 
the mark provides the nucleus, in the following terms. 
Brands have both definition and value. A brand is a 
product which provides functional benefits plus added 
values which consumers value enough to buy. These added 
values are derived from consumer experience of the 
brand, the kind of people who use the brand, a belief 
that the brand is effective and the appearance of the 
brand. 77 This represents a mix of the product and the 
74. Hanson and Walls 81 TMR 480-533 [19911 485-487. 
75. Gielen Proefschrift 20. 
76. Sanders & Maniatis [19931 11 EIPR 406-415 408. 
77. See Sanders & Maniatis 409 footnote 20 and the sources there discussed. 
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mark into a package called the brand. It is by means of 
the brand that trade marks now appear on the balance 
sheet of firms in addition to 11 goodwill 11 • 78 
Whether a trade mark has both an advertising and a 
selling function in need of autonomous recognition does 
not appear to me to be a question requiring 
consideration in depth. Nevertheless, for the purpose 
of analysis, the selling aspect or function in the 
narrow sense can in my view be regarded as the power of 
the mark to induce the desire to purchase and exert a 
suggestive attractive force upon consumers. 
6. THE GOODWILL FUNCTION 
According to Kaufmann, the goodwill function refers to 
the ability of a trade mark to increase the confidence 
of the consumer to a degree where qualities present in a 
product of a certain category which features the mark 
are attributed also to products in other categories 
which feature the same mark. This "goodwill function" 
is one of the three economic functions of trade marks 
(beside the identification and guarantee functions) . 79 
The close link between trade marks and goodwill has 
already been discussed at length. 80 
From a trade mark economics point of view when 
considered from a positive perspective, trade marks 
foster competition and the maintenance of quality by 
securing to the producer the benefits of a good 
reputation. Successful trade marks are, therefore, 
valuable because of the information they convey. The 
consumer sees the mark and knows what the mark 
represents: a consistent quality, a reputation for 
service and any of the things that, when taken together, 
are thought of as business goodwill. Although goodwill 
78. Seep 181-182 supra. 
79. Kaufmann Dissertation 138 (as discussed by Gielen at 21 ). 
80. Seep 177-181 supra. 
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is intangible and its precise source is often difficult 
to trace, it is nevertheless one of a firm's most 
valuable assets because it is by definition a major 
reason for the consumer's choice amongst competing 
brands. The trade mark is therefore one of the visible 
means by which goodwill is identified, bought, sold and 
made known to the public. 81 
Carter follows the traditional approach that trade marks 
have no meaning except when appurtenant to goodwill. 
Traditionally trade marks are protected because they 
represent goodwill. The mark as a symbol - not the mark 
itself is protected. The mark therefore confers no 
monopoly in the proper sense - being merely a commercial 
signature which facilitates goodwill. Historically, 
says Carter, marks without goodwill have been treated by 
the law as meaningless and unworthy of protection. 82 
Hence there is no protection at law for the mark itself 
and the law has never created an incentive to create 
marks of an attractive kind. No matter how clever the 
idea for a mark, no matter what special charm it has, 
the mark itself, lacking any underlying goodwill, has 
not before the advent in the U.S.A. of trade mark 
registration legislation, been afforded federal or 
common law protection. In economic terms, no matter 
how charming the mark, without goodwill it carries no 
' f ' d ' b . d 1 83 in ormation an 1t cannot e economise as a resu t. 
It appears to me that if consumers respond more 
positively to certain marks such marks have an intrinsic 
value. The fact that the law has not hitherto protected 
them does not mean that it never should. 
Hertzog regards the goodwill function 
not however define with specificity 
' d k f ' 84 important tra e mar unction. He 
81. Per Carter 99 Yale Law Journal 759-800 (1990) 761. 
82. Carter 761-762. 
83. Carter 767-768. 
84. Hertzog Functional Theory 120. 
which he does 
as the most 
regards the 
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goodwill function as an umbrella under which resorts a 
number of diverse factors such as origin, quality, 
emotion and any other considerations which in 
combination give rise to positive implications 
concerning the product in the mind of the consumer and 
which bring about a purchase. It appears that the 
goodwill function as constructed by Hertzog is 
essentially that function 
whatever single cause or 
brings about a positive 
of a trade mark which, for 
multiple underlying reasons, 
response in the consumer 
1 . . h 85 resu ting in a pure ase. 
As observed earlier, I prefer to regard the multiple 
functions of trade marks when simultaneously present as 
part of a functional matrix. 
hereunder. 86 
This concept is considered 
7. THE INFORMATION BEARING AND COMMUNICATION FUNCTIONS 
A trade mark, according to Gielen, creates an 
associative network around products by means of its 
power to communicate. 
can create brand or 
Through sound strategy a producer 
outlet loyalty which attaches a 
reputation or goodwill to the mark. This influences the 
consumer to repeat purchase as the desire to buy is 
stimulated because the mark is found attractive. 87 
Gielen•s central point is that trade marks have 
undergone a significant change in modern times: the 
earlier importance of the rational or physical character 
of trade marks has been replaced by the emotional or 
psychic aspects 
proposition is 
of trade mark functioning. This 
derived by the writer from his 
examination of research conducted in the advertising and 
marketing sciences which 
validity of the classical 
f . . 88 unctioning. 
85. Hertzog Functional Theory 82. 
86. See p 497-498 infra. 
87. Gielen Proefschrift 10. 
88. Gielen Proefschrift 10-11 . 
led him to question 
approaches to trade 
the 
mark 
488 
According to Gielen, a trade mark features an 
associative network which it encapsulates and conveys. 
This associative network is made up of the properties 
and characteristics of the product, packaging and the 
advertising associated with the product, which includes 
real or perceived product qualities both consciously and 
unconsciously discerned by the consumer. 89 
The associative network is built up over time out of 
diverse associations which a consumer is offered through 
advertising, and the product image which he creates for 
himself in relation to the product. The trade mark then 
comes to incorporate and communicate this information to 
him when he encounters the mark. 90 In other words, a 
trade mark can capture and contain an associative 
network of information and emotionally and 
psychologically charged signals or impulses which are 
communicable to consumers. The product attains both an 
image in the market and a subjective gestalt in the mind 
of a particular consumer. This enables the off eree of 
products to forge a bond with consumers. A trade mark 
is therefore an information conveying and a signalling 
means. The trade mark symbolises and encapsulates that 
which makes up the external image of the product in the 
market as well as its image in the subjective mind of 
each consumer. I have labelled this combination of 
external and internal images provided by a mark as the 
trade mark imago. According to Gielen, the intrinsic 
value of trade marks is to be found in this aspect of 
trade mark functioning and must be protected by law. 91 
The role of advertising and the formation of product 
image is discussed by 
distinguishes between 
perception advertising. 
89. Gielen Proefschrift 10. 
90. See Economides 533. 
91. See Gielen Proefschrift 10. 
Economides. This writer 
information advertising and 
Information advertising 
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disseminates information about prices, store location, 
dates of sales and the like. Perception advertising -
also referred to as persuasive advertising is relevant 
to the perceived image of the product and adds 
attributes to the product to be perceived by the 
consumer. A desired mental image is added to the 
physical goods by perception advertising. The consumer 
then buys both the commodity and the mental image. 
Trade marks are the carriers and means by which the 
d . . f . d . b . bl 92 a vertising o perceive images ecomes possi e. 
Trade marks, 
information 
therefore, 
and fulfil 
both contain and communicate 
information bearing and 
communication functions alongside and in conjunction 
with other trade mark functions. 
8. LEGAL AND OTHER FUNCTIONS 
I have already indicated in preceding paragraphs that in 
the view of a number of prominent writers the modern 
functions of trade marks are not recognised by law. 
This is aptly illustrated by the continental writer Von 
Bunnen. 
According to Van Bunnen, 
primary and the original 
its only legal function. 
the origin function is the 
function of a trade mark and 
This is so despite that the 
impersonal nature of modern production and trade has 
caused the trade mark to undergo the basic change from 
indicating origin to 
According to Van Bunnen, 
mark indicates to the 
providing identification. 
a product bearing a specific 
consumer that another product 
bearing that mark is the same. The product itself and 
not the source of product is emphasised. This is the 
identification function of a trade mark which leads in 
turn to the guarantee function in the minds of 
consumers. Certain standards are associated with the 
mark by consumers although commercial imperatives rather 
92. Lunsford 325. 
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than legal provisions require the producer to maintain 
standards. Advertising gives a trade mark a value 
independent of its use and advertising expenditure 
imbues a mark with a value independent of the article to 
which it is applied. This indicates the advertising 
function of trade marks which is also recognised by Van 
Bunnen. Nevertheless, he concludes that whereas in 
modern conditions the functions upon which the value of 
a trade mark is based are the guarantee and advertising 
functions, these functions are not recognised in law and 
therefore an incongruency exists 
93 
realities and legal theory. 
between economic 
Hertzog identifies the following as economic functions 
of trade marks: 
8.1 the "distinction" function; 
8.2 the origin function; 
8.3 the quality function; 
8 4 th d ' ' f ' 94 . e a vertising unction. 
By means of a comparative study, 
which functions serve as "legally 
acknowledged" functions. 95 The 
relevant hereto is as follows: 96 
Hertzog investigates 
protected" or "legally 
conclusion of Hertzog 
If, then, it is patently illogical to expect a trade mark to fulfil a 
concrete origin function, and an abstract origin function also does not 
seem tenable, it would seem as if the quality function does really 
suggest itself as a "legally protected" function. However, as pointed 
out in the course of the research, the quality function is not the only 
function which a trade mark may in practice fulfil. Apart from the fact 
93. Van Bunnen Aspects 4 (Discussed by Hertzog Functional Theory 27). 
94. Hertzog Functional Theory 7 - 8. 
95. Hertzog Functional Theory 8. 
96. Hertzog Functional Theory 169 - 170. 
that a trade mark may have quality connotations, it may also have 
various other connotations for an ordinary buyer. It may, for 
example, evoke various psychological images (some of them rational, 
some of them irrational) which may lead the buyer to make a specific 
purchase. The exact reason why a purchaser selects a specific product 
out of many, may not always be clear and it may differ in different 
situations (this is the so-called "socio-economic" or, to use Troller's 
phrase, "phenomenological" aspect of the trade mark). Evidently the 
law, whilst not formulating all of these functions in so many words, 
will nevertheless in a practical situation be confronted with all the 
different aspects of a specific situation. And it is suggested that to turn 
a blind eye to all these practical considerations and to insist on 
recognising only one or a few "legally protected" functions to the 
possible detriment of others, is to point out a shortcoming in the law. 
While it is not suggested that there should be no legal limitations 
imposed on a practical situation, and that the judge should be 
exclusively guided by "socio-economic" considerations, it is suggested 
that legal cognisance should be taken of all the practical 
considerations in a given situation. 
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A conclusion that the law must not confine itself to 
"legally protected" or "legally acknowledged" trade mark 
functions a priori is clearly sound. 
The central issue appears to me to be this: the law 
does not yet provide an appropriate theory to underpin 
the right of a trade mark proprietor to assert the newly 
recognised de facto functions of trade marks against 
others, or to protect the proprietor from conduct by 
others which impinges upon his ability or capacity to 
apply fully the available spectrum of functioning which 
comprises the content of his trade mark right. This has 
come about, in my view, due to a failure to afford 
elasticity to trade mark rights and a failure to 
properly define the nature of such rights in civil 
systems or the nature of trade marks as property in 
common law systems. 
492 
9. THE FUNCTION OF TRADE MARKS AND ECONOMICS 
9.1 
I do not ref er in this paragraph to those functions 
which the law has traditionally failed to recognise 
fully or at all (which some writers ref er to as 
"economic functions"), but rather to the functions which 
trade marks perform in the context of economic theory. 
Certain of the trade mark functions already discussed 
have consequences of which economic theory takes note. 
In this regard the identification and communication 
functions, operating together, reveal a product 
differentiating function which in the functional matrix 
might be regarded as an aspect of the distinguishing 
function. By the product differentiating function I 
mean the operation of a trade mark to assist consumers 
in identifying the unobservable features of trade marked 
product. Consumers do not achieve this result 
analytically but with reference to the summary provided 
by the trade mark, which the consumer identifies with a 
specific cluster of features. In other words the trade 
mark goes further than identifying quality standards. A 
trade mark identifies both quality and variety features 
(the full combination of features which constitute the 
product). In economic terms, the trade mark enables 
product differentiation by the consumer which affords 
the consumer a wider spectrum of quality and variety 
choice. From this economic perspective firms are 
thereby able to compete in an added dimension, which 
h . . 97 en ances competition. 
According to Economides, where experience goods have 
unobservable differences in quality and/or variety 
features, trade marks: 
enable consumers to choose 
combination of features 
distinguishing functions); 
products with the desired 
(the identification and 
97. See Economides 526-527, 533. 
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9.2 encourage firms to maintain consistent quality and 
variety standards which enable the product to compete 
over a wide quality and variety spectrum (the quality 
f . ) 98 unction . 
. As trade marks enable consumers to distinguish between 
goods which otherwise look identical in all their 
features before purchase, trade marks -
9.3 facilitate and enhance consumer decisions; 
9. 4 create incentives for firms to produce products with 
desirable qualities 
purchase) . 99 
(even if not observable before 
Trade marks assist in advertising activity in the 
interests of consumers in two ways: 
9.5 they add to consumer knowledge of the existence of goods 
i.e. consumers get to know more about existing products 
and new products announced by means of advertising. 
This assists competition; 
9. 6 they help form consumer expectations as to the utility 
of the product which assists consumers to assess real 
differences between products. In this way identical or 
. . 1 d d . ff . d 1 00 s1m1 ar pro ucts are i erent1ate . 
In the latter regard, Gielen makes the point that the 
objectively measurable differences between the intrinsic 
qualities of competing products are ever diminishing in 
modern commerce. Hence, according to Gielen, as already 
observed, trade mark functions which recognise the role 
of non-rational aspects of the psyche of the consumer in 
relation to the purchase are of increasing importance. 
In his view, the modern trade-marked article comprises a 
more or less uniquely marked product which is purchased 
in the first instance because it features a specific or 
well-known trade mark. It is bought because its 
98. Economides 525. 
99. Economides 526. This reveals the distinguishing function. 
100. Cornish & Phillips 53. This reveals the communication and quality assurance functions. 
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character fits the values and lifestyle of a specific 
category of consumers which is maintained through repeat 
purchasing. The characteristics of the product itself -
although not unimportant - do not play the crucial role 
in the exercise of consumer choice. Insofar as 
differences between product properties have diminished 
whilst the power of consumers has increased, producers 
must vie to attract the consumer's choice. If the 
product itself cannot determine the choice, other 
non-rational factors must. Here the associative network 
which the producer has been able to build up will 
determine the choice. In this sense, according to 
Gielen, a trade mark has a powerful communication 
f . . h . . f. ld 101 unction in t e soc10-econom1c ie . 
In my view, the suggestion that it is the non-rational 
which determines consumer choice does not serve as 
universally true. The nature of the market appears to 
me to determine the primary function which a particular 
trade mark performs. In a less consumer-lifestyle 
oriented market such as that for precision instruments 
for laboratory use, it will be the known quality of the 
product and source which will determine the choice 
rather than a fad-market response signalled and 
initiated by a non-rational aspect encapsulated in the 
imago of the mark. 
The question arises whether a trade mark imago created 
through manipulative advertising should be protected. 
This is a matter which deserves specific attention 
beyond the confines of this work. I mention it, 
however, as a matter which is ultimately likely to arise 
in the practical application of the conclusions at which 
this work ultimately arrives. 
In regard to matters relevant to the preceding 
discussion Cornish & Phillips point out: 
101 . See Gielen Proefschrift 11-13 . 
A consumer will frequently be prepared to buy a more expensive product 
about whose quality he is confident rather than a cheaper product about 
which he knows little or nothing and judges the cost of finding out more 
to be too great. 102 
On the other hand -
Not all brand loyalty is to be described in these rational terms. 
Sometimes it stems rather from faddish preference. The satisfaction of 
acquiring things for the trade mark they bear seem analogous to the 
phenomenon of "conspicuous consumption": the purchase of goods 
more for the display of the purchaser's wealth to others than for their 
l . 103 va ue muse. 
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Economic functions in the narrow sense indicate the 
results of the operation of other 
functions viewed from the economics 
functional matrix. Thus, the 
known trade mark 
perspective of the 
operation of the 
identifying, 
of a trade 
distinguishing and communication functions 
mark in the market leads to the mark 
fulfilling a product differentiating function in 
economics. The operation of the quality assurance 
function on the other hand, leads to the mark fulfilling 
a competition enhancing function from the perspective of 
economics. A consideration of Gielen' s views discloses 
a further example: the operation of the advertising, 
selling and communication functions in the non-rational 
sphere of consumer choice leads to a socio-economic 
d k f . 104 tra e mar unction. 
Johnston translates the various trade mark functions 
into the following economic implications and policies: 
confusion, promoting the protecting 
manufacture 
against consumer 
of quality goods, eliminating free-riders 
and the protection against intrusion upon the goodwill of 
102 Cornish & Phillips 11 C Vol 13 (1982) 41-64 49. 
103 Cornish & Phillips 49. 
104 Gielen Proefschrift 16. 
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the undertaking. The communication function 
particularly facilitates the free flow of information to 
d d . 105 consumers an re uces transaction costs. 
I am ultimately led to subscribe to Gielen•s conclusion 
that to deny legal protection to the socio-economic, 
the non-rational, modern de facto functions of trade marks 
negates the realities of market-economics, including the 
merchandising phenomenon and other diversifications of 
105 
use. 
I am also led to conclude that insofar as the true 
economic functions which trade marks perform derive from 
the direct functions 106 (which more often than not 
operate in conjunction with each other), to categorise 
certain of them as legal functions 107 and then extend 
the protection of law only to the latter, is untenable. 
My answer then to Lord MacKenzie Stuart's question is, 
therefore, that the law should recognise all those 
functions of a trade mark which are discernible in the 
market-place. In the following chapter I conclude that 
the legal basis upon which such protection is to be 
based in South Africa is revealed by an 
investigation of the entitlements attaching to the trade 
mark as the object of the subjective immaterial property 
right to a trade mark. 
10. THE DURATION OF FUNCTION 
It must be noted that a dis'tincti ve trade mark does not 
cease to function immediately after a purchase is made. 
It will in most cases identify and always distinguish 
the goods featuring 
purchase, whilst the 
it, whether 
question of 
105. Johnston 85 TMR 1-54(1995) 19-22, 53-54. 
before or 
source and 
after 
other 
106. Such as the identifying, distinguishing, assurance, advertising and communication 
functions. 
107. Such as the origin function and the assurance function only. 
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functions comes into play - insofar as they are present 
or are of importance in any specific instance 
immediately prior to the purchase or at the time of 
infringement of the right. 
Whether any importance attaches to the mark as an indicator, after 
purchase, of where the goods come from will vary with the type of 
product. Durables which require servicing or repairing calls for this 
kind of trade mark use; goods that are consumed straightaway do not, 
unless of course they prove to be defective. 108 
11. THE FUNCTIONAL MATRIX 
Trade marks are able to perform multiple functions: a 
particular trade mark at a given time can display a 
number of functions simultaneously. 
I have discussed certain of these functions in the 
preceding paragraphs. 
A numerus clausus of trade mark functions is not however to 
be constructed as new functions will develop as the 
market changes and develops. The historical overview of 
the development of trade mark protection which is a 
theme of this work makes this clear although it also 
shows that the response of the law thereto has been slow. 
The various trade mark functions display various aspects 
and their operation is discernible in different spheres 
at the same time, such as the legal and economic spheres. 
Trade mark functions often commix and this is of ten 
evident especially with the origin and quality assurance 
functions, the advertising and communication functions 
and the identifying and distinguishing functions. These 
functions are projections of the immaterial property 
known as the trade mark. 
108. Cornish & Phillips 43. 
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When a distinctive trade mark in use displays the 
operation of a number of functions simultaneously, a 
functional matrix arises in which the functions which 
the particular trade mark as a unit is performing de facto 
in the market is taken up. Whether any particular 
function is present is a question of fact. A particular 
function need not be autonomous to be protected: 
inter-dependency with other functions will not vitiate 
it. 
Unlawful interference with any function discernible 
therein will impinge upon the matrix and infringe the 
right. 
The functional matrix of a distinctive trade mark in use 
is akin to a cut gemstone in the hands of its 
proprietor: its various facets reflect the multiple 
functions it performs - the perspective from which it is 
viewed shows different aspects of its functioning a 
turn of the stone reveals the presence of functions not 
previously apparent. 
12. CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear to me that a trade mark can perform diverse 
and multiple functions. The functions which a trade 
mark performs in fact are derived from and mirror its 
action in the market. Modern markets are dynamic and as 
they change so the range of trade mark functions can be 
expected to extend correspondingly. This leads to the 
modification of recognised trade mark functions and the 
appearance and recognition of new modes of functioning. 
At the same time, the various aspects of trade mark 
functioning are not amenable to absolute lines of 
division but rather commix. At any given time, a trade 
mark in use in the market-place will invariably function 
to distinguish product and will in most instances 
display one or more of the variable trade mark functions 
operating simultaneously therewith in a functional mix -
the functional matrix of the trade mark. 
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Concepts of trade mark functioning must, therefore, be 
afforded elasticity and a numerus clausus of legally 
recognised and universally applicable trade mark 
functions ought not to be constructed. This approach 
requires the trade mark right to be sufficiently elastic 
to accommodate the functional matrix without drawing 
absolute technical distinctions between available 
functions and then affording them labels which restrict, 
a priori. Nomenclature and labelling assist greatly in 
the analysis of the trade mark functions. In my view, 
however, the desirability of recognising functions which 
are sufficiently defined to be regarded as autonomous 
must not lead to the application of rigid models which 
regard such functions in isolation, detached from the 
realities of the market-place. 
In my view there are both invariable and variable trade 
mark functions. If a trade mark is incapable of 
performing the invariable trade mark function of 
distinguishing goods or services it cannot function as a 
trade mark. When a mark does so qualify and 
function it may also - depending upon the facts - fulfil 
one or more of the variable trade mark functions. I 
define variable trade mark functions as those functions 
which a particular trade mark fulfils de facto but which 
do not, if absent, render the mark incapable of 
functioning as a trade mark both de facto and de iure. If a 
mark cannot distinguish goods or services it cannot 
function as a trade mark either in fact or in law. 
Thus, all functions other than the distinguishing 
function I regard variable they may be present but 
they need not be. Furthermore, in my view, all 
functions and aspects of functioning which are present 
de facto in any particular case deserve and require 
protection from unlawful interference by others. 
It follows that rigid maintenance of the often made 
distinction between "economic" trade mark functions and 
"legal" trade mark functions (being functions of which 
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the law takes cognisance) places an unnecessary a priori 
limitation upon the rights of the trade mark holder. The 
same objection applies to those approaches which deny 
that all or certain of the traditionally accepted trade 
mark functions have any remaining relevance or residue 
of importance and those approaches which regard it a 
necessary corollary, when recognising new functions or 
establishing known functions as sovereign, that the 
validity of other functions must then be denied in toto. 
It must, however, be said that when considering trade 
mark functions in law from a historical perspective, the 
origin theory has heretofore provided the axis about 
which everything turned. In this regard, trade mark law 
has, until .the recent acceptance of the advertising 
function in the new Continental, British and South 
African legislation, been reluctant to stray from its 
origins, which as earlier chapters have shown, was to 
guard against the appropriation of trade marks in order 
to pass off product. The trade mark functions which the 
law has recognised in the past have, therefore, for the 
most part been confined to indicating origin or source 
of product and functions reducible thereto by means of 
legal fiction. 
Trade marks have clearly functioned otherwise than 
merely to indicate origin or source of product 
throughout the twentieth century but the law has not yet 
provided a way to properly extend protection to such 
functions. Where the law has not yet found the means 
of protecting modern trade mark functions the division 
already ref erred to between legally recognised functions 
and economic or socio-economic functions was introduced. 
In the following and penultimate chapter of this work, I 
propose to show that the diverse functions which a trade 
mark performs reflect the content of the immaterial 
property right to a trade mark and that all of these 
functions are protectable under the law. 
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CHAPTER 16 
THE SUBJECTIVE RIGHT TO A TRADE MARK 
This chapter sets out my conclusions regarding the 
nature of the right to a trade mark revealed by the 
historical development of trade mark law and trade mark 
functions in the preceding chapters of this work. 
It proposes that the construction placed upon the notion 
of a subjective right by W A Joubert which is derived 
from the thoughts of H Dooyeweerd and the classification 
of rights by Dabin provides the construct, when 
suitably amplified, which is most apt for revealing the 
nature of the right to a trade mark in the trade mark 
law of South Africa. 
The chapter first considers the traditional approach to 
private law rights in the common law of South Africa 
briefly, and then proceeds with a discussion of the 
doctrine of subjective rights. Particular emphasis is 
placed upon the work of W A Joubert and J D van der 
Vyver in regard there.to. 
A brief consideration is afforded the notion of 
subjective rights in the Common Law, whereafter the 
trade mark right in South Africa is given gestalt 
following a brief discussion regarding the protection of 
intellectual property rights in general and the place of 
trade mark rights in regard thereto, particularly at the 
interface between statutory law and common law. 
Important approaches regarding trade mark rights and the 
protection afforded trade marks are then discussed and 
the chapter culminates in a description of the trade 
mark right to which this research has led me. 
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1. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO PRIVATE LAW RIGHTS1 
The traditional approach to private law rights in South 
Africa is based upon the distinction between real and 
personal rights. According to this approach real rights 
are absolute 
1 . . 2 app icat1on. 
"against the 
and personal 
In other words, 
whole world", 
rights relative in their 
real rights are effective 
whilst personal rights 
operate between specific parties. 
1.1 Classical Roman Law 
Classical Roman law featured a system of actions which 
recognised the distinction actiones in rem and actiones in 
personam. Actions of the first kind were directed at 
real objects whilst actions of the second kind were 
directed at a specific person. The distinction in Roman 
law between actio in rem and actio in personam did not, however 
result directly in the present-day distinction between 
ius in re and ius in personam. 3 This development took place 
only in the 16th century. 
1.2 Subsequent Developments 
During the early 13th century Tancredus began the 
conceptual transformation of the real and personal 
actions of Roman law to iura in re and iura in personam. It 
took until the 16th century, however, for the distinction 
1 . In contrast to public law rights as the distinction is generally understood in South 
Africa. 
2. See Van der Vyver "The doctrine of private law rights" in SA Strauss (ed) W A 
Joubert (hereafter Van der Vyver) 201. It is interesting to note that "incorporales", 
being intangible things having an existence in law, were known to Gaius (Inst 2.14). 
See Van der Vyver 203 footnote 10. 
3. See Van der Walt 1992 (55) THRHR 170-203 173. 
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to be established with clarity in the work of Apel4 . As 
Feenstra puts it: 
In de 16e eeuw worden ineens de uitdrukkingen iura in re en iura ad 
rem door vele auteurs bij voorkeur gebruikt om de tegenstelling weer 
te geven die de Postglossatoren tussen iura realie en iura personalia 
gemaakt hadden. Reeds in 1880 heeft Stintzing in dit verband terloops 
de aandacht gevestigd op Johannes Apel, die in zijn uit 1535 
stammend tractaat Methodica dialectices ratio ad jurisvrudentiam 
accommodata het onderscheid tussen ius in re en ius ad rem tot 
hooftndeling van het gehele privaatrecht maakte. 5 
Donellus then advanced matters by making a fundamental 
classification of real rights into ownership on the one 
hand and limited real rights on the other. He 
postulated that the owner's dominium could be reduced by 
the detraction of certain rights therefrom which he 
named iura in rebus alienis . 6 
The concept of a diminution in ownership by way of a 
detraction of rights therefrom was followed by De Groot 
who regarded ownership a more valuable right to those 
which were subtracted - such as a right of way. Full 
dominium Grotius termed voile eigendom, which became 
gebreckelicke eigendom when a gerechtigheid such as a right of 
way was granted to another by the owner. De Groot 
divided patrimonial rights into beheering and inschuld, a 
division which corresponds to that between real and 
4. See Van der Vyver 204. Feenstra /us in Re 1-4. 
5. Feenstra /us in Re 17. He states of the German jurist Apel: "Hy gebruikte geheel 
nieuwe methoden om het recht te beschryven, maar zijn materiaal putte hij voor een 
belangrijk gedeelte uit de geschriften der Postglossatoren." (at p 18). 
6. Van der Walt 174. He states: "In this way the fundamental distinction between 
personal and real rights on the one and and between ownership and limited real rights 
on the other became the basis for the modern theory of limited real rights." (at p 17 4); 
See J C de Wet "Ou Skrywers" 84-85 regarding Hugo Donellus (1527-1591 ). 
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personal rights . Beheering was divided in bezitrecht and 
. nd 7 eige om. 
Van der Walt summarises the contribution of De Groot 
concisely as follows: 
Grotius distinguished real rights from personal rights by stressing the 
direct or immediate character of real rights, which are exercised 
without reference to any other person. A real right is, therefore, not a 
legal relationship that exists between two or more people with 
reference to a thing, but rather a relationship that exists between a 
person and a thing without reference to other people. It follows that 
limited real rights must be distinguished from personal rights that 
involve a thing: the first exists without reference to other people, whilst 
the second exists with reference to another person. This approach is 
directly related to the remedies for the enforcement of the two rights 
respectively: a real remedy is instituted against any person who is in 
breach of the right, because the remedy is aimed at the thing and not 
the person. A personal remedy, on the other hand, is aimed at and 
can be instituted only against a specific person, who is bound to the 
claimant by way of his duty of performance in terms of the creditor's 
right. 8 
Regarding the Roman-Dutch authors in general he observes: 
Although a number of Roman-Dutch authors were sensitive about the 
fact that the Corpus iuris civilis proffers no direct authority for the 
distinction between ius in re and ius ad rem, and although their 
opinions about the number of real rights still varied, the majority of 
Roman-Dutch authors accepted Grotius's distinctions between 
beheering and inschuld and between eigendom and gerechtigheid. 9 
Early South African authors followed the approach of De 
Groot, and of Van Leeuwen and Van der Linden who accepted 
7. Van der Walt 174-176. 
8. Van der Walt 176. 
9. Van der Walt 176-177. 
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h . . 10 is construction. 
A number of theories have been propounded subsequently 
in relation to the nature and classification of private 
law rights in South Africa which Van der Walt discusses 
under the headings "classical theory", "personalist 
theory" and the theory of "subjective rights 1111 
He observes that the "classical theory" is built upon 
the distinction between real rights and personal rights. 
The real right has a thing as its object and concerns 
the relationship between the thing and a subject. A 
personal right has a claim as its object and concerns 
the relationship between a subject and some other 
person. The real right provides the subject with direct 
entitlements in respect of the thing without reference 
to other persons whilst personal rights do not entail 
entitlements over objects but rather concern direct 
1 . . 12 c aims inter partes. 
Briefly stated, the personalist theory turns about the 
range of enforceability of real and personal rights. A 
real right is regarded absolute in that it is valid 
against all persons at large - "the whole world". The 
personal right, on the other hand, is valid and 
enforceable against a specific person or persons only, 
and is therefore relative in effect. 13 
The classification of private law rights into real and 
personal - absolute and relative categories - is not of 
10. Van der Walt 182. 
11. See Van der Walt 184-192 for a rigorous discussion and critique of each theory. 
12. See Van der Walt 184-185. The name "classical theory" is a misnomer as is does not 
derive directly from Roman Law as is often supposed (p 1 84 footnote 1 03). This 
theory is distinguishable from the Joubertian theory of subjective rights in that it does 
not have as its central feature the dual subject-object and subject - subject relationship 
(see p 507 infra). 
13. Van der Walt 186. 
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great utility to jurists seeking particularity about the 
nature of intellectual property rights in general and 
trade mark rights in particular. This is not to say 
that the distinction absolute - relative does not serve 
at all. For instance, the rights of the trade mark 
proprietor 
authorises 
to 
use 
use 
of 
the mark are absolute unless he 
14 the mark by others. Hence trade 
mark rights are, in the South African law, real in that 
they are "enforceable against the whole world", i.e. 
absolute. The theoretical justification for the 
application of the concept real and personal rights to 
trade marks seems merely to be that insofar as trade 
mark rights, being immaterial or intellectual property 
rights, are rights to property, they must be real and 
enforceable against all at large. Hence, it has been 
held that an action to expunge a trade mark registration 
is an actio in rem and not an actio in personam. It was held 
further that although an intangible or incorporeal 
could, depending on its nature, be movable or immovable, 
where it was evidenced in a written document such as a 
trade mark register permanently situated at a fixed 
place, it would be incorrect to regard it as movable. 
Thus, a trade mark registration is for the purposes of 
jurisdiction at least, immovable property situated at 
the seat of the Register. 15 
In my view, the construct given to the doctrine of 
subjective rights by Joubert and later by Van der Vyver 
is preferable for the purpose of affording the trade 
mark right clear definition in the South African law. 
The theory of subjective 
pre-eminence in this work. 
thereof are the following. 
rights is, 
The most 
therefore, given 
relevant aspects 
14. Metal Box SA Ltd v Midpak Blow Moulders (Pty) Ltd 1988(2) SA 446{T). 
15. See Spier Estate v Die Bergkelder Bpk and another. 1988 (1) SA 94 (CPD) 98-99; 
Rembrandt Fabrikante en Handelaars (Edms) Bpk v Gulf Oil Corp. 1963(3) SA 341 (A) 
348-349; See also section 3(2)(f) of the Estate Duty Act No.45 of 1955, as amended; 
See Van der Vyver 234-236. 
507 
2. THE THEORY OF SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS 
Joubert introduced the Dooyeweerdian doctrine of private 
law rights to South African legal theory - adding to it 
the classification of rights proposed by Dabin. 16 
The essential 
private law 
b . 17 o Ject. 
feature of this approach 
rights according to the 
2.1 The essential relationships of the subjective right 
The subjective right evidences 
is to classify 
nature of their 
two essential 
relationships, namely, the subject-object relationship 
and the subject-third party relationship. 18 
2.1.1 The Subject-object relationship 
This is the special relationship between the subject -
the entity in whom the right vests - and the object of 
the right. This relationship affords the subject powers 
or entitlements in regard to the object which he can 
apply thereto, such as the power to use, enjoy and 
dispose of the object. 
2.1.2 The Subject-third party relationship 
This is the relationship between the subject in whom the 
right vests and all other legal subjects. It implies 
that the subject should not be disturbed by others in 
the legitimate application of the powers to which the 
16. Joubert Persoonlikheidsreg 119-122; Joubert (1958) 21 THRHR 12-1 5, 98-115. 
17. See Van der Vyver 201; Van der Merwe Vorderingsregte uit Kontrak 140-141. 
1 8. This refers to the particular view of the notion of a subjective right adopted in this 
work, following the "Joubertian school" of commitment to the Dooyeweerdian - Dabin 
based adaptation of the theory of subjective rights by Joubert. See Universiteit van 
Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films 1977 (4) SA 376 (T) at 381-383 discussed at p 519 
infra. For the position of J C Van der Walt see (1990) 53 THRHR 316-329. See also 
A J van der Walt 1995 De Jure 43-60. 
2.1.3 
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holder of the right is entitled under the subject-object 
relationship. There is a duty upon third parties to 
endure the subject's exercise of the powers to which he 
is entitled. A breach of this duty implies the 
commission of a delict. 19 
Classification of subjective rights 
I have observed that subjective rights are classified 
according to the nature of the object which features in 
the subject-object relationship. Dabin distinguishes 
between the following four classes of legal objects 
discernible in law: 
2. 1. 3 . 1 Corporeal things both movable and immovable which 
exist outside of the subject: the objects of real 
rights. 
2.1.3.2 Performances - claims to do or not to do - between one 
person and another: the objects of creditors rights. 
2 .1. 3. 3 Incorporeal things which exist outside of man and of 
which man is the creator: the objects of immaterial 
property rights. 
2.1.3.4 Elements within and integral to the individual 
aspects of the individuals body or psyche: the objects 
f 1 . . h 20 o persona ity rig ts. 
Joubert concludes thus: 
Die deurslaggewende aspek van die subjektiewe reg is die betrekking 
tussen subjiectum en obiectum iuris. Trouens, die aard van die 
regsobjek, sy ekonomiese waarde en die ttyse waarop dit gebruik kan 
word, is in hoe mate bepalend vir die aard van die reg wat daarop 
bestaan). So moet grotendeels die verskille tussen 
immaterieelgoedereregte en saaklike regte (albei sg. absolute regte) 
19. See Van der Vyver 211-212 regarding the essential relationships of the subjective 
right. 
20. Dabin Le Droit Subjectif 83-84; see Van der Merwe Vorderingsregte uit Kontrak 141; 
Van der Vyver 224-230, particularly 228. 
verklaar word, dit is immers onmoontlik om oor 'n uitvinding prakties 
op dieselfde wyse te beskik as oor 'n stoflike objek soos 'n perd. En, 
soos ek hoop om by 'n ander geleentheid aan te toon, die verskil 
tussen persoonlike reg en saaklike reg is nie dat die een "'n reg 
teenoor 'n bepaalde persoon" is en die ander "'n reg teenoor die hele 
wereld" nie, maar wel dat die een 'n bepaalde menslike handeling tot 
objek het en die ander 'n (stoflike) saak. Deur op hul objekte te let 
kan 'n mens die private subjektiewe regte ontleed en klassifiseer. 21 
2.2 Aspects of the subjective right 
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Before embarking upon the analysis of the right to a 
trade mark as a subjective right it is necessary to 
amplify certain aspects of the subjective right relevant 
to that inquiry. 
2.2.1 Nomenclature: Subjective right 
The term "right" has different meanings in the English 
language and the term offers the South African jurist 
many pitfalls both semantically and in relation to 
Anglo-American law. 22 
It is not only beyond the province of this work but 
unnecessary for me to embark upon a discourse regarding 
the term. 
It is however necessary to make clear that where this 
work speaks of a subjective right I attribute a 
technical meaning to it, namely, that phenomenon in 
legal discourse by which is meant the dual relationships 
between a legal subject and a legal object and a legal 
subject and others with reference to the legal object 
which imply, 
21. Joubert 115. The latin spelling is as it appears in the article. 
22. See Van der Vyver 206-210. 
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(a) in the first instance that the legal subject is entitled 
to exercise powers in connection with the legal object 
which are determined by its nature (the entitlements of 
the subject) and, 
(b) in the second, the power of the legal subject to demand 
and enforce non-interference with his entitlements over 
the legal object which others are thus required to 
endure. 
Put another way, the subjective right is the claim of a 
legal subject to a legal object which entails -
(aa) a relationship between the subject and object by virtue 
of which the subject is entitled to use and enjoy the 
object and to decide at any given time what is to be 
done therewith (the subject's entitlements in relation 
to the legal object), and 
(bb) a relationship between the subject and third parties by 
virtue of which the subject requires third parties to 
endure the exercise of his powers of entitlement in 
1 . h b' 23 re ation to t e o Ject. 
A corollary of the requirement that third parties should 
endure the exercise of the subject's entitlements with 
reference to the legal object is that third parties have 
a positive duty not to impinge thereon. Thus, the 
subjective right can have both positive and negative 
aspects i.e. the legal subject has entitlements with 
reference to the legal object which others must endure 
(the positive concept of entitlements) and a negative 
aspect a duty is placed upon third parties not to 
interfere with the application of the legal subject's 
entitlements to the legal object. A breach of this duty 
implies an unlawful infringement of the legal subject's 
subjective right and a delict is committed where, in 
addition to the infringer's unlawful conduct, the other 
elements for delictual liability are simultaneously 
23. See Van der Vyver 214; For the sake of uniformity I shall, henceforth, adopt the term 
"entitlements" in preference to "powers", as suggested by Van der Vyver (at p 215); 
Van Zyl lnleiding 421 . 
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present. 24 
In other words, the subject can claim against other 
persons that they endure the exercise of his 
entitlements in respect of the object. Conversely, the 
third party may do nothing which would impinge upon or 
obstruct the legal subject in the exercise of his 
entitlements included in the particular right in 
question. Thus, the right of the subject in respect of 
the legal object implies a duty on the part of third 
parties not to interfere with the exercise of his 
entitlements. Should a third party so interfere the 
right is infringed and a delict is likely to have been 
committed. 
The triangular construct, subject-object-third parties, 
is essential to the existence of all subjective rights. 
By definition, there cannot be a subjective right which 
does not have an object or which is exercised in limbo 
without a subject. 
The ultimate object of this work is to establish the 
entitlements of the holder of the subjective right to a 
trade mark - in other words - to define the powers of 
the holder of this right. 
It is suggested that such entitlements, when 
appropriated or impinged upon by another, will lead to 
an infringement of the right. 
An analysis of the entitlements reveals that the 
positive aspect of the trade mark right has been 
neglected. One of the entitlements of the trade mark 
right is to use the mark exclusively in relation to the 
goods or services in respect of which - in the case of a 
registered mark - it is registered. This is a positive 
entitlement which traditional approaches in trade mark 
24. See Van der Vyver 211-212. 
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law have largely ignored because the concept of property 
in trade marks which implies the application of a 
trade mark in the positive sense as property to be used 
- has been resisted throughout the history of trade mark 
law in the Anglo and American systems. The concept that 
the public must not be confused or deceived by the use 
of a mark that the public interest rather than the 
proprietor's interest is protected by trade mark law -
has predominated. As a consequence, the confusion 
standard has predominated, as has been noted. From the 
point of view of functional theory it is the origin 
function and the guarantee function (as an aspect of the 
latter) which has predominated because trade mark law 
protects the public from confusion in connection 
therewith. Hence, also in South Africa, the trade mark 
right has taken on a negative orientation, following the 
Common Law model. Thus, in regard to a registered trade 
mark, there is a duty upon third parties not to use the 
mark or a confusingly or deceptively similar mark inter 
alia in relation to the registered goods or services. 
Given a positive 
of the confusion 
orientation, however, the application 
standard should rather provide the 
limits within which the registered trade mark right may 
be positively exploited: the right holder's entitlements 
or powers may not be applied in such a way as to bring 
about public confusion or deception when the mark 
concerned is dealt with. 
With the possible exception of the new dilution 
provisions in regard to well-known marks, the statutes 
have, from the beginning, been silent or even 
prohibitive in relation to positive applications of the 
trade mark such as applying it in advertising or 
realising its merchandising potential. It is in this 
context, where the positive nature of the trade mark 
right is explored, that a consideration of the 
entitlements of the holder of the trade mark right in 
relation to its object - the trade mark - takes on 
2.2.2 
2.2.3 
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considerable importance. This is especially so in 
relation to the common law trade mark. For this reason, 
clarity must be established regarding the concept of 
entitlements, which is discussed briefly in the 
following paragraph. 
The entitlements of a subjective right 
The content of a subjective right is to be found in its 
entitlements. The entitlements comprise that which the 
holder of a subjective right can do with or in regard to 
the legal object of his right pursuant to the fact that 
he is the holder of the right. 
Thus, by way of example, the owner (the holder of a 
right of ownership) of a corporeal movable will be 
empowered in terms of the entitlements of the subjective 
right of ownership to possess the object, to use and 
enjoy it, to transfer or alienate it, to abandon or 
destroy it or to do whatever else he likes with it 
subject to the stricture that his conduct with reference 
to the object must be lawful. Entitlements are, 
therefore, normative. They are not congruent with all 
those things a legal subject can physically do or have 
done in regard to the object but correspond with what 
the legal subject is entitled to do - what is legally 
appropriate for him to do - in respect thereof. 25 
Subjective rights in the Common Law 
It has been established that the South African law of 
trade marks is underpinned by the law of trade marks of 
the United Kingdom and guidance can be sought from 
American law where the common law of South Africa is 
25. See Van der Vyver 212-213. 
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silent. 26 Some consideration must, therefore, be given 
to the concept of subjective rights in the Common Law. 
I have indicated earlier that in the Anglo and American 
common law systems, trade marks are regarded as 
appurtenant to goodwill and do not feature as property 
in themselves. I have also observed that some hold the 
view that a registered trade mark is property sui 
. 27 generzs. 
The concept of a subjective right is not known to the 
Common Law. Samuel, 
Subjectif" and English Law, 
in his article concerning Le Droit 
for the want of a more suitable 
example, proceeds on the basis that: "The subjective 
right is a term corresponding to an "individual 
prerogative" in the legal subject." He regards it "a 
power which the individual (legal subject) can exercise 
against another person or over a thing (legal object) 11 • 28 
He concludes: 
In both public and private law the litigant in the English legal system 
must always behave like the plaintiff in a tort claim: he or she can 
certainly assert that they have in such or such a situation an action 
against some public or private body - and they can probably assert 
that they have a "legitimate interest" or "expectation". What they 
cannot claim is a right to the actual substance, or object, of the action 
itself - they cannot claim a right, as a citizen, to succeed. In other 
words, for better or for worse, the concept of le droit subjectif has 
little relevance in English law. 29 
To compound the difficulty in reconciling the underlying 
concepts of the Common Law with European theory is the 
difficulty the British system has with the concept of 
"property" in intangibles. This aspect has already been 
26. See chapter 10 p 230-231 supra. 
27. See p 83, 220 supra. See also p 607-608 infra regarding sections 2( 1) and 22 of the 
1994 UK Act. 
28. Samuel 46(2)[19871 C.L.J. 264-286 264-265. 
29. Samuel 286. 
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addressed at length elsewhere. 30 In regard to the topic 
Libling writes: 
Historically, property has meant land and interests in land. Property 
in chattels has been recognised from the earliest times, but the 
importance of chattels had not become great till the nineteenth 
century. The first recognition of property rights in intangibles appears 
to have been in the sixteenth century and was well established in 
relation to copyright early in the seventeenth century. Common law 
recognition of property rights in intangibles waned as statutory control 
was extended over copyright, patents and trade marks. However, it is 
worth while to remember that copyright is not a creature of the 
legislature curing a defect in the common law, but, on the contrary, 
statutes have often cut down the protection afforded by common law. 31 
The author finds that intangibles are much like chattels 
at first glance but further scrutiny reveals that they 
cannot be owned in the same way as chattels or land can, 
intangibles cannot be held, moved or possessed. 
Therefore, intangibles cannot be property in the same 
manner as chattels or land. Nevertheless, a person can 
"own a right to the commercial exploitation of an 
intangible". Libling proposes: 
Any expenditure of mental or physical effort, as a result of which there 
is created an entity, whether tangible or intangible, vests in the person 
who brought the entity into being, a proprietary right to the 
commercial exploitation of that entity, which right is separate and 
independent from the ownership of that entity. 32 
Libling•s review of Anglo-American decisions however 
ff d 1 ' 1 f h ' ' ' 33 a or s itt e support or is proposition. 
30. See p 206-214 supra. 
31. Libling 94 [19781L.Q.R.103-119 103. 
32. Libling 104. 
33. See Libling 103-119. See also p 212-215 supra. 
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Despite that the doctrine of subjective rights is not 
part of the Common Law and the concept of property in 
intangibles (including trade marks) is not clearly 
established therein, it is not imperative for this work 
to sever all conceptual ties with the existing Common 
Law as my investigations proceed. The essential focus 
of the remainder of this chapter will be the content of 
the subjective right to a trade mark in the South 
African law and the protection the right affords. In 
regard to this endeavour, the following should be borne 
in mind. 
I have already drawn attention to the fact that European 
Community law will henceforth exercise a great influence 
over the law of trade marks in the United Kingdom 
directly through the impact of the Directive upon the 
Trade Marks Act, 1994 and through the Regulation and 
jurisprudence of the ECJ in the future. Although 
Community law is civil law based it bears little 
resemblance to the civil law of South Africa. Insofar 
as the trade mark law of the United Kingdom has perforce 
made a radical break with the past in that the Trade 
Marks Act, 1994 is not a response to Common Law 
evolutionary processes but pursuant to EU obligations, 
there is no justification for the conclusion that the 
South African trade mark law of the future will be but a 
reflection of future developments in the United Kingdom. 
Ideally, South African law will, now more so than in the 
past, itself provide sound solutions consonant with the 
international trend towards the modernisation of trade 
mark law. 
It is clear from the discussion regarding the object of 
a legal right by Devine which is derived chiefly from 
the writings of the Common Law authorities, Holland, 
Paton, Salmond and Austin, that the concept that a legal 
right has an object and content determined according to 
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the nature of the right is known to the Common Law. 34 
Furthermore, 
objects of 
objects can 
objects are. 
names and 
according to 
Salmond postulates a classification of the 
rights and accepts that intellectual 
be the objects of rights just as material 
Thus, intellectual 
goodwill feature 
Salmond. 35 
property including trade 
as objects of rights 
According to Paton, there are four elements in every 
legal right: 
(1) The holder of the right; (2) the act or forbearance to which the 
right relates; (3) the res concerned (the object of the right); (4) 
the person bound by the duty. Every right, therefore, involves a 
relationship between two or more legal persons, and only legal 
persons can be bound by duties or be the holders of legal rights. 36 
Devine points out that Paton's elements correspond with 
the first four of Salmond's elements. Salmon imposes a 
fifth element that there must be a title which gives 
. h . h 37 rise to t e rig t. 
Regarding the third element Devine writes: 
There must be content of the right. This comprises obligatory acts or 
omissions which are incumbent on the subject of the duty. Austin too 
accepts that there must be content in a right when he says that a right 
is created when "a person or persons are commanded to do or forbear 
... ". Holland describes one of the elements of a legal right as "the act 
of forbearance". Thi~ is obviously the content of the right. The holder 
of the right enjoys the benefit of the compulsion imposed upon the 
subject of the duty. 38 
34. See Devine 1965/1966 Acta Juridica 11 3-1 22 113-118. 
35. See Devine 115-116. 
36. Paton Jurisprudence 284-285. 
37. Devine 113-114. 
38. Devine 113. 
Devine adds by way of footnote: 
In addition, of course, the holder of a right may enjoy innumerable 
liberties and powers which are incidental to the right. These liberties 
and powers must be carefully distinguished from the content of the 
right, of which they do not form a part. 39 
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Thus, there is no congruency between the approach to 
subjective rights which this work adopts in relation to 
trade marks and the concept of rights in English 
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the matters with which I 
proceed - the object of the trade mark right and its 
content - are not concepts which are an anathema to the 
jurists of the Common Law. 
Van der Vyver draws an apt distinction: 
As far as English law is concerned, failure to distinguish between 
"right" in the sense of the claim of a legal subject to a legal object, 
and "right" in the sense of being legally entitled to deal with a legal 
object within the confines of a right, goes deeper than mere 
impeifections of language. The English legal system is not founded 
upon or conditioned by the notion of rights. Whereas Roman private 
law was a system of actions and Roman Dutch law developed into a 
system of rights, English law can be said to be a system of duty. The 
basic difference between a rights - oriented and a duty - oriented 
system is clearly reflected in emphases, and also in the vocabulary of 
h l l d . . . . 40 t e ega zspensatwns m question. 
Ultimately, for the conclusions arrived at in this 
thesis, it is the difference between the specific-tort 
system of remedies of the Common Law and the Aquilian 
system of delictual remedy in the South African system 
which is most significant. 
39. Devine 113 footnote 10. 
40. Van der Vyver 217. 
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2.4 Judicial acceptance of the doctrine 
41 In Universiteit Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films, Mostert 
J stated: 
In die regsvergelykende werk wat deur Suid-Afrikaanse akademici 
gedoen is, is veral aansluiting gevind by die kontinentale 
regswetenskap van die afgelope 150 jaar; dit is waarskynlik geen 
toevalligheid nie as in gedagte gehou word dat die kontinentale 
regstelsels, soos ons eie, geskiedkundig diep in die Romeinsregtelike 
sistematiek en begrippeleer gewortel is. 
Die moderne Vastelandse teorie oor subjektiewe regte onderskei tussen 
regte op aspekte van die menslike persoonlikheid (die sogenaamde 
persoonlikheidsregte) en regte op objekte gelee buite die menslike 
persoonlikheid. Hierdie ander regte is die saaklike regte (met as objek 
sake), vorderingsregte (met as objek menslike prestasie) en 
immaterieelgoedereregte (met as objek die immateriele produkte van 
die menslike gees waaraan 'n uiterlik waarneembare vorm verleen is.) 
Tot hierdie moderne leer en veral die onderskeid tussen 
persoonlikheidsregte en die ander regte, het die leer van die 
subjektiewe reg veel bygedra (sien die proefskrif van prof. W.A. 
Joubert, Grondslae van die Persoonlikheidsreg (1953), bl. 13). 
Sover ek kon vasstel, is die begrip van die subjektiewe reg vir die 
eerste keer in 1953 met enige mate van besonderheid in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse regswetenskap deur prof. Joubert in sy voormelde 
proefskrif behandel. In 1958 Zig hy die onderwerp verder toe in 'n 
artikel onder die opskrif "Die Realiteit van die Subjektiewe Reg en die 
Betekenis van 'n Realistiese Begrip daarvan vir die Privaatreg ". 
T.H.R.H.R. (1958), bl. 12. Sedertdien is die begrip gebruik in 
41. Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977(4) SA 376(T). 
meerdere proejskrifte (dr. H.J. 0. van Heerden, Grondslae van die 
Mededingingsreg (1961); dr. N.J. van der Merwe, Die Beskerming van 
Vorderingsregte uit Kontrak deur Aantasting deur Derdes (1959); 
Risiko-aanspreeklikheid uit Onregmatige Daad (1974), deur prof J C 
van der Walt; Die Reg op Privaatheid (1976), deur dr. J Neethling, 
om net 'n paar te noem). Die be grip is ook deur verskeie skrywers 
behandel of gebruik (Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-A(rikaanse 
Reg deur Van der Merwe en Olivier, 2de uitg., bl. 56; Regsleer. 
Regswetenskap. Regsfilosofie (1973), deur prof. Van Warmelo; 
Inleiding tot die Regswetenskap (1972), deur Van der Vyver en Van 
Zyl.) 
In hierdie uitspraak is dit nie doenlik om die begrip subjektiewe reg in 
besonderheid te behandel nie. Die volgende aanhalings bevat 'n 
voldoende omskrywing van die begrip vir doeleindes hiervan. 
"Juis omdat onregmatigheid privaatregtelik gelee is in die skending 
van 'n subjektiewe reg. is dit nodig dat 'n paar aspekte van hierdie 
kardinale begrip goed onder die knie gekry word. Teenoor die reg in 
objektiewe sin as normkompleks staan die reg in subjektiewe sin as 
verhouding. By die subjektiewe reg word met 'n tweerlei verhouding 
te doen gekry. Eerstens is daar die verhouding tussen die regsubjek as 
reghebbende en alle ander regsubjekte as partye wat verplig is om 
eersgenoemde se reg te eerbiedig - daarop nie inbreuk te maak nie. 
Tweedens bestaan tussen die reghebbende en zy regsgoed 'n 
subjek-objekverhouding. Die verpligting wat op derdes rus om nie op 
die regsgoed van 'n ander in te werk nie. spruit juis voort uit die 
regsbetrekking wat tussen die reghebbende en die voorwerp van zy reg 
bestaan. Ook die algemene spraakgebruik dui op die tweeslagtige 
karakter van die subjektiewe reg. So word dan gepraat van 'n reg op 
my saak wat ek teenoor alle ander regsubjekte kan handhaaf. 
Trouens. betrokkenheid op 'n regsgoed is by uitstek die kenmerk van 
die subjektiewe reg. Inderdaad is dit ook so dat die karakter van 'n 
bepaalde kategorie subjektiewe reg in 'n hoe mate bepaal word deur 
die aard van die betrokke regsobjek. Byvoorbeeld. die verskil tussen 
die saaklike reg van die eienaar en die immaterieelgoederereg van die 
outeur word grotendeels bepaal deur die feit dat die eienaar 
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bevoegdhede ten opsigte van 'n stoflike. fisies hanteerbare saak het. 
die outeur daarteen 'n reg ten aansien van 'n onstoflike geestesproduk. 
Kortom. vir 'n insig in die subjektiewe reg is dit ndodsaaklik om 
kennis te neem van die verskillende kategoriee regsgoedere wat volgens 
hedendaagse regsbeskouing objek van reg kan wees." 
(Bl. 56 en 57 van Van der MeJWe en Olivier, Onregmatige Daad in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg.) 
Die volgende uittreksel uit die proejskrif van dr. Van der MeJWe dui op 
die belangrikheid vir die regswetenskap van die begrip subjektiewe reg. 
"Die allesoorheersende vraag is hierby: waarin is die onregmatigheid 
van die dader se optrede gelee? En hierdie vraag hang weer, ten spyte 
van groat verskil van mening omtrent die wese van onregmatigheid, 
ten nouste saam met die vraag na die aard van die benadeelde se 
subjektiewe reg. 
Hoe uiteenlopend oak die menings oor die wese van onregmatigheid, is 
'n betreklik verbrede opvatting dat die onregmatigheid van 'n 
handeling minstens ten dele gelee is in die aantasting van 'n ander se 
subjektiewe reg. Om te kan bepaal in hoeverre hierdie beskouing 
gehandhaaf kan word, is dit noodsaaklik om eers 'n beeld te verkry 
van die subjektiewe reg self - daardie kardinale aspek van die reg, die 
wetenskaplike behandeling waarvan 'n belangrike hoofstuk in die 
geskiedenis van die regswetenskap van die afgelope 150 jaar en meer 
beslaan." 
(Sien Van der MelWe, Vorderingsregte. supra te bl. 138-139.) 
Van belang en nuttig is prof Joubert se klassifikasie van regte na 
aanleiding van die regsobjek. (Joubert, Subjektiewe Reg, bl. 113.)42 
Following upon this the learned Judge goes on to say: 
42. At p 381-382. 
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Gevolglik karakteriseer ek die eerste probleem in hierdie saak soos 
volg: skend die vertoning van die respondent se film 'n subjektiewe 
reg van die applikant? 1143 
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In this way the Joubertian adaption of the doctrine of 
subjective rights obtained judicial recognition in South 
Africa. On appeal to the Appellate Division, the matter 
was decided upon the facts without further judicial 
comment regarding the doctrine of subjective rights. 44 
2.4.1 The doctrine of subjective rights and immaterial property rights 
Van der Vyver defines immaterial property rights thus: 
[T]he intangible expression of human skills, or inventions of the human 
mind, embodied in an tangible agent and which are by law allotted to 
their author (such as the ideas expressed in a poem, novel or academic 
dissertation, the design of a building or a piece of furniture, a patent, 
the registered colour arrangement of a university blazer or the emblem 
of a sports club, a trade name or trade mark, goodwill of a business, 
the exchange value of money, etcetera). The rights to immaterial 
property (for instance, copyright, patent right, the right to a trade 
mark or trade name, etcetera) are called immaterial property rights, 
and the acquisition, contents, transfer and termination of immaterial 
property rights are governed IYy immaterial property law. 45 
43. At p 383. 
44. Universiteit Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1979(1) SA 441 (A); Van der 
Walt (1990) 53 THRHR 316-230 has suggested an adjustment to the theory of 
subjective rights to one of subjective relationships in that the mandament van spolie is 
an acknowledged remedy which does not entail the infringement of a subjective right. 
In his view this remedy provides the framework of stability and security at the heart of 
property law which enables the system of real rights to function: "The essential 
function of the mandament van spolie is important enough to merit a fundamental 
reappraisal of the doctrine which fails to accommodate it, rather than to sidetrack the 
remedy in order to save the integrity of the doctrine." (at p 329). 
45. Van der Vyver 231. I have used the term intellectual property rights for the most part. 
The term immaterial property rights is also technically suitable in regard to trade mark 
rights. The trade mark right is a species of intellectual property right (according to 
modern nomenclature) which resort under the genus immaterial property rights. 
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It is to be noted that the classification of Dab in is 
not to be regarded as a numerus clausus of subjective 
rights. Thus, Neethling has persuasively suggested a 
category of legal objects termed personal intellectual 
46 . . h d k property. It is my view t at tra e mar s are too 
easily categorised with other intellectual property such 
as patents, copyright and design to which they bear 
little resemblance. The proposition of Van Zyl that the 
object of a right is never a concrete thing or act as 
such but rather always some aspect thereof is in my view 
particularly well founded in regard to the trade mark as 
object. This is so because the entitlements of the 
holder of the trade mark right are to be found in the 
functions which trade marks fulfil - which are aspects 
of the trade mark. 47 
3. KOHLER 
I have recorded that in this thesis intellectual 
property rights are regarded as a category of subjective 
rights alongside real rights, personal rights (claims) 
and personality rights, following Dabin. Insofar as it 
has been stated that subjective rights are classified 
with reference to the legal object at which the right is 
directed, intellectual property rights are identifiable 
and distinguishable from other subjective rights in that 
the legal object thereof is an intangible product of 
human mental activity with an economic value or 
potential which is discernible and exists outside and 
independent of the body or psyche of any person. 48 
The proposition that the object of an intellectual 
property right must have economic or patrimonial value is 
46. See Van der Vyver 231-233. 
47. See Van der Vyver 229-230; Van Zyl lnleiding 412-419. 
48. See du Plessis - Statut~r beskermde immaterieelgoedereregte en onregmatige 
mededinging (veral prestasie aanklamping) 89-11 3 in Neethling (ed) Onregmatige 
Mededing 89-90. 
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questioned by Van Zyl. 49 This is not, however, an issue 
in trade mark law as trade marks clearly have economic 
significance and the trade mark milieu is trade. 
That trade mark rights exist outside of the human 
personality has not always been universally accepted. 
According to Kohler, the trade mark right is a right of 
1 . 50 h. 1 d hl persona ity. T is e Ko er to suggest the 
"principle of unity and universality of trade mark law" 
in regard to which he wrote: 
[T]rade mark law, as the law of personality, is, like all laws of 
personality, bound in its validity and manifestation within no local 
limits, since in theory the individual can assert the rights of an 
individual for all his actions, not only for those taking place within a 
particular legal region. The spiritual strength of the person is not 
locally limited, and the right to recognition is therefore a right which 
should not be tied to boundaries. 
He goes on to say: 
If the mark characterises the origin of goods from a certain producer, 
one cannot grant or deny protection to the mark according to whether 
the goods were produced domestically or abroad. 51 
The realities of modern commerce clearly vitiate at 
least that aspect of Kohler's theory which holds that 
the right to a trade mark is a personality right. 
4. THE DUAL NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
According to Du Plessis, intellectual property rights 
49. Van Zyl lnleiding 409-410. 
50. Kohler Recht des Markenschutzes 446. See van Heerden & Neethling 
Mededingingsreg 117-118. 
51 . Kohler Recht des Markenschutzes 442, 412-413, 423. See the discussion by Hiebert 
Parallel Importation 29-31. Translations from the German are Hieberts'. 
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exhibit a duality arising from the fact that rights of 
this kind can be divided into two groups. This grouping 
is not with reference to their nature but to the 
source 
namely, 
first 
from which they originate and obtain protection, 
under statute or under the common law. The 
category includes intellectual property rights 
copyright and 
as the 
such as patents, trade marks, design, 
plant breeder's rights whilst goodwill 
single generally accepted example of 
features 
the second 
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category. 
It is, however, my intention to show that as a general 
proposition, the aforegoing does not serve for trade 
mark rights which are derived from both sources. In 
this I am in accord with Van Heerden & Neethling when 
they propose that all the distinguishing signs of an 
undertaking must be recognised as the object of an 
intellectual property right. 53 
Registration is not a sine qua non for the constitution of 
a distinguishing sign as the object of a subjective 
right. In modern trade mark law trade marks are signs 
of various kinds capable of distinguishing product. 54 
Registration facilitates the protection thereof but is 
not the only source or means of protecting trade 
marks. 55 This has always been the common law position 
as the historical overview provided by the earlier 
chapters of this work has established. 
52. Du Plessis 90. 
53. See Van Heerden & Neethling Onregmatige Mededinging96-98. I propose that this 
suggestion must be taken to its proper conclusion - modern trade mark law has 
become the law of distinguishing signs whether they are registered as trade marks or 
not. 
54. See p 529 infra. 
55. See for example Pepsico Inc (and ors) v United Tobacco Co Ltd 1988(2) SA 334 (W) 
(the Ruffles case.) The court afforded protection to an unregistered mark where it had 
acquired a reputation by "pre-launch demonstration" on the basis of unlawful 
competition and passing-off. 
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In my view, therefore, modern trade mark law, congruent 
with its historical foundations, has largely become the 
law of distinguishing signs of which the registered 
trade mark is a speciality. 
Trade marks are, therefore, a 
property from those intangible 
mind which derive their legal 
alone. 
very different kind of 
products of the human 
existence from statute 
The suggestion that the analogy between trade mark law 
and patent and copyright law is more supposed than real 
is not new. Kohler, for instance, was of the view that 
trade mark and other intellectual property rights such 
as patents, are largely different. He based the 
distinction, however, upon the untenable premise that 
trade mark rights are personality rights. Kohler is, 
however, correct in stating that the modern law of 
patents for inventions is to be found only in statute. 56 
The true distinction lies herein that after its adoption 
and use, a distinguishing sign, as the Ruffles case has 
recently shown, is protectable at common law - without 
registration - if it has achieved a protectable status 
h h f k . d . h . h h . 57 t roug use o a in whic vests a rig t t erein. 
Du Plessis, 
intellectual 
building upon 
property rights 
the 
fall 
proposition that 
into one or two 
categories depending upon whether they derive from a 
statutory or common law source, suggests that there is 
not an established numerus clausus of intellectual property 
. h ' ' h 58 I d t t d k rig ts in eit er category. n regar o ra e mar 
rights I believe the position to be as follows. 
56. See: Hiebert Parallel Importation 30-31. It must be mentioned that although no longer 
the case copyright in England was initially protected under the common law and first 
recognised during the 17th century; Libling 103. 
57. Seep 565-566 infra for the circumstances in which this occurs. 
58. Du Plessis 90-92. 
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The source of trade mark rights is to be found both in 
statute and in the common law. Indeed, the historical 
investigations of this work clearly reveal that until 
the historical break constituted by the enactment of the 
Trade Marks Act, 1994, statutory trade mark protection 
in the trade mark law of the United Kingdom (which has 
provided the bedrock of the South African law of trade 
marks) has largely been a gloss upon the common law 
edifice of trade mark law. The position is the same in 
the trade mark law of the United States, the dilution 
statutes excepted. 
I believe Du Plessis provides an apt summation of the 
status quo regarding the protection of intellectual 
property rights at the interface between the recognised 
and legally protected categories of rights of this kind 
and the protection afforded by law to the new or 
previously unrecognised categories or aspects of such 
rights which are in need of legal protection: 
Die samehang tussen the statutere en die gemeenregtelike 
immaterieelgoedereregte kan waargeneem word by aantastings van 
onstoflike regsgoedere in sommige grensgevalle, waar beskerming 
geverg (en somtyds verleen) word in die praktyk, en waar dit om die 
een of ander rede nie 'n duidelike geval van inbreuk op 'n statutere 
immaterieelgoederereg is nie. As daar in so 'n geval 'n duidelike 
onregmatige aantasting van die weifkrag, en dus onregmatige 
mededinging, is die grondslag vir regshulp duidelik. 'n Probleem 
ontstaan egter waar daar, om die een of ander rede, nie 'n aantasting 
van die weifkrag plaasvind nie (byvoorbeeld omdat daar nie 'n 
mededingingsituasie bestaan nie) of waar die aantasting nie binne een 
van die geykte klasse van onregmatige inwerkings op die weifkrag val 
nie. 
Ten einde in sulke gevalle regshulp te verleen wat op billikheidsgronde 
verdienstelik is, moet die howe soms poog of om 'n ttryer interpretasie 
aan die omvang van 'n statutere reg te gee, of om nuwe, ttryer kriteria 
vir die vasstelling van onregmatigheid neer te le, of om 'n gans ander 
grondslag vir regshulp te vind. 
Die vraag wat telkens by 'n beskouing van hierdie grensgevalle 
ontstaan, is of the regsorde op die huidige tydstip oor die nodige 
regsmiddels beskik om in al die gevalle waar beskerming nodig en 
geregverdig lyk, inderdaad die gevraagde regshulp te verleen op 'n 
grondslag wat duidelik gei"dentifiseer en bevredigend gefundeer kan 
word. En verder, of prestasieaanklamping moontlik die ideate 
regsmiddel bied om vir hierdie gevalle voorsiening te maak. 59 
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Du Plessis is led to conclude that the field of 
immaterial property law is fragmented and at the present 
time it can only be regarded certain that an 
intellectual property right will qualify for legal 
protection if it falls within one of the established 
statutorily delimited classes of intellectual property 
or within the limits of protection afforded to goodwill 
at common law. 60 With reference to trade marks, this 
conclusion would limit protection to marks registered 
under statute and to goodwill in the business in the 
goods or services in connection with which a particular 
trade mark is known and to which, according to the 
61 traditional approach, the trade mark is appurtenant. 
I am of rather the view that when the subjective right 
to a trade mark is fully considered it becomes clear 
that trade marks are to be afforded common law 
protection under the general principles of the actio legis 
Aquiliae aside from the available statutory protection 
without restricting the relief obtainable to that 
available under the species of Aquilian liability known 
as unlawful competition. The delict lies in the 
unlawful interference with the entitlements of the 
holder of the trade mark right - a subjective right of 
immaterial property which has the trade mark as its 
object. The entitlements provided by this object are 
revealed by the functions which trade marks perform. 
59. Du Plessis 92-93. 
60. See Du Plessis 100. 
61 . See Du Plessis 1 00. 
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5. TRADE MARKS AS DISTINGUISHING SIGNS 
When one reflects upon the signs used by man throughout 
human history and the significance of signs in the 
religions of man and in human psychology in particular, 
it is apparent that symbols play an essential role in 
human life and this has always been so. The flag of a 
nation, the religious cross, the badge on a blazer and 
the birth sign of an individual afford examples. In 
relation to the world of trade and commerce it is the 
trade mark - the distinguishing sign of the undertaking 
and of product- which is the relevant symbol. 
The discussion of distinctive marks by Van Heerden & 
Neethling affords a substantial contribution to the 
clarification of the nature of trade mark rights which 
this work seeks to provide. According to Van Heerden & 
Neethling, there are two groups of distinguishing signs 
which are utilised in connection with an undertaking. 
Distinguishing signs of the first kind, such as the 
trading name of the undertaking, individualise the 
undertaking as a whole. 62 This applies also to the 
62. See Van Heerden & Neethling Mededingingsreg 58-59 (and particularly footnotes 49 
and 50). In the 1983 edition of their work, the authors refer to "onderskeidings 
tekens" - distinguishing signs. In the revised English edition of the work published in 
1995 (Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition) the authors refer to "distinctive 
marks". It is not necessary to embark upon a debate in regard to this terminology. 
Both terms are appropriate. I shall maintain the term "distinguishing sign" in view of 
the pre-eminence which this thesis affords to trade mark functions - amongst which 
the distinguishing function is invariable. Where I refer to the views of the authors, 
however, I shall refer to "distinctive marks" - which emphasises that essential 
feature of distinguishing (cont) 
"flagship" 
signs of 
k f h . 63 mar o t e enterprise. 
the second kind such as its 
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Distinguishing 
trade marks, 
service marks, packaging and product get-up 
individualise the goods or services of the undertaking. 64 
In considering function, the authors suggest that the 
prime function of the distinctive marks of an 
undertaking is to distinguish the performances of the 
undertaking from the similar competitive performances of 
others. In the sense that the distinctive marks of an 
undertaking afford the undertaking and its products a 
name, the undertaking and its products are 
individualised and therefore distinguished by its 
d . . . k 65 istinctive mar s. 
The authors recognise the origin function of distinctive 
marks. According to the authors, the effect of a 
distinctive mark is to lead consumers to the conclusion 
that performances connected with the same marks emanate 
from the same source, which need not, however, be an 
identified source. 
recognised. 
The advertising function is also 
The authors regard the functions which distinguishing 
62. (cont) signs known as "distinctiveness". I seek to avoid confusion between distinctive 
signs and registered trade marks (a species thereof) in regard to which "distinctive 
mark" is a term of art. The function of distinguishing and the characteristic of 
distinctiveness are aspects of the same concept; see also Van Heerden & Neethling 
Unlawful Competition 1 06-1 07. 
63. Flagship makes sum up the enterprise and encapsulate all of its activities in a single 
symbol. 
64. See Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition 107. 
65. See Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition 107. This "individualising" is an 
aspect of the identification function. I have shown that although often closely linked 
the identification and distinguishing functions are not invariably linked. Marks can 
distinguish without an identification. (see p 461 supra) . 
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signs fulfil as more or less autonomous. It is 
important, in my view, that Van Heerden & Neethling 
perceive passing off involving a distinctive mark as an 
interference with function. The authors suggest that in 
a passing off scenario involving the deceptive use of 
marks it is not only the distinguishing function but 
also the origin and advertising functions which are 
usually affected. On the other hand, where the conflict 
is outside of the competition struggle, in the sense 
that there is no common field of competition present, 
the origin and advertising functions play an autonomous 
role separate from the distinguishing function and it is 
the origin and advertising functions which are impinged 
d h d . . . h' f ' 66 upon an not t e ist1ngu1s ing unction. 
In my view, 
interference 
mark is an 
impingement 
it must necessarily follow that the unlawful 
with any particular function of a trade 
infringement of the trade mark right. An 
upon one aspect of the functional matrix 
does not, however, necessarily mean that all aspects of 
functioning are being interfered with. In order to 
discern the presence of an infringement the aspect of 
the matrix involved the particular function or 
functions impinged upon - must be identified. 
6. DISTINCTIVE MARKS AND GOODWILL 
The distinctive marks of an undertaking are important in 
the formation of goodwill in connection with its 
business. Marks, as discussed earlier, individualise 
the products of the undertaking and render it possible 
for consumers to distinguish the products of the 
66. See Van Heerden & Neethling Onregmatige Mededinging 58-59, footnote 50. 
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undertaking from those of others. The mark provides the 
consumer with something to associate with the 
undertaking and its products, about which goodwill can 
then accrue. In this regard, Van Heerden & Neethling 
recognise that a distinctive mark can have an attractive 
force of its own because of its appealing nature. The 
question then arises whether a distinctive mark can be 
the object of a separate right independent from the 
goodwill of the undertaking. According to the authors, 
the answer is obtained by clarifying the nature of the 
object of the right concerned. This is the central 
enquiry of the thesis. In conducting this enquiry, 
according to Van Heerden & Neethling, it is essential to 
perceive that the right which a holder has in relation 
to the distinctive mark is not a right to the symbol 
itself but to the distinguishing value thereof in 
relation to the product concerned. 67 
I suggest the essence of the matter is this. When a 
sign functions to distinguish the products of an 
enterprise, an element of the content of the holder's 
right to the mark is revealed. The holder of the right 
is entitled to apply the distinctive mark to his 
enterprise and its products in order that they might be 
distinguished from the products of others. It follows 
that the holder of the right is entitled to exclude 
others from using the mark upon or in relation to their 
enterprise or product because, if they were entitled to 
do so, the sign concerned could no longer distinguish 
enterprises or the products of one enterprise from those 
of another. Therefore, an unlawful interference with 
the distinguishing function of a sign infringes the 
right to the sign. This is my construction of the 
infringement of a trade mark right where the 
distinguishing function is disrupted. Interferences 
with other functions give rise to infringements as well 
67. Van Heerden & Neethling Onregmatige Mededinging 60. 
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which must be established, as a fact, with reference to 
a disruption of the particular function or functions 
concerned. 
Van Heerden & Neethling write as follows in relation to 
these matters: 
In die Engelse en die Amerikaanse reg word veelal aangevoer dat 'n 
ondernemer wet op sogenaamde tegniese handelsmerke - dit wit se 
woord- of beeldmerke wat ''fanciful, arbitrary, unique, 
non-descriptive" is - regte kan verkry, maar nie op beskrywende 
woorde, die vorm van houers, kleurkombinasies, ensovoorts nie. 'n 
Ondernemer sou byvoorbeeld nie 'n reg op die merk "American Ball 
Blue" kan he nie want, so Lui die argument, hierdie woorde is 
beskrywend en behoort tot die ''public domain". Word hulle deur 'n 
ondernemer toegeeien, kom dit daarop neer dat die taal verarm word. 
Hierdie beswaar berus natuurlik op 'n misverstand. Erken 'n mens 'n 
reg op die onderskeidingsteken, beteken dit hoegenaamd nie dat die 
woord, die beeld of wat ook al aan die ondernemer "behoort" sodat 
alle ander van die gebruik daarvan uitgesluit is nie. Ook in die geval 
van tegniese handelsmerke - byvoorbeeld "Mazawati "-skoenpolitoer -
verkry die ondernemer nie 'n reg op die kunswoord as sodanig nie, 
maar wet op die onderskeidingswaarde daarvan in verband met sy 
produk. 
Dieselfde kan ten aansien van alle onderskeidingstekens gese word. 'n 
Mens het nie 'n reg - as daar wet van 'n reg sprake is - op 
beskrywende woorde of die aankleding van ware nie, maar wet op die 
onderskeidingswaarde daarvan in verband met die produkte of 
onderneming wat hulle individualiseer. Daarom kom dit ook volkome 
ongegrond voor om 'n reg op 'n "tegniese" handelsmerk te erken, 
maar nie regte op ander merke, die verpakking van ware of 
handelsname nie. Al hierdie onderskeidingstekens dien dieselfde doel, 
naamlik die individualisering van 'n produk of 'n onderneming en besit 
ook almal in mindere of meerdere mate onderskeidingskrag. Is die 
onderskeidingswaarde van 'n "tegniese" merk objek van 'n reg, dan 
sekerlik ook die onderskeidingswaarde van elke ander 
onderskeidingsteken. Word hierteen opgewap dat die vapakking van 
ware of die beskrywende merk nie noodwendig onderskeidingskrag het 
nie, is - soos reeds hierbo aangedui - die eenvoudige antwoord dat 
hulle dan geen onderskeidingstekens is nie. 68 
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In other words, one must be wary of the Anglo-American 
approach which would grant trade mark rights to 
technical marks, which are distinctive perse, as opposed 
to non-distinctive marks, (e.g. descriptive words which 
fall in the public domain) , if it is reasoned that in 
the latter case, the grant of rights in the descriptive 
words remove them from the language and thereby deprive 
others from using them - which is not the case with 
technical marks. This construct rests upon the 
misconception that recognition of a right affords the 
holder thereof "proprietorship" or "ownership" of the 
sign itself, which excludes all others from use thereof. 
The distinction is relevant only insofar as it relates 
to whether the mark in question can function as a 
distinctive mark or not. The holder of the right has 
exclusivity in relation only to the distinguishing value 
of the mark when used in connection with the product. 
Thus, the right does not fall upon the distinctive word 
or get-up of goods, but upon the distinguishing value 
they have in connection with the product or undertaking 
which they individualise and so distinguish. In this 
sense, the distinction between technical marks and the 
grant of trade marks rights therein to the exclusion of 
other marks, is unfounded. All distinctive marks serve 
the same purpose - to distinguish and individualise the 
undertaking or product: where signs are non-distinctive 
they cannot be distinguishing signs and no right based 
upon their ability to distinguish can arise. 
It has been said that for a distinctive mark to be the 
object of an independent right it must be autonomous and 
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distinct from the goodwill and other components of the 
undertaking. Insofar as marks can be assigned 
independently from the other components of an 
undertaking no difficulty arises. As far as goodwill is 
concerned, however, the situation is different because a 
close relationship exists between an undertaking's marks 
and its goodwill. According to Van Bearden & Neethling 
marks are the substrate upon which the goodwill of the 
undertaking rests and are an important means through 
which the goodwill is developed. Nevertheless, the 
authors posit that a certain independence is possible 
and must be recognised: 
Hiermee is nog nie gese dat die onderskeidingstekens selfstandig 
teenoor die weifkrag van 'n onderneming staan nie. Inderdaad 
bestaan daar tussen hulle die nouste verband. lndien die 
onderskeidingstekens enkele jare na die verval van die onderneming as 
ekonomiese eenheid nog waarde het, beteken dit noodwendig dat die 
weifkrag deur die onderneming geskep, nog bly voortbestaan. Die 
onderskeidingstekens is dan juis die substrate waarop die weifkrag 
berus. Ook wanneer die ondernemer 'n onderskeidingsteken aan 'n 
ander oordra, dra hy noodwendig tegelykertyd die weifkrag wat hy 
geskep het - of 'n deel daarvan - oor. Wanneer dus, soos so dikwels 
in die Engelse en die Amerikaanse reg, gese word dat 'n 
onderskeidingsteken "a symbol of goodwill" is, is dit nie verkeerd nie, 
maar ewemin is daarmee die voile waarheid vertel. 'n 
Onderskeidingsteken is veel meer as net 'n simbool van weifkrag. Dit 
is, soos reeds aangedui, 'n belangrike faktor in die vorming van 
weifkrag en kan uiteindelik die enigste substraat wees waarop die 
weifkrag berus. Dit is 'n eenvoudige feit dat die individualisering van 
'n onderneming of die ware daarvan 'n voorvereiste vir die skepping 
van weifkrag is. Hoe innig dan ook al die samehang tussen weifkrag 
en onderskeidingstekens, kan 'n sekere selfstandigheid van 
laasgenoemde teenoor eersgenoemde nie weggeredeneer word nie. 
The authors go on to say: 
Die onderskeidingsteken kan nie bloot met "goodwill" - of dan 
welfkrag - vereenselwig word of 'n simbool daarvan genoem word nie, 
want dit is, soos reeds herhaaldelik opgemerk, 'n uiters belangrike 
faktor in die vorming van welfkrag. Dit is miskien waar dat die 
waarde van die onderskeidingstekens met venvysing na die waarde van 
'n ondememing gemeet kan word, maar tenoor die welfkrag geniet 
hulle tog, indien nie 'n ekonomiese nie, 'n sekere juridiese 
selfstandigheid. 
Dit baat ook nie om aan te voer dat die erkenning van 'n reg op die 
onderskeidingsteken geen sin het naas die erkenning van 'n reg op die 
welfkrag omdat 'n aantasting van eersgenoemde noodwendig ook 'n 
aantasting van laasgenoemde sou wees nie. Die reg op die 
onderskeidingsteken moet nie net negatief nie maar ook positief betrag 
word, dit wil se uit die oogpunt van die genots-en 
gebruiksbevoegdhede van die reghebbende. 69 
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Thus, the authors recognise that although the link 
between marks and goodwill is very close it is not 
inextricable. A sign can have 
own. The authors note that a 
a significance of 
trade mark does 
its 
not 
necessarily lose its value if an undertaking ceases to 
exist as an economic unit. Trade marks can remain 
associated with the goods and services of an enterprise 
separately from the components thereof in the mind of 
consumers. Hence, the authors do not agree with the 
contention that a distinctive mark can have no value of 
its own and only have meaning in the context of the 
goodwill of the undertaking. 70 
Nevertheless, according to the authors, it cannot be 
denied that within the context of the enterprise there 
is always a close connection between its goodwill and 
distinctive marks. This does not, however, detract from 
the recognition of an independent right to the 
69. Van Heerden & Neethling Onregmatige Mededinging 60-62. 
70. Van Heerden & Neethling Onregmatige Mededinging 63. 
537 
distinctive mark alongside the right to goodwill. Yet 
the authors agree with the view that distinctive marks 
are accessory property and the right thereto is an 
accessory right. As to the nature of the right 
concerned the learned authors conclude: 
Oor die aard van die reg op die onderskeidingsteken kan weinig twyfel 
bestaan. Soos reeds aangetoon, is die objek van die reg 'n 
onliggaamlike goed, en dat dit nie onlosmaaklik met die persoonlikheid 
van die reghebbende verbonde is nie, kan sekerlik nie betwis word nie. 
Die onderskeidingsteken is immers vatbaar vir oordrag en gaan nie 
saam met die reghebbende tot niet nie. Volgens die toets hierbo aan 
die hand gedoen, is dit dus die objek van 'n immaterieelgoederereg. 71 
According to Page, a symbol which is inherently adapted 
to distinguish an undertaking can in itself possess an 
attractive force in relation to the undertaking 
unrelated to use. This recognises the right to the 
symbol itself as a component of the attractive force of 
an undertaking in addition to whatever goodwill may be 
created by its use and to which the right to the symbol 
is accessory. Consequently, the appropriation of a 
symbol which has not acquired a reputation through use 
can amount to unlawful competition in appropriate 
. 72 
circumstances. 
This right is acquired when a trader originates a symbol 
in relation to his undertaking and it is the act of 
origination which vests the right in him. Originality 
or novelty is not required and the same vesting takes 
place where the act of origination is in the nature of 
an adoption of a symbol originated by another. The 
right so vested will stand unless an objector can show a 
prior overt claim thereto in connection with his own 
71. Van Heerden & Neethling Onregmatige Mededinging 63. The test referred to is 
whether the property concerned can stand independently of both the entrepreneur 
involved in the undertaking and its other components (at p 53). 
72. Page - The Territorial Limitations of Repute in Passing Off, and the Applicability of 
Unlawful Competition to Situations Created by International Trading 51 in Neethling 
(ed) Onregmatige Mededinging 41-54. 
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d . . h . d 73 goo s or services in t e territory concerne . It is 
I 
to be noted, however, that the acquisition of the right 
to a distinctive symbol, whether by origination or by 
adoption and overt assertion, can only take place in 
relation to a undertaking and is, 
thereto. The right can only exists 
74 is carried on, according to Page. 
therefore, accessory 
where an undertaking 
In modern law trade marks are distinguishing signs of 
various kinds which are capable of graphical 
representation. It is my thesis that recognition must 
be afforded to an independent right to the trade 
mark (distinguishing sign) . In order to take on 
commercial significance and reflect the range of values 
characteristic of the right which include distinction 
(the value of the sign as a means of distinguishing) , 
advertising value and goodwill related values (such as 
providing the substrate for and means of generating and 
symbolizing goodwill), the trade mark must be 
associated with an enterprise. In this sense the right 
to a trade mark is accessory. The contents of the trade 
mark right are the entitlements of the holder, which are 
determined by the matrix of functions which the holder 
is positively entitled to have the mark perform. 
An unlawful impingement upon any function - be it the 
distinguishing, origin, assurance, advertising, 
communication or other function infringes the trade 
mark right and the Aquilian action will then lie if the 
remaining elements of the remedy action are present, 
also. 
Where, for example, a particular trade mark functions to 
symbolise the goodwill of an undertaking in the business 
73. Page 51. And seep 279-299 supra. See also p 565-566 infra regarding vesting. 
74. Page 52. I have, however, observed in connection with the law of the United Kingdom 
that registration prior to use, or for that matter, the existence of an undertaking before 
registration - provided there is an intention to use the mark in relation to a company to 
be formed - creates statutory property sui generis (see p 291-220 supra). See also p 
298 - 299 supra regarding the rights of peregrini. 
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in the goods and services in respect of which the trade 
mark is used, u~e of a confusingly similar mark by a 
third party upon products of the same kind will confuse 
consumers as to the source of such product. This 
amounts to an appropriation of the goodwill symbolised 
by the trade mark. It is indicated by an interference 
with the origin function of the mark which evidences an 
infringement of the trade mark right. 
The time has come in my view for modern trade mark law -
which is essentially the law of distinguishing signs 
to accept that the full range of functions performed by 
trade marks are protectable by law. If interference 
with a trade mark function constitutes the infringement 
of a right no justification exists for restricting 
relief to only those functions which have been 
traditionally protected for historical reasons. 
An apt example of the inhibiting effect of traditional 
approaches upon the development of trade mark protection 
is afforded by the want of recognition given to the 
advertising function over the years. It will be recalled 
that this trade mark function has been struggling for 
autonomous recognition since the time Schechter drew 
attention thereto during 1927. 
I proceed to consider infringements of the advertising 
function of the trade mark in the South African law and 
the approaches of South African writers in regard 
thereto. 
Clearly, if in doing so a basis is revealed according to 
which the traditionally protected functions - the origin 
and quality assurance functions - are protectable under 
the same construct as the advertising function the 
solution or model arrived at should serve to protect all 
other functions discernible in the functional matrix 
i.e. to protect the integrity of the trade mark right as 
a whole. 
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7. THE ADVERTISING FUNCTION REVISITED 
7.1 Rutherford 
It has been observed that, traditionally, the accepted 
function of a trade mark is to indicate the origin or 
source of the product in relation to which it is used. 
It has been shown, however, that a trade mark is capable 
of fulfilling multiple functions such as indicating or 
assuring quality or serving as an advertising or selling 
device. According to Rutherford, this latter function 
is seen by modern commerce to be the most important 
economic function of a trade mark. 75 
To recap, the nature of this function and the basis upon 
which the law should protect it is aptly summed up by 
Rutherford thus: 
Today, through the use of sophisticated advertising techniques, a 
manufacturer aims at promoting the sale of his product. In this 
regard, he makes use of his trade mark firstly, to identify and 
distinguish his product and secondly, as a conduit for the transmission 
of the persuasive power of his advertising. If his advertising campaign 
is successful and the product proves acceptable to the consumer, the 
trade mark will identify the product as satisfactory and will thereby 
stimulate further sales. The trade mark actually helps to sell the 
product. In this way the trade mark creates and retains custom. A 
trade mark, therefore, not only constitutes a symbol of the goodwill of 
the proprietor's business but is an important agent in the creation and 
perpetuation of that goodwill. 
The preservation of the reputation and unique identity of the trade 
mark and the selling power which it evokes is of vital importance to 
the trade mark proprietor in order to protect and retain his goodwill. 
Other traders will frequently wish to exploit the selling power of an 
75. Rutherford - Misappropriation of The Advertising Value of Trade Marks, Trade names 
and Service Marks 55-56 in Neethling (ed) Onregmatige Mededinging 55-69. 
established trade mark for the purpose of promoting their own 
products. The greater the advertising value of the trade mark, the 
greater the risk of misappropriation. Any unauthorised use of the 
trade mark by other traders will lead to the gradual consumer 
disassociation of the trade mark from the proprietor's product. The 
more the trade mark is used in relation to the products of others, the 
less likely it is to focus attention on the proprietor's product. The 
reputation and unique identity of the trade mark will become blurred. 
The selling power becomes eroded and the trade mark becomes 
diluted. The proprietor of the trade mark usually expends vast sums of 
money through advertising in order to build up the reputation and 
selling power or advertising value of his trade mark. The growth of 
his business is dependent upon the growth of the meaning and 
importance of his trade mark. It is therefore only fair that he should 
be entitled to protect this valuable asset against misappropriation. 
Moreover, a misappropriator should not be allowed to obtain a 
promotional advantage for his product at the expense of the trade mark 
proprietor. Misappropriation of the selling power or advertising 
value of a trade mark is commercially injurious to the trade mark 
proprietor and results in the impairment of the goodwill of his 
business. It is submitted that such conduct is, in principle, unlmeful 
and constitutes an infringement of his right to goodwill. 76 
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Thus, according to Rutherford, misappropriation leading 
to dilution is an impingement upon the advertising value 
or selling power of the trade mark, which can be derived 
from its inherent uniqueness, but which is usually the 
result of extensive advertising. It is not the mark 
itself, but its advertising and selling power which is 
protected. 77 In other words, the advertising function 
must not be interfered with. 
In the case of the passing off action involving the 
application of deceptive marks, and with the traditional 
form of the statutory trade mark infringement action, it 
is the origin function of the trade mark which is 
interfered with or impaired in circumstances of trade 
76. Rutherford 56-67. 
77. See Rutherford 57. 
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competition. In such cases, consumers are confused as 
to the origin of the product 
mark and they are unlawfully 
featuring the deceptive 
diverted from the true 
source. Where one has to do with an interference under 
the advertising function of a trade mark, however, it is 
not necessary for the protagonists to be in competition 
and there need not be confusion as to the source of the 
product concerned. The damage lies in the dilution of 
the attractive force of the trade mark. 78 
I believe this to be correct. The entitlement of the 
holder of the trade mark right to apply the advertising 
function of the trade mark positively and to its fullest 
extent is dissipated by the infringer who pre-empts the 
entitled party by detracting from the positive focus of 
consumers upon the trade mark holder's products, which 
the advertising function of the mark is intended to 
establish. 
According to Rutherford, the misappropriation of the 
advertising value of a trade mark can be either 
concealed or unconcealed. Examples of the latter 
species are comparative advertising (where disparagement 
is required) or generic usage of the mark concerned by a 
competitor. In both the aforegoing instances a 
competitive situation is present between the 
. 79 protagonists. 
Rutherford points out that in the traditional trade mark 
infringement and passing off situations there is not 
only an impairment of the origin function of a trade 
mark but there is also a concealed misappropriation of 
the advertising power of the trade mark. The 
traditional remedies of passing off and infringement 
however afford sufficient and established protection to 
h . . d 80 t e inJure party. 
78. See Rutherford 57. 
79. See Rutherford 58. 
80. See Rutherford 59. 
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This accords with my view that in order to establish an 
infringement of the trade mark right it is not necessary 
to bring to light all the functions present in the 
functional matrix of the mark and then show an 
impairment of each function. The right which is 
infringed is not fragmented but unitary. The multiple 
functions a mark might perform reflect the entitlements 
of the holder of the right thereto. An interference 
with an entitlement infringes the right. Hence, 
unlawful impairment of a single function establishes an 
infringement of the right. 
Rutherford draws attention to a more subtle form of 
misappropriation which takes place outside the 
competitive situation in the case of allusion 
advertising where a third party appropriates the 
attractive force of an established trade mark by 
applying it suggestively to his own products - which are 
unconnected with the goods or services of the true 
proprietor of the mark. A dilution of this kind can be 
particularly damaging where tainting or tarnishment of 
the mark occurs through its association with goods or 
services which give offence, cause degradation, reflect 
an unwholesome or unhealthy aura, or are of inferior 
quality. The wrongdoer seeks to enhance the image of 
his product in the' eyes of the ·consumer by seeking a 
connection, affiliation or sponsorship between the mark 
as used by its genuine proprietor and, in so doing, 
appropriates the mark without the consent of the true 
. 81 proprietor. 
According to Rutherford, for an action for concealed 
misappropriation to lie, the following requirements must 
be met: 
7 .1.1 the misappropriated trade mark must have an advertising 
value; 
81. See Rutherford 59-60. 
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7.1.2 the defendant must have used the trade mark or a similar 
trade mark on non-competing products without the consent 
of the true proprietor of the mark; 
7 .1. 3 the right to the proprietor's goodwill must have been 
. f . db . h d'l . 82 in r1nge y a tarn1s ment or i ut1on. 
From the perspective of the construction I propose, the 
advertising function of the mark has been intruded upon, 
the subjective right to the trade mark has thereby been 
inf ringed and damage to an aspect of the goodwill of the 
undertaking has resulted. 
7.2 ltfostert 
Mostert is an early and rigorous proponent still of 
protection for the advertising value of a trade mark in 
South Africa. According to this author, the parasitic 
use of a trade mark on non-competing goods or services 
has as its object the misapplication of the commercial 
magnetism or advertising value embodied in a trade mark 
in order to exploit its attractive force by drawing 
consumers to the goods or services of the unauthorised 
user.
83 
In discussing protection against confusion or deception 
involving unauthorised associations created in 
connection with dissimilar goods, Mostert points out 
that in these instances also a false trade connection 
can be established. For example, the public could 
conclude that there has been an extension of the range 
of products. A bad reputation of quality attaching to 
the similar goods or services of the unauthorised user 
could in such cases be carried over to the products of 
the genuine user, which would clearly be adverse to the 
interests of the entitled party. Mostert would have 
relief granted in such cases also where the goods or 
82. See Rutherford 60. 
83. Mostert 1986 (49) THRHR 173-188 173. 
545 
services of the unauthorised user could not be shown to 
be provably inferior or tainted as there would still be 
the possibility of a tainting association developing in 
the future. 84 
In Mostert's view, granting an action in the aforegoing 
circumstances would protect the reputation and goodwill 
of the true user's goods and/ or services as well as 
protect the public from confusion - two basic objects of 
a trade mark. The action would go beyond passing off 
because unconnected goods or services are involved. The 
action would resort under the general law of unlawful 
competition, but extended beyond the competitive milieu, 
as contemplated by the Holiday Inns case. 85 
Thus, it seems to me that although the intention of the 
unauthorised user is to exploit the advertising value of 
the trade mark concerned, the source and quality 
assurance functions are immediately intruded upon, also. 
The property damaged is the goodwill of the entitled 
party connected with the trade mark concerned. 
Ultimately, the advertising value of the trade mark -
goodwill closely attached to the mark itself will 
erode as well. 
This brings me to Mostert's discussion of dilution. 
The advertising function concerns the distinguishing 
value, uniqueness and attractive force which a trade 
mark itself exhibits. As Mostert puts it: 
Die advertensiefunksie van 'n handelsmerk behels onder meer om 
weens die onderskeidingswaarde, uniekheid en aantrekkingskrag wat 
'n handelsmerk op sigself inhou, by die afnemerspubliek 'n spesifieke 
produk of diens in die geheue op te roep en die aandag daarop te 
84. Mostert 174-175. 
85. See Mostert 178-179 and Capital Estate and General Agencies Pty Ltd v Holiday Inns 
Inc. 1977 (2) SA 916(A). 
vestig. Die advertensiefunksie van 'n handelsmerk omvat die 
identiteitswaarde van en houvas wat 'n handelsmerk op die 
afnemerspubliek het, om hulle na 'n speslfieke produk of diens aan te 
trek. So byvoorbeeld roep die onderskeidende "COCA-COLA "-merk 
onmiddellik die beeld van 'n speslfieke, danker koeldrankproduk by 'n 
koper op. Deur 'n sekere produk of diens in die geestesoog van die 
koper vas te pen, is so 'n handelsmerk ook 'n effektiewe skakelmiddel 
waardeur bevrediging en begeerlikheid geheg kan word aan 'n 
speslfieke produk of diens. 'n Handelsmerk simboliseer en weerspieel 
die bevrediging en begeerlikheid van die speslfieke produk of diens 
waaraan dit gekoppel is. As sodanig is 'n handelsmerk 'n belangrike 
stimulant vir die verdere aanvraag na die speslfieke produk of diens 
waaraan dit verbonde is. 'n Handelsmerk is gevolglik 'n besonder 
doeltreffende verkoopsinstrument waardeur inligting aan die 
afnemerspubliek oorgedra kan word oor die aantreklikheid van die 
speslfieke produk of diens waaraan die handelsmerk gekoppel is. So 
byvoorbeeld simboliseer die "COCA-COLA "-merk die brevredigz~g en 
begeerlikheid van die aangename koeldrank ten aansien waarvhn dit 
gebruik word en weerspieel die "ROLLS-ROYCE"-merk weer die hoe 
gehalte van die motor ten aansien waarvan dit gebruik word. 'n 
Handelsmerk besit derhalwe advertensiewaarde indien dit 'n sekere 
produk of diens aandui en by die afnemerspubliek oproep en 'n 
gunstige assosiasie opwek oor die bevrediging en begeerlikheid van die 
speslfieke produk of diens waaraan dit verbonde is. Op grond van 
hierdie advertensiefunksie wat 'n handelsmerk verrig, dien dit om die 
afnemersaanvraag te kanaliseer na die speslfieke produk of diens 
waaraan die handelsmerk gekoppel is, om sodoende by te dra tot die 
vorrning van werfkrag random hierdie speslfieke produk of diens 
waaraan die handelsmerk verbonde is. 86 
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A claim based on erosion or dilution protects a trade 
mark against the unlawful use 
products in a manner which 
thereof on non-competing 
dilutes the mark, i.e. 
impinges upon its advertising function. This happens in 
two ways: 
(a) The unauthorised use weakens the bond between mark and 
product and the focus of the consumer is distracted from 
86. See Mostert 180-181. 
the genuine product . 
longer exclusively 
product. Dilution, 
the trade mark to 
attractive force. 
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In time, the trade mark is no 
associated with the proprietor's 
therefore, affects the ability of 
distinguish, identify or exert an 
Thus, in terms of my construction, dilution of this kind 
infringes the mark in that it disrupts the identifying, 
distinguishing and advertising functions and also, I 
suggest, the origin function of the mark concerned. 
(b) Generic usage which destroys the ability of the trade 
mark to distinguish the goods of the proprietor. 
Mostert suggests that a claim should lie in this 
instance, also. 87 I agree. The distinguishing function 
because the mark is rendered non-distinctive is 
wiped out. 
Mostert recognises that an action should lie also in 
instances of disparagement: i.e. use of the trade mark 
in a disparaging manner or context. Where a trade mark 
has a positive association, its use upon unconnected 
goods which have an indecent, offensive or negative 
connotation can indeed impinge upon the positive 
association which the mark enjoyed previously. 
In my view, disparagement impinges upon the advertising 
function and damages the advertising value of a trade 
mark. Infringement by disparagement is not to be 
confined to association of the mark with offensive 
goods. An offensive distortion of the mark itself can 
be a disparagement, as well. The enquiry will be 
whether the advertising function has been unlawfully 
disrupted in fact. This is not to say that the enquiry 
ends there. For a delict to be established, all the 
elements of liability must be shown. Thus, damage must 
for instance have resulted to the goodwill in the 
87. SeeMostert181-183. 
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business in the goods or services in connection with 
which the holder of the right has established use in the 
mark because the attractive force of the mark in 
relation thereto has been lost. Fault must lie in the 
the mark and a casual intentional 
connection 
appropriation of 
between the act of appropriation 
to be established. 
and the 
resultant damage will 
view, the unlawful 
have 
intrusion upon any trade 
In my 
mark 
function can be visited with Aquilian liability in the 
same manner, provided all the elements of the action are 
present. 
Diluting or disparaging use of a trade mark results in 
the effectiveness of the mark to channel consumers to 
the owner's products being drastically curtailed. This 
impedes the accrual of further goodwill to the product 
with which the mark is connected. 88 
Mostert would not confine relief in the case of dilution 
to famous marks only. He holds that the plaintiff in an 
action based on dilution must indicate that the 
defendant's unlawful use of the trade mark in relation 
to non-competing products dilutes or impairs an 
established commercial magnetism and advertising value 
of the mark. 
magnetism and 
of course so 
Thus, any mark possessing this commercial 
advertising value can be diluted. It is 
that the more well known a trade mark 
becomes, the easier it will then be to show that it has 
the requisite magnetism and advertising power and the 
easier it will be to found an action based on dilution. 89 
I agree with this approach. The quantum of attractive 
force which renders a mark "well known" is not clear in 
dilution theory 
seeking to apply 
unfortunate that 
and represents a major weakness in 
it consistently in practice. It is 
the "well known" label has become 
attached to the theory through the wording of the Paris 
C ' 9o h 1 . ' f h t t I onvention. In t e app ication o t e cons rue 
88. See Mostert 183-1 84. 
89. See Mostert 185. 
90. See article 6 bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as 
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have proposed, it is a matter of evidence in each case 
whether a mark can be said to exhibit an advertising 
function which, if infringed, will damage a proven 
attractive force in the mark. 
Mostert sums up thus regarding the dilution action: 
'n Eis gegrond op erosie is gerig op die beskerming van die 
advertiensiejunksie van 'n handelsmerk, wat dien om die 
afnemerspubliek te kanaliseer na die spesifieke produk of diens 
waaraan die betrokke handelsmerk gekoppel is. Die advertensiejunksie 
van 'n handelsmerk is derhalwe 'n belangrike komponent in die 
vorming van die weifkrag na die spesifieke produk of diens waaraan 
die betrokke handelsmerk verbonde is. Deur die betrokke handelsmerk 
te beskerm, dien die eis gegrond op erosie dus in werklikheid ter 
beskerming van die vorming van die weifkrag na die spesifieke produk 
of diens waaraan die betrokke handelsmerk verbonde is. Dit is dan 
ook niks minder as billik nie dat 'n handelsmerkreghebbende geregtig 
moet wees op die weifkrag wat hy random sy produk of diens opgebou 
het, deur sy eie inspanning en arbeid. Daarbenewens sal die 
berskeming van die weifkrag van die handelsmerkreghebbende se 
onderneming deur middel van 'n eis gegrond op erosie, ook dien ter 
beloning en aansporing van die handelsmerkreghebbende om weifkrag 
random sy produk of diens op te bou. Dit sal natuurlik weer lei tot die 
produsering van kwaliteitsware en kwaliteitsmededinging wat slegs tot 
voordeel van die gemeenskap strek. 91 
In his doctoral thesis, Mostert argues for recognition 
of an independent immaterial property right to the 
advertising image of an undertaking as an accessory 
right to the right of goodwill in the same way as the 
common law right to the trade mark is regarded as an 
accessory right to the right of goodwill. Mostert would 
not confine this right to trade marks but would include 
any name, mark, symbol or character identified with a 
particular product or undertaking which third parties 
might appropriate because of its potential promotional 
advantage for them. A misappropriation of this 
91. Mostert 186. Seep 632-651 infra regarding dilution under the new laws. 
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advertising value infringes both the accessory right 
(the right to the advertising image) as well as the 
right to the goodwill of the undertaking. 92 
In Rutherford's view, the common law provides 
indirect protection against misappropriation of 
advertising value of a trade mark, namely 
circumstances where the right to goodwill of 
only 
the 
in 
the 
proprietor is infringed and the misappropriation is 
accompanied by a likelihood of confusion as to the 
origin or sponsorship of the product featuring the mark 
complained of. He observes: 
To date there has been no recognition of misappropriation of the 
advertising value or "dilution" as an independent cause of action. 
Nor has there been any recognition of the existence of an independent 
right to the advertising image. 93 
It is my view that the law should protect all aspects of 
the distinguishing signs of an enterprise which are 
present in a particular case. These distinctive signs 
or marks are common law trade marks. They include 
service marks - signs which distinguish services. Trade 
marks are able to perform multiple functions. Each 
trade mark displays a functional matrix in which the 
functions which a particular mark fulfils feature. An 
unlawful disruption of any function present in the 
matrix infringes the trade mark in question. In order 
to establish the delict, damage to an aspect of the 
property in the trade mark must be present. In the case 
of interference with the advertising function considered 
by Mostert the aspect of property damaged is, in my 
view, the advertising value in a trade mark of the 
undertaking. 
92. Mostert Reklamebeeld (RAU 1985) chapters V-VI 281-367. See Rutherford 63 for a 
succinct comment thereon from which this paragraph is gleaned. 
93. Rutherford 63; See also Mostert (1982) 99 SALJ 413-419. 
7.2.3 
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independent 
rights to 
My model is not, therefore, based upon 
causes of action founded upon independent 
aspects of the property concerned - which is the trade 
mark as a distinguishing sign. It proposes a subjective 
immaterial property right to a trade mark with 
entitlements corresponding to the range of functions 
fulfilled by a particular trade mark, taken up in a 
functional matrix. An approach akin to attributing .a 
specific 'tort' to certain types of unlawful action such 
as dilution, disparagement, 
misappropriation and the like a 
approach is thereby avoided without 
tarnishment, 
specific action 
detracting from 
the unlawful and infringing nature of the conduct so 
labelled. 
Neethling 
Participating in the debate, Neethling records that it 
is trite law that the unauthorised use of a trade mark, 
service mark or trade name by a non-competitive 
undertaking may comprise an unlawful infringement of 
goodwill. He questions, however, whether this is an 
example of the species of the genus, unlawful 
competition, known as passing off. Before the Holiday 
Inns case, passing off was restricted to a 
misrepresentation that the unauthorised user's goods or 
services (i.e. performance) was that of a competitor. 
According to Neethling, it is the distinguishing value 
of a sign or trade mark which is infringed in these 
instances. Passing off presumes a competitive struggle 
and for this reason qualifies as a form of unlawful 
. . 94 
competition. 
Therefore, Neethling suggests, the courts are not 
dealing with passing off when the competitive struggle 
between the litigants is absent. Here another form of 
94. Neethling (1993) 5 SA Mere LJ 306-313 308 hereafter referred to as Neethling (Mere 
LJ); See footnote 85 for a reference to the Holiday Inns case. His discussion relates to 
"leaning on" in confusion of sponsorship situations. Dilution (by means of 
disparagement or otherwise) is not confined to such circumstances (see p 638-649 
infra). 
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unlawful trade practice is in issue i.e. 
misrepresentation as to the source, origin or business 
connection of a non-competitive performance. 
Consequently, the passing off action should not be 
1 . d h. . f f 1 . 95 app ie to t is species o wrong u action. 
According to my construction of the confusion of 
sponsorship situation contemplated 
number of the multiple trade mark 
by Neethling a 
functions in the 
functional matrix could be impinged therein - depending 
on the facts including the distinguishing, origin, 
advertising, identification and communication functions. 
Neethling suggests that the species of wrongful conduct 
he refers to - use of the marks of an enterprise by a 
non-competitor in such a way that a misrepresentation 
is created that the performance of the latter has the 
same source or origin as that of the former - concerns 
the appropriation of the advertising value of a trade 
mark. 
The unauthorised performance is an appropriation of the 
advertising value which the "proprietor" of the trade 
mark has in relation to his performance. This is a 
"leaning on" the reputation or good name of the 
proprietor's performance by the infringer in order to 
promote his own performance and benefit from that of 
h . 96 t e proprietor. 
According to Neethling, in such cases of leaning-on the 
goodwill of the proprietor's business may be infringed 
in two ways, namely: 
7.2.3.1 by disparagement: here the positive associations which 
the proprietor's mark represents may be harmed if the 
use of the mark complained of is in relation to bad or 
inferior performances; 
7.2.3.2 by dilution: here the effectiveness of the drawing 
power of the mark is reduced and the advertising value 
and goodwill thereof impinged. 
95. Neethling (Mere LJ) 308-309. See also Neethling (1994) SA Mere LJ 1-15. 
96. Neethling (Mere LJ) 309. See also Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition 
201-219 particularly 213 regarding dissimilar fields of activity, and p 288-289 supra. 
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Neethling suggests that the following is required if a 
plaintiff is to succeed in an action for "leaning on" 
in confusion of sponsorship situations: 
7.2.3.3 He must show that the sign has acquired a reputation or 
advertising value in regard to his performance; 
7. 2. 3. 4 He must show that the unauthorised use of the trade 
mark (distinguishing sign) creates the 
misrepresentation that the defendant's performance has 
the same origin or source as that of the plaintiff; 
7. 2. 3. 5 He must show that his goodwill is being infringed by 
disparagement or dilution of 
advertising value of his mark. 97 
the reputation or 
In passing off, by way of contrast, the mark (sign) 
must be shown to be distinctive i.e. that it has 
acquired a distinguishing value. The misrepresentation 
is then that the defendant's performance is that of the 
1 . . ff 98 p a1nt1 . 
In his conclusions, Neethling suggests that 
unregistered marks should also be protected against 
dilution and disparagement. I agree. In my view, 
registration is not the constitutive act which vests 
the holder of the trade mark right with its 
entitlements, although the statutory elements thereof 
require registration for protection under the Act to be 
obtained. These matters are discussed below. 
Furthermore, Neethling also posits that not only famous 
marks should be protectable against such wrongdoing, 
but all marks having advertising value should be 
protected. 
97. Neethling (Mere LJ) 309-310. He suggests that the criteria he proposes are implied 
by the Marlboro and Manhattan cases - although misrepresentation was not found in 
the first case and public confusion as to source was not present in the second. See 
Philip Morris Inc. & anr. v Marlboro Shirt Co. SA Ltd & anr. 1991 (2) SA720(A); 
Royal Beech-nut (Pty) Ltd t/a Manhattan Confectioners v United Tobacco Co Ltd t/a 
Willards Foods 1992 (4) SA 118(A). 
98. See Neethling (Mere LJ) 310. 
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The court should also recognise an immaterial property 
right in the advertising value of a sign (trade mark) 
or, as Mostert puts it, the right to the advertising 
image. He concludes, however that the courts are not 
willing to protect this right unless a passing off or 
"leaning on" is present. 99 
In regard to the aforegoing Van Heerden & Neethling 
write: 
The protection of the advertising marks of an entrepreneur against 
open and concealed misappropriation by rivals as well as by other 
non-competitive entrepreneurs is, as far as South African law is 
concerned, to a large extent unexplored terra nova. Under the cloak 
of passing off decisions such as Capital Estate and General Agencies 
(Pty) Ltd v Holiday Inns Inc provide the only authority for the 
protection of the advertising value of such marks, and then only if the 
goodwill of the plaintiff's undertaking was infringed as a result of the 
deception or confusion or his potential customers as to the source or 
origin of the defendant's peiformance. The door must still be opened 
for protection of the advertising value against unlawful competition 
(open and concealed leaning on), against open leaning on outside the 
competitive context, against dilution as an independent cause of 
action, and for the recognition of the right to the advertising mark as 
. d d . . l . h 100 an m epen ent immatena property ng t. 
It is my respectful submission that the conclusions 
which follow provide a model which, when properly 
applied, reveals the basis for solution of each of the 
unresolved matters to whic~ the authors refer. 101 
99. See Neethling (Mere LJ) 312-313 and the cases discussed there. 
100. Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition 219. When a sign fulfils the 
advertising function the authors label it an advertising mark. See p 641 infra. 
101. Regarding dilution, Salmon, in his LL. M dissertation (University of South Africa, 
November 1990) however concludes: "The concept of the dilution of a trade mark has 
received juridical and legislative recognition in a number of foreign jurisdictions. South 
African Trade Mark Law does not grant protection against dilution of trade marks 
although a number of decisions in recent cases have mentioned the damage caused by 
dilution, without meaningfully addressing the issue. 
It is submitted that, notwithstanding the dynamism of the common-law in South 
Africa, protection against the erosion of the commercial magnetism enjoyed by a 
distinctive mark should be afforded by the legislature." 
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8. CONCLUSION 
This treatise, in dealing with the development of trade 
mark law from its inception in the jurisdictions of 
historical importance to the South African law of trade 
marks, 102 shows, I believe, that the development of the 
law from its inception to the present time has been 
subject to traditional constraints and limitations which 
can no longer be justified as trade marks display 
. 1 . 1 f . . d k 103 important mu tip e unctions in mo ern mar ets. 
The recent reception of EC trade mark law in the United 
Kingdom means an intrusion of EU policy and a break in 
the United Kingdom from the Common Law trade mark 
tradition. 104 
This will require a new approach in British trade mark 
law which South African jurists can hardly follow 
without caveat. 
I do not, however, advocate· a localised approach to 
trade mark law in South African but rather a full 
exploitation of the utilities which our system provides. 
The historical investigation of the U.S. trade mark 
system in this thesis reveals real tension in the system 
between the need to afford greater protection to modern 
trade marks which acceptance of trade marks as 
property in the full sense would provide and the 
contrary approach which places anti-monopoly doctrine 
and considerations of public interest in the central 
position. Nevertheless, the striving of American 
writers and in many instances, also American judges to 
102. See Introduction xi-xiii. 
103. See chapter 15. 
104. See chapter 13. 
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extend trade mark rights, provides an incentive to South 
African jurists to recognise and give effect to the 
possibilities which our principle oriented hybrid legal 
system affords. 105 
Earlier chapters have shown that a common law of trade 
marks is an established feature in both British and 
American trade mark law. In the United Kingdom, the 
protection of common law trade marks is confined to a 
specialised passing off action. The tort is founded in 
deceit and involves the appropriation of the trade mark 
of another in a manner which deceives or confuses the 
public as to the origin of the product featuring the 
counterfeit mark. Proposals in the United Kingdom that 
relief in trade mark infringement cases at common law 
should be based on a trespass upon property have not 
prevailed. The common law of trade marks in the United 
Kingdom is subject to the constraint that neither a 
general action for wrongful conduct nor a general action 
for unlawful competition is known to the legal system. 
In my view, the limitations imposed upon the protection 
of trade marks in the law of the United Kingdom has 
prevented the establishment of a broad trade mark 
infringement action in the common law of South Africa. 
As the historical chapters regarding the trade mark law 
of the United Kingdom prior to the 1994 Act have shown, 
the trade mark statutes have largely been a re-enactment 
of the common law which, as observed above, is not 
expansive in the protection it affords trade marks. 106 
The means by which the protection afforded trade marks 
has been limited is to restrict protection to the 
traditional trade mark functions of indicating origin 
and assuring quality with reference to source which 
105. See chapter 14. 
106. See chapter 5. 
107. 
108. 
109. 
110. 
111 . 
functions alone are regarded worthy of 
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. 107 protection. 
The South African statutes and courts have traditionally 
placed similar limitations upon the legal protection of 
trade marks( following the British example. 108 
The chapters concerning the trade mark law of the U.S.A. 
have also revealed that in the U.S. , the common law 
infringement action - which the Lanham Act attempted to 
codify - applies the confusion standard with restrictive 
effect. Again, the public interest predominates as the 
protected interest in contra-distinction to the theory 
of property in trade ·marks, which has not yet 
· 1 d 109 prevai e . 
It has been shown in 'the chapter concerning U.S. trade 
mark law that even the anti-dilution remedy, which is an 
endeavour to extend protection to the mark itself as 
property, has been restricted by the unjustified 
application of the confusion standard to dilution 
cases. 
110 
Nevertheless, the call to extend protection to new trade 
mark functions is a persistent one in the U.S.A. and 
various rationales are being explored in an endeavour to 
meet the demands of commerce for trade marks to be 
protected as valuable assets and brands. Again, in the 
U.S.A. , the restrictions of a system which knows only 
specific torts prevents the establishment of a general 
trade mark action which can provide protection to all 
the trade mark functions which have been discerned and 
h . h . 1 1 . 111 w ic require ega protection. 
See chapter 15. 
See chapter 11 . 
See chapter 14. 
See chapter 1 4. 
See chapter 14. 
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The South African law is not subject to the basic 
restrictions of the Anglo-American system of torts. The 
genus for a general trade mark action - the actio legis Aquiliae 
- is already established. If a basic common law trade 
mark right is discernible in fact in the market place 
and is capable of proper description, the law should 
protect the holder of this right against its unlawful 
infringement. I have concluded that there is such a 
right extant in the South African law which I describe 
hereunder. 
The fact that the legislature has provided statutory 
trade mark protection does not exclude or deny the right 
to a trade mark at common law. 112 
8.1 The right defined 
Trade marks are immaterial 113 property. Under the 
classical and personalist theories of private law 
rights, the trade mark right is real and absolute - it 
is not a claim which operates inter partes but is 
enforceable against all comers i.e. 
114 large. 
the world at 
It is, however, under the theory of subjective rights 
that the nature of the right to a trade mark is fully 
revealed. 
In terms of this doctrine the trade mark is the object 
of a subjective right. As the trade mark is an 
incorporeal object unconnected with the human body or 
psyche, the right thereto, when classified with 
reference to the object of the right, i.e. the trade 
k . h . . . 1 . h 115 mar rig t, is an immateria property rig t. 
112. Historically the statutes have been a gloss on the common law. 
113. See section 41 of Act 194 of 1993 regarding registered marks and the discussion of 
the section at p 662-667 infra. 
114. See p 506 supra. 
115. See p 508 supra. 
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In order to take on commercial significance the object 
of the right, the trade mark, must be associated with an 
enterprise. In this sense the trade mark right is 
116 
accessory. 
The trade mark, as property, reveals a range of values 
which are characteristic and which feature distinction 
as a sine qua non. 117 Depending on the trade mark, the 
f 1 . 1 d d . . 1 118 range o va ues can inc u e a vert1s1ng va ue, an 
associative network/imago119 , and goodwill related 
values. 120 
Because of the immaterial nature of the object of the 
trade mark right the entitlements of the holder of the 
right are constrained accordingly. There is no dominium 
or possessio over property of this kind within the meaning 
of those concepts when applied to things. Quasi-pledges 
and hypothecs over registered trade marks are 
d 1 1 f . . d 121 constructe as ega ict1ons un er statute. 
The entitlements of the right include the power to 
transfer and license and otherwise use the trade mark as 
a unique kind of intellectual property. In the latter 
regard the entitlements of use are characteristically 
derived from the functions trade marks perform and which 
are taken up in the functional matrix of the trade mark. 
The right is characterised further by the limitation 
that it is lost if the trade mark is used in such a way 
as to vitiate its distinctiveness. Subject to the 
aforegoing and statutory provision, the trade mark right 
116. See p 535-537 supra. 
117. Seep 459 supra. 
11 8. See p 540-541, 550 supra. 
119. See p 488 supra. 
120. Seep 485-487 supra. 
121 . See p 663-667 infra. But see the approach of Trollip J in Broadway Pen Corporation 
and anr v Weschler & Co (Pty) Ltd and ors 1963(4) SA 434T 444-445. It will be 
recalled that the concepts of proprietor and owner are derived from the Common Law 
which differ substantially from civil law dominium (seep 204-215 supra). 
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is of indefinite duration, provided it remains in use. 
I have, therefore, concluded that the entitlements of 
the holder of the subjective right relating to the use 
of a trade mark are to be found in the functions which 
the trade mark performs. 122 
8.1.1 The positive aspect of the right 
The trade mark right has both positive and negative 
aspects. 
The positive aspect of the trade mark right derives from 
the first characteristic relationship of the subjective 
right - the relationship between the subject (the holder 
of the trade mark right) and the object (the trade 
mark) . 123 
In terms of this relationship, the holder can assert his 
entitlements to the trade mark in a positive way. This 
means that the trade mark can be applied so as to fulfil 
the multiple functions it is capable of performing in 
the market place. A description of the entitlements of 
the holder of the right to a trade mark is set out 
below. 124 A numerus clausus of trade mark functions is not 
proposed. New trade mark functions, of which the law 
will be required to take account once they become 
established, can be expected to develop as modern 
markets evolve . The advertising function affords an 
example of a trade mark function suitable for positive 
application to which the law denied clear protection for 
some time. I have shown in earlier chapters that 
acceptance of the advertising function in the British 
and American systems has been delayed because the 
property theory of trade marks has not been accorded 
122. See p 568-573 infra. 
123. See p 507 supra. 
124. See p 568-573 infra. 
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proper recognition in those jurisdictions. 125 The 
advertising function of the trade mark requires a 
positive application of the trade mark right. The 
British and American systems, however, emphasise the 
negative. The view has dominated that the trade mark 
"owner" has a shared interest in the protection of his 
right with the public at large. The public at large, it 
is posited, must not be deceived or confused by trade 
mark usage. Trade marks must not be afforded the status 
of property in the full sense because this will inhibit 
competition and monopoly will follow. The confusion 
standard has, therefore, as observed earlier, taken up a 
central position in the Anglo-American trade mark 
126 
systems. 
It is beyond the province of this work to suggest how 
trade marks must be regarded in the British and American 
systems. Nevertheless, it does appear to me that, 
ultimately, recognition of trade marks as property in 
the full sense is likely in both systems. Under the 
United Kingdom Trade Marks Act, 1994, registered trade 
127 
marks are now stated to be personal property. It 
will, however, be recalled that property theory also 
underpinned all the earlier British trade mark statutes, 
to no avail from the point of view of the property based 
approach becoming pre-eminent. Earlier chapters have 
made clear that both the British and American systems 
reveal a long-established tension concerning the concept 
of property in the trade mark itself. 128 This tension 
will, I believe, bring about full acceptance of property 
theory in time. Insofar as questions of anti-monopoly, 
promotion of competition and the public interest operate 
against this trend, I expect that Anglo-American 
jurists could work out rules under which monopolies 
125. See chapters 9 and 14. 
126. See p 431-432 supra. The effect which the new law under the 1994 UK Act will have 
upon the concepts of the past remain to be determined. 
127. Seep 607-608 infra. Incorporeal movable property in Scotland. See sections 2(1) and 
22 of the 1994 UK Act. 
128. See chapters 9 and 15. 
8.1.2 
8.1.3 
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would be restricted and the public interest maintained, 
whilst proper recognition of trade marks as property is 
achieved at the same time. 
The extent of the right 
In the light of the aforegoing and with reference to 
South African trade mark law, I do not propose that the 
confusion standard has no role to play in the South 
African law. 
operation of 
provided by 
In my view, the parameters of 
the subjective right to a trade mark 
the confusion standard and 
"distinctiveness" criterion. 
the 
are 
the 
The trade mark proprietor may not use the mark to 
confuse or deceive the public. This does not mean, 
however, that the public has an interest in the mark. 
Should the mark become deceptive it can no longer fulfil 
the invariable trade mark function of distinguishing 
between undertakings and products. This results in the 
loss of the right as the essential element of the trade 
mark - its distinctiveness - has been lost. 
The trade mark right must not, therefore, be exercised 
so as to deceive, 
non-distinctive. 
confuse 
The negative aspect of the right - infringement 
or render the mark 
The negative aspect of the trade mark right is to be 
found in the second characteristic relationship of the 
subjective right the relationship between the trade 
k h ld ( h . ) d h. d . 129 . mar o er t e sub] ect an t ir parties. It is 
this aspect of the trade mark right which has been 
129. See p 507-508 supra. 
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recognised and applied over the years. 130 It entails 
the right of the trade mark holder to prevent others 
from intruding upon or pre-empting the entitlements or 
potential entitlements which the subject object 
relationship of the subjective right to the trade mark 
affords. 
As to whether the subjective right is being infringed in 
any particular instance will depend upon whether the 
action complained of disrupts a function which is 
present in the functional matrix of the particular mark, 
in fact. 
Hence, for example, where the mark is new and has yet 
to develop the quantum of attractive power necessary to 
sell the product in relation to which use of the mark 
has commenced, its functional matrix is unlikely to 
display an advertising or selling function. As a 
consequence, it is unlikely that third parties will seek 
to appropriate a non-existing aspect of the mark. There 
is no incentive for potential infringers to do so. A 
claim of infringement by dilution in respect of the 
mark, therefore, cannot be established as there is no 
advertising function, origin function or quality 
assurance function in the functional matrix which can be 
diluted. The matter would be very different, however 
were the mark concerned to be "famous", such as 
Coca-Cola. In such a case the advertising function 
would most certainly be present in the functional matrix 
and dilution of this function would infringe the right. 
I have concluded that any provable disruption of a 
function present in the functional matrix of a trade 
130. In the sense that the trade mark statutes frame the right as one under which the 
registrant can prevent certain defined conduct (which amounts to infringement) on the 
part of third parties. 
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mark by a third party in 
duty of non-interference 
a manner which breaches the 
implied by the second 
characteristic relationship of the subjective right i.e. 
that unauthorised third parties must not interfere with 
the subject-object (right holder/trade mark) 
relationship of the right, is an unlawful infringement 
of the trade mark right. 
The holder of the right can then obtain relief under the 
general principles of the actio legis Aquiliae, provided the 
unlawful act results in damage, and fault on the part of 
the infringer can be shown. In most cases of trade mark 
infringement, fault will lie in the intention of the 
infringer to appropriate some aspect of the trade mark 
as property - such as its goodwill or advertising value 
- to his own ends. 
Where the holder of the trade mark right seeks relief by 
way of interdict, a disruption or threatened disruption 
or infringement of any function present in the 
functional matrix in fact will suffice in the absence of 
h . d 131 some ot er appropriate reme y. 
8.2 Registration 
A trade mark does not have to be registered to fulfil 
the functions described. The historical investigations 
of this work have shown that, in the main, trade mark 
legislation has come about in the Common Law 
jurisdictions in order to afford common law concepts 
closer description and to facilitate enforcement of the 
common law trade mark infringement actions which are 
k . h 132 ta en up in t e statutes. 
131. See Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition 75. 
1 32. See chapters 3 and 5. 
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My description of the South African trade mark right, 
therefore, includes both its common law and statutory 
manifestations. 
8.3 Vesting 
8.3.1 
8. 3. 2 
A distinction must be drawn between the concepts of 
"claiming to be the proprietor" and bona fide "claim to 
proprietorship" in the 1916, 1963 and 1993 Acts - which 
relate to the status of the applicant for registration 
of a trade mark under the Acts - and the vesting of the 
property right to the trade mark in the holder of the 
subjective right thereto. 
According to Page a trade mark right vests in two ways: 
a trader originates a distinctive symbol in relation to 
his undertaking and the act of origination vests the 
right in him; 
a trader makes on overt claim to the mark such as -
8.3.2.1 using it in trade in relation to product; 
8 3 2 2 k . 1 . . f . . . 1 33 . . . ma ing app ication or its registration. 
In Broadway Pen Corporation v Weschler & co134 it was 
said that the usual way of becoming the proprietor of a 
trade mark is by acquiring, inventing or otherwise 
originating the mark and then actually using it. In 
wm. Penn Oils Ltd v Oils International (Pty) Ltd135 it 
was said that the concept of proprietorship under the 
1963 Act was not related to the common law right of 
property in the trade mark but merely required the 
applicant to claim to have originated or acquired the 
1 33. See Page 51-52 in Neethling Onregmatige Meededinging 41-54 
134. Broadway Pen Corporation v Weschler & Co (Pty) Ltd 1963(4) SA 434(T) 444. 
135. Wm Penn Oils Ltd v Oils International (Pty) Ltd 1966(1) SA 311 (A) 317-318. 
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trade mark and to intend to use it. For a right of 
property to vest, there had to be sufficient use of the 
mark and very slight use would not suffice. 
The concept was considered recently in the Victoria's 
Secret case136 in which it was held that "claiming to be 
the proprietor" of a trade mark meant asserting a claim 
to be the proprietor of the mark. The proprietor had to 
take the mark as his own. He had to show that he had 
appropriated the mark for use in relation to goods or 
services and had so used it. "Appropriation" in this 
sense included the concepts of "originate", "acquire" 
and "adopt" required by the Hon. Trollip in the Moorgate 
137 
case. 
In my view, in order for the subjective right of 
property in a trade mark to vest at common law three 
elements must be satisfied: 
8. 3. 3 the claimant must invent, originate, adopt, select or 
acquire the chosen mark, and appropriate the mark as his 
own for use; 
8.3.4 
8.3.5 
the mark must be used; 
the mark must display 
which indicates that 
that degree of distinctiveness 
the distinguishing function is 
present in the functional matrix of the mark concerned. 
It follows that more distinctive marks require less 
quantum of use (if any) to establish the presence of the 
distinguishing function. Thus, marks which are 
distinctive per se will display the distinguishing 
function immediately upon use - when the right will vest. 
136. Victoria's Secret Inc. v Edgars Stores Limited 1994(3) SA 739(A) 744-747. 
137. Moorgate Tobacco Company Limited v Philip Morris Inc. R.T.M. 21May1986. 
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8. 4 The common law trade mark 
8.4.1 
8.4.2 
8.4.3 
8.4.4 
It is my thesis that any distinguishing sign in use -
whether or not it is registered as a trade mark; 
whatever form it takes, and 
138 
whatever description it is given, 
is protectable as a trade mark under the common law, 
provided: 
it functions to distinguish between undertakings and/or 
product (goods and/or services) i.e. displays the 
invariable trade mark function, the distinguishing 
function; 
The mark concerned may be a pending registration on the 
trade mark register or a registered trade mark in use in 
respect of goods or services for which it is not 
registered. 
In the case of registered trade marks, use is not 
required for the mark to be protected under the Act -
subject to the requisite intention to use required by 
statute being present. The benefits provided by 
registration are specifically defined in the trade mark 
statute in force from time to time. The current 
entitlements under the Trade Marks Act No. 194 of 1993 
are set out in paragraph 8.6 hereunder. 
The remedies for infringement, impingements or 
pre-emptions of the statutory entitlements overlap with 
the remedies available for common law infringements 
but specific relief is facilitated by the relevant 
provisions of the statute concerned. 
Protection has been afforded unregistered trade marks by 
the courts. 
138. Such as trade mark, service mark, distinctive mark, advertising mark, distinguishing 
sign, get-up, house mark, symbol, insignia, flagship mark and the like. Van Heerden 
and Neethling, when the advertising value of a distinguishing sign is impinged, regard 
the sign as an entity, the advertising sign (see p 64 1-642 infra). My approach is to 
regard the distinguishing sign as a wider concept in which the advertising function and 
--•- - ~- ------- _1_..._ _ _. "T"L- .-1~..C.L. ______ :_ --- -L ...J_J::-:.._: __ 
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In the Holiday Inns 139 case, a common law trade mark 
which had become distinctive of the respondent's hotel 
and motel business was afforded protection under the 
passing off action in circumstances where the infringing 
use was not in relation to such business - there was no 
common field of activity between the protagonists - yet 
resiilted in a reasonable likelihood of deception which 
had the potential of damaging the respondent. 140 
In the Football World Cup 141 case the court, in 
recognising and protecting character merchandising inter 
alia in the unregistered 1994 Football World Cup 
insignias and symbols, acknowledged the presence of 
advertising and merchandising value in common law trade 
marks and protected the holders against appropriations 
of the advertising and selling functions of the rights 
thereto. 
8.5 The holder's entitlements 
It is my thesis that the entitlements of the holder of a 
subjective right to a trade mark are to be found in the 
functions which the trade mark performs. There is no 
numerus clausus of trade mark functions. Those mentioned 
below are functions which are commonly revealed in 
present day free markets. 
In considering 
overlooked that 
distinctive mark. 
the 
they 
It 
entitlements it must not be 
refer to the entitlements of a 
is central to my thesis that a 
mark must fulfil the invariable distinguishing function 
139. Capital Estate and General Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Holiday Inns Inc 1977(2) SA 916(A). 
140. See also Philip Morris Inc v Marlboro Shirt Co SA Ltd 1991 (2) SA 720 (A) and Royal 
Beech-nut (Pty) Ltd v United Tobacco Co. Ltd 1992 (4) SA 118 (A) in which relief was 
denied unregistered marks on the facts. 
141 . Federation Internationale de Football and ors. v Bartlett and ors 1 994(4) SA 722(T) 
736, 739-740. 
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if it is to qualify as a trade mark. It is the 
presence of this function which vests the trade mark 
right with exclusivity. If the holder of the right 
does not have the exclusive right to apply the trade 
mark so as to distinguish his undertaking or products, 
the trade mark will lose its essential element of 
distinctiveness if others use it, and the right will be 
vitiated. 
Exclusivity is also essential to the proper fulfilment 
of all other functions if there is not to be confusion 
or deception in the market place. Thus, the unlawful 
appropriation of any function of a trade mark by 
another intrudes upon the principle of exclusivity and 
indicates an infringement. Hence, the power of the 
holder of the right to apply the entitlements of the 
mark is exclusive in respect of all the functions 
presented by the marks. 
8.5.1 Entitlements which relate to the Identification function 142 
Under this function, the holder of the trade mark right 
is entitled to apply the mark in order to -
8.5.1.1 identify an undertaking; 
8.5.1.2 identify the products (goods and/or services) of an 
undertaking. 
8.5.2 Entitlements which relate to the Distinguishing function 143 
Under this function the holder of the trade mark right 
is entitled to apply the mark in order to: 
8.5.2.1 distinguish his undertaking from other undertakings; 
8.5.2.2 distinguish the products of his undertaking from those 
of other undertakings. 
8.5.3 
142. 
143. 
144. 
Entitlements which relate to the Origin function 144 
See p 458-464 for a discussion of this function. 
See p 458-464 for a discussion of the distinguishing function. 
See p 464-475 for a discussion of the origin function. 
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Under this function the holder of the right is entitled 
to apply the mark in order to indicate the origin or 
source of product (goods and/or services) featuring the 
mark which -
8. 5. 3 .1 can indicate the origin in concrete terms i.e. reveal 
and/or confirm the identity of the specific undertaking 
from which the product emanates; 
8. 5. 3. 2 can also indicate the origin of product in abstract 
terms i.e. to indicate a constant albeit anonymous 
source from which the product emanates, or which is 
accountable for constancy (as to source and/or quality) 
in the product in relation to which the mark is 
applied. 
8.5.4 Entitlements which relate to the assurance function 145 
Under this function the holder of the right is entitled 
to apply the mark in order to: 
8.5.4.1 assure consumers that the qualities, characteristics or 
properties of product (goods and/or services) featuring 
the mark will, in a general sense, be of a consistent 
quality or, in a narrower sense, indicate that the 
product will be subject to a single, constant and 
unified source of quality control; 
8.5.4.2 to encourage consumers to repeat purchase. 
8.5.5 Entitlements which relate to the advertising function 146 
Under this function, the holder of the trade mark right 
is entitled to apply the mark in order to: 
8.5.5.1 provide an advertising device for the creation of 
product acceptance, consumer loyalty and goodwill; 
8.5.5.2 create consumer demand for product (goods and/or 
services); 
145. See p 476-482 for a discussion of the assurance function. 
146. See p 482-485 for a discussion of the advertising function. 
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8.5.5.3 provide a focus for advertising expenditure and effort 
in relation to undertakings and products; 
8.5.5.4 provide the centre about which the associative network 
d d k . . b 'l 147 an tra e mar imago is u1 t up; 
8.5.5.5 encourage consumers to repeat purchase; 
8.5.5.6 add attributes to the product as the focus of 
perception advertising. 
8.5.6 Entitlements which relate to the selling function 148 
Under this function the holder of the right is entitled 
to apply the mark in order to: 
8.5.6.1 exert an attractive force upon consumers in relation to 
product (goods and/or services) ; 
8.5.6.2 induce consumers to purchase or repeat purchase. 
8.5.7 Entitlements which relate to the goodwill function 149 
Under this function, the holder of the right is 
entitled to apply the mark in order to: 
8.5.7.1 symbolise the goodwill of an undertaking; 
8.5.7.2 symbolise goodwill in the business relating to product 
(goods and/or services) ; 
8.5.7.3 extend consumer interest to all ranges of product 
featuring the trade mark. 
8.5.8 Entitlements which relate to the information bearing function 1 50 
Under this function, the holder of the right is 
entitled to apply the mark in order to: 
8. 5. 8 .1 encapsulate the associative network and imago of the 
trade mark; 
8.5.8.2 encourage consumers to repeat-purchase product. 
14 7. See p 488 regarding the trade mark imago. 
148. See p 482-485 for a discussion of the selling function. 
149. See p 485-487 for a discussion of the goodwill function. 
150. See p 487-489 for a discussion of the information bearing function. 
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8.5.9 The communication function 1 51 
Under this function, the holder of the right is 
entitled to apply the mark in order to: 
8.5.9.1 disseminate product information to the consumer; 
8.5.9.2 convey information to consumers either generally, or in 
particular to assist consumer choice and reduce 
consumer search costs; 
8.5.9.3 transmit the signal of the associative network of the 
mark to consumers; 
8. 5. 9. 4 transmit the signal of the trade mark imago to the 
consumer; 
8.5.9.5 forge a bond between the consumer and the product. 
8.5.10 Entitlements which relate to the property function 152 
Under this function, the holder of the right is 
entitled to apply the mark to serve as property and 
provide security. 
8. 6 The entitlements of registered trade marks 
The act of registration of a trade mark is to vest the 
registered trade mark right in the registrant. 
This provides the holder with -
8.6.1 the exclusive right to use the mark in relation to the 
goods or services in respect of which the mark is 
registered, subject to the limitations and provisions 
of the Act; 1 53 
8.6.2 the right to deny third parties use of the same or a 
similar mark in the circumstances giving rise to the 
statutory infringement actions provided for in section 
154 34 of the Act. 
151. See p 487-489 for a discussion of the communication function. 
152. See section 41 of Act 194 of 1993 and p 663-667 infra. 
153. See section 2(i)(ix) of Act 194 of 1993. 
154. See p 616-627, 632-649 infra for a discussion of the infringement actions under the 
Act. 
The first consequence 
positive aspect of the 
mark and correlates with 
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of registration reflects the 
subjective right to the trade 
the subject/object relationship 
characteristic of the subjective right. 
The second consequence of registration reflects the 
negative aspect of the operation of the right and 
correlates with the subject/third parties relationship 
characteristic of the subjective right. 
Registration does not curtail the exercise of the 
entitlements to which the holder of a subjective right 
to the trade mark is empowered to exercise. Rather, it 
provides the holder of the right with specific relief in 
defined circumstances. Registration does, however, 
imply that the registered mark has the ability to 
perform the invariable trade mark function, namely that 
of distinguishing between undertakings and between 
product. 
A consideration of the circumstances in which the 
statutory trade mark infringement actions are afforded 
immediately reveal an impingement upon the origin 
function and in the case of well-known trade marks, the 
advertising function. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals 
that, depending upon the factual presence thereof in the 
functional matrix of the infringed trade mark at the 
time of infringement, also a number of other functions 
can be disrupted in the circumstances giving rise to the 
statutory actions. 
For example: use in the course of trade of an identical 
or a confusingly or deceptively similar mark to the 
registered mark in relation to the registered goods or 
services infringes the registration under section 
34(1) (a) of the Act. This form of the statutory 
infringement action has its roots in common law passing 
off. Consumers are confused as to the origin of the 
8.6.3 
8. 6. 3 .1 
8.6.3.2 
8.6.3.3 
8.6.4 
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goods featuring the counterfeit mark. The origin 
function is impinged and the goodwill aspect of the 
trade mark as property is damaged. 
only disruption of function which 
But this is not the 
takes 
identification, 
assurance 
functions 
and 
the distinguishing, 
also the advertising and 
place. The 
the quality 
communication 
can be impaired as well. In the 
circumstances of a section 34(1)(a) infringement -
consumers are likely to be confused or deceived -
regarding the origin of the product featuring the 
inf ringing mark; 
regarding the identity of the product featuring the 
infringing mark; 
regarding the quality of the product assured by the 
infringing mark. 
The functioning of the registered mark will be impaired 
in -
8.6.4.1 distinguishing genuine product from infringing product; 
8.6.4.2 communicating genuine product information to consumers; 
8.6.4.3 providing an advertising or selling means or device; 
8.6.4.4 fulfilling its function as property where the 
inf ringing conduct diminishes the goodwill or 
advertising value aspects of the trade mark as property. 
An examination of the section 34(1) (b) and section 
34(1) (c) infringement actions reveals the same 
phenomenon. Registration does not, therefore, in any 
way exclude or prevent a registered trade mark from in 
fact displaying the full range of available functions. 
It follows that a registered mark can be afforded 
common law protection under the actio legis Aquiliae in 
respect of all its aspects and functions in addition to 
the protection afforded by statute. 
The statutory and common law protection afforded trade 
marks is cumulative. 
In the final chapter which follows, the theoretical 
constructs of the preceding chapters of Part 6 are 
considered in the context of the new South African 
trade mark law. 
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CHAPTER 17 
THE NEW LAWS 
This chapter considers the trade mark statutes enacted 
in the United Kingdom and in the Republic of South 
Africa at the time of the completion of this work. 
The chapter has a dual purpose. 
Firstly, it considers the new trade mark statutes and 
concludes the historical discourse of the thesis. 
Secondly, it considers whether the construction I have 
placed upon the subjective right to a trade mark in the 
preceding chapter can provide a theoretical basis for 
the new South African statute. 
The role of the Directive and the new laws in the United 
Kingdom feature prominently throughout for reasons made 
clear in the first part of the chapter which deals with 
the considerations which gave rise to the modernising 
statutes. 
Thereafter, the chapter considers those provisions of 
the statutes which cast the most light upon the nature 
of the trade mark right. These concern the definition 
of a trade mark, the registrability provisions, the 
infringement provisions and the assignment and licencing 
provisions. 
It appears to me that the new South African trade marks 
statute has not been drafted with any particular 
underlying theoretical basis in mind. It seems that in 
many instances it has been left to the courts to add 
substance to the provisions of the Act and to decide 
what the law is, rather than to interpret the law. 
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The provisions of the statutes and the Directive are for 
the most part considered alongside each other. I have 
adopted this approach in order to emphasise that the 
modernising thrust of the legislation - which has its 
origins largely in Benelux law adapted for the 
requirements of the EC1 - must not be overlooked and the 
theoretical vacuum created by the new South African Act 
re-occupied by the outdated but conceptually entrenched 
doctrines established under the old United Kingdom based 
legislation. 
The danger o'f this coming about is compounded by the 
fact that the South African legislature has, perforce, 
enacted much of the South African statute in the 
Westminster style language of the statutes of old, 
whilst Parliament in the United Kingdom has been 
constrained to enact the Trade Marks Act, 1994 in the 
language of Brussels. 
1. THE BACKGROUND TO THE TRADE MARKS ACT, 1994. 2 
I have dealt with the background and philosophy of the 
Directive3 in full elsewhere. 4 It is clear that the 
United Kingdom was obliged to give effect to the 
Directive under the Treaty of Rome. 5 The Trade Marks 
Act, 1994 is, therefore, apart from a need to modernise, 
the result of the United Kingdom's membership of the EU 
and its obligations to give effect to Common Market 
policy. 
Morcom comments thus: 
It is a matter of considerable practical importance that a major 
purpose of the 1994 Act is to implement the EC Directive. The 
1. Gielen [19921 8 EIPR 262-269 264. 
2. The United Kingdom statute which came into force on 31 October 1994. 
3. Council Directive 89/104 EEC : OJ L 140 11.2.1989. 
4. See chapter 13. 
5. See chapter 1 2. 
Directive itself can be the subject of interpretation by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. 
Although this procedure may be of less relevance in instances in which 
the 1994 Act is not in identical terms to the Directive, it is to be noted 
that the draughtsman of the Act has in fact kept very close to the 
wording of the Directive; in many instances the wording is identical or 
virtually so. Therefore it is inevitable, as a practical matter, that 
courts in the UK will need to pay close attention to the interpretation 
placed on the provisions of the Directive by the ECJ, and to be ready 
to request rulings from that court. Rulings of the ECJ on references 
from other member states will also have to be considered and applied 
where relevant. 6 
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A number of major philosophical changes to the trade 
mark law of the United Kingdom have resulted as a 
consequence. These are: 
1.1 It is now left to trade mark owners to protect their own 
interests and the Registrar's discretion, which played 
an important role under the earlier statutes, has been 
all but eliminated; 
1.2 an applicant is presumed to be entitled to obtain 
registration of a mark unless the Act provides some 
specific ground of objection thereto; 
1.3 registered trade 
registration are 
property; 
marks and 
specifically 
trade 
accorded 
marks pending 
the status of 
1.4 in accordance with the view that trade marks are 
property per se restrictive provisions relating to the 
assignment and licencing of trade marks have been 
discarded and these matters are now the responsibility 
of the proprietor. 7 
6. Morcom Trade Marks Act 1994 6. 
7. See Morcom Trade Marks Act 1994 7; Annand & Norman Trademarks Act 1994 10. 
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It is 
jurists 
laws of 
of considerable importance for South African 
seeking to find guidance in the new trade mark 
the United Kingdom that the Trade Marks Act, 
1994 is part of the European trade mark edifice. The 
1994 UK Act is to be interpreted in the light of the 
wording and purpose of the Directive, the compulsory 
provisions of which are of direct effect. 8 Further 
parts of the United Kingdom trade mark system are 
provided by the Regulation regarding the Community Trade 
Mark9 and the Madrid protocol to which the United 
Kingdom has acceded. 1 O Furthermore, several provisions 
of the new Act are directed at giving effect in domestic 
law to the obligations of the United Kingdom under the 
. c . 11 Paris onvent1on. 
Against this background, the primary influences of 
community upon United Kingdom trade mark law are: 
1. 5 The territorial nature of intellectual property rights 
in the United Kingdom are subject to the provisions of 
the EC Treaty relating to the free movement of goods and 
the establishment of the single market; 
1.6 the manner of exploitation and the assignment and 
licencing of trade mark rights are subject to Articles 
85 and 86 of the EC Treaty relating to restrictive 
agreements and the abuse of a dominant position; 
1. 7 the ECJ, charged with the implementation of EC policy, 
will play a dominant role. 12 
Regarding the ECJ Annand & Norman state: 
8. See Groom & Abnett UK Trade Marks Act 1994 10. See p 320-323 supra regarding 
direct effect of community enactments. 
9. Council Regulation No. 40/94/EC: OJ37 14.1.1994. 
10. The Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Regulation 
of Marks (27 June 1989), Cm 1601 . See Groom & Abnett UK Trade Marks Act 1994 
13. The Regulation and Madrid Protocol are dealt with in full at p 334-347, 357-359 
supra. 
11. See sections 55-60; Morcom Trade Marks Act 1994 2. 
12. See p 360-361 supra regarding Articles 30-36 and 85-86 of the EC Treaty and p 359 
regarding the ECJ. See Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 1994 5-6. 
When asked to interpret a Directive, the Court of Justice, in keeping 
with the civil law tradition, will adopt the teleological style of 
interpretation, that is, it will consider the legislation in the light of its 
objectives, making use of working papers and discussions which 
preceded its enactment. Accordingly, much emphasis will be placed 
on the Commission's Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the first 
(1980) draft of the Directive. It is also likely that reference will be 
made to the minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers which 
adopted the Community Trade Mark Regulation. Both of these travaux 
preparatoires will be referred to throughout this book. 
British lawyers and their clients will therefore have to accept that the 
meaning of the key provisions in the 1994 Act can no longer be 
conclusivefy determined by the Chancery Division, the Court of Appeal 
or the House of Lords. The only judicial body which has the authority 
to give a definitive interpretation of the Directive and any national 
legislation based on it will be the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. It 
is this body also which alone can decide, in any action brought by the 
EC Commission under Article 169 of the EC Treaty, whether the Trade 
Marks Act 1994 correctly implements the Directive. 
The authors go on to say: 
National courts have a responsibility to ensure that Community law is 
enforced in Member States. Where a national court is satisfied that 
national legislation, whether primary or secondary, or a rule of 
common law, conflicts with the clear meaning of the Treaty of Rome or 
any legislation made pursuant to it, the court must "disapply" (to use 
the language of the Court of Justice) the offending national law. As 
the House of Lords has made clear in R v Secretary of State for 
Emoloyment ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission {1994] 2 WRL 
409, the Divisional Court has jurisdiction to declare any rule of law, 
whether derived from the common law, statute or delegated 
legislation, incompatible with Community law. 
For the above reasons, the European dimension to the Trade Marks 
Act 1994 must be kept constantly in mind. 13 
13. Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 1994 6-7. 
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2. THE BACKGROUND TO THE TRADE MARKS ACT 194 OF 199314 
The considerations which gave rise to the new South 
African trade mark statute were founded in perceived 
shortcomings in the existing law and in considerations 
of policy. 
Thus, the memoranda accompanying publication of the 
first draft Trade Marks Bill 15 and the Trade Marks Bill, 
1993 16 referred to: 
2 .1 The need for South African trade mark law - previously 
based substantially on the 1938 United Kingdom Act - to 
be modernised in several respects; 
2.2 a need discernible in trade and industry for trade marks 
to receive greater protection; 
2.3 the perception that trade marks deserve extended 
protection as commercial assets of great importance and 
value; 
2. 4 the need for cognisance to be taken of developments in 
the law in the fields of trade mark law and unlawful 
competition. 
Viewing the aforegoing shortcomings in the law 
cumulatively it is stated in the memorandum accompanying 
the publication of the Trade Marks Bill, 1993: 
It is the view that the present trade marks legislation has not kept pace 
with the need of trade and industry and developments in the field of the 
common law. This is particularly the case with regard to matters such 
as licencing, which "goods" can qualify as trade marks, the criteria 
14. The South African Act which came into force on 1 May 1995. 
15. See GN 808 in Government Gazette 13482 of 30 August 1991 102-103. 
16. Memorandum on the Objects of the Trade Marks Bill, 1993 (henceforth the 
"Memorandum") [81748-93 (GA)] 50. 
for registrability, protection against irifringement, and the legal 
remedies available in the event of infringement. 1 7 
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It was also an objective of the Committee which drafted 
the new legislation to bring South African trade mark 
law in line with that of the domestic legislation of the 
EC states, where this would be compatible with South 
African requirements, as the Member States of the EU are 
stated to be South Africa's most important trading 
partners. In this regard the Memorandum states: 
South Africa's most important trade partners, the members of the 
European Community, are rapidly moving towards the modernisation 
and harmonisation of their trade mark legislation. The first European 
Directive of the European Community to bring the legislation 
concerning trade marks of the member countries into agreement 
(891104/EEC dated 21 December 1988 - "The European Directive") is 
of particular importance in this regard. The European Directive 
requires members of the European Community to amend their domestic 
legislation relating to trade marks to ensure that such laws are in 
accordance with the provisions of the Directive. The British White 
Paper on the Reformation of the Trade Marks Law, dated September 
1990, is also of importance. It sets out the manner in which the 
United Kingdom proposes to amend its Trade Marks Act of 1938 so as 
to bring it into line with the European Directive. 
The Bill takes several of the above-mentioned developments and 
requirements into account and proposes amendments to the South 
African law on trade marks that will bring it into accordance with the 
European Directive in cases where such principles and proposals are 
reconcilable with South African requirements. 1 8 
The Memorandum accompanying the Draft Trade Marks Bill, 
1992 goes so far as to speak of harmonising South 
African law with the Directive. Referring to the 
developments in Europe set out above, it is stated: 
17. Memorandum 50. 
18. Memorandum 50. 
The Draft Trade Marks Bill, 1992, takes many of the aforesaid 
developments and requirements into account and also proposes 
amendments to South African Trade Mark law which will harmonise it 
with the European Directive where it (sic) principles and proposals are 
compatible with South African requirements. 1 9 
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It is my view that if the new South African statute is 
to succeed as a modernising statute it must not be 
restricted by an undue attachment to restrictive 
concepts of the past nor be applied with slavish 
imitation of what the United Kingdom provides by way of 
future precedent - thereby implementing a forced rather 
than a considered Anglo-Eurocentricity. The 1993 Act 
provides ample scope for South African innovation in 
response to South African requirements and the 
application of modern trends of a more universal kind 
beyond the confines of the European system. In the 
latter regard the Act includes provisions implementing 
South Africa's obligations under the Paris Convention 
and enables it give effect to the obligations it takes 
20 
on pursuant to TRIPS under GATT. 
Thus, from an international perspective, the Trade Marks 
Act, 1993, gives effect to: 
2. 5 The principle of national treatment in terms of which 
nationals of Convention countries are afforded the same 
treatment under the Act as is afforded to South African 
19. See GG 13482, 30 August 1991, par 1.5 102. During 1995 the USA placed South 
Africa on a US Trade Representative section 301 blacklist of states affording US 
undertakings inadequate intellectual property protection, as a consequence of the 
alleged failure of South African law to protect well known U.S. brands. Considerations 
of trade imperialism aside, it is not unlikely that the Department of State also took note 
of the Eurocentric orientation of the drafters of the new South African statute stated in 
the Memoranda to the draft legislation. 
20. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS) in re the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GA TT). See Rutherford - An Overview of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 in its 
International Context - in Visser New Law: Trade Marks and Designs 1-82. 
. 1 21 nationa s; 
2 6 f 1 . . . . . 22 . a system o c aiming convention priority; 
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2.7 the obligation to protect well-known marks belonging to 
nationals of convention countries. 23 
3. OBTAINING REGISTRATION UNDER THE NEW LAWS 
An applicant who shows that the sign he is seeking to 
register qualifies as a trade mark under the statutes is 
presumed entitled to register it unless the application 
is struck by one or more of the specific absolute or 
relative grounds for refusing registration set out in 
the statute. The matter is one of fact and law and the 
Registrar's discretion, which was a cornerstone of the 
law under earlier statutes, has almost been eliminated. 24 
3.1 Definition of a Trade Mark 
3.1.1 Under the Directive 
Article 2 of the Directive provides: 
Signs of which a trade mark may consist 
A trade mark may consist of any sign capable of being represented 
graphically, particularly words, including personal names, designs, 
letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their packaging, provided 
that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of 
one undertaking from those of other undertakings. 
21. See Article 2 of the Paris Convention as revised. 
22. See Article 4 of the Paris Convention and section 63 of the Act. 
23. See Article 6 bis of the Paris Convention. See also Rutherford's succinct contribution, 
referred to at footnote 20 p 582. 
24. Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 1994 40; Webster - The Registration of Trade 
Marks - in Visser New Law: Trade Marks and Designs 9-21 10-11; see Art 2 of the 
Directive which derives from Art 4 of the Regulation. See Groom & Abnett UK Trade 
Marks Act 1994 8, 55; See section 16(2) of the SA Act; White Paper 12-13. 
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3.1.2 Under the UK Act 
The definition of a trade mark in section 1 of the UK 
Act is taken directly from Article 2 of the Directive 
and provides: 
3.1.3 
(1) In this Act a "trade mark" means any sign capable of being 
represented graphically which is capable of distinguishing goods or 
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings. 
A trade mark may, in particular, consist of words (including personal 
names), designs, letters, numerals or the shape of goods or their 
packaging. 25 
The side by side treatment of trade marks and service 
marks which applied earlier has been eliminated by the 
new United Kingdom statute. 26 
Under the SA Act 
The South African legislature has 
temptation to draft the new Act tersely. 
resisted the 
To establish 
the definition of a trade mark regard must be had to 
sections 2 (1) (xxiii) "trade mark", 2 (1) (x) "mark" and 
2 (1) (viii) "device". 
These sections provide: 
3.1.3.1 S2(1)(xxiii) "trade mark", other than a certification trade mark or a 
collective trade mark, means a mark used or proposed to be used by a 
person in relation to goods or services for the purpose of 
distinguishing the goods or services in relation to which the mark is 
used or proposed to be used from the same kind of goods or services 
connected in the course of trade with any other person; 
25. Section 1 (2) of the UK Act provides: 'References in the Act to a trade mark 
include, unless the context otherwise requires, references to a collective mark 
(see section 49) or certification mark (see section 50).' In the SA Act 
collective and certification marks are dealt with in sections 42 and 43. This 
work does not consider these special marks. 
26. See White Paper 10; Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 7. 
3.1.3.2 
3.1.3.3 
3.1.4 
S2(l)(x) "mark" means any sign capable of being represented 
graphically, including a device, name, signature, word, letter, 
numeral, shape, configuration, pattern, ornamentation, colour or 
container for goods or any combination of the aforementioned; 
S2 (1) (viii) "device" means any visual representation or illustration 
capable of being reproduced upon a surface, whether by printing, 
embossing or by any other means; 
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The definition of a trade mark : an overview 
The contrast between the wording of the Directive and 
the UK Act on the one hand and that of the SA Act on the 
other, is immediately apparent. The United Kingdom 
enactment follows the civil law tradition of 
draftsmanship according to which enactments embody broad 
principle rather than specific detail. The South 
African enactment is drafted in the traditional way and 
is essentially the 1963 definition with the direct 
incorporation of the connection in the course of trade 
doctrine eliminated. 
The crucial change brought about by the modern 
definitions is that the modern trade mark is defined in 
terms of its distinguishing function alone. 
Essentially, 
fulfilling 
therefore, if a sign is capable of 
a distinguishing function de facto it will 
qualify as a trade mark. Although examples of signs 
which may qualify as trade marks are listed no numerus 
clausus of signs which qualify as trade marks is intended. 
According to the White Paper regarding the European 
definition of a trade mark: 
This is a flexible definition intended to serve the needs of commerce 
and is open-ended so as to be capable of adapting to changes m 
trading practices. In brief, if a sign functions in the marketplace as a 
trade mark, it is to be regarded as a trade mark. The Government 
fully endorses this approach. 27 
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The only limitation upon the signs which may qualify as 
trade marks is that they must be capable of graphical 
representation. The inclusion of "the shape of goods" 
in the definition in the UK Act overrules the Coca-Cola 
decision of the House of Lords. 28 
There is no doubt that colour can function as a 
distinguishing sign and be the subject of trade mark 
registration in both territories - the SA Act providing 
for this specifically in section 2 (1) (x) . Furthermore, 
the new definitions imply that sounds insofar as they 
can be graphically represented, can also serve as trade 
marks. Section 1(2) (c) of the SA Act refers to audibly 
reproducible marks specifically. The question in all 
cases will be one of fact, namely, is the sign concerned 
capable of graphic representation and of distinguishing 
products? 
The White Paper puts it thus: 
2.1.2 The law will therefore neither exclude or make specific 
provision for the registration as trade marks of cowurs, sounds or 
smells. It will be up to an applicant to convince the Registrar (and if 
necessary the courts) that what he seeks to protect is in fact capable of 
functioning as a trade mark. It is likely that in most (if not all) cases 
it will be necessary to prove by evidence that the alleged trade mark is 
perceived by the public as distinguishing the applicant's goods or 
services. (See also paragraph 2.1.5.) 
2.1.3 The experience in the United States which has long operated an 
open-ended definition of what may be registered, is that applications 
to register unusual kinds of trade marks (such as sounds or 
three-dimensional shapes) are very infrequent and cause no 
administrative or legal problems. 
27. White Paper 7. 
28. Coca-Cola Trade Marks [19861 R.P.C. 421, discussed at p 101-102 supra. 
2.1.5 For most trade marks of course this will simply be a facsimile of 
the word or device constituting the mark. How this can best be 
achieved in other cases is a matter to be worked out between 
applicants and the Trade Marks Registry; for example a 
three-dimensional mark might be portrayed by one or more drawings 
and/or described in words, and a sound mark could be represented in 
conventional musical notation or described in words. It would be an 
unreasonable burden on the public and the Registry alike however if 
the latter had to accept three-dimensional specimens or recordings of 
sounds. 29 
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It is to be noted that the wording of the enactments 
refer to a capability of graphic representation and do 
not require the mark concerned to be in graphic form 
h . 30 w en in use. 
According to some writers the ingenuity which trade mark 
owners will apply to the open-ended definition will give 
rise to further developments in the range of protection 
afforded traders by trade mark law. It is also 
suggested that a verbal description of the mark is 
likely to qualify as a graphical representation thereof. 
This is the practice in the U.S.A.. The essential 
enquiry, it has been suggested, will always be whether 
or not the mark claimed can be identified by means of an 
. . f h . 31 inspection o t e Register. 
My conclusion that the distinguishing function is the 
single invariable trade mark function is congruent with 
the definition of a trade mark set out in the new 
statutes and provides a basis for the definition. 
29. White Paper 8; See Rutherford 2. 
30. See Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 5; section 103(2) of the UK Act provides: 
'References in this Act to use (or any particular description of use) of a trade mark, or 
of a sign identical with, similar to, or likely to be mistaken for a trade mark, include use 
(or that description of use) otherwise than by means of a graphic representation.' 
31. See Groom & Abnett UK Trade Marks Act 1994 20-21. Morcom Trade Marks Act 
19949-10. 
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In regard to the definition of a trade mark and the 
significance thereof, my construction is the following. 
Trade marks (and other signs for that matter) can fulfil 
multiple functions. For a sign to qualify as a trade 
mark, however, it requires the property of 
distinctiveness, that is, it must fulfil or be capable 
of fulfilling the function of distinguishing product. 
It is this function alone which affords a particular 
sign registrability and statutory protection as a trade 
mark upon its registration. 
It is important for the purposes of this work to 
consider whether the definition of a trade mark in terms 
of its distinguishing function only has removed the 
restrictive hold which the origin function, under the 
"connection in the course of trade" doctrine or 
otherwise, has, historically, extended over the 
protection afforded trade marks. 32 
According to Morcom, it was never necessary for a trade 
mark, in fulfilling its traditional trade mark 
function of denoting the trade origin of goods, to 
establish the identity of the proprietor. This was 
expressly confirmed 
under section 68(1) 
there is no reason 
in the definition of a trade mark 
of the 1938 UK Act. In his view, 
to suppose that the new law has 
changed the position in this respect. The connection in 
the course of trade doctrine was adopted to indicate 
relationships between the proprietor of the mark and the 
goods it featured which were specified in section 3 of 
the 1905 Act i.e. manufacture, selection, certification, 
dealing with or offering for sale. Relationships of 
this kind indicated that the goods were those of the 
proprietor of the trade mark, in other words, indicated 
32. See p 105-106 supra regarding the doctrine. 
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the origin of the goods featuring the mark. The new 
definition reflects the old law: a trade mark enables 
the source of goods to be identified (in terms of their 
origin) and, therefore, to distinguish the goods with 
reference to their source. Morcom concludes: 
Essentially, whatever the wording used, a trade mark or a service 
mark was an indication which enable the goods or services from a 
particular source to be identified and thus distinguished from goods or 
services from other sources. In adopting a definition of "trade mark" 
which simply describes the function in terms of capability of 
"distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of 
other undertakings" the new law is really saying precisely the same 
h . 33 t mg. 
In my view, this is too narrow an approach and the view 
of Gyngell & Poulter is to be preferred where they state 
the following in regard to the removal of the 
"connection in the course of trade" requirement from the 
new UK Act: 
The omission of this requirement means that the commercial 
exploitation of signs through character merchandising, franchising and 
other licencing operations which may amount to treating the sign as a 
commodity will not, of itself, mean that the sign cannot be considered 
to be a trade mark. 34 
The latter view encapsulates the essential break with 
the past which must be made if modernisation is to take 
place. The crucial modernising principle - particularly 
in the context of the Common Law - is to afford trade 
marks full protection as discrete items of property. In 
the context of South African law it requires acceptance 
that trade marks perform multiple functions and all 
functions which a particular trade mark displays de facto 
at a given time must be afforded protection cumulatively 
under statute and common law. 35 
33. See Morcom Trade Marks Act 1994 10-11 . 
34. Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 8. 
35. Seep 498, 574 supra. 
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The significance of the words "connected in the course 
of trade" in the new South African definition of a trade 
mark, albeit in a different context than before, 
requires closer scrutiny. 
Under the rules of Interpretation of Statutes the words 
"connected in the course of trade" contained in section 
2(1) (xxiii) of the SA Act cannot be discarded as merely 
gratuitous but must be given a meaning. 
According to Webster, the words mean goods or services 
connected in the course of trade with persons other than 
h d k . 36 h' . 1 1 t e tra e mar proprietor. T is is c ear y so. In my 
view the words are restrictive. Their effect is that 
although a trade mark is by definition no longer 
required to indicate the origin of product (goods or 
services) but to distinguish product the manner of 
distinguishing under the SA Act is essentially with 
reference to a notional source or origin of other 
products which are connected in the course of trade 
elsewhere. The concept is indirectly maintained. This 
is in contradistinction to the continental wording which 
focuses upon the mark itself. The means of 
distinguishing is with reference to the legal or factual 
distinguishing qualities of the mark itself untrammelled 
by other considerations or doctrines. It appears to me 
that the presence of the "connection in the course of 
trade" doctrine in the revised South African definition 
provides an ill-suited tail which is bound to wag with 
uncertain consequences. 
3.2 Intention to Use 
The definition of a trade mark in the 1993 SA Act 
requires a purposeful intention regarding use on the 
36. See Webster 20. 
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part of the owner, namely, the mark is to be used or 
proposed to be used in relation to goods or services for 
the purpose of distinguishing them from goods or 
services elsewhere connected in the course of trade as 
discussed above. 37 
The United Kingdom Act merely requires the applicant to 
state either that the mark is in use by him or by 
another with his consent in relation to the goods or 
services in respect of which registration is sought, or 
that he has the bona fide intention that the mark should 
be so used. 38 
Under the UK Act, therefore, the proprietor merely 
intends the mark to be used in relation to the 
registered goods or services and this is not related to 
the definition of a trade mark. Under the SA Act, the 
use contemplated must have a defined purpose to 
distinguish the products of the proprietor with 
reference to the source of goods or services which are 
not those of the owner. 
Thus, whether or not this was intended, the definition 
of a trade mark in the 1993 SA Act follows the 
construction of Morcom in regard to the UK Act and 
maintains a strong link with origin theory. 
3.3 Distinctiveness 
In order to be registered a trade mark must be 
distinctive in law at the time of the application for 
its registration. Under the new laws trade marks which 
are de facto distinctive are distinctive de iure. 
The historical investigations of the work regarding the 
distinctiveness requirement as it has developed in the 
37. See section 2(1 )(xxiii) set out at par 3.1.3.1 above. 
38. Per section 32(2). The section also has consequences in relation to licensing; see p 
668 infra. 
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trade mark laws of the United Kingdom, South Africa and 
the U.S.A. has revealed a considerable body of technical 
law associated therewith. 
In the past, different criteria were applied in order to 
obtain the registration of trade marks of different 
strengths in Part A or Part B of the Register in the 
United Kingdom and in South Africa. 
In adopting the continental approach the 1994 UK Act has 
eliminated provisions setting out specific 
distinctiveness criteria and the registrability of a 
sign which qualifies as a trade mark is determined with 
reference to the listed absolute and relevant grounds 
for refusal and revocation. 
The South African Act, however, maintains a section 
according to which the distinctiveness of a mark is to 
be tested and which provides: 
Registrable trade marks 
9. (1) In order to be registrable, a trade mark shall be capable of 
distinguishing the goods or services of a person in respect of which it 
is registered or proposed to be registered from the goods or services of 
another person either generally or, where the trade mark is registered 
or proposed to be registered subject to limitations, in relation to use 
within those limitations. 39 
9. (2) A mark shall be considered to be capable of distinguishing 
within the meaning of subsection (1) if, at the date of application for 
registration, it is inherently capable of so distinguishing or it is 
capable of distinguishing by reason of prior use thereof. 
39. Section 2(1 )(ix) of the SA Act provides: " 'limitation' means any limitation of 
the exclusive right to use of a trade mark given by the registration thereof, 
including a limitation of that right as to the mode of use, as to use in relation to 
goods to be sold, or otherwise traded in, or as to services to be performed, in 
any place within the Republic, or as to use in relation to goods to be exported 
from the Republic;". 
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It is worth noting that section 9(1) does not repeat the 
"connection in the course of trade" phraseology of the 
definitions section. 
Hence, for a mark to be regarded distinctive under the 
new SA Act it must be "capable of distinguishing" goods 
or services. This it will be if, at the time of 
application, it is either -
3.3.1 inherently distinctive; 
3.3.2 defacto distinctive through use; 
3.3.3 both of the aforegoing. 40 
3. 4 Grounds for refusal or invalidity 
The new UK Act regards all trade marks prima facie 
registrable unless they must be refused registration on 
the basis of one or more of the express grounds for 
refusal set out in the statute. 
The new SA Act adopts a similar approach although, as I 
have observed, section 9 provides a specific description 
of distinctiveness which, if satisfied, entitles the 
applicant to registration unless the application is 
struck by one or more of the absolute or relative 
grounds of refusal. The grounds of refusal provided for 
in the SA Act are briefly dealt with below, seriatim. 
My approach has been to concentrate upon the grounds for 
refusal provided for in the SA Act and, in dealing 
therewith, to reveal the differences - where differences 
exist - between these grounds and those of the Directive 
and the UK Act. 
40. See Webster 9-10. 
3.4.1 
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Insofar as the South African legislature has not 
followed the wording of the UK Act in many respects, 
South African courts will be constrained to give effect 
to the letter of the South African enactment according 
to the South African rules regarding the interpretation 
of statutes and to depart from interpretations of the 
equivalent provisions of the UK Act and the Directive 
placed thereon by the courts of the United Kingdom and 
by the ECJ, respectively, where the interpretations of 
the latter courts cannot be reconciled with the terms of 
the South African enactment. Essentially, in not 
following the wording of the UK Act closely, the 
harmonisation of South African trade mark law with that 
of its European trading partners, if this was truly 
intended, is unlikely to materialise beyond the local 
adoption of certain general concepts. 
Absolute Grounds 
The absolute grounds of refusal are those based upon 
characteristics in the mark itself which render it 
non-registrable, or if registered, expungeable from the 
register. 
These grounds are set out specifically in article 3 of 
the Directive, sections 3 and 441 of the UK Act and 
sections 10(1) to 10(13), inclusive, of the SA Act. 
The UK provisions follow those of the Directive. The 
grounds therein set out are to be found also in the SA 
Act. The SA Act, however, has its own terminology, its 
provisions differ from the European grounds in certain 
respects and it contains additional grounds not found in 
the Directive or the UK Act. 
41. Section 4 relates to specially protected emblems. 
3.4.1.1 
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Section 10(1) - SA Act 
Section 10(1) of the SA Act provides the first absolute 
ground of refusal, namely that a mark which does not 
constitute a trade mark, cannot be registered. The 
same ground is to be found in section 3(1) (a) of the UK 
Act and Article 3 (1) (a) of the Directive. Insofar as 
the SA Act, as I have already pointed out, features a 
more elaborate definition of a trade mark than does the 
UK Act and the Directive, the South African provision 
is not necessarily congruent with the new UK law and 
that which is contemplated by the Directive. 
3. 4 .1. 2 Section 10 (2) denies registrability to marks of the 
following kind: 
10(2) a mark which -
(a) is not capable of distinguishing within the meaning of section 9; 
or 
(b) consists exclusively of a sign or an indication which may serve, in 
trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, 
value, geographical origin or other characteristics of the goods or 
services, or the mode or time of production of the goods or of 
rendering of the services; or 
(c) consists exclusively of a sign or an indication which has become 
customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established 
practices of the trade;. 
Section 10(2) (a) is the equivalent of Article 
3 (1) (6) (b) of the Directive and section 3 (1) (b) of the 
UK Act. Again it must be borne in mind that the South 
African Act, in section 9, provides a statutory 
definition of distinctiveness which is not to be found 
in the UK Act and the Directive. Therefore, in this 
instance also, it cannot be accepted that South African 
law in regard to this ground is the same in all 
respects as that provided for in the UK Act and which 
is contemplated by the Directive. 
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Section 10(2) (b) and (c) of the SA Act are the same as 
the provisions of Article 3(1) (c) and (d) of the 
Directive and section 3(1) (c) and (b) of the UK Act. 
The provisions in section 10 (2) (a), (b) and (c) of the 
SA Act and those in the equivalent articles and 
sections of the Directive and the UK Act are subject to 
the proviso that a mark of the kind therein defined 
which has become de facto distinctive through use prior 
to the date of application for its registration is 
. bl 42 reg1stra e. 
3.4.1.3 Section 10(3) of the SA Act introduces an absolute 
ground of refusal which is not contained in the UK Act 
or in the Directive. Under section 10(3) "a mark in 
relation to which the applicant for registration has no 
bona fide claim to proprietorship" is to be refused 
registration. 
3.4.1.4 Section 10(4) of the SA Act renders marks of the 
following kind disentitled to registration: 
10(4) A mark in relation to which the applicant for registration has no 
bona fide intention of using it as a trade mark, either himself or 
through any person permitted or to be permitted by him to use the 
mark as contemplated by section 38;. 43 
Section 32 (3) of the UK Act requires that an 
application for registration of the mark shall state 
that the applicant has a bonafide intention of using the 
42. See the proviso to section 3(1) of the UK Act and article 3(3) of the Directive. The 
proviso to section 10 of the SA Act determines: 'Provided that a mark shall not be 
refused registration by virtue of the provisions of paragraph (2) or, if registered, shall 
not be liable to be removed from the register by virtue of the said provisions if at the 
date of the application for registration or at the date of an application for removal 
from the register, as the case may be, it has in fact become capable of distinguishing 
within the meaning of section 9 as a result of use made of the mark.' 
43. Section 38 relates to permitted use and registered users. 
597 
trade mark himself or by another with his consent. The 
requirement is not elevated to an element of the 
definition of a trade mark or to an absolute ground of 
refusal as is the case in the SA Act. 44 
3.4.1.5 Section 10(5) of the SA Act disentitles registration to 
marks of the following kind: 
10(5) a mark which consists exclusively of the shape, configuration or 
colour of goods where such shape, configuration or colour is 
necessary to obtain a specific technical result, or results from the 
nature of the goods themselves;. 
The equivalent section (3(2)) in the UK Act and Article 
3(1) (e) of the Directive refer to shape only and 
"configuration" and "colour" are not included as they 
are in the SA Act. 
section is more 
counterparts. 
Thus, the equivalent South African 
restrictive than its European 
3.4.1.6 Section 10(6) of the SA Act provides that marks of the 
following kind are not registrable: 
10(6) subject to the provisions of section 36(2), a mark which, on the 
date of application for registration thereof, or, where appropriate, of 
the priority claimed in respect of the application for registration 
thereof, constitutes, or the essential part of which constitutes, a 
reproduction, imitation or translation of a trade mark which is entitled 
to protection under the Paris Convention as well-known trade mark 
within the meaning of section (35)(1) of this Act and which is used for 
goods or services identical or similar to the goods or services in 
. 45 question;. 
There is no equivalent absolute ground for refusal 
44. Seep 584, 594 supra. 
45. Section 36(2) of the Act deals with vested rights in connection will well-known trade 
marks. 
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provided for in the UK Act or in the Directive. The 
protection afforded well-known marks under the new laws 
is dealt with fully below. 46 
3.4.1.7 Section 10(7) of the SA Act denies a mark registration 
where the application for its registration was made mala 
fide. The equivalent provision in the Directive 
Article 3(2) (d) refers to applications made in bad 
faith by the applicant whilst section 3 (6) of the UK 
Act provides: 
A trade mark shall not be registered if or to the extent that the 
application is made in bad faith. 
3.4.1.8 The absolute ground for refusal provided for in 
sections 10(8) and 10(9) 
following specific kind: 
relate to marks of the 
10(8) a mark which contains the coat of arms, seal or national flag of 
the Republic or, save with the authorization of the competent authority 
of the convention country concerned, of any convention country; 
10(9) a mark which contains any word, letter or device indicating 
State patronage; 
Such specially protected emblems are provided for in 
sections 3 (5) and 4 of the UK Act and Article 3 (1) (h) 
and 3(2) (b) and (c) of the Directive. 
3.4.1.9 Section 10(10) of the SA Act renders "a mark which 
contains any mark specified in the regulations as being 
for the purposes of this section a prohibited mark" 
disentitled to registration. There is no equivalent 
provision in the UK Act or in the Directive. 
3. 4 .1.10 Section 10 (11) introduces a further absolute ground 
for refusal which is unique to the SA Act and which 
46. Seep 627 infra. 
disentitles from registration -
10(11) a mark which consists of a container for goods or the shape, 
configuration, colour or pattern of goods, where the registration of 
such mark is or has become likely to limit the development of any art 
or industry;. 
3.4.1.11 Section 10(12) disentitles from registration -
10(12) a mark which is inherently deceptive or the use of which would 
be likely to deceive or cause confusion, be contrary to law, be contra 
bonos mores, or be likely to give offence to any class or persons;. 
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This is largely an exclusively South African provision, 
also, but which with Section 10(3) does share some 
common features with section 3 ( 3) of the UK Act which 
provides: 
A trade mark shall not be registered if it is -
(a) contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of morality, or 
(b) of such a nature as to deceive the public (for instance as to the 
nature, quality or geographical origin of the goods or service). 
This section of the UK Act is the direct equivalent of 
Articles 3(1) (f) and (g) of the Directive. 
3.4.1.12 The final absolute ground of refusal provided for in 
the SA Act disentitles from registration -
10(13) a mark which, as a result of the manner in which it has been 
used, would be likely to cause deception or confusion;. 
This is a theoretically sound section which is likely 
to become one of the cornerstones of the Act, 
especially in regard to deceptive use resulting from 
licencing or assignment. Where the confusion or 
deception is in relation to the rights of others this 
ground, however, takes on the nature of a relative 
ground. 
3.4.2 
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Absolute grounds : An overview 
In view of the provisions of sections 10 (3), (4), (6), 
(10), (11) and (13), which comprise additional or hybrid 
absolute grounds for refusal in the South African Act 
which are not contained in the UK Act or in the 
Directive, and sections 10 (5) and (12) which are more 
limiting than their counterpart provisions in the UK Act 
and the Directive, the SA Act is distinctly more 
restrictive in its provisions relating to the absolute 
grounds of refusal than is both the UK Act and the 
Directive. 
Under the Directive, the absolute grounds of refusal 
which relate to specially protected emblems and 
applications made in bad faith are not peremptory 
although the legislature of the United Kingdom has 
chosen to include them. 47 
The UK Act features an absolute ground particular to the 
United Kingdom in section 3(4) which provides: 
3(4) A trade mark shall not be registered if or to the extent that its use 
is prohibited in the United Kingdom by any enactment or rule of law 
or by any provisions of Community Law. 
The essential difference in approach between the old and 
the new laws is that whereas under the old laws a mark 
had to meet a number of conditions before it would be 
registrable, 48 under the new laws a mark is registrable 
unless it conflicts with one or more of the specifically 
49 
stated grounds for refusal. 
47. See article 3(2) of the Directive and sections 3(5) and 4 of the UK Act. 
48. See p 96, 250 supra. 
49. See Groom & Abnett UK Trade Marks Act 1994 37. 
3.4.3 
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Relative Grounds 
The relative grounds for refusal of a trade mark in the 
new laws are to be found in sections 10(14), (15), (16) 
and (17) of the SA Act, sections 5 and 6 of the UK Act 
and Article 8 of the Directive. 
The provisions relating to the relative grounds for 
refusal in the SA Act differ substantially from those 
of the Directive and the UK Act. 
The relative grounds for refusal in the SA Act are as 
follows. 
3. 4. 3 .1 Under section 10 ( 14) , registration will be refused to 
an identical or similar mark to a registered mark in 
circumstances where use of the mark applied for in 
relation to the goods or services in respect of which 
registration is sought and which are the same or 
similar to the goods or services in respect of which 
the registered mark is registered, would be likely to 
deceive or cause confusion. The provisions of this 
section are subject to the provisions of section 14 
(which relate to honest concurrent use) The consent 
of the proprietor of the registered mark to the 
registration of the conflicting mark applied for 
overcomes the obstacle to registration provided by 
section 10(14), absolutely. 50 
3.4.3.2 Subject to the provisions of sections 14 and 10(16), 
section 10 ( 15) denies a mark registration in the same 
circumstances as those set out in paragraph 3. 4. 3. 1 
where the same or a similar mark is the subject of an 
earlier application for registration. In this instance 
also the consent of the prior applicant overcomes the 
obstacle presented by section 10(15), absolutely. 51 
50. See section 10(14). 
51. See section 10(15). 
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3.4.3.3 Section 10(16) provides for circumstances where a prior 
applicant has "existing rights" and registration of the 
earlier application would be "contrary thereto" . In 
these circumstances the later application prevails and 
the earlier application is disentitled to registration 
. h . 52 in sue circumstances. 
3.4.3.4 Section 10(17) provides a relative ground for refusal 
in circumstances where registration is sought of a mark 
which is the same or similar to a registered mark which 
is well-known in the Republic of South Africa where use 
of the mark applied for will dilute the registered mark 
i.e. "if the use of the mark sought to be registered 
would be likely to take unfair advantage of, or be 
detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute 
of the registered trade mark, notwithstanding the 
absence of deception and confusion". 53 
The Act does not provide specific assistance to an 
applicant on the basis of consent in relation to the 
grounds described in section 10 ( 16) and 10 ( 1 7) . This 
seems to imply that the legislature intended to exclude 
consent. A curious result then comes about for there 
is no apparent basis for the holders of existing rights 
to have the right to waive them in the circumstances 
described in sections 10(14) and 10(15) but not in the 
circumstances described in sections 10(16) and 10(17). 
3. 4. 3. 5 The provisions of Article 4 of the Directive underpin 
sections 5 and 6 of the UK Act in which the relative 
grounds for refusal of registration are set out. Under 
the Directive certain of the relative grounds are 
mandatory whilst others are optional. The provisions 
of the Directive are aptly summarised by Gielen. In 
regard to the mandatory relative grounds Gielen states: 
52. See section 10(16). 
53. See section 10(17). 
Article 4(1) and (2), the mandatory provisions, deal with the conflicts 
with earlier rights. A registration shall be refused or, if registered, 
shall be liable to be declared invalid if: 
- it is identical with an earlier mark and registered or applied for in 
connection with identical goods or services or 
- if it is similar to an earlier mark for similar goods or services and 
because of that there is likelihood of confusion. 
Earlier trade marks are those CTMs, national or international trade 
marks, which were applied for before the date of application of the 
trade mark and furthermore the trade marks which on the date of 
application of the mark are well known in the sense of Article 6 bis 
Paris Convention. 54 
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In regard to the optional relative grounds of refusal he 
writes: 
Seven grounds are mentioned as optional grounds for refusal or 
invalidation of later trade marks in conflicts with earlier rights, 
characterised as follows: 
4(4) (a) the later trade mark is identical with, or similar to, earlier 
marks for non-similar goods or services which have a reputation 
provided that the use of the later mark without due cause would take 
unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or 
the repute of the earlier trade mark; 
4(4)(b) rights to earlier non-registered marks or other signs (such as 
trade names) were acquired prior to date of application for 
registration of the later mark (or priority date claimed therefor) if the 
proprietor has the right to prohibit the use of a later mark; 
4(4)(c) on the basis of other earlier rights such as: 
- name rights (for example the name of the artist Madonna versus the 
mark Madonna for music cassettes); 
- personal portrayal rights; 
- copyrights; 
- industrial property rights (for example, the rights to the name of a 
plant variety, if the proprietor has the right to prohibit the use of a 
later mark); 
54. Gielen 265. 
4(4) (d-f) the so-called vulture prohibition: the trade mark is identical 
with/similar to certain expired rights to collective or certification 
marks and to individual marks if the later rights are acquired within 
specified periods after the relevant expiration date. 
4(4) (g) the applicant was acting in bad faith, based upon the 
likelihood of confusion between the later trade mark and an earlier 
trade mark in use abroad. 55 
604 
The UK Act adopts the concept of "earlier trade mark" 
from the Directive and defines it in section 6. In this 
way, United Kingdom trade marks, international trade 
mark registrations in the UK under the Madrid protocol, 
community trade marks (CTM's) and considerations of 
56 priority under the Paris Convention are provided for. 
Section 6 of the UK Act further distinguishes the new UK 
legislation from that of the SA Act in affording a clear 
illustration of the loss of autonomy of the United 
Kingdom legislature in regard to trade marks, which are 
made subject to the obligations of the United Kingdom 
under the EU treaties, the Madrid Protocol and the Paris 
C . 57 onvent1on. 
55. Gielen 265-266. 
56. See section 6 of the UK Act. 
57. Section 6 of the UK Act provides: "Meaning of 'earlier trade mark' (1) in this Act an 
'earlier trade mark' means - (a) a registered trade mark, international trade mark (UK) or 
Community trade mark which has a date of application for registration earlier than that 
of the trade mark in question, taking account (where appropriate) of the priorities 
claimed in respect of the trade marks. (b) a Community trade mark which has a vaild 
claim to seniority from an earlier registered trade mark or international trade mark (UK), 
or (c) a trade mark which, at the date of application for registeration of the trade mark 
in question or (where appropriate) of the priority claimed in respect of the application, 
was entitled to protection under the Paris Convention as a well known trade mark. (2) 
References in this Act to an earlier trade mark include a trade mark in respect of which 
an application for registration has been made and which, if registered, would be an 
earlier trade mark by virtue of subsection (1 )(a) or (b), subject to its being so 
registered. (3) A trade mark within subsection (1 )(a) or (b) whose registration expires 
shall continue to be taken into account in determining the registrability of a later mark 
for a period of one year after the expiry unless the registrar is satisfied that there was 
no bona fide use of the mark during the two years immediately preceeding the expiry." 
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The mandatory provisions of the Directive are taken up 
in sections 5 and 6 of the British Act as are certain of 
h ' 1 ' ' 58 t e optiona provisions. 
It is significant to note that in terms of section 5(5) 
all of the relative grounds for refusal of registration 
can be overcome with the consent of the holder of the 
earlier right 
South Africa. 
3.5 The Registrar's Discretion 
which is apparently not the case in 
It is to be noted that the application of both the 
58. Section 5 of the UK Act provides: "5 Relative grounds for refusal of registration (1) A 
trade mark shall not be registered if it is identical with an earlier trade mark and the 
goods or services for which the trade mark is applied for are identical with the goods 
or services for which the earlier trade mark is protected. (2) A trade mark shall not be 
registered if because - (a) it is identical with an earlier trade mark and is to be 
registered for goods or (b) it is similar to an earlier trade mark and is to be registered 
for goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the earlier trade mark 
is protected. there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which 
includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark. (3) A trade mark 
which - (a) is identical with or similar to an earlier trade mark, and (b) is to be 
registered for goods or services which are not similar to those for which the earlier 
trade mark is protected, shall not be registered if, or to the extent that, the earlier trade 
mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom (or, in the case of a Community trade 
mark, in the Eurpoean Community) and the use of the later mark without due cause 
would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the 
repute of the earlier trade mark. (4) A trade mark shall not be registered if, or to the 
extent that, its use in the United Kingdom if liable to be prevented - (a) by virtue of any 
rule of law (in particular, the law of passing off) protecting an unregistered trade mark 
or other sign used in the course of trade, or (b) by virtue of an earlier right other than 
those referred to in subsections (1) to (3) or paragraph (a) above, in particular by 
virtue of the law of copyright, design right or registered designs. A person thus 
entitled to prevent the use of a trade mark is referred to in this Act as the proprietor of 
an 'earlier right' in relation to the trade mark. (5) Nothing in this section prevents the 
registration of a trade mark where the proprietor of the earlier trade mark or other 
earlier right consents to the registration." 
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absolute and relative grounds of refusal and removal are 
matters of fact and of law binding upon the Registrar. 
In the event of the Registrar making a finding of fact 
or of law in relation thereto he is bound to refuse 
registration or expunge the entry, as the case may be, 
subject to the provisions of the Act. In relation to 
the registration provisions, also, there is no provision 
in the new laws for the exercise of an extensive 
d . t' b h R . . h 59 iscre ion y t e egistrar as in t e past. 
3. 6 Disclaimers 
The revocation of the Registrar's discretion is less 
complete in the SA Act than in the UK Act. A good 
illustration of this is afforded by the manner in which 
disclaimers are entered upon the Register under each Act. 
In terms of section 15 of the South African Act the 
Registrar, as a condition of a mark being registered or 
remaining on the Register, may require the proprietor of 
the mark to disclaim the non-distinctive matter or enter 
some other memorandum against the entry for the purpose 
of defining the rights afforded by the particular 
registration. 
The Registrar in the UK has no such discretion. In 
terms of section 13 of the UK Act, an applicant faced 
with objections raised by the Registrar or by a third 
party in opposition proceedings may voluntarily, in 
order to overcome the objection, enter a disclaimer or 
other limitation against the entry and any registration 
subsequently obtained will be restricted thereby. The 
Act does not empower the Registrar to require or request 
disclaimers or limitations of his own accord. 60 
59. See Groom and Abnett UK Trade Marks Act 1994 8. 
60. See section 13 and Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 62. 
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4. PROPERTY IN REGISTERED MARKS IN THE UK 
The UK Act has at last recognised in specific terms that 
a registered trade mark must be regarded as property. 
Section 2(1) of the Act provides: 
2(1) A registered trade mark is a property right obtained by the 
registration of the trade mark under this Act and the proprietor of a 
registered trade mark has the rights and remedies provided by this Act. 
Section 22 of the Act provides: 
22 Nature of registered trade mark 
A registered trade mark is personal property (in Scotland, incorporeal 
movable property). 
As to the rights conferred by a registered trade mark in 
the United Kingdom section 9(1) of the Act provides: 
The proprietor of a registered trade mark has exclusive rights in the 
trade mark which are infringed by use of the trade mark in the United 
Kingdom without his consent. 
The exclusive rights of the proprietor of a registered 
trade mark in the United Kingdom are delimited by -
4.1 the description of the actions which comprise the 
statutory infringements which are set out in section 10 
of the Act; 
4.2 the limited defence against infringement provided by 
section 10(6); 
4.3 the limitations upon infringement provided for in 
sections 11 and 12; 
4.4 the effect of voluntary disclaimers and limitations 
entered against the registration pursuant to section 
13(1). 61 
61 . See Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 11 5. 
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As pointed out earlier, it was established under the 
early statutes that registered trade marks are a species 
of property in the United Kingdom. It was not however 
clear whether this property was included in a recognised 
category or was to be regarded as sui generis. The 1994 
Act has, therefore, settled this aspect of the matter. 62 
5. PROPERTY IN UNREGISTERED MARKS IN THE UK 
The question arises whether the statutory recognition of 
property in registered trade marks will lead to 
developments in the common law which recognise property 
in unregistered marks beyond mere appurtenance to the 
goodwill of the business in connection with which they 
63 
are used, as was held in Spalding v Gamage. 
Annand & Norman suggest that registered trade marks 
could attract property rights in time because: 
(a) The 1994 Act, in section 56, by implementing the obligation in the 
Paris Convention to protect well-known marks, provides that the owner 
of such a mark can obtain injunctive relief "whether or not that person 
carries on business, or has any goodwill, in the United Kingdom". 
The provision protecting well-known marks therefore treats them as 
being independent of the goodwill of the business. 
(b) The Court of Appeal in Taittinger v Allbev Ltd [1993] 2 CMLR 
741, anticipating section 10(3) of the 1994 Act, has recently extended 
passing off to cover the dilution of an unregistered mark. Dilution is 
the gradual erosion of the mark's selling power. The action for 
dilution is based on the assumption that the trade mark is a valuable 
item of property in its own right and that it is a means for creating 
goodwill, rather than being part of goodwill. 64 
62. Seep 220 supra. 
63. A.G. Spalding & Bros v A.W. Gamage Ltd (1915) 32 R.P.C. 273 discussed at p 
77-81 supra. 
64. Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 1994 11 . The Court of Appeal held that 
there would be a real injury to the goodwill of the champagne houses if 
marketing of a non-genuine product continued in a way which would lead to a 
blurring or erosion of the uniqueness of the word champagne and a 
debasement of the exclusive reputation of the champagne houses in the word 
(p 7 53 of the report}. 
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Although conclusion (b) is too broadly stated as the 
court found an injury to goodwill, I nevertheless 
believe the time has come for it to be acknowledged that 
the approach of Lord Westbury in equity was correct 
after all. 65 Trade marks are property whether 
registered or not. 
in relation to the 
negate this. 66 
That they fulfil important functions 
goodwill of enterprises does not 
The mere act of registration does not transmute common 
law marks into property but facilitates enforcement of 
rights thereunder, as was the primary and continuing 
. . f h l' 67 intention rom t e ear ier statutes. 
6. INFRINGEMENT 
The new laws have extended the infringement action 
considerably both in the United Kingdom and in South 
Af . 68 rica. 
6.1 Registration prerequisite 
Only registered marks are 
action under the UK Act. 69 
provided registration ensues, 
f . . 70 or registration. 
afforded an infringement 
The date of registration, 
is the date of application 
h . . . h . h f . 71 T e position is t e same in Sout A rica. 
6.2 Acts of infringement: UK 
65. See section 10(1) of the Act. 
66. See p 177-187 supra. 
67. Seep 44-51, 58-62, 85-88 supra. 
68. See Groom and Abnett UK Trade Marks Act 1994 87, Job: The Infringement of 
Trade-Mark Rights' - in Visser New Law: Trade Marks and Designs 22-34 22. 
69. See sections 9(3)(a). 
70. See sections 9(3) and 40(3). 
71. See sections 29(1 )(b) and 33 of the SA Act. 
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There are six acts of infringement defined in sections 
10 (1) to 10 (3) (inclusive) of the UK Act. The elements 
thereof are the following: 
6.2.1 Under section 10(1) (identical sign and product) 
6.2.1.1 Unauthorised use, 
6.2.1.2 in the course of trade, 
6.2.1.3 of an identical sign to the registered mark, 
6. 2 .1. 4 in relation to identical goods or services to those 
. d 72 reg1stere . 
6.2.2 Under section 10(2)(a) (identical sign, similar product) 
6.2.2.1 Unauthorised use, 
6.2.2.2 in the course of trade, 
6.2.2.3 of an identical sign to the registered mark, 
6.2.2.4 on similar goods to those registered, 
6. 2. 2. 5 resulting in a likelihood of confusion on the part of 
the public, 
6. 2. 2. 6 which includes the likelihood of association with the 
registered trade mark. 73 
6.2.3 Under section 10(2)(b) (similar sign, identical product) 
6.2.3.1 Unauthorised use, 
6.2.3.2 in the course of trade, 
6.2.3.3 of a similar sign to the registered mark, 
6.2.3.4 in relation to identical goods or services to the 
registered mark, 
6. 2. 3. 5 resulting in a likelihood of confusion on the part of 
the public, 
6. 2. 3. 6 which includes the likelihood of association with the 
registered trade mark. 74 
72. See section 10(1) of the Act. 
73. See section 10{2)(a). 
74. See section 10(2)(b). 
6.2.4 Under section 10(2)(b) (similar sign and product) 
6.2.4.1 Unauthorised use, 
6.2.4.2 in the course of trade, 
6.2.4.3 of a similar sign to the registered mark, 
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6.2.4.4 in relation to similar goods or services to those 
registered, 
6.2.4.5 resulting in a likelihood of confusion on the part of 
the public, 
6.2.4.6 which includes the likelihood of association with the 
registered trade mark. 75 
6.2.5 Under section 10(3) (identical sign, dissimilar product) 
6.2.5.1 Unauthorised use, 
6.2.5.2 in the course of trade, 
6.2.5.3 of an identical sign 
6. 2. 5. 4 to the registered mark which has a reputation in the 
United Kingdom, 
6. 2. 5. 5 in relation to dissimilar goods or services to those 
registered, 
6.2.5.6 where use of the sign, 
6.2.5.7 which is without due cause, 
6.2.5.8 takes unfair advantage of, 
6.2.5.9 or is detrimental to, 
6.2.5.10 the distinctive character 
6.2.5.11 or repute of the registered trade mark. 76 
6.2.6 Under section 10(3) (similar sign, dissimilar product) 
6.2.6.1 Unauthorised use, 
6.2.6.2 in the course of trade, 
6.2.6.3 of a similar sign 
6. 2. 6. 4 to the registered mark which has a reputation in the 
United Kingdom, 
75. See section 10(2)(b). 
76. See section 10(3). 
612 
6. 2. 6. 5 in relation to dissimilar goods or services to those 
registered, 
6.2.6.6 where use of the sign, 
6.2.6.7 which is without due cause, 
6.2.6.8 takes unfair advantage of, 
6.2.6.9 or is detrimental to, 
6.2.6.10 the distinctive character 
6.2.6.11 or repute of the registered trade mark. 77 
77. 
78. 
Sections 10 (1) 10 ( 3) of the UK Act bear a close 
relation to the provisions of section 5 (1) 5 (3), 
which concern the relative grounds for refusal of 
registration. This affords the registration, 
infringement and expungement provisions of the UK Act 
a coherence and regularity which is not as evident in 
the SA Act. 
I have already observed that the relative grounds 
provided for in section 5 of the UK Act utilise the 
concept of "earlier trade mark" which gives effect to 
the Community, Madrid Protocol and other convention 
obligations of the United Kingdom. 
This concept must necessarily be excluded from the SA 
Act as South Africa is not a part of the system it 
contemplates. 
The concept of "the likelihood of association" is new 
to United Kingdom trade mark law and is derived from 
Benelux jurisprudence. Essentially, the concept 
relates to similarity between marks and a likelihood 
of association is established where the public forms a 
mental association between marks which is evoked 
merely on the basis of their resemblance without 
1 f . . . 78 actua con usion arising. 
See section 10(3). 
See Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 1994 155; Morcom Trade Marks Act 1994 
23; see also par 6.3 p 613 infra where the concept is considered in the context of 
Benelux law. 
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Section 10(1) of the UK Act gives effect to Article 
5(1) (a) of the Directive whilst section 10(2) gives 
effect to Article 5(1) (b) thereof. So too section 10(3) 
gives effect to Article 5 (2) of the Directive whilst 
section 10(4) gives effect to Article 5(3) of the 
Directive. 
It is to be noted, however, that in regard to the acts 
of infringement the UK Act does not fallow the wording 
of the Directive closely - as is the case in most other 
instances. According to Annand & Norman this is due to 
a combination of drafting technique and the legislature 
intending to confer narrower infringement rights under 
h h . . d d f . h . . 79 t e UK Act t an is provi e or in t e Directive. 
Finally, it needs to be recorded that the UK Act 
. d 1 f d . f . 80 d . d provi es a so or secon ary in ringement an provi es 
a specific defence against infringement in the case of 
unauthorised use of the registered mark to identify the 
source of the registered proprietor's goods or services, 
which could include such use in comparative 
d . . 81 a vertising. 
provided for 
In addition to the acts of infringement 
in section 10, it must be borne in mind 
that section 56(2) confers a remedy on the proprietor of 
a well-known trade mark (which need not be registered) 82 
whilst section 60(4) confers a remedy on the proprietor 
regarding certain unauthorised acts of an agent or 
. 83 
representative. 
6.3 Infringement under Benelux law 
Gielen records that as far as the criteria for 
79. See Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 1994 146. 
80. See section 10(5). 
81. See section 10(6); Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 124-125. 
82. See section 56(2). 
83. See section 60(4). 
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infringement are concerned the final text of the 
Directive was greatly influenced by Benelux trade mark 
law. He writes: 
It was in fact under the pressure of the Dutch delegation that the 
infringement criteria were widened. The Dutch delegation vigorously 
defended the important progress which was made in the field of trade 
mark law in the Benelux countries on the basis of the Benelux Trade 
Mark Act as interpreted by the Benelux Court of Justice. The result of 
the negotiations between the Member States was a clear recognition 
that in present times a trade mark not only functions as an indication 
of origin but can constitute a valuable asset in and of itself. In other 
words, it is a symbol having goodwill even apart from the goods or 
services for which protection is applied for. 84 
This clears the way for the positive-entitlements 
approach to the trade mark right under the Directive 
rather than the traditional negative approach of the 
common law which affords the trade mark proprietor 
powers to prevent rather than with entitlements to 
exercise. 
Benelux trade mark law provides the key to the 
interpretation of the mandatory infringement provisions 
set out in Article 5(1) (b) of the Directive (as taken up 
in section 10(2) (b) of the UK Act) which relates to 
those acts of infringement requiring "a likelihood of 
confusion on the part of the public, which includes the 
likelihood of association with the trade mark 11 • 85 
Under Article 3(a) of the Benelux Trade Marks Act, the 
following acts of infringement are contemplated. 
In the first place, unauthorised use of the registered 
mark or a similar sign in relation to the same or 
84. Gielen 266. 
85. See p 610-611 and article 5(1 )(b) of the Directive. 
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similar goods as those for which the registered mark is 
registered, infringes the registration. 
In the second place, all other unauthorised use which is 
made of the registered trade mark or a similar sign 
infringes the registration provided such unauthorised 
use takes place in the course of trade without a valid 
reason in circumstances which result in prejudice to the 
trade mark owner without reference to the goods or 
services in respect of which unauthorised use takes 
place and whether or not such use is in relation to 
. d . 86 certain goo s or services. 
In Benelux law the concept of similarity is crucial and 
the risk of confusion, therefore, does not play a role. 87 
This gives rise to the "likelihood of association" test 
in regard to which Gielen affords the following example. 
Under the confusion standard the trade mark Toyota 
Tercel would probably not be inf ringed by the use of the 
trade mark Nissan Tercel as the public would not be 
confused particularly as to origin regarding the 
products featuring the marks. In Benelux trade mark 
law, which does not have regard to the confusion 
standard, infringement would be established through the 
likelihood of association test because a distinctive 
element of the marks, Tercel, results in a resemblance 
between the marks which would lead to them being 
. d . h bl. . d 88 associate in t e pu ic min . 
The manner in which the relevant article and section of 
the Directive and the UK Act is drafted, however, 
relegates "likelihood of association'' to a specific 
category of acts which are likely to bring about public 
confusion. 
86. See Gielen 266. 
87. Gielen 266. 
88. See Gielen 266-267. 
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This does not, therefore, accord strictly with the 
Benelux approach: 
The likelihood of association-concept is a wide criterion for assessing 
trade mark infringement, much wider than the classical notion of 
likelihood of confusion. If a risk of confusion is established, the risk 
of association is given. It is, however, very strange that Article 5 of 
the Directive speaks of likelihood of confusion which 'includes ' the 
likelihood of association. In other words: the wider criterion is 
mentioned as a genus of the species 'likelihood of confusion'. This 
seems to be contradictory. However, in the statements which were 
entered into the minutes of the meeting of the Council at which the 
Directive was adopted, it was said: 'the Council and the Commission 
note that "likelihood of association " is a concept which in particular 
has been developed by Benelux caselaw '. Notwithstanding the fact 
that Article 5 is worded in a strange way, it is clear that the intention 
of the Community legislature was to accept the wide criterion as 
applied under Benelux law. The interpretation of Article 5 should 
therefore be that 'likelihood of confusion' should be understood in its 
widest sense. 89 
It appears to me, however, that the wording of section 
10 (2) of the UK Act and particularly the words "which 
includes" will require the "likelihood of association" 
contemplated to bring about a likelihood of confusion 
before an infringement action will lie. 
6. 4 Acts of infringement: SA Act 
There are six acts of infringement set out in the 
provisions of sections 34(1) (a) - (c), inclusive. The 
elements thereof are the following: 
6.4.1 Under section 34(1)(a) (identical mark and product) 
6.4.1.1 unauthorised use, 
89. See Gielen 267. 
6.4.1;2 in the course of trade, 
6.4.1.3 of an identical mark to the registered mark, 
6.4.1.4 upon the identical goods or services 
. d 90 reg1stere . 
6.4.2 Under section 34(1)(a) (resembling mark, identical product) 
6.4.2.1 unauthorised use, 
6.4.2.2 in the course of trade, 
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to those 
6. 4. 2. 3 in relation to identical goods or services to those 
registered 
6.4.2.4 of a mark so nearly resembling the registered mark 
6.4.2.5 as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion. 91 
6.4.3 Under section 34(1)(b) (identical mark, similar product) 
6.4.3.1 unauthorised use, 
6.4.3.2 in the course of trade, 
6.4.3.3 of an identical mark to the registered mark, 
6. 4. 3. 4 in relation to goods or services which are so similar 
to those registered 
6.4.3.5 that in such use a likelihood of deception or confusion 
. 92 
exists. 
6.4.4 Under section 34(1)(b) (similar mark, similar product) 
6.4.4.1 unauthorised use, 
6.4.4.2 in the course of trade, 
6.4.4.3 of a similar mark to the registered mark, 
6. 4. 4. 4 in relation to goods or services which are so similar 
to those registered 
6.4.4.5 that in such use a likelihood of deception or confusion 
. 93 
exists. 
6.4.5 Under section 34(1)(c) (identical mark, dissimilar product) 
6.4.5.1 unauthorised use, 
90. See section 34( 1 )(a) of the SA Act. 
91 . See section 34( 1 )(a). 
92. See section 34(1 )(b). 
93. See section 34(1 )(b). 
6.4.5.2 in the course of trade, 
6.4.5.3 of an identical mark 
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6.4.5.4 to a registered mark which is well-known in South 
Africa, 
6. 4. 5. 5 in relation to dissimilar goods or services to those 
registered, 
6.4.5.6 where use of the identical mark would be likely to 
6.4.5.7 take unfair advantage of, 
6.4.5.8 or be detrimental to, 
6.4.5.9 the distinctive character or the repute of the 
registered well-known trade mark, 
6.4.5.10 notwithstanding the absence of 
d . 94 ecept1on. 
6.4.6 Under section 34(1)(c) (similar mark, dissimilar product) 
6.4.6.1 unauthorised use, 
6.4.6.2 in the course of trade, 
6.4.6.3 of a similar mark 
confusion or 
6.4.6.4 to a registered mark which is well-known in South 
Africa, 
6. 4. 6. 5 in relation to dissimilar goods or services to those 
registered, 
6.4.6.6 where use of the similar mark would be likely to 
6.4.6.7 take unfair advantage of, 
6.4.6.8 or be detrimental to, 
6.4.6.9 the distinctive character or the repute of the 
registered well-known trade mark, 
6.4.6.10 notwithstanding the absence of confusion or 
d . 95 ecept1on. 
6.5 Infringements: A comparison between the UK and SA Acts 
94. 
95. 
A comparison between the inf ringing provisions of the 
UK and SA Acts reveals that the acts of infringement 
are generally similar but feature significant 
differences in emphasis and detail. 
Apparently identical at first glance, the first act of 
infringement differs in the two systems insofar as the 
See section 34(1 )(c). 
See section 34(1 )(c). This section does not apply to defensive registrations obtained 
_ ....,'"'''"'' _.£. .... 1-._ "'nn'J A ........ \ 
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concept "sign" (used in the UK Act) is not necessarily 
the same as the term "mark" (used in the SA Act) . 
"Mark" is defined in section 2 (1) (x) of the SA Act and 
the meaning of the term is therefore limited thereto in 
regard to the infringing marks contemplated by section 
34(1) (a) of the SA Act. 
"Sign" is not defined in the UK Act and the term is not, 
therefore, subject to statutory limitation similar in 
kind to that placed upon the concept of "mark" under the 
SA Act. 
The first act of infringement in the South African 
statute is therefore narrower than its United Kingdom 
counterpart under which the use of any kind of sign can 
apparently infringe. 
In regard to the further acts of infringement under the 
UK Act, (excluding the dilution provisions in relation 
to marks which have a reputation which are dealt with 
hereunder), the use complained of must give rise to a 
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. This 
confusion must arise out of two things, namely that the 
infringing signs concerned are identical or similar to 
the registered mark and by virtue of the use of the 
cl 
infringing signs in relation to identical or similar 
goods or services to the registered goods or services. 
As already discussed, the UK Act also introduces the 
concept of "a likelihood of association" derived from 
Benelux law, which is included under the umbrella of a 
"likelihood of confusion". The concept is not part of 
established South African trade mark law and is not 
introduced by the 1993 SA Act. 
In the SA Act the requisite likelihood of deception or 
confusion relates to different aspects depending upon 
the particular act of infringement concerned. Thus, in 
the case of infringement by means of use of a similar 
mark in relation to the registered goods or services the 
deception or confusion must, according to the wording of 
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section 34 (1) (a), arise as a consequence of the 
resemblance between the registered and the inf ringing 
mark. 96 In other words, the enquiry as to the 
likelihood of confusion or deception is limited to a 
comparison of the marks. 
In the case of use of an identical or similar mark to 
the registered trade mark in relation to similar goods 
or services to those registered, as provided for in 
section 34 (1) (b), the likelihood of deception or 
confusion must arise as a consequence of the use of the 
infringing mark in circumstances of similarity between 
the goods or services. 97 It is not perfectly clear from 
the wording of the section whether the legislature 
intended a three-tier or a two-tier test to be applied. 
In other words, does the court establish as a first step 
that the marks are identical or similar and then, as a 
second step, investigate whether the goods or services 
concerned are similar? The third step would entail 
considering whether the use of the marks concerned in 
relation to the goods or services concerned would be 
likely to cause confusion or deception. 
Alternatively, does the court consider the identity or 
similarity of the marks as the first step and then, as 
the second step, consider whether by virtue of the 
similarity between the goods or services concerned, 
deception or confusion is likely to exist in the use 
contemplated? 
Job supports the second alternative. 
author: 
According to this 
8.1 The second infringement category (which is one of the more 
controversial provisions of the new Act) is contained in section 
34(1)(b). This section prohibits the use of a mark which is identical or 
96. See section 34(1 )(a). 
97. See section 34(1)(b). 
similar to a registered trade mark in relation to goods or services 
which are so similar to the goods or services respect of which the trade 
mark is registered that in such use there exists the likelihood of 
deception or confusion. 
8.2 In other words, the infringement protection in terms of section 
34(1) (b) is no longer limited to the precise goods or services covered 
by the trade-mark registration, which has historically been the case in 
all South African trade-mark statutes. This is consistent with the 
international move to broaden infringement protection to include 
'similar' goods or services. 98 
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The question of the protection of marks with a- repute 
and well-known marks under the new laws of both systems 
is dealt with fully below. The differences in the 
provisions relating to acts of infringement by dilution 
in the UK Act and the SA Act are dealt with fully 
there. 99 
It has been stated in the context of section 34 (1) (b) 
that the infringement provisions of the SA Act comply 
with South Africa's obligations in terms of TRIPS under 
GATT and that the enactment is generally in line with 
the Directive and the UK Act. 100 
Nevertheless, a caveat needs to be entered in the latter 
regard. A comparison of the provisions of the 
enactments ref erred to in relation to key concepts such 
as the definition of a trade mark, the grounds for 
refusal of registration and the acts of infringement 
reveal discernible differences. 
An approach which regards the South African Act as 
merely the local equivalent of the United Kingdom Act 
would, therefore, not be correct. Also, any 
98. Job 24. 
99. Seep 649-651 infra. 
100. Job 24 (and see Job 22). 
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predisposition to apply old and familiar concepts 
derived from earlier United Kingdom and South African 
enactments without a comprehensive review of their place 
in a new and modern system must be guarded against if 
the intention to modify is to be realised. 
Job adds in regard to section 34(1) (b) infringements: 
Interpreting the word "similar" and assessing whether particular 
goods or services are similar in practice will not always be easy. A 
considerable body of case law will no doubt develop around this term. 
We can conifort ourselves to some extent by the knowledge that we will 
be able to look to European (including British) case law in future for 
assistance. But it is submitted that the words have a plain meaning, 
and that a common-sense approach to assessing the question of 
similarity of goods and services, and a likelihood of deception or 
confusion, should be followed. It is emphasised that the test is 
whether the goods or services are so similar that in use there exists the 
likelihood of deception or confusion. So the court will have regard to 
conditions in the marketplace, and surrounding practical 
circumstances in trade. 
Although the expressions are not coterminous, "similar goods" no 
doubt include "goods of the same description". In relation to the 
latter term a considerable body of case law has already developed, 
. ·z . h TT • d K' d , o1 pnman y zn t e umte mg om. 
It must however be borne in mind that the concept of 
11 similar goods 11 in modern European trade mark law is 
derived from Article 5 of the Directive in regard to 
which a considered analysis of European and particularly 
Benelux authority (as Gielen suggests) 102 would be a 
more appropriate guide to establishing its intended 
meaning in the context of a modern system than an 
101. Job 24-25. The legislature could surely not have intended to abdicate its function, 
expecting the Courts to flesh out and give meaning to the provisions of the enactment, 
whereas it is incumbent upon the legislature to indicate its intention by means of the 
words of the enactment itself. The legislature could surely not have been uncertain as 
to what it wished to enact regarding key aspects. 
102. See Gielen 269. 
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approach which relies upon the "goods of the same 
description" doctrine which 
African trade mark law some 
was abandoned in South 
f . 103 twenty ive years ago. 
This is surely so in circumstances where the British 
courts will be looking to the ECJ for a definitive 
interpretation of the provisions of the Directive and it 
is the stated intention of the authors of the SA Act to 
modernise along the lines of the European model. 
6. 6 Non-infringing conduct 
Section 34(2) of the SA Act lists specific conduct which 
does not amount to the infringement of registered trade 
marks. The section provides: 
34(2) A registered trade mark is not infringed by -
(a) any bona fide use by a person of his own name, the name of his 
place of business. the name of any of his predecessor's place of 
business; 
(b) the use by any person of any bona fide description or indication of 
kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin 
or other characteristics of his goods or services, or the mode or time 
of production of the goods or the rendering of the services; 
(c) the bona fide use of the trade mark in relation to goods or services 
where it is reasonable to indicate the intended purpose of such goods, 
including spare parts and accessories, and such services; 
(d) the importation into or the distribution, sale or offering for sale in 
the Republic of goods to which the trade mark has been applied by or 
with the consent of the proprietor thereof; 
(e) the bona fide use by any person of any utilitarian features 
embodied in a container, shape, configuration, colour or pattern 
which is registered as a trade mark; 
103. See Webster and Page Trade Marks 3rd ed 116-11 7. See also Webster 14, 
where the author contemplates application of 'Pussy Galore' Trade Mark 
[19671 R.P.C. 265 to the new licencing provisions. The Act has itself 
specifically retained outmoded concepts such as 'connection in the course of 
trade' (albeit in an unfamiliar context as I have discussed) despite the 
modernising intent published in the Memoranda preceding the Act (see section 
2(1 )(xxiii) and p 580-583 supra). 
(/) the use of a trade mark in any manner in respect of or in relation to 
goods to be sold or otherwise traded in, or services to be peifonned, 
in any place, or in relation to goods to be exported to any market, or 
in any other manner in relation to which, having regard to any 
conditions or limitations entered in the register, the registration does 
not extend; 
(g) the use of any identical or confusingly or deceptively similar trade 
mark which is registered: 
Provided that paragraoh (a) shall not aooly to the name of any juristic 
person whose name was registered after the date of registration of the 
trade mark: 
Provided further that the use contemplated in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) 
is consistent with fair practice. 
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Section 34 (2) (a), (b) and (c) is generally in line with 
the provisions of section 11 (2) (a), (b) and (c) of the 
United Kingdom Act save that those parts of the section 
which I have underlined above represent South African 
additions beyond the terms of section 11 (2) of the UK 
Act and Article 6(1) of the Directive. The most 
significant change is the introduction of the concept of 
bonafide and the replacement of the word "necessary" with 
"reasonable" in section 34(2) (c) of the SA Act. The UK 
proviso refers to "honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters" whilst the South African enactment 
requires the conduct to be "consistent with fair 
practice". 
The exhaustion provision of section 34(2) (d) of the SA 
Act is wider than the exhaustion provision of section 12 
of the UK Act, which is confined to goods put on the 
k . h . 104 mar et in t e European Economic Area. 
Both systems exempt use of a registered mark from 
infringement. In this regard the UK provision restricts 
protection to use of a validly registered mark only in 
104. See section 12(1) of the UK Act. 
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relation to the goods or services in respect of which it 
is registered. The corresponding provision in the SA 
Act does not restrict the exemption to use of the 
registered mark only in relation to the goods or 
. . f h. h . . . d 1 o5 Th services in respect o w ic it is registere . e 
South African provision, therefore, appears to be 
significantly wider insofar as it extends exemption to a 
registered mark when used also in relation to similar as 
well as dissimilar goods or services 
of which it is registered. If 
. d h . l' 106 registere t e exemption app ies. 
to those in respect 
the trade mark is 
The exclusion provided by section 34(2) (e) of the SA Act 
does not feature in the UK Act whilst the exclusion 
contained in section 34(2) (f) of the SA Act features as 
a restriction upon infringement in section 13(1) of the 
UK Act. 
Section 11 (3) of the UK Act provides that a registered 
trade mark is not inf ringed by the exercise in the 
course of trade in a particular locality of an earlier 
right which applies only in that locality and defines 
the "earlier right" contemplated by that section. 107 
This provision does not feature in the SA Act. 
Finally, it must be observed that there are differences 
between the UK and SA Acts also in the remedies afforded 
the proprietor of a registered trade mark in the event 
f . f . 108 o in ringement. 
6. 7 Infringement and the subjective right to a trade mark in South Africa 
In this paragraph I consider the acts of infringement 
105. See sections 11 ( 1) and 4 7(6) of the UK Act. 
106 See section 34(2)(g) of the SA Act. 
107. See section 11 (3) of the UK Act provides: "(3) A registered trade mark is not infringed 
by the use in the course of trade in a particular locality of an earlier right which applies 
only in that locality." 
108. See section 34(3) of the SA Act and sections 14-19 of the UK Act. 
6.7.1 
6.7.2 
626 
provided for in sections 34(1) (a) and (b) in relation to 
the trade mark functions impinged upon in each instance. 
The application of trade mark functional theory to the 
infringements by dilution provided for in section 
34(1) (c) is considered below. 109 
Section 34(1) (a) infringements 
Infringements of this kind, as I have indicated, concern 
unauthorised use in the course of trade of an identical 
mark to the registered mark in relation to identical 
d . h . d 110 h' goo s or services to t ose registere . In t is case 
of infringement the capability of the registered mark to 
distinguish the goods or services (as the case may be) 
of the registrant from the inf ringing goods or services 
is completely extinguished. At the same time, the 
capability of the trade mark to fulfil any of the other 
recognisable trade mark functions as a trade mark in 
relation to the goods or services concerned is 
eliminated. 111 The commixture of the registered and 
inf ringing marks and goods or services is complete. 
Section 34(l)(b) infringements 
Infringement under section 34(1) (b) of the SA Act 
involves, as I have pointed out, unauthorised use in the 
course of trade of an identical or similar mark to the 
registered mark in relation to goods or services which 
are so similar to those registered that in such use a 
likelihood of deception or confusion exists. 112 
The wording of the section requires the following to be 
established. The marks concerned must be identical or 
109. See p 632-649 infra. 
110. See p 616-617 supra. 
111 . I have suggested that these mainly include the identifying, origin, assurance, 
advertising, selling, goodwill, information-bearing and communication functions. See 
chapter 15. 
112. See p 617 supra. 
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similar, the goods or services in relation to which the 
inf ringing mark is used must be similar to the 
registered goods or services and a likelihood of 
deception or confusion must result from use of the first 
in relation to the second. The essence of the 
infringement lies in the requirement that there must be 
a likelihood of deception or confusion in relation to 
use of the marks in connection with the goods or 
services concerned. The aim of the section is to extend 
the infringement action beyond the confines of the 
registered specification. Recognition of the multiple 
functions which trade marks perform implies that in the 
event of a likelihood of confusion or deception arising 
in relation to the impairment of any function in the 
circumstances provided for in the section will found the 
infringement. 
7. PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN MARKS 
The new laws give effect to the obligations placed upon 
convention countries to protect well-known trade marks 
under Article 6 bis of the Paris Convention. 
7.1 The UK Act 
Section 56 of the UK Act confers rights and remedies on 
proprietors of well-known marks with reference to the 
Paris Convention. Section 56 provides: 
(1) References in this Act to a trade mark which is entitled to 
protection under the Paris Convention as a well known trade mark are 
to a mark which is well-known in the United Kingdom as being the 
mark of a person who -
(a) is a national of a convention country, or 
(b) is domiciled in, or has a real and effective industrial or 
commercial establishment in, a Convention country, 
whether or not that person carries on business, or has any goodwill, in 
the United Kingdom. 
References to the proprietor of such a mark shall be construed 
accordingly. 
(2) The proprietor of a trade mark which is entitled to protection 
under the Paris Convention as a well known trade mark is entitled to 
restrain by i"njunction the use in the United Kingdom of a trade mark 
which, or the essential part of which, is identical or similar to his 
mark, in relation to identical or similar goods or services, where the 
use is likely to cause confusion. 
This right is subject to section 48 (effect of acquiescence by proprietor 
of earlier trade mark). 
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) affects the continuation of any bona fide 
use of a trade mark begun before the commencement of this section. 
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At the time of writing it is not clear which marks will 
qualify as well-known. According to Gyngell & Poulter: 
The question of whether a trade mark is well-known is very much at 
large. Ultimately, the court will have the pleasure of determining the 
meaning of "well-known" in the context of a trade mark as well as the 
nature and extent of the evidence that will be required to establish that 
a mark is well-known. 11 3 
According to Morcom, the well-known marks contemplated 
by section 56 must be significantly better known than 
trade marks with a reputation in the United Kingdom 
referred to in sections 5(3) and 10(3) . 114 
It is important to note that whereas sections 5 and 10 
refer to signs section 56 refers to use of an identical 
or similar trade mark. The inference is, therefore, 
that for the purposes of section 56 the conduct eschewed 
is use of a trade mark, as that term is defined in the 
Act. 115 
113. Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 1 2. But see Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 1994 
31. 
114. Morcom Trade Marks Act 1994 62. But contrast Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 
1994 97. 
115. See Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 150. The same inference arises under section 
35(3) of the SA Act considered at p 629-632. 
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The defences against infringement provided for in 
section 11 concern registered marks and are not 
available against injunctive relief sought under section 
56 of the Act. 116 
Morcom is of the view that the injunctive relief 
referred to in section 56 would include supportive 
remedies such as delivery up of goods featuring the 
well-known mark for obstruction or obliteration of the 
mark where this would enhance the efficacy of the 
injunctive relief. 117 Section 48 of the UK Act provides 
the defence of acquiescence against injunctive relief 
under section 56 (2) . A further defence is afforded by 
section 56 (3) in the case of the continuation of bona fide 
use of the offending trade mark concerned prior to 31 
October 1994 - the date of commencement of the 1994 UK 
Act. 118 
Aside from the protection afforded well-known marks by 
section 56, relief is afforded also under section 5 
which provides a relative ground for refusing 
registration of a trade mark contrary to rights in a 
trade mark which is an 'earlier trade mark', as defined 
in section 6. In terms of section 6(1) (a), a mark which 
is entitled to protection under the Paris Convention as 
a well-known trade mark is a species of 'earlier trade 
mark' which is protected by section 5. 119 
7.2 SA Act 
The provisions of section 35 of the SA Act are much the 
same as the provisions of section 56 of the UK Act. 
However, whereas the UK Act restrains use of an identical 
116. See Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 150. The same applies in regard to the section 
34(2) defences of the SA Act. 
117. Morcom Trade Marks Act 1994 62. 
118. See sections 48 and 56(2). As to the applicability of sections 5, 6 and 60, see 
Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 14-1 5. 
119. See sections 5(1 )(2)(3) and section 6(1 )(c) of the UK Act. 
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120 
or similar mark to the well-known mark, the SA Act 
follows the wording of Article 6 bis of the Paris 
Convention and restrains use of a trade mark which 
constitutes or the essential part of which constitutes a 
reproduction, imitation or translation of the well-known 
trade mark . 
. Section 35(3) of the SA Act provides: 
The proprietor of a trade mark which is entitled to protection under 
the Paris Convention as a well-known trade mark is entitled to restrain 
the use in the Republic of a trade mark which constitutes, or the 
essential part of which constitutes, a reproduction, imitation or 
translation of the well-known trade mark in relation to goods or 
services which are identical or similar to the goods or services in 
respect of which the trade mark is well known and where the use is 
l 'k l d . ,.r, . 121 l e y to cause eceptwn or conJ uswn. 
The savings provision (section 3 6 ( 2) ) in the SA Act is 
considerably more detailed than section 56(3) of the UK 
Act122 , providing: 
36(2) Nothing in this Act shall allow the proprietor of a trade mark 
entitled to protection of such trade mark under the Paris Convention as 
a well-known trade mark, to inteifere with or restrain the use by any 
person of a trade mark which constitutes, or the essential parts of 
which constitute, a reproduction, imitation or translation of the 
well-known trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of 
which that person or a predecessor in title of his has made continuous 
and bona fide use of the trade mark from a date anterior to 31 August 
1991 or the date on which the trade mark of the proprietor has become 
entitled, in the Republic, to protection under the Paris Convention, 
120. See section 56(2) of the UK Act. 
121. For the first judicial analysis of the section and the evidentiary requirements thereof 
see McDonald's Corporation v Joburgers Restaurant (Pty) Ltd and anr; Dax Prop CC v 
McDonald's Corporation and anr; McDonald's Corporation v Joburgers Drive-Inn 
Restaurant (Pty) Ltd v Dax Prop CC, TPD 5 October 1995 (to be reported) 17-39. 
122. Section 56(3) of the UK Act provides: "(3) Nothing in subsection (2) affects the 
continuation of any bona fide use of a trade mark begun before the commencement of 
this section." 
whichever is the later, or to object (on such use being proved) to the 
trade mark of that person being registered in relation to those goods or 
services under section 14. 
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Thus, prior continuous and bona fide use to the date upon 
which the Draft Trade Marks Bill, 1991, was published or 
prior to the well-known mark becoming entitled to 
protection under the Paris Convention, affords the prior 
user a better right to that of the proprietor of the 
well-known mark, which right entitles him to 
registration and protects him from interference. 
Subject to section 36 (2), section 10 (6) of the SA Act 
provides correlative relief to the provisions of section 
35 (3) in respect of well-known marks under the Paris 
Convention. It establishes an apparently absolute ground 
for refusing registration in the same circumstances in 
which relief is afforded by section 35(3) . 123 
It is noteworthy that under the UK Act the corresponding 
ground for refusal is relative and not absolute as in 
the SA Act. It must, however, be borne in mind that 
unlike the provisions relating to refusal in the UK Act, 
the distinction between absolute and relative grounds is 
not specifically maintained in sectio~ 10 of the SA Act 
in which all the grounds for refusing registration are 
set out. 
To be noted is the distinction between section 10(17) of 
the SA Act which provides a relative ground for refusing 
registration to a trade mark which will dilute a trade 
mark which is well-known in the Republic and the 
corresponding section of the UK Act (section 5(3)) which 
provides protection in similar circumstances but to 
k h . h h . . h U . d K . d 1 24 mar s w ic ave a reputation in t e nite ing om. 
Thus, in sum, both the UK and the SA Acts afford 
well-known unregistered marks of the kind envisaged by 
123. Section 10(6) set out at p 597 supra. 
124. See p 627-629 supra. 
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Article 6 bis of t.he Paris Convention protection by 
restraining use of an identical or similar mark thereto 
or to an essential part thereof, 
circumstances set out in the enactments. 
in the limited 
In similar circumstances, which are defined in the 
statutes, unregistered well-known marks present a bar to 
the registration of marks which are identical or similar 
thereto, or to an essential part thereof. 
7. 3 Dilution of established marks 
Under section 34(1) of the SA Act -
34. (1) The rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be 
infringed by -
(a) .. . 
(b) .. . 
(c) the unauthorized use in the course of trade in relation to any goods 
or services of a mark which is identical or similar to a trade mark 
registered, if such trade mark is well known in the Republic and the 
use of the said mark would be likely to take unfair advantage of, or be 
detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the registered 
trade mark, notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception: 
Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to a 
trade mark referred to in section 70(2). 125 
The UK Act affords protection in the same circumstances 
to trade marks which have 'a reputation' in the United 
Kingdom where the use complained of is without due 
126 
cause. 
7. 3.1 Dilutio11; under the SA Act 
1 25. Section 70(2) refers to marks which were registered as defensive registrations under 
section 53 of the 1 963 Act. 
126. See section 10(3) of the UK Act and p 649-651 infra. 
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7.3.1.1 Well known marks 
It was established law under the 1963 Act that the 
appropriation of a well-known or other foreign trade 
mark was lawful in circumstances where the foreign 
proprietor of the trade mark could not establish an 
assertable right to the trade mark in the Republic. 127 
The cases ref erred to are correct in my view in that a 
valid right must be constituted before its infringement 
can be established. It seems that too often too little 
was done by foreign proprietors to establish an 
assertable right to their marks in the series of cases 
culminating in Tie Rack and Victoria's Secret. In these 
cases the emphasis was often misplaced upon the alleged 
1 h . b . 1 . 1 28 f h . . h . 1 mora repre ensi i ity o t e appropriation w i st 
the need to establish a properly defined and assertable 
right was neglected in the evidence. 
In the case of a foreign trade mark, there is no legal bar to its 
adoption in South Africa unless it is attended by something more. 129 
This something more is, in my view, the establishment 
a vested right to the trade mark in the territory 
South Africa. 
In Victoria's Secret it was found that there was 
of 
of 
no 
evidence that the mark was well-known in South Africa or 
130 that the mark had a reputation in this country. 
Clearly, therefore, the Appellant failed to establish an 
assertable right. 
The aforegoing posits the question: what is the nature 
127. See Tie Rack pie v Tie Rack Stores (Pty) Ltd and anr 1989 (4) SA 427 T; Victoria's 
Secret Inc v Edgars Stores Limited 1994(3) SA 739(A) . These cases are discussed in 
chapter 11 paragraph 10 at p 279 supra. 
128. See for example Greaterman's Stores (Rhodesia) Ltd v Marks and Spencer (SR) (Pvt.) 
Ltd 1963 (2) SA 58 (FC) and Victoria's Secret at p 746-747 of the report. 
129. Per Nicholas AJA in Victoria's Secret at p 747 of the report. 
130. See p 755 of the report. 
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of the right which must be shown? I have suggested that 
a proper analysis of the nature of the right to a trade 
mark reveals a subjective right with entitlements which 
correspond to the multiple functions which trade marks 
fulfil. The application of this construct to the claims 
of peregrini has already been discussed. 131 
A registered trade mark which in fact displays a range 
of functions which can be impinged upon by dilutive 
action will, according to this view, be infringed by 
such impingement . It is to be expected that a trade 
mark which has attained the status of "well known in the 
Republic" will display such a range of functioning and, 
particularly, reveal the presence of the advertising 
function. I shall discuss this crucial aspect in full 
hereunder. 
7.3.1.2 Dilution of well known marks 
According to Ginsberg: 
The development of the common-law protection for dilution is closely 
associated with what has been referred to as the misappropriation of 
the advertising value of trade marks. This approach is founded on the 
proposition that the true function of a trade mark is to stimulate sales. 
But these concepts still remain in the realm of unexplored common-law 
territories. 132 
The concept of an advertising value in the advertising 
133 image of marks and the like was proposed by Mostert. 
According to Mostert: 
Under the advertising image is understood every name, mark, symbol 
or character that is identified with a particular product, business or 
131. See p 295-299 supra. 
132. Ginsberg -Trade Mark Dilution - in Visser New Law: Trade Marks and Designs 35-47. 
133. Inter alia in his doctoral theses referred to at p 549-550, namely FW Mostert-Grondslae 
van Die Reg Op Die Reklamebeeld (RAU 1985). 
person, and that harbours potential advertising value and possible 
goodwill for products or business of other entities in various other 
unrelated fields of commerce. A commercial value of the advertising 
image could therefore be exploited by the former entity with which it is 
connected. 1 34 
Mostert goes on to suggest: 
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From these foregoing observations it can be deduced that the right to 
the advertising image does not constitute a near manifestation or 
sub-particle of an already crystallised and recognised right. The right 
to the advertising image is therefore nothing other than a distinctive 
and autonomous intellectual property right. It is the particular object 
or interest protected by this right, the advertising image, that gives it 
its particular characteristics and distinguishes it from other intellectual 
property rights. 1 35 
From the point of view of trade marks Mostert observes: 
Although trade marks of fictional characters such as Asterix, 
Pinnochio and Superman, the likenesses of personalities such as 
Mohammed Ali, Telly Savalas and Vera Johns and signatures such as 
that of Gary Player have been registered, it appears that only a small 
area of protection is afforded to advertising images by way of 
trade-mark law. . . . Trade-mark law, therefore, simply offers a small 
shield of protection to certain marks being used as advertising 
images. 136 
In my view, therefore, common law protection against 
trade mark dilution must not be sought in an independent 
advertising image appurtenant to trade marks as 
conceived by Mostert but rather in a construct derived 
from the nature of the right to a trade mark itself, 
which affords protection to those functions of a trade 
134. Mostert (1982) 99 SALJ 413-420 424. 
135. Mostert 429. 
136. Mostert 428. 
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mark which are 
proposing this 
impinged 
I do not 
by dilutive conduct. 
existence 
In 
of deny the 
advertising and other signs which are not trade marks. 
Rather, my investigations have been confined to trade 
marks which, by definition, must inevitably display the 
distinguishing function. 
The distinguishing function is that 
which affords it the status of a 
feature of a sign 
trade mark. The 
distinguishing function in this senses is the invariable 
d k f . 137 tra e mar unction. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that only the 
distinguishing function of trade marks is to be 
protected or that the distinguishing function is 
impinged or must necessarily be impinged in all 
instances for a dilution to take place. An 
investigation of the new dilution provisions of the Act 
brings this issue crisply to the fore and the matter is 
fully considered hereunder. 
7.3.2 Requirements for dilution under the SA Act 
7.3.2.1 
7.3.2.2 
7.3.2.3 
7.3.2.4 
The requirements for infringement of well-known marks by 
dilution under section 34(1) (c) of the Act are: 
unauthorised use, 
in the course of trade, 
of an identical or similar trade mark, 
to a registered mark which is well known in the 
Republic, 
7.3.2.5 where use of the mark complained of would be likely 
to 
7.3.2.6 take unfair advantage of, 
7.3.2.7 or be detrimental to, 
137. Seep 460 supra. 
7.3.2.8 
7.3.2.9 
7.3.2.10 
the distinctive character or 
the repute of the registered trade mark, 
notwithstanding the absence of confusion 
d . 138 eception. 
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or 
In considering the dilution provisions of section 
34(1) (c), an analysis of the type of conduct which 
constitutes dilution and the trade mark functions upon 
which such conduct impinges is instructive. 
The aim of dilutive conduct is to exploit the commercial 
magnetism, selling power and advertising value embodied 
in the well-known trade mark. In most instances neither 
a diversion of custom 
intended thereby. 139 
nor unlawful 
Rather, the 
competition 
owner of 
is 
the 
well-known mark loses control over the reputation and 
140 goodwill symbolised by the mark. 
According 
take two 
to Mostert 
forms. The 
& Mostert, dilutive 
first relates to 
conduct 
confusion 
can 
of 
sponsorship and the second to dilution in the strict 
sense. In the first instance the true trade mark owner 
is mistaken as the source of the goods or services of 
the unauthorised user or it is believed that he has a 
connection with or sponsors the product business 
concerned. In the second instance, in the case of 
dilution strictu sensu, the conduct of the infringer causes 
the trade mark to lose its ability to attract the public 
towards the goods in respect of which its reputation was 
established. 141 According to the authors, dilution of 
this kind usually takes place by blurring or by 
tarnishing. 
They describe blurring thus: 
138. See section 34(1 )(c) of the SA Act. 
139. See the instructive article of Mostert & Mostert (1995) DR, July 1995 443-449 443. 
140. Mostert & Mostert 444. 
141. Mostert & Mostert 443. 
In effect, an erosion or watering down of the singularity and 
exclusivity of the trade mark to call to mind a specific product is at 
issue. It is obvious that the more a trade mark is used on a variety of 
goods and the closer it becomes associated with such goods, the less 
that trade mark will call to mind and focus the public's attention on 
the plaintiff's particular product. 142 
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Tarnishment, on the other hand, contemplates use of a 
trade mark in an offensive or unsavoury context which 
tarnishes the power of the trade mark to call to mind 
associations of satisfaction and desirability previously 
linked with the particular product in respect of which 
the well-known mark has established its reputation. 143 
Dilution can also come about as a consequence of the 
generic usage of a well-known trade mark to denote a 
class of products, which erodes the association of the 
trade mark with the goods or services of its 
. 144 proprietor. 
It has been suggested that comparative advertising is 
also a species of dilutive conduct which injures the 
selling power of a trade mark by diverting its desirable 
images to the products of a competitor. This burdens 
the images previously gained by the mark which are then 
no longer associated exclusively with the mark. At the 
same time there is a detraction from the desirable 
. . 1 . d d h k 145 images previous y constitute aroun t e mar . 
7. 4 Dilution and disruption of function 
In order to constitute a proper basis for the views 
expressed hereunder and to clarify them, I shall first 
briefly set out the construct of the subjective right to 
142. Mostert & Mostert 445. 
143. See Mostert & Mostert 445. 
144. See Ginsberg 39. 
145. See Ginsberg 40. I suggest at p 64 7 infra that comparative advertising is neither 
dilutive nor unlawful at common law per se. 
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a trade mark at which I arrived in the preceding chapter 
and which I shall apply in the paragraphs which follow. 
In order to afford my views proper perspective I shall 
then deal bri.efly with the views of Rutherford and Van 
Beerden & Neethling insofar as they are different to 
those I have set out. 
Trade marks are distinguishing signs of various kinds 
applied in commerce .. 
The essential element of distinctiveness distinguishes 
trade marks from all other commercial signs. By 
distinctiveness I mean the capability of a trade mark to 
distinguish between undertakings and the product (goods 
or services) of undertakings i.e. the ability of the 
trade mark to perform the distinguishing function. 
Trade marks perform multiple functions taken up in a 
functional matrix. One such function the 
distinguishing function already referred to above is 
invariable. 
I attribute to it the strict meaning specified above, 
which is to distinguish between undertakings and product 
of undertakings untrammelled by secondary connections to 
other functions (co-existence or commixture with other 
functions in the functional matrix aside) . 
I regard the distinguishing function invariable because 
if a mark cannot perform it the mark is not a trade mark 
- whatever other functions it might perform. Therefore, 
the distinguishing function is the essential element of 
the functional matrix of a sign if it is to be a trade 
mark. 
I postulate an independent right to a trade mark which 
is in the nature of a subjective right having the trade 
mark as its object. Aside from the entitlements to 
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transfer and licence use of the trade mark it is 
characteristic of the right that the entitlements of use 
of the holder comprise the functions which the holder is 
positively entitled to have the trade mark perform. 
An interference with any function present in the 
functional matrix of the trade mark infringes the right 
to the trade mark. 
Trade marks display a number of values derived from the 
functions present in the functional matrix of a 
particular trade mark. 
Thus, the value of distinction of a trade mark derives 
from the essential distinguishing function, advertising 
value derives from the advertising function, goodwill 
derives inter alia from the assurance and origin functions 
and associative (or imago) value derives from the 
communication function present in the functional matrix 
of a particular trade mark. 
Trade marks are, therefore, real property of a very 
different kind to other intellectual property. 
Although it encapsulates multiple functions, the 
functional matrix can be regarded as a composite and the 
trade mark as a unitary whole. Therefore, an infringing 
impairment of any function present in the matrix 
infringes the independent and unitary right to the trade 
mark and not, in my view, one or other separate right 
accessory to the trade mark (such as an independent 
right to advertising value or to distinguishing value) , 
which depends upon the nature of the infringement. In 
other words, the trade mark right is unitary and not a 
bundle of independent rights to its values. 
However, in the view of Rutherford: 
The distinguishing function is wide enough to embrace not only the 
traditional origin function but also the other socio-economic functions 
641 
that a trade mark may fulfil from time to time such as its quality and 
ad . . fi . 146 vertlSlng unctions. 
This view brings about the satisfactory result that any 
impairment of function is an impairment of the 
distinguishing function. As the modern trade mark is 
defined in terms of the distinguishing function, an 
impairment of this function infringes the trade mark. 
Hence, in all the examples of dilutive conduct discussed 
below, an impairment of the distinguishing function 
takes place in Rutherford's view. 
My view differs in that I regard the encapsulating means 
to be the functional matrix rather than an all embracing 
distinguishing function. An impairment of any function 
present in the matrix, in my view, infringes the whole. 
In my construct the distinguishing function need not be 
impinged in each instance of infringement. The 
significance of the distinguishing function lies in its 
presence being the determinant of which signs qualify as 
trade marks. It is' the glue which binds the functional 
matrix. 
Van Heerden & Neethling discuss two species of commercial 
signs, namely, distinctive marks and advertising marks. 
Distinctive marks are of two kinds. Marks of the first 
kind are used to individualize an undertaking as a whole 
(trade names) . Marks of the second kind individualize 
the products (goods or services) of an undertaking (such 
as trade marks, service marks, and get-up) . 147 
Advertising marks have advertising value which 
subject to an independent right as Mostert 
d 148 h . . h . . f . d . suggeste . T is rig t is in ringe in cases 
leaning on and dilution (such as in the instances 
dilutive conduct discussed below) . 149 
146. Rutherford 2-3. See also p 540-544 supra. 
is 
has 
of 
of 
14 7. Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition 106. See also p 529-537 supra where 
the views of the authors regarding the relationship between distinctive marks and 
goodwill are discussed. 
148. See p 544-550, 634-635 supra regarding the views of Mostert. 
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Distinctive marks have distinguishing value which is the 
. . f . d . h f . ff 1 50 interest in ringe in t e case o passing o . 
My view differs herein that in the case of a trade mark 
as I have defined it in terms of the characteristic 
presence of the distinguishing function, the values 
mentioned by the authors are derived from functions 
present in the functional matrix of the trade mark. 
These values are protectable under an independent right 
to the trade mark as a composite rather than in terms of 
separate independent rights attaching to each value. 
The import of my approach in relation to dilution is set 
out in the discussion which follows. 
7. 4.1 Confusion as to sponsorship 
Relating the manifestations of dilutive conduct 
discussed above to a correlative disruption of trade 
mark functioning reveals, in 
primary impingement of the 
well-known trade mark in 
my view, an immediate 
origin function of a 
cases of confusion of 
sponsorship. A primary or secondary impingement of the 
assurance function can also come about depending upon 
the facts particular to the instance. 
The public is confused regarding whether the infringing 
products are connected with the anonymous source which 
underwrites the famous mark and an impairment of the 
distinctiveness of the mark results. 
In relation to the wording of the Act, the impairment of 
functioning which results in such cases is detrimental 
to the distinctive character of the trade mark whilst 
any accompanying impairment of the assurance function is 
detrimental to the repute of the mark. 
150. Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition 201. 
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Although the statute does not require it, public 
confusion or deception is likely to result from dilutive 
conduct which brings about a confusion of sponsorship. 
7.4.2 Blurring 
7.4.3 
7.4.4 
In the case of dilution by blurring an erosion of the 
distinctive base of the trade mark takes place. The 
uniqueness of the mark is whittled away. It becomes 
less of an attractive force which poses a very real 
threat to the selling and advertising functions of the 
trade mark and indicates their impingement. 
It is also so that blurring will, with the passage of 
time, render the registered mark less able to 
distinguish the goods or services for which it became 
well known. Ultimately, therefore, blurring leads also 
to an impingement of the distinguishing function. 
Blurring is also likely to result in impingement of the 
communication function of the trade mark in that the 
network of association built up around the trade mark 
will lose the unity and coherence of the message which 
it usually transmits as the blurring continues or 
increases. 
Generic usage 
In the case of generic usage of 
occurred with Cellophane and 
destruction of the marks' 
a trade mark, such as 
Asperin, the total 
distinctiveness its 
distinguishing function and, therefore, the trade mark 
itself, results. 
Tamishment 
In the case of tarnishment, there is no primary 
impingement upon the distinguishing or origin functions 
in the strict sense. The trade mark still indicates 
source and distinguishes the famous product from other 
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makes. The advertising function is, however, disrupted 
as is the communication function, because the image of 
the mark becomes soiled by negative associations. The 
mark loses its attractive force and no longer 
communicates the desired message to consumers. It is, 
however, to be noted that certain 
powerful de facto that they 
. h 151 tarnis ment. 
trade marks are 
are resistant 
so 
to 
It is of great significance that in many instances of 
tarnishment there is no infringement or disruption of 
the distinguishing function of the well known trade mark 
because it is still able to distinguish the product in 
respect of which its prominence and distinctiveness have 
been established from competing product as before. 
I must, therefore, suggest that the significance of the 
distinguishing function is not that it must necessarily 
be impinged in every case of trade mark infringement. 
Rather, it is an inevitable manifestation of that 
property which cloaks a particular mark with the mantle 
of a trade mark, the property of distinctiveness. It 
follows that if a mark is distinctive the distinguishing 
function must inevitably be present. Such other 
functions as might be present in the functional matrix 
of a particular trade mark besides the distinguishing 
function are not incorporated in the distinguishing 
function as such or necessarily derived therefrom from a 
functional point of view. 
They cannot, however, be 
matrix of a trade mark 
present in the functional 
unless the distinguishing 
function is present for if it is not the trade mark does 
not exist. Hence, the presence or absence of the 
distinguishing function plays a role also in the vesting 
of trade mark rights. 152 
1 51 . See Ginsberg 42 for an apt example from US case law. 
152. See p 565-566 supra. 
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Where a sign functions as an advertising or 
communicating sign without having the property of 
distinctiveness which renders it able to fulfil a 
distinguishing function the sign is of another kind and 
is not a trade mark. 
Where, however, the sign is a trade mark because it is 
distinctive in a trade mark sense, no purpose is served 
in my view by labelling it an advertising sign when its 
advertising function is apparent or a communicating 
when its communication (information bearing 
transmitting) function is apparent, and so forth. 
approach which modernisation requires would be 
sign 
and 
The 
to 
recognise the distinguishing function as the invariable 
trade mark function which derives from the property of 
distinctiveness. This function is taken up in the 
functional trade mark matrix with other variable 
functions which do not necessarily derive from or depend 
upon the distinguishing function for their operation. 
This implies that the various functions present can be 
independently infringed without all or any of the other 
functions including the distinguishing function 
necessarily being infringed at the same time. 
This does not deny the existence of other commercial 
signs which are not trade marks such as those which can 
be regarded as advertising signs in the strict sense 
i.e. signs which fulfil an advertising function but 
which are not trade marks because they cannot fulfil a 
distinguishing function (being non-distinctive) . 
It is to be noted that no absolute rules can be laid 
down which determine all of the particular trade mark 
functions which must necessarily be impinged every time 
a particular species of dilution or infringing conduct 
is present. Although the disruption of certain 
functions as primary can be expected in specific cases 
the question will always be one of fact and will turn on 
a variety of considerations including the mark concerned 
and the nature and range of the goods or services in 
respect of which it has established well-known status. 
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Certain well-known marks are closely associated with 
specific goods or services whilst others are not. It is 
well-known marks of the first kind which require it to 
be recognised that an impingement upon the 
distinguishing function in the strict sense in which I 
have defined it is not immediately discernible in 
certain cases of infringement by dilution. 
It must, however, be borne in mind that continued 
dilution of a trade mark to a significant degree will 
over time lead to its destruction through a loss of 
distinctiveness. Dilutive conduct is, therefore, 
ultimately directed at debasing the distinctive 
character of the mark which will at some time involve 
infringement of the distinguishing function. What I 
have postulated above, therefore, must be regarded in 
this context. My submission is that relief must not 
necessarily wait until the distinguishing function is 
engaged and infringement, therefore, can result from the 
impingement of any function present de facto. 
7.4.5 Comparative advertising 
Acts of comparative advertising can infringe both 
sections 34(1) (a) and 34(1) (c) of the Act. 
In the case of section 34(1) (a) all acts of comparative 
advertising featuring the registered or a similar mark 
will infringe the section if the enquiry regarding the 
likelihood of confusion or deception contemplated 
therein is confined to a consideration of confusing 
similarity between the marks concerned i.e. where the 
mark complained of is a similar and not identical mark. 
Use of an identical mark in relation to the registered 
goods or services will, under this construction, 
infringe per se. 
As far as comparative advertising and dilution is 
concerned it is my view that section 34(1) (c) is 
correctly drafted in that no dilution takes place unless 
the conduct complained of takes unfair advantage of or 
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is detrimental to the registered mark (for example by 
comparing goods, identified by their trade marks in 
different performance classes such as the top of the 
range vehicle of A with the bottom of the range vehicle 
of B) . 153 
In my view, comparative advertising is not unlawful per 
se at common law and there is no presumption that it is 
unlawful . 1 54 
This approach is reflected in section 10(6) of the 1994 
UK Act which provides that any use of a registered trade 
mark which may otherwise constitute infringement under 
section 10 does not infringe a registration where such 
use is for the purpose of identifying the goods or 
services as those of the proprietor or a licensee and 
accords with honest practices in industrial or 
. 1 155 commercia matters. 
It seems to me that in the case of unlawful comparative 
advertising such as the making of disparaging or false 
comparisons there is a primary impingement of the 
advertising function as the product is placed in an 
adverse light which dilutes its attractive force. There 
is also a primary disruption of the positive associative 
network built up around and communicated by means of of 
the mark which indicates an infringement of the 
communication function. 
The assurance function of the well-known mark can also 
be impinged when doubt is placed upon the quality of the 
goods. The origin and distinguishing functions on the 
1 53. In other words damage or harm must clearly result or be immanent. 
154. But see Dean - Comparative Advertising, as Unlawful Competition - in Neethling 
'Unlawful Competition' 114-124 and Waker (1995) 2 SA Mere L J 239-248, for a 
contrary view. 
155. See section 34(2) of the SA Act and section 10(6) of the UK Act. 'The types of use 
likely to fall within this section would include the use of registered mark in comparative 
advertising and use in relation to spare parts.': per Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 124. 
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other hand are, however, more likely to be affirmed by 
the infringer, enabling the taint to adhere. 
The South African legislature has, therefore, not 
followed the example of the legislatures of those states 
in the U.S. A. which have a general dilution provision 
which protect all trade marks from dilution. 156 
Rather, the European example has been followed and the 
1993 SA Act, therefore, provides limited protection 
against dilution to well-known registered trade marks, 
157 
only. . 
In my view unlawful dilutive conduct which impairs one 
or more of the functions present in the functional 
matrix of a trade mark at any given time should be 
actionable. Thus, although the construction of the 
subjective right to a trade mark which I have suggested 
provides a theoretical basis for the protection of a 
trade mark against dilution in the circumstances set out 
in section 34(1) (c) of the 1993 SA Act, which recognises 
and protects the advertising function, my construction 
implies that trade marks can be afforded wider 
protection against dilution than that provided for in 
the specific circumstances stated in the section. 
It provides a basis for all trade marks, whether 
well-known or otherwise, to be afforded protection 
against dilution where this results in a discernible de 
facto impingement of the functioning of the mark which 
results in damage or, for relief by interdict, the 
reasonable prospect of apprehended harm. Clearly, 
however, a trade mark which has never been used or which 
has not been used to the extent where it has established 
a presence or a repute, cannot be diluted. In marks of 
this kind the advertising function is not developed to a 
degree where dilution can take place. 
156. Seep 444-451 supra regarding dilution in the U.S.A .. 
157. See Salmon (1987) 104 SALJ 647-668. 
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The dilution provisions of the 1994 UK Act recognise 
this by affording protection against dilution to marks 
. th . . h . d . d 1 58 wi a reputation in t e Unite King om. The concept 
of a trade mark which "has a reputation in the United 
Kingdom" is wider than the concept of a trade mark which 
is well-known in 
159 Morcom, and the 
that jurisdiction, according to 
statutory protection afforded trade 
marks on the basis of dilution is, therefore, wider in 
the United Kingdom than it is under the 1993 SA Act. 
7.5 Dilution under the UK Act 
I have pointed out that, in terms of section 10 ( 3) of 
the UK Act, unauthorised use in the course of trade of 
an identical or similar sign to a registered mark which 
has a reputation in the United Kingdom in relation to 
dissimilar goods or services to those registered is an 
infringement of the registered mark, where use of the 
sign is without due cause and takes unfair advantage of, 
or is detrimental to the distinctive character or repute 
of the registered trade mark. 160 
Apart from the difference that the SA Act provides 
protection to well-known marks whereas in the United 
Kingdom, 
dilution 
marks with a reputation are protected by the 
provisions, the UK Act provides dilution 
protection against use of an identical or similar sign 
to the registered mark whereas the SA Act protects 
against use of an identical or similar trade mark. 
Thus, as "trade mark" is defined in the SA Act the 
infringing use must be use as a trade mark as defined 
under the SA Act. This protection is narrower than the 
infringing sign provision of the UK Act which does not 
define "sign" at all and which, therefore, means any 
sign. 
158. See section 10(3) of the UK Act. 
159. See Morcom Trade Marks Act 1994 62 and p 628-629 supra. 
160. See p 611-612 supra. 
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Further differences between the enactments are to be 
found in the UK Act which requires the inf ringing use to 
be "without due cause", a requirement not taken up in 
the SA Act. The SA Act, on the other hand, specifically 
indicates that confusion or deception is not a 
requirement for protection under section 34(1) (c) which 
the UK Act merely implies. 
The UK Act follows the provisions of the Directive in 
relation to the requirement that the infringement must 
be "without due cause". It appears that the latter 
wording was introduced by the drafters of the Directive 
as one of the three limitations (together with the 
requirements regarding taking unfair advantage of or 
detriment to the distinctive character or repute of the 
trade mark inf ringed) which were introduced to 
ameliorate the argument that an extension of trade mark 
protection to dissimilar goods would effect too great an 
extension to the protection which should be be afforded 
to trade marks. 161 
The extent to which the concept of a trade mark which 
has a reputation is likely to bring about more extensive 
protection against dilution in the United Kingdom and in 
Europe than is the category of marks which are 
"well-known" marks in South Africa appears from the view 
of Gielen stated thus: 
In the author's opmwn reputation is not a very important criterion. 
The owner of the trade mark only has to show that the trade mark is 
genuinely used in a normal commercial way and that on the basis of 
such use the trade mark has become known within interested circles. 
Reputation need certainly not be established among the public at large 
- the relevant concerned sector would be sufficient- perhaps some 30 to 
40 per cent. 1 62 
161 . See Gielen 267. 
162. See Gielen 267. In my view the requirement that the registered mark must have a 
reputation 'in the United Kingdom' indicates a greater degree of repute than that 
postulated by Gielen in relation to the Directive. Nevertheless, it does illustrate that 
the concept is likely to be wider than 'well-known' - depending upon the construction 
placed upon the concept of repute by the European and British courts. 
651 
Finally, it is to be noted that under the Benelux 
dilution provisions which require the trade mark owner 
to suffer prejudice, and which Gielen correlates with 
"taking unfair advantage of or being detrimental to the 
distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark", 
the Benelux courts have recognised both positive and 
negative aspects of prejudice. Prejudice seen 
negatively means that it is not necessary that the 
distinctive power of the mark is affected or that there 
is a risk of confusion in order to establish prejudice 
to the trade mark owner. In other words, a trade mark 
can be infringed through its dilution without 
significant if any impingement upon its distinguishing 
function. Thus, use of the trade mark Klarein for a 
liquid cleaning agent was held to infringe the trade 
mark Claeryn for a Dutch Gin because the negative 
association resulting from use of the infringing mark 
adversely affected the attractive power of the infringed · 
mark. 163 Purchasers of gin could still distinguish 
Claeryn gin from other gins but would be put off the 
brand by the associated image of drinking cleaner, 
introduced by the mark Klarein. 
In my view, this 
brought about by 
African Act that 
is the sort of result which will be 
the specific provision in the South 
the dilutive conduct contemplated by 
section 34 (1) (c) infringes notwithstanding the absence 
of confusion or deception. In other words, an 
infringement by dilution takes place notwithstanding the 
absence of an intrusion upon either the invariable trade 
mark function of distinguishing goods or services or the 
paramount trade mark function of old, the origin 
function. 
8. ASSIGNMENT 
163. See Gielen 267. 
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8.1 UK Act 
The Directive contains no provisions relating to the 
assignment of registered trade marks. Such matters are 
governed by the domestic property law of Member States 
pursuant to Article 222 of the EC treaty. This Article 
provides that the Treaty is not to prejudice the rules 
relating to the system of property ownership of Member 
States. 164 
As contemplated by the White Paper, the assignment 
provisions of the 1994 UK Act are less restrictive than 
d 1 . 165 un er ear ier statutes. 
According to Gyngell & Poulter: 
The statutory provisions relating to the assignment and licensing of 
registered trade marks have become steadily less restrictive. This can 
be seen by comparing section 22 of the 1938 Act with section 22 of the 
1905 Act and section 70 of the 1883 Act. Consistent with this more 
liberal attitude, the 1994 Act further simplifies the conditions and 
· · h. h d l' 166 restnctwns attac mg to sue ea zngs. 
The deregulation under the 1994 Act is aimed at 
disposing of the artificial rules contained in the 
repealed statute which were directed at protecting the 
bl . f f . 167 pu ic rom con usion. 
According to the authors, the 1994 Act makes four 
notable improvements, namely: 
8.1.1 Under section 24(2) it is possible to assign a 
registered trade mark partially in connection with a 
particular manner of use or in relation to a particular 
locality without the approval of the Registrar. 
164. See Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 1994 188, 191. 
165. See White Paper 27-28. 
166. Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 162. 
167. Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 163. 
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8.1.2 The Act dispenses with association and identical or 
similar marks on the Register can now be independently 
assigned. 
8.1.3 It is no longer necessary to advertise the assignment of 
registered trade marks without goodwill. 
8.1.4 Whereas the 1938 Act made no 
contemplate the assignment of 
possible under the 1994 
1 . . . d d 1 168 app icat1ons in epen ent y. 
provision for and did not 
pending applications it is 
Act to assign pending 
Section 24(1) provides that a registered trade mark can 
be transferred by way of assignment, testamentary 
disposition or operation of law in the same way as 
other personal or moveable property. It follows that 
marks can be assigned as security and 
a charge (or provide security in 
registered trade 
be subject to 
Scotland) . 169 The direct registration of security 
interests and charges were not possible under the 1938 
Act. 17° Failure to register the assignment of a 
registered mark or a charge can render it ineffective. 
In terms of section 25 (3) (a), any transfer of a trade 
mark which has not been registered is ineffective 
against a person who without knowledge thereof, acquires 
a conflicting interest in or under the registered trade 
mark concerned. This provision applies also to a 
charge. 
In terms of section 25 (4) a transferee (which includes 
an assignee) loses any right to damages or an account of 
prof its in respect of an infringement of the registered 
mark which occurs after the date but before registration 
of its transfer, if the transfer is not registered 
within six months. 
168. See Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 162. 
169. See section 24(4). 
170. See Groom & Abnett UK Trade Marks Act 1994 110-111 regarding the registration of 
memoranda relating thereto under the 1 938 Act. 
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The relaxations of the 1994 Act do not mean that a trade 
mark will not become vulnerable to revocation if it 
becomes misleading through use. 
In this regard Gyngell & Poulter write: 
The freedom to transmit a registered trade mark or an application 
therefor is tempered by the risk that the subsequent use made of the 
mark may lead to possible revocation of the registration if the use is 
liable to mislead the public, particularly as to the nature, quality or 
geographical origin of the goods or services in relation to which it is 
registered. This concern is all the more real in practice where the 
transmission is without the goodwill of the business in which the mark 
has been used because the mark may no longer be used in relation to 
the goods or services for which it has become known. 1 71 
The theoretical basis for this is that without the 
capability of distinguishing goods or services a mark 
cannot qualify as a trade mark. When it becomes 
misleading to such a degree that this property is lost 
and it can no longer function to distinguish, the sign, 
whatever else it might be, is no longer a trade mark. 
The 1994 Act does not deal with the assignment of 
unregistered marks and section 22 (3) of the 1938 Act, 
which provided for the simultaneous assignment of an 
unregistered mark together with a registered mark for 
the same goods or services used in the same business, is 
not repeated. 
The 1994 Act does contemplate the assignment of 
unregistered marks as part of the goodwill of a business 
insofar as it provides that nothing in the enactment 
h 11 ff . f h' k' d 172 s a a ect an assignment o t is in . 
171. Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 164. 
172. See section 24(6) of the 1994 Act. 
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Thus, the common law still governs the assignment of 
unregistered trade marks in the United Kingdom. 173 
Unless the terms of any license relating thereto provide 
otherwise, assignments and other transfers of a 
. d k b. h 1. 174 registere mar are su Ject to t e icence. 
I . d f h . b . . . 175 t is man atory or t e assignment to e in writing. 
The Act contains complex 
co-ownership of trade marks 
provisions relating to 
which are relevant to the 
. . . 176 
assignment provisions. 
In general, however, the assignment provisions of the 
1994 Act are less restrictive than before, as has 
already been stated. This is indicative of the greater 
freedom of the trade mark owner to use his trade mark as 
personal property 
established and 
in the United Kingdom - subject to the 
theoretically sound limitation that 
should he use the mark deceptively his property right 
will be lost. 
Finally, it is to be recalled that the assignment 
provisions are subject to EC law and in particular, the 
law relating to the free movement of goods and 
. . 1 177 competition aw. 
8.2 Assignment: SA Act 
Part Xl (sections 3 9 41 inclusive) of the 1993 Act 
deal with assignment and the hypothecation of registered 
trade marks. The sections contain provisions of 
uncertain import which are discussed hereunder. 
173. See Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 1994 190; Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 
166. 
174. See sections 28(3) and 29(2). 
175. See section 24(3). 
176. See Groom & Abnett UK Trade Marks Act 1994 105-106; Annand & Norman Trade 
Marks Act 1994 188-190. 
177. See Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 1994 187, 202-209. 
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In terms of sections 39(1) and (2) of the Act, a trade 
mark is assignable with or without the goodwill of the 
business concerned in the goods or services in respect 
of which it has been registered and in connection with 
all or some of the goods or services concerned. This is 
as before. 178 So too, as before, pending applications 
are assignable and the Act provides for the assignee to 
b b . d l' 179 e su st1tute as an app icant. 
Section 39 (1) provides that assignments of registered 
trade marks are "subject to any rights appearing from 
the Register". Rights which the Register can evidence 
are the registered right of the proprietor, the rights 
of a permitted user recorded as a registered user and 
the rights of the quasi-pledgee under a registered 
hypothecation of the trade mark in terms of section 41. 
Disclaimers, memoranda and other endorsements against 
the registration delimit or qualify the right of the 
registrant and do not evidence rights. The section 
therefore appears to mean that a registered trade mark 
cannot be assigned or transferred without the discharge 
or cancellation of any hypothec, or the transfer or 
cancellation of any licence to which it is subject, as 
the case might be. 
However, section 39(3) of the Act provides further that 
the assignment or transmission of a registered trade 
mark shall be subject to any deed of security 
hypothecating it. As section 39 (1) already appears to 
provide that the assignment of a registered trade mark 
is subject to recorded hypothecs and rights of permitted 
use, section 39(3) must either be regarded as confirming 
the introductory clause of section 39(1) in relation to 
hypothecs or as providing something else. 
Alternatively, section 39 (1) must be regarded as 
providing something other than the interpretation I have 
suggested in the preceding paragraph. 
178. See section 49(2) of the 1963 Act. 
179. See sections 49(7) of the 1693 Act and 39(5) of the 1993 Act. 
In order to 
section 39(3) 
attribute 
it might 
a meaning to 
be suggested 
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the wording of 
that the words 
indicating that the assignment is subject to "any deed 
of security hypothecating it" means that transfer of 
the mark assigned is subject to the terms and conditions 
set out in the deed of security, in other words, that 
the mark is transferred along with and subject to the 
terms and conditions of the hypothec. This construction 
is untenable in my view because the principal debt is 
and remains between the pledgor/assignor/debtor and the 
pledgee/creditor and there is no obligation owed the 
latter party by the assignee which the pledged property 
secures in the absence of a delegation by the assignor 
to the assignee of the principal debt, an unlikely 
scenario indeed and surely not in need of a specific 
provision in the Act. 
The only reasonable interpretation is that assignment 
cannot take place unless the obligations evidenced by 
the deed of security have been fully discharged by the 
pledger or the deed cancelled by mutual agreement 
between the parties thereto, and the registered hypothec 
entry cancelled prior to or simultaneously with the 
assignment. In other words, the ef feet of the 
introductory wording to section 39 (1) when related to 
registered hypothecs as set out in section 39(3) are of 
the same effect. 
What is clear from the aforegoing is that trade mark 
rights must be regarded as real rights when the 
classification of real/personal rights is applied 
thereto, as the pledge holds against the world. 
Registration of the Deed of Security effects 
constructive delivery of the trade mark in pledge and 
affords public notice of the existence of the right. The 
question of hypothecation is dealt with further below. 180 
The provisions of sections 39(4) and 39(6) are likely to 
180. See p 663 infra. 
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bring about much uncertainty in practice. 
provide: 
The sections 
39(4) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in 
subsections (1), (2) and (3), a registered trade mark is not assignable 
or transmissible if, as a result of the assignment or transmission and 
the use of the trade mark by different persons in the Republic or 
elsewhere, circumstances exist or would exist which give rise or would 
give rise to the likelihood of deception or confusion. 
39(6) (a) The proprietor of a registered trade mark or the applicant for 
the registration of a trade mark who intends to assign it, may apply to 
the registrar in the prescribed manner, setting out the circumstances of 
the proposed assignment, for a certificate stating whether the proposed 
assignment of the trade mark would or would not be invalid under 
subsection (4). 
39(6)(b) The registrar may issue to the applicant such a certificate, 
which shall, unless it is shown that it was obtained by fraud or 
misrepresentation, be conclusive as to the validity or invalidity under 
the said subsection (4) of the assignment in so far as such validity or 
invalidity depends upon the facts set out in the application, but a 
certificate in favour of validity shall be of no force or effect unless 
application for registration of the assignment or transmission is made 
under section 40 within six months from the date on which the 
;.p,· • . d 181 
certl.J .cate cs cssue . 
In the trade mark statutes the term assignment was 
adopted by the South African legislature from earlier 
British statutes. 
In the South African common law the term is associated 
mainly with leases and resembles a combined cession and 
a delegation. Assignment in South African law is 
however a tripartite novation of a previous arrangement 
whereby the assignee takes on the previous obligations 
of the assignor - who is discharged - and obtains the 
rights of the latter. 182 
181. Section 40 deals with the registration of assignments and transmissions. 
182. See Hutchinson - Wille 's Principles 497; Gibson SA Mercantile Law 98. 
The assignment of a 
cession of rights. 
trade mark, 
There is 
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however, entails a 
no delegation of 
obligations alongside the cession which is, of course, 
subject to the rule that the cedent cannot cede a better 
right than he has. 
It is a fundamental and theoretically sound principle of 
trade mark law that if the assignee uses the mark in a 
way which gives rise to public deception or confusion, 
the right to the trade mark will be lost should it lose 
its distinctiveness. At common law, the assignor and 
the assignee are entitled to contract on such terms and 
conditions as they deem fit and it is for the assignee 
to ensure that the trade mark is not lost as a 
consequence of deceptive use. 
Under section 39(4), however, the freedom of an assignor 
and an assignee so to contract in regard to the 
assignment of a registered trade mark is significantly 
curtailed. 
In the circumstances postulated in section 39(4) a 
registered trade mark is not assignable at law. 
It is therefore prudent for all assignors to obtain a 
certificate from the Registrar under section 3 9 ( 6) . In 
terms of this certificate (unless obtained by fraud or 
misrepresentation) an assignment made pursuant thereto 
can never be attacked on the basis that it was deceptive 
at the time the assignment took place if the question of 
validity turns on the facts set out in the application. 
It appears that the certificate will be enforceable even 
where all the circumstances pertaining to the proposed 
assignment at the relevant time were not brought to the 
attention of the Registrar, provided fraud and 
misrepresentation are absent. 
In instances where the Registrar's certificate is not 
obtained it seems clear that the agreement giving effect 
to the transfer 
time after its 
can be rendered null 
conclusion if it can 
660 
and void at any 
be shown that a 
likelihood of deception or confusion existed at the time 
of the assignment. This is so despite that the rights 
to the trade mark have been transferred to the assignee 
who might well have been using the mark for a 
considerable time subsequent to the assignment. The lot 
of the assignee of a trade mark who does not obtain the 
Registrar's certificate is, therefore, one of perpetual 
uncertainty. The same applies where the certificate was 
obtained but the attack succeeds on grounds not dealt 
with in the application - whether foreseeable or not. 
In the event of a successful attack on the assignment ex 
post facto on the basis of section 3 9 ( 4) the cession is 
null and void and the trade mark must surely be restored 
to the original assignor albeit in it's present state. 
The assignor who had no remaining interest in the mark 
or who sold his interest therein now has a deceptive 
mark on his hands and might have to compensate the 
assignee in addition. How a balance of rights is to be 
restored in such circumstances is a question of 
considerable difficulty especially where the parties did 
not forsee or contemplate the deceptive consequences of 
the transaction. In my view considerable injustices are 
to be expected in such circumstances. 
The provisions of section 39(4) of the Act are a radical 
interference also with the right to dispose of a trade 
mark by way of testamentary disposition. A Registrar's 
certificate under section 3 9 ( 6) can hardly be obtained 
timeously in anticipation of the sudden death of the 
testator and if the circumstances postulated in the 
section obtain at the time of vesting of the rights the 
trade mark under his estate the mark is not 
transmissible and is rendered of no value in the estate. 
Another substantial objection to section 3 9 ( 4) is that 
it postulates notional use of the trade mark by the 
assignee which, in the view of the Registrar, would give 
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rise to a likelihood of deception or confusion. It does 
not consider that although such circumstances might well 
exist at the time of the assignment or transmission, it 
is not incumbent upon the assignee to use the mark 
immediately after the assignment or at any time 
thereafter. This means that the likelihood need never 
materialise. Similarly, the likelihood can be avoided 
by the assignee taking steps to ensure that use of the 
trade mark after assignment does not give rise to 
deception or confusion. 
Section 39(4), therefore, is a serious interference with 
the ability of the holder of trade mark rights to assign 
or transmit trade marks as species of property. What 
impelling reason could there be for such an intrusion 
upon common law property rights to be introduced by the 
legislature? 
The purpose of section 
public deception or 
39 (4) can 
confusion 
only be to 
in advance. 
prevent 
No 
contracting party is assisted thereby. This approach is 
contrary to the requirements of a modern trade mark 
system which regards trade marks as discrete property. 
It also represents a fundamentally different approach to 
the philosophy of the 1994 UK Act regarding assignment 
which reference to the overview of the assignment 
. . f h h . . d d 1 1 83 provisions o t at Act erein provi e soon revea s. 
Insofar as the Act is intended to modernise the trade 
mark law of South Africa according to the example of the 
EC and the United Kingdom which systems place the 
obligation on the proprietor of a trade mark to protect 
his trade mark as property - the provisions of section 
39(4) are in discord with the whole. 
The provisions of section 39(6) are also most 
unfortunate in that they place a unique burden upon the 
Registrar who must enter upon an enquiry of some 
183. See p 652-655 supra. 
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substance and importance involving notional use of a 
trade mark by an assignee not only in South Africa but 
elsewhere184 upon a set of facts provided by the 
assignor alone. The full facts and possibilities are 
not canvassed before the Registrar because no other 
party is involved in the application. It is hardly 
feasible for a sensible or reasoned determination to be 
made in these circumstances and in circumstances where 
the volume of certificates sought can be anticipated to 
be large. 
A further radical intrusion into the common law power to 
deal with trade marks is the provision in section 39(7) 
that a trade mark assignment must be in writing and 
signed by the assignor. Verbal agreements assigning 
registered trade marks are, therefore, of no force and 
effect. The reason for this is not clear. If it is a 
question of facilitating proof of the assignment which 
underlies the provision, insofar as a cession is 
involved which the common law requires the assignee to 
accept for the agreement to be concluded, the Act might 
have provided also that the assignee should sign the 
document in order that the evidence regarding the 
conclusion of the assignment embodied in the document 
might be complete. 
Under section 40(1) it is peremptory to record the 
assignment of registered trade marks in the prescribed 
way. Late registration of the assignment entails a 
penalty. It is not provided that non-recordal renders a 
written deed bf assignment invalid. 
In my view there is no sound theoretical basis upon 
which the intrusive and restrictive assignment 
provisions of the 1993 SA Act can be justified. They 
negate an approach which would regard trade marks as 
property and intrude upon the fundamental entitlement of 
184. See section 39(4). Seep 274 supra regarding certificates under the 1963 Act. 
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the owner of property - to alienate it if he so chooses. 
The Act opts for restricted dealing with trade marks 
ostensibly in the interest of the public who must not be 
confused or deceived. In my view the sanction that a 
registered trade mark can be expunged if its use results 
in deception or confusion is an ample and theoretically 
appropriate sanction against deceptive assignments 
already available under section 10(13) of the Act. 
9. HYPOTHECATION 
Section 41 provides that a registered trade mark may be 
hypothecated by a deed of security. The provisions for 
the hypothecation of trade marks are new and are 
considered hereunder as it is to be expected that the 
provision will reveal something of the approach of the 
legislature towards the nature of the right to a 
registered trade mark. 
The first question arising is what is meant by the 
hypothecation of a registered trade mark. 
In terms of section 41(4), the hypothecation of a 
registered trade mark has the effect of a pledge in 
favour of the pledgee under the deed of security 
evidencing the transaction. As contemplated by section 
41 (6) the deed of security secures "a debt or 
obligation". Thus, under the Act, hypothecation of a 
trade mark means a statutory pledge constituted under a 
written deed of security upon its registration, by means 
of which the trade mark is in effect pledged as security 
for a debt or obligation. 
The Act constructs a species of hypothec similar to the 
special hypothecs of the Roman Dutch law which combined 
the concept of pignus in regard to the specificity of the 
object and hypothec indicating non-delivery thereof. 
Such hypothecs could be constituted over both moveable 
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d . bl 185 an immovea e property. 
In Roman law the term pignus indicated a security where 
the pledge was delivered to the creditor. The term 
hypotheca was used when no delivery of possession took 
place. 186 
In their brief conspectus of the views of the old 
writers regarding the distinction between pignus and 
hypotheca Scott & Scott show that different views were 
expounded. Hypotheca referred either to a form of 
security where the object of the security was not 
delivered, or pignus referred to security over moveables 
and hypotheca to security over immoveables. 187 
Insofar as the word hypothec is used in the section 
under which the pledge is effected, with reference to 
the common law the word hypothec indicates that the 
property pledged is not delivered. 
The requirement that delivery of the object of the 
security must take place for a pledge to come about is 
replaced in the Act by the statutory delivery of the 
pledged trade mark by means of registration of the 
deed of security. At common law, if a discharge of the 
secured debt or obligation takes place, possession of 
the moveable must be restored. In the case of a trade 
mark, registration of the hypothec is cancelled under 
section 41(6). 
In the event of the debt not being discharged the trade 
mark is liable to be sold in execution pursuant to a 
judgement based upon the debt or obligation secured by 
185. See Van der Merwe Sakereg 608-611 regarding the hypothecs of Roman and Roman 
Dutch law. 
186. See Scott & Scott Mortgage and Pledge 3. 
187. Scott & Scott Mortgage and Pledge 3-4. 
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the hypothec. 188 In terms of section 2(1) (xxiv) of the 
Act "transmission" means transfer by operation of law, 
not being assignment, and "transmit" and "transmissible" 
have corresponding meanings. This would include 
transfer pursuant to a sale in execution. 
Therefore, in so far as a sale in execution brings about 
a transmission of the trade mark by operation of law the 
sale can be struck by the provisions of section 39(4) of 
the Act. Hence, a sale in execution would be void under 
that section if a likelihood of deception or confusion 
would result in the circumstances provided for in the 
section when applied to the sale. 189 
This is an extraordinary result and renders the efficacy 
of hypothecation of a trade mark under the Act 
uncertain. In the case of a valuable mark with repute, 
as notional postulated use by others is clearly likely 
to lead to a conclusion that public confusion or 
deception will result, a transmission of such a mark 
under a sale in execution is therefore potentially of no 
effect as the mark is "not assignable or transmissible". 
In the event of the ultimate sequestration or 
liquidation of the pledger the same result is likely to 
obtain. 
Section 39 (4), therefore, gives rise to anomalies also 
in regard to the hypothecation provisions of the Act 
which would suggest the repeal of the section. 
In my view the right to a trade mark should be freely 
assignable and transmissible and in the event of the 
trade mark becoming misleading by virtue of its use 
188. For the mark to be sold in execution the judgment pursuant to which execution takes 
place must issue out of or be made an order of the Transvaal Provincial Division or 
Magistrate's Court for the District of Pretoria. See section 41 (2). 
189. See p 657-658, 659 supra. 
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after the assignment, the appropriate sanction arises of 
itself as the mark becomes revocable as deceptive under 
section 10(13) of the Act. 
The import of the provisions of section 41 (5) are also 
uncertain. The section provides: 
41 (5) An assignment or transmission of a registered trade mark in 
respect of which a deed of security has been endorsed in terms of 
subsection (3) shall not, without the written consent of the person in 
whose favour the deed of security has been granted, be registered by 
the registrar in terms of section 40. 
This section, therefore, contemplates the assignment or 
transmission of the trade mark subject to the hypothec. 
Otherwise the section would surely require the 
cancellation of the hypothec and not the written consent 
of the creditor to the transfer. Insofar as the rights 
to the trade mark are transferred to a new proprietor by 
way of the assignment or transmission, the pledge 
constituted by registration must surely be lost thereby. 
The property of X can surely not serve as security for 
the obligations of the assignor or transferor (the 
debtor) towards the creditor unless there is in both 
. . h 1 190 Th. cases an assignment in t e common aw sense. is 
requires a delegation of the debtor's obligations and 
his discharge therefrom coupled with a cession of the 
rights to the trade mark. The discharge of the debtor, 
however, suggests cancellation of the hypothec not its 
apparent continuation by the written consent of the 
creditor. 
It seems, therefore, that the appropriate provision 
would be for the Registry to obtain the consent of the 
pledgee to cancellation of the entry recording the 
hypothecation as a condition precedent to recordal of 
190. See p 658-659 supra in regard to common law assignments. 
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transfer or assignment of the mark concerned. This 
implies a release of the mark from the pledge by 
agreement or discharge of the debt or obligation secured 
thereby. 
Insofar as the classification of property into moveable 
or immoveable is of significance to trade marks at all, 
the constitution of a quasi-pledge over trade marks 
under section 41(4) of the Act suggests that trade marks 
are to be regarded as moveable or analogous to moveable 
property as only moveable property can be pledged. 
Section 41 (2), on the other hand, gives effect to the 
d . . . h . 191 . h. h . ecision in t e Spier Estate case in w ic it was 
held that the right to a trade mark, which is evidenced 
by an entry in a Register permanently situated at a 
fixed place, namely Pretoria, is an immoveable situated 
at Pretoria for the purpose of expungement of the right 
concerned. The res concerned, it was said, is the 
Register of Trade Marks. 
Section 41(2) provides: 
41 (2) A registered trade mark may be attached to found or confirm 
jurisdiction for the purposes of any proceedings before the Transvaal 
Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa or the 
magistrate's court for the district of Pretoria and may be attached and 
sold in execution pursuant to an order of any such court. 
The ef feet of this provision is to render the hypo thee 
contemplated by section 41 more akin a to species of 
mortgage/hypothec over immoveable property than to the 
pledge of a moveable. 
10. I LICE!VSI!VG 
10.1 The Directive and the UK Act 
191. Spier Estate V Die Bergkelder Bpk and anr. 1988(1) SA 94(C). 
10.1.1 
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The Directive 
Article 8 of the Directive deals succinctly with the 
licensing of trade marks. It provides: 
Licencing 
1. A trade mark may be licensed for some or all of the goods or 
services for which it is registered and for the whole or part of the 
Member State concerned. A license may be exclusive or non-exclusive. 
2. The proprietor of a trade mark may invoke the rights conferred by 
that trade mark against a licensee who contravenes any provision in 
his licensing contract with regard to its duration, the form covered by 
the registration in which the trade mark may be used, the scope of the 
goods or services for which the licence is granted, the territory in 
which the trade mark may be affixed, or the quality of the goods 
manufactured or of the services provided by the licensee. 
According to Annand & Norman three principles are 
revealed: 
10.1.1.1 A registered trade mark may be licensed in whole or in 
part; 
10 .1.1. 2 a licensee who breaches the terms of the licence is 
regarded as an infringer of the trade mark; 
10.1.1.3 use of a trade mark with the consent of the proprietor 
is deemed to be use by the proprietor. 192 
10.1.2 The UK Act 
According to Annand & Norman in regard to the 
licensing provisions of the UK Act and with reference 
to principles derivable from the Directive as set out 
above: 
By contrast, the 1994 Act contains no such statement of principle. 
Instead, rules equating to the provisions of Articles 8 and 10(3) have to 
192. See Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 195. See articles 8 and 10(3) of the 
Directive. 
be gleaned from sections dealing with revocation (section 46), the 
procedural rights of licensees (section 30 and 31), the registration 
requirements (section 25) and the courts' powers to grant remedies for 
infringement. It is a matter of regret that there is no equivalent in the 
1994 Act to article 8(2). 193 
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Although the old terminology of registered users and 
permitted use is gone and the 1994 Act refers to 
licenses and licensees instead, the licensing provisions 
of the new Act remain complex. 
The Act sanctions licenses, which may be general or 
limited with reference to the goods or services covered 
by the licence, the manner of use of the mark or the 
locality of its 194 Sublicensing is permitted. 195 use. 
A trade mark licence is not effective unless it is in 
. . d . h 196 writing an signed on behalf of t e grantor. 
Specific and fairly extensive provisions relate to 
exclusive licences which are defined in section 29. 
Section 30 sets out general provisions relating to the 
rights of licensees in the case of infringement. In 
matters of infringement and otherwise exclusive 
licensees have rights equivalent to those of assignees 
and are dealt with in some detail. 197 
The licensee's rights of action are, however, always 
subject to the terms of the licence agreement with the 
proprietor. In the case of infringement, the licensee 
can call upon the proprietor to take action and if he 
does not do so, the licensee can institute action and 
join the 
defendant 
proprietor as either the plaintiff or the 
(without the jeopardy of a costs order if the 
proprietor does not participate) . Where the proprietor 
193. Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 195. 
194 See section 28( 1). 
195. See section 28(4). 
196. See section 28(2). 
197. See sections 29, 30(7) and 31. 
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institutes proceedings he must look after the interests 
of the licensees as prescribed in the enactment. In 
contrast to the position 
not entitled to join the 
this regard section 30(6) 
in South Africa, licensees are 
d . f . h 198 I procee ings as o rig t. n 
provides: 
30(6) In infringement proceedings brought by the proprietor of a 
registered trade mark any loss suffered or likely to be suffered by 
licensees shall be taken into account; and the court may give such 
directions as it thinks fit as to the extent to which the plaintiff is to 
hold the proceeds of any pecuniary remedy on behalf of licensees. 
An exclusive licensee can, however, as the equivalent of 
an assignee, 
proprietor, 
Essentially, 
take action in his own name as if he were a 
subject to the 
the exclusive 
provisions of section 31. 
licensee obtains concurrent 
rights with the proprietor but no rights against him 
other than as provided for in the licence agreement. 
The licence agreement can exclude the statutory rights 
and remedies afforded exclusive licensees by the Act. 199 
As licenses are registrable transactions in terms of the 
Act, licences must be recorded under section 25 and a 
failure to do so has the serious consequences provided 
for in sections 25(3) and (4) of the Act. 200 
198. See sections 30(2), 30(4)(5) and p 675-676 infra regarding the SA Act. 
199. See Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 198-199 and section 31 (1 ). 
200. Sections 25(3) and (4) provide: "(3) Until an application has been made for registration 
of the prescribed particulars of a registrable transaction - (a) the transaction is 
ineffective as against a person acquiring a conflicting interest in or under the registered 
trade mark in ignorance of it, and (b) a person claiming to be a licensee by virtue of the 
transaction does not have the protection of section 30 or 31 (rights and remedies of 
licensee in relation to infringement). (4) Where a person becomes the proprietor or a 
licensee of a registered trade mark by virtue of a registrable transaction, then unless -
(a) an application for registration of the prescribed particulars of the transaction is 
made before the end of the period of six months beginning with its date, or (b) the 
court is satisfied that it was not practicable for such an application to be made before 
the end of that period and that an application was made as soon as practicable 
thereafter, he is not entitled to damages or an account of profits in respect of any 
infringement of the registered trade mark occurring after the date of the transaction 
and before the prescribed particulars of the transaction are registered. 
See Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 177-178. 
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As is the case in South Africa, the essential 
requirements of licences are not stipulated in the Act. 
As Annand & Norman put it: 
From the above discussion, it will have been noted that the 1994 Act 
contains no stipulations as to how a trade mark should be licensed. In 
particular, no mention is made in the Act about the issue of the control 
to be exercised by the trade mark proprietor over the licensee. The 
philosophy of the Act would seem to be that this is a matter for 
contractual arrangements between the parties, as determined by 
. l . 201 commercza requirements. 
Gyngell & Poulter point out in this regard: 
As with assignments, the policy is that trade mark owners should be 
free to licence the use of their trade marks as they see fit and the only 
caveat is the proprietor's own interest in maintaznzng the 
distinctiveness and hence the value of his trade mark by, inter-alia, 
asserting proper quality control over the goods or services for which it 
. l' d 202 zs zcense . 
It is unfortunate that the South African legislature did 
not follow and clearly enunciate these principles in the 
1993 SA Act. 
If a licensed trade mark in the United Kingdom becomes 
generic or misleads because of deceptive use resulting 
from trafficking, want of control on the part of the 
licensor or for other reasons, the trade mark is 
vulnerable to revocation under section 46 (1) (d). In 
instances where the want of control is such that use of 
the mark is not "genuine" for the purposes of section 
46(1) (a) of the 1994 Act, the mark becomes revocable on 
203 the grounds of non-use. 
201. Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 200. 
202. Gyngell & Poulter Trade Marks 168. 
203. See Groom & Abnett UK Trade Marks Act 1994 73-76. 
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Finally, as always when dealing with the trade mark law 
of the United Kingdom and with licensing in particular, 
the governance of the EC Treaty and laws must be 
constantly borne in mind and especially the provisions 
of articles 32-26 and article 85-86 of the EC Treaty. 204 
10. 2 Under the SA Act 
In sharp contrast to the strictures placed upon 
assignments and the great concern about pu~lic confusion 
or deception revealed by the assignment provisions of 
the Act, the licensing provisions are simple and 
apparently unconcerned about public confusion resulting 
from use of the licensed mark. Control over the trade 
mark and its use under licence is left to the 
proprietor. 
Use of a trade mark with the licence of the proprietor 
is deemed to be permitted use of the mark. 
38(1) provides: 
Section 
38(1) Where a registered trade mark is used by a person other than 
the proprietor thereof with the licence of the proprietor, such use shall 
be deemed to be permitted use for the purposes of subsection (2). 
Subsection 2 provides: 
38(2) The permitted use of a trade mark referred to in subsection (1) 
shall be deemed to be use by the proprietor and shall not be deemed to 
be use by a person other than the proprietor for the purposes of section 
27 or for any other purpose for which such use is material under this 
Act or at common law. 205 
It needs to be considered whether "with the licence" has 
a meaning different to "with the consent" which is the 
d d h 206 . . concept use un er t e 1994 UK Act. "Licence" 1s not 
204. Annand & Norman Trade Marks Act 202. 
205. Section 27 relates to the removal of trade marks from the Register on the basis of 
non-use. 
206. See section 28(3) of the 1994 Act. 
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defined in the SA Act. In ascribing an ordinary meaning 
to the word it is my view that insofar as the licence 
refers to an object - the trade mark - it must be given 
that meaning ascribed to the word which indicates 
. tt d f . f . 207 h. perm1 e use or some spec1 1c purpose. T is 
refers to the specific purpose agreed upon and stated in 
the licence rather than use to of trade mark howsoever 
the licensee pleases. This implies that the registrant 
is to exercise control over the permitted use of the 
trade mark. 
In the event that the want of control over use of the 
mark leads to a loss of the distinctiveness of the mark 
it then loses also its trade mark character and is 
vitiated as a trade mark. In the case of a registered 
mark it is then expungeable under section 10(13). 
Morley, however, expresses an expansive view: 
The function of a trade mark has undergone a significant change in 
terms of the new Act. The essence of a trade mark now is to 
distinguish goods from goods, service from service, and goods from 
service, as opposed to the provenance from which they originate. I 
believe that in the light of the definition of a trade mark under the new 
Act quality control is no Longer a requirement for trade-mark 
licensing. This will also become apparent from other provisions of the 
new Act. 
The author however introduces this caveat: 
This is not to contend that quality control should not be required by a 
trade-mark proprietor as prudent business practice. Quite obviously it 
is the interests of a prudent trade-mark proprietor to control the use of 
his mark. The economic value of a trade mark lies in its uniqueness, 
and long before a mark is threatened in terms of section 10(13) for 
207. The meaning ascribed to the word licence in this context by the Compact Oxford 
English Dictionary (2nd ed (mimeographic text)) 968 is: "b. To grant a licence 
permitting (a house, theatre etc.) to be used for some specified purpose." 
causing deception or confusion, it already would have had a big 
impact on the advertising function; in other words, whilst the Act does 
not specifically require quality control, of course, very few licensors 
will be willing not to exercise such control. 208 
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For all purposes under the Act, and at common law, 
permitted use of a registered trade mark - use with the 
licence of the proprietor in other words - is deemed to 
be use by the registered proprietor. 
Section 38(3) permits the recordal of licensees as 
registered users. Recordal is not peremptory. The 
requirements of the application for recordal are set out 
in section 38 (6) (b) and includes the giving of 
particulars of the relationship, existing or proposed, 
between the proprietor and the proposed registered 
user. 
209 As the Act does not prescribe the nature of 
the relationship or the degree of control required it is 
not clear whether the Registrar is expected to respond 
to the information given and, if this is intended, what 
the Act contemplates the Registrar should do. 
According to Morley: 
The new Act retains the right of a trade-mark proprietor to record a 
registered user voluntarily. Provided that the necessary information is 
furnished to him, the registrar is required to enter the registered-user 
recordal. Thus the "recordal of registered-user" function has become 
an administrative one under the new Act with the registrar having no 
discretion in the matter, unlike the situation under the 1963 Act. 210 
This is correct. Section 38(7) provides that when the 
requirements of section 38(6) have been complied with, 
208. Morley - Trade-Mark Licencing and Franchising - in Visser New Law: Trade Marks and 
Designs 48-53 48-49. 
209. See section 38(6)(b). 
210. See Morley 53. This approach is very different to the onerous tasks placed upon the 
Registrar in regard to certificates issued under section 39(6). 
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the Registrar shall register the proposed registered 
user as a 
goods or 
registered user in 
. 211 h services. T e 
respect of 
interface 
the relevant 
between the 
assignment and licensing provisions of the Act are 
provided by section 38(8) (b) which provides: 
(8) Without derogating from the provisions of section 24, the 
registration of a person as a registered user -
(a) ... 
(b) shall be cancelled by the registrar where the trade mark in respect 
of which such person has been registered has been assigned and 
application has in terms of section 40 been made for registration of the 
assignment, unless the subsequent proprietor registered in terms of the 
said section requests the registrar in the prescribed manner not to 
cancel any such registration and furnishes the registrar with the 
particulars referred to in paragraph (b) of subsection (6). 212 
Thus, in the event of an assignment the registered user 
entry must be cancelled unless the assignor indicates 
that the licence has been assigned along with the mark 
or a new licence has been entered into between the 
assignee 
specific 
and the 
powers 
registered user. 
of cancellation 
The Registrar's 
or variation of 
registered user entries are set out in sections 38(8) (a) 
and 38(9). The provisions of section 38 apply to 
registered users recorded under the 1963 Act. 213 
Finally, regard must be had to the provisions of 
sections 38(4) and 34(5). Unless the licence agreement 
provides otherwise, section 38 (4) enables a registered 
user to call upon the proprietor to institute 
infringement proceedings and to institute such 
proceedings himself in his own name if the proprietor 
211. See section 38(7). 
212. Section 24 deals with the general powers of the Registrar to rectify entries in the 
Register. Section 40 provides for registration of assignments and transmissions. 
213. See section 38(10). 
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does not do so within two months of the notice, in which 
event the proprietor must be cited as a co-defendant 
(who is exempted from costs if he does not enter the 
214 fray) . 
Under section 34(5), where the registered proprietor of 
the trade mark institutes an infringement action, it is 
peremptory for him to give notice in writing of his 
intention to institute proceedings to every user 
recorded on the Register and this entitles such 
registered user to intervene in the proceedings and to 
recover any damages suffered by the user as a result of 
the infringement. It is notable that this section is 
not rendered subject to the terms of the licence with 
users and cannot by implication be excluded thereby. 
The Act does not provide a specific sanction if, because 
of urgency, or for some other reason or for no reason at 
all, the registered proprietor does not give notice. 
Section 34 ( 5) could well dissuade proprietors of 
extensively licensed registered trade marks to record 
registered users in order to avoid large-scale joinder 
of users in infringement actions as this could lead to 
the proprietor losing control over his infringement 
action or application. This is a real prospect where 
there has been an extensive recordal of franchisees as 
registered users against a particular mark. The 
prospect of multiple joinder of a large number of 
licensees is not an attractive prospect for a plaintiff 
or applicant as costs are bound to increase where the 
particular circumstances and claims of various claimants 
fall to be considered and this is coupled with the 
inevitable delays characteristic of multi-party matters. 
Unlike assignments which must be in writing to be valid, 
licenses can be concluded between the parties with no 
statutory restrictions upon the common law rights of the 
parties to do so. 
214. See section 38(4). 
According to Morley: 
There is no requirement that the licence be in writing. So the normal 
provisions of the common law apply - the licence agreement may be 
oral, written, or inferred by conduct. The words "with the licence" go 
no further than a bare licence: this reinforces the view that no quality 
control is required for permitted use (this is consistent with the 
European Directive on trade marks). The prohibition against 
trafficking has been removed, and there are no provisions that will 
prohibit or in any way limit sub-licencing. Indeed, the new Act has 
greatly facilitated franchising, character merchandising and corporate 
licensing. 
The author goes on to say: 
The provisions of the new Act thus greatly facilitate trade-mark 
licensing. As mentioned above, it is likely that, despite the absence of 
a requirement that the trade-mark proprietor exercise quality control, 
proprietors will provide in their licence agreements for such control. 
The benefit to the parties is that they will be entitled to regulate their 
l . h. . h h h. kfi" 21 5 re atwns ip m w atever manner t ey t m lt. 
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Whether or not the need for control by the licensor is 
implied by the Act as I have suggested, or not, the 
intention of the legislature to de-regulate trade mark 
licensing in favour of 
trafficking provision 
owner's 
is no 
control is 
more and 
clear. The 
the earlier 
restrictions implied by the 1963 Act in recognising only 
the origin and distinguishing functions have been 
eliminated in regard to licensing. The trade mark 
proprietor is entitled to licence all the entitlements 
of the subjective right to his trade mark. There is no 
preoccupation with the prospect of public deception or 
confusion arising from the permitted use as in the 
assignment provisions. Such considerations obtain their 
proper place in the scheme under section 10(13) which 
215. Morley 52, 53. 
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circumscribes and provides the limits beyond which the 
licensed use may not go. The licensed trade mark will 
be lost if it becomes deceptive through licensed use. 
11. IN SUM 
11. l 
11.2 
11.3 
The legal historical investigations of this work 
reveal that at the time of the coming into force of the 
Trade Marks Act, No. 194 of 1993 on 1 May 1995, the 
South African law of trade marks was indeed in need of 
change to accommodate modern concepts and developments. 
The route chosen by the legislature was to follow the 
modernised European model whereunder changes to the law 
in the United Kingdom in which legal system the 
bedrock of South African trade mark law was previously 
to be found - serve as an example. 
Thus, the new South African statute has no particular 
theoretical underpinning in the South African law. 
In broad terms, the concepts upon which recent 
developments in European trade mark law rest are to be 
found in the following general premises: 
Trade marks are property which the proprietor thereof is 
entitled to apply and exploit as such. 
It is for the proprietor to protect his property 
interests in the trade mark and he must use the trade 
mark accordingly. 
It is especially incumbent upon the proprietor to ensure 
that the distinctiveness of the trade mark is not lost 
through deceptive use. 
11.4 
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A number of secondary premises are required in the base 
of a modern trade mark statute in order to give effect 
to the aforegoing, namely: 
11.4.1 Whatever the nature of the sign, it must be registrable 
as a trade mark if it presents or is capable of 
presenting the invariable function of trade marks 
which is to distinguish goods or services. 
11.4.2 The applicant for registration of a trade mark is 
entitled to obtain its registration unless it offends 
specific grounds of objection set out in the statute. 
11. 4. 3 The statute must not restrict or prohibit transfer of 
trade mark rights. 
11.4.4 A trade mark owner must be entitled to licence the trade 
mark as he deems fit. 
11.4.5 Trade marks must be afforded extended protection against 
infringement beyond protection of the origin function 
only. 
11.4.6 Well-known trade marks must be protected. 
11.4.7 The use of trade marks must be subject to the 
fundamental principle that deceptive use leading to the 
destruction of the distinctiveness of the trade mark 
will invalidate it. 
The question as to the degree to which the 1993 SA Act 
satisfies the requirements for a modern trade mark 
statute then arises. 
The 1993 SA Act represents a real endeavour to modernise 
South African trade mark law in a manner compatible with 
and generally following the EC model. The Act lacks the 
simplicity which a continental drafting style 
facilitates and its want of theoretical underpinning is, 
in my view, evident. 
It is clear that the Act regards trade marks as 
property. But whereas the licensing provisions 
encourage a positive approach, largely permitting the 
proprietor to licence his property as he deems fit, the 
assignment provisions are limiting and are firmly based 
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upon the core principle of old, namely, that the public 
must be protected against confusion or deception. 
The Act, therefore, does not adopt a property-based 
approach uniformly and does 
that registered trade marks 
not specifically 
are property of a 
provide 
defined 
kind. Insofar as the classification is sometimes 
relevant to immaterial property, there is also 
uncertainty as to whether registered trade marks are 
moveable property (as they constitute quasi-pledges) or 
immoveable property (as they can be attached to found 
jurisdiction only in the Transvaal Provincial Division 
and the Magistrate's Court for the district of Pretoria). 
In my view, the assignment provisions as they now stand, 
and particularly sections 39(4) and 39(6), are an 
anomaly in a trade mark statute based upon the premise 
that trade marks are property. 
The presence of the "connection in the course of trade" 
doctrine in the definition of a "trade mark" is, in my 
view, an unnecessary remnant of origin theory indirectly 
maintained in the definition. 
The infringement provisions provide extended protection 
to trade marks by including "similar goods" infringement 
and protection of well-known registered marks without 
reference to registered goods or services. Also 
significant is the prohibition against the registration 
of well known marks and their protection against 
unauthorised use by means of interdict. 
The doctrine of dilution has been introduced in a 
limited form according to the European model and does 
not extend to all trade marks which are vulnerable to 
dilution according to the American model. 
Regarded as a whole, the 1993 Act has moved the trade 
mark law of South Africa a considerable distance from 
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where it was before, although many difficulties 
regarding its concepts and interpretation are to be 
anticipated in its practical application in future. 
It is my submission that the theoretical construction of 
the trade mark right set out in this and the preceding 
chapter is wholly compatible with the essentials of a 
modern trade mark system described in paragraphs 10.1 to 
10.4 above - which refers to a system along the lines of 
the Directive and Regulation models of present day 
Europe. 
The proposals are, however, directed primarily at the 
South African trade mark law in relation to which it is 
suggested that the construct can serve in both the 
statutory and common law models of a new South African 
system. Furthermore, it can, in my view, provide a 
theoretical base in the South African trade mark law 
from which the new trade mark system could proceed on a 
path compatible with the common law of South Africa as 
well as with modernising trends and concepts elsewhere. 
Particularly, it provides a system of reference which 
could assist in the interpretation of the new statute in 
a progressive manner rather than in a manner which 
reverts to outmoded concepts by way of analogy in order 
to occupy the theoretical vacuum brought about by the 
new statute. 
-----0000000-----
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EC policy 
and the UK 
EC Treaty (see also Treaty of Rome) 
ECSCTreaty 
ECU 
EMU 
Entitlements 
general 
of trade ma,rk rights 
Essential Function (EC) 
Euratom 
European Assembly (ECSC) 
European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) 
European Economic Area (EEA) 
European Community (EC) 
European Council 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
European Parliament 
European Union 
Exhaustion of rights doctrine (EC) 
578 
576-577 
305, 306-308, 324, 333, 578 
304-305, 324 
709 
311-312 
215, 513 
163, 221, 568-574, 639-640, 677 
368, 369-371, 374, 379 
305, 313, 324, 327 
315 
304-305, 327 
327-328, 624 
313, 324, 327-328, 331 
310, 312 
713 
302, 308, 310, 319-320, 321-322 325, 326,329, 
332, 336, 337, 341, 344-345, 359-377, 577, 
578-579, 594, 623 
308, 315-316, 317, 318, 335 
312-313, 326-328 
362-363, 366, 377 
Experience goods 
F 
Fanciful marks 
Fancy words 
Forgery of a trade mark 
Formalism 
Fraud (and trade mark law) 
not required for an infringement in Equity 
prerequisite for Common Law infringement 
when required in US law 
Free movement of goods 
Functions - trade and other marks 
advertising function 
assurance function 
communication function 
distinguishing function 
economic functions 
essential (ECJ) (see Essential function [EC]) 
480-481, 492 
68, 112, 114, 409, 427, 533 
49, 52-53, 55, 58, 70 
42-43 
381, 384-390, 403, 408, 444, 451 
13, 18, 23, 36, 37, 75, 384, 467 
26, 27, 29, 31, 38-39, 78 
24, 25, 26-27, 28-29, 31, 38 
35, 36, 37, 67 
714 
307, 331, 332, 348, 360-361, 363, 366, 367, 
373, 374, 376-377, 578, 655 
180, 198, 381, 422, 457-458, 482-485, 490, 
495, 497, 530, 531, 538, 539, 540-554, 
560-561, 563, 570-571, 573, 574, 626, 634, 
641, 643, 644, 647, 648 
3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 275, 383, 
370-371, 392-393, 398-399, 411, 417, 
440-441, 457-458, 468, 469, 470, 474, 475, 
476-482, 489, 490, 492, 495, 497, 538, 539, 
556, 563, 574, 641 
394-395, 441, 474, 475, 487-489, 493, 494, 
497, 538, 552, 572, 574, 626, 643, 644, 645, 
647 
1, 2, 15, 18, 30, 33, 254, 458-464, 469, 471, 
475, 490, 492, 495, 497, 531-532, 538, 546, 
552, 562, 566, 567, 569, 585, 587, 588-589, 
590-591, 636, 639-640, 641-642, 643, 
644-646, 648, 651, 654, 677, 679 
383, 394, 455, 485, 492, 496, 499-500 
Functions - trade and other marks (cont) 
generally 
goodwill function 
guarantee function (see assurance function) 
identification function 
information function 
infringement of 
invariable function 
legal functions 
multiple functions 
of Guild marks 
origin function 
ownership function 
publicity function 
product differentiating function 
quality function (see assurance function) 
selling function 
Schechter regarding 
socio-economic functions 
suggestive function 
trust function 
under the Lanham Act 
variable functions 
Functional matrix 
G 
GAIT 
382-384, 454-458, 560, 568-569 
440-441, 485-487, 571, 626 
715 
1, 2, 15, 18, 80, 408-409, 458-464, 474, 489, 
492, 495, 497, 546, 552, 569, 574 
393, 396, 397-398, 487-489, 571, 626 
454, 531, 563-564, 625-627, 638-649 
1, 298 459, 464, 473, 499, 562, 573, 639, 545, 
679 
455, 489-491, 496, 499-500 
1, 441, 540, 543, 555, 588, 589, 627, 639 
15-17 
2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 38, 143, 167, 
189, 198, 242-243, 254, 256, 368, 369, 371, 
374, 379, 408-409, 417, 423, 439-442, 457, 
464-475, 489, 490, 497, 530, 531, 538, 539, 
541, 542, 547, 552, 556-557, 563, 569-570, 
573, 588-589, 640, 642, 643, 647, 651, 677, 
679, 680 
2, 8, 9, 440, 465, 466, 468 
457 
492, 495 
422, 440-441, 495, 540-554, 571, 626 
439-443, 467-468 
495, 640-641 
457 
480 
421, 422 
l, 464, 475, 499 
484, 487, 492, 497, 498, 499, 531, 538, 539, 
543, 550, 551, 559, 563, 564, 566, 573, 639, 
640, 642, 645, 
379, 582, 621 
Genen'c marks 
Genen'c use 
Geographical marks (names) 
in early US law 
in US law generally 
medieval 
under UK Acts 
under early 1905 UK Act 
under the 1938 UK Act 
under the 1963 SA Act 
under the 1993 SA Act 
under the Regulation 
'Goods of the same descn'ption' 
Goodwill 
and advertising value 
and assignment of trade marks 
and distinctive marks 
and reputation 
as a pure intangible (Common Law) 
assignment (transfer of) 
collective 
generally (and in relation to trade marks) 
in brands 
in SA trade mark cases 
nature of 
personal (individual medieval) 
property in 
'trademark good will' 
trade marks appurtenant to 
trade marks as symbols of 
under early UK cases 
Goshen committee 
138, 220, 385 
542, 547, 638, 643 
68 
384 
5-6, 12, 13, 16 
50, 52, 57, 113-114 
59, 114 
108, 109, 112, 113-115, 116, 128, 263 
259, 263 
595 
342 
716 
23-24, 129, 130-131, 132, 133-134, 148, 
239-240, 622-623 
540-541, 544, 545, 548, 549-550 
45, 48, 164-165, 167-169, 169-170, 189-192, 
272-273, 415-416 
531-538 
171-172, 183-185, 295-299 
206-208 
174-176 
10, 11, 12, 16, 18, 187 
169-174, 176-177, 184-186, 194, 195, 201, 
208, 292, 365, 366, 390 
176, 181-183 
295-299 
171-174 
10, 11, 13, 16, 18 
171-172, 174 
436 
75, 77-83, 164-169, 202, 216, 219, 346, 417, 
429-430, 432, 440, 480, 535-537 
13, 177-179, 202, 440, 540 
165-169 
169-170, 199, 251, 275 
Guarantee ju,nction (see 
Functions - trade mark) 
Guilds 
H 
Herschell report 
High Authority (ECSC) 
Honest concurrent use 
Hypothec 
generally 
under 1993 SA Act 
I 
Identification ju,nction (see Functions - trade mark) 
Imago (trade mark) 
Immaterial property rights 
Importing a reference 
Incorporeal property (intangibles) 
Incorporeal rights to trade marks in SA 
Industrial Revolution 
Inferior goods 
Information (bearing) ju,nction (see Functions - trade mark) 
Infringement 
action by registered user 
717 
5, 9-10, 15-17 
54-55 
304 
130, 131, 135-137, 316, 216-217, 601 
663-664 
559, 655-657, 663-667 
488, 494, 559, 640 
508-509, 519, 520-521, 522, 523, 527-528, 554 
150-151 
206, 207, 210, 213-215,231, 286, 346, 607 
285 
20, 404, 465 
24, 25, 28 
671-672, 675-676 
Infringement (cont) 
action in US law 
and Benelux law 
and passing off 
as trespass upon property 
Common Law generally 
fraud not required in Equity 
fraud required in Common Law 
fraud in early US law 
offu,nction (see Functions - trade mark) 
registration prerequisite 
- under I 870 US Act 
under I 875 UK Act 
under I 881 UK Act 
under 1881 US Act 
under 1883 and 1888 UK Acts 
under 1905 US Act 
under 1938 UK Act 
under Lanham Act 
under 1963 SA Act 
under the Directive 
under 1993 SA Act 
under 1994 UK Act 
Intellectual property (and rights thereto) 
'Intention to use' 
Invented words (and marks) 
ius ad rem 
!us in personam 
!us in re 
Jura in rebus alienis 
37-38, 65 
614-616 
28-29, 40, 556 
32, 556 
22-25, 27-29, 31, 63 
25-27, 29-31, 34 
24, 25, 26-27, 28-29, 31, 32 
35, 36, 37 
44, 47, 63-64, 70, 150, 609 
65 
48 
66 
63-64, 193 
67-69 
88, 94, 141-163 
417-425 
242-246, 265-272, 299 
613 
616-627, 632-651 
607, 609-613, 618-623, 649-651, 653 
718 
101, 207-208, 332, 367, 374, 375-376, 401, 
522, 524-528, 640 
103-104 
50, 52, 54-57, 59, 68, 71, 90, 108, 111-112, 
113 242 
503, 504 
502-503, 504 
502-503, 504 
503 
719 
J 
luge Rapporteur 319-320 
K 
L 
Leaning on 552-553, 554, 641 
Licensing 
generally 182, 580, 591 
under 1883 UK Act and before 61-62, 193-194, 202 
under 1888 UK Act 62 
under 1905 UK Act (eschewed under) 61-62, 89, 194, 202 
under 1938 UK Act 89-90, 92, 94, 194-201 
under Lanham Act 405, 413, 416-417 
under 1963 SA Act 249, 275-279 
under 1993 SA Act 596, 672-678, 679 
under 1994 UK Act 577, 578, 668-672 
under the Directive 361, 668 
under the Regulation 342-343 
Likelihood of association 338-339, 419, 605, 610-611, 612, 614-616, 619 
Likelihood of confusion (see also Deception and confusion) 126, 129, 262, 264-265, 267-268, 269, 
338-339, 351, 418-420, 423, 426, 435, 604, 
605, 610-611, 614, 615-616, 619 
M 
Maastricht (see Union Treaty) 
Madrid Agreement (MTA) 353-357, 375, 378 
Madrid Protocol 302, 328-329, 357-359, 378, 578, 604, 612 
'Mark' 
under the 1938 UK Act 95, 96-102, 250 
'Mark' (cont) 
under the 1963 SA Act 
under the 1993 SA Act 
Mathys committee 
Medieval guilds 
Medieval marks 
Misappropriation 
of trade marks 
of advertising value 
tort of 
Monopoly 
anti-monopoly sentiment (origin of) 
early anti-monopoly sentiment 
general and trade mark 
medieval guild 
trade mark in US law 
Morality 
issue in SA trade mark case law 
N 
Names (as trade marks) 
'Nearly resembling' marks 
0 
Office for Harmonization in 
the Internal Market 
'Old' marks (under 1883-1888, 1905 UK Acts) 
249, 250-253 
584-587, 619 
92, 93 
5, 9-10, 15-17 
4, 5-19, 72, 444 
383, 433-435, 452 
541-544, 550 
386-390, 433-435 
15-16 
23, 41-42, 74-75, 87, 402-403, 467 
87, 101, 115, 121, 208, 555, 561-562, 563 
5, 9-10, 15-16, 17 
720 
381, 384, 385, 391, 394-395, 398, 399, 400, 
402-405, 406, 408, 422-423 
281-282, 286-287, 291, 295 
49, 50, 59, 108, 109, 111, 116-117, 125, 250, 
257, 258-259, 585 
146-147, 150 
337 
57-58, 60, 71 
Organization for European Economic 
co-operation (OEEC) 
Origin function (see Functions -
trade mark) 
Owner (see Proprietor of trade marks) 
Ownership 
civil law 
Common Law 
of medieval marks 
of trademarks (US law) 
of trade marks (see also Proprietor ["proprietorship" of 
trade marks]) 
p 
Paris Convention 
Parallel importation 
Part A and B 
1919 UK Act 
1938 UK Act 
Chowles report regarding 
1963 SA Act 
Passing off 
303 
503-504 
205, 210-215 
14 
69, 410, 411, 423, 428-429, 430 
30-31, 88, 221, 370, 372, 534, 559 
721 
42, 342, 348, 354-355, 358, 578, 582, 583, 
593, 603, 604, 605, 627-629, 630-632 
91, 92, 157-158, 269, 340-341, 362-377 
62, 124-125, 142, 592 
88, 90, 92, 96, 107, 114-115, 116, 117, 119, 
121-126, 135, 143-144, 146, 149, 152-153, 
159, 160, 592 
239 
239, 256, 261, 265, 271-272, 592 
28-29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 38, 40-41, 42, 47, 63, 
69, 70, 77, 78-80, 82, 86, 87, 92, 101, 121, 
137, 147, 177-178, 182, 183-184, 185-187, 
190-191, 211, 220, 223, 230-231, 241, 266, 
267, 270-271, 279, 287, 288, 290-291, 292, 
295-296, 297-298, 340, 402, 410, 415, 424, 
429, 500, 531, 541-542, 545, 551, 552, 554, 
556, 573, 605, 608, 642 
Peregrini 
marks of in SA 
Perception advertising 
Permitted use (see Licensing) 
Persona (trade mark) 
Personal Rights 
Personality Rights 
Pi gnus 
Piracy 
trade mark 
Pledge 
Possession 
Property 
anti-property approach (Comrrwn Law) 
concept underpinning trade mark statutes 
as real property (in the Common Law) 
in early medieval marks (England) 
in early marks in France 
in EC law 
in registered trade marks 
in early marks in South Africa 
in service marks 
in trade marks generally 
in trade marks (under early Acts) 
in trade marks (US law) 
in trade marks (under 1938 UK Act) 
in trade marks (under 1993 SA Act) 
in trade marks (under 1994 UK Act) 
intangible property (in the Common Law) 
226, 279-299, 300, 633-634 
399, 488-489 
436-437 
502, 503, 504, 506, 523 
508, 523, 524 
663-664 
7-8 
22-23, 24, 38, 74 
559, 664 
212, 285, 504, 559 
32-33, 72, 74, 77-81 
44, 70, 76 
204-205 
6, 14-15, 18 
7 
345-347 
72-73, 219-220 
226-230 
94 
722 
29-31, 32, 33, 41-42, 44, 73, 75-79, 215-216, 
397, 444, 451-452, 555, 557, 560-561, 562 
44, 80, 216, 218, 219, 231 
74-75, 81-83, 381, 384, 386, 392, 423, 
430-432, 448, 469, 
219-220 
661, 663, 664, 667, 679-680 
577, 607-609, 653, 655 
514-515 
Property (cont) 
persorzal property (in the Common Law) 
quasi-property under Ins. and otherwise 
trade marks as property in Equity 
trade marks not property in the Common Law 
'Propose to use' 
Proprietor ('proprietorship' of trade marks) (see also 
Ownership) 
Publicity junction (see Functions - trade mark) 
Public interest (in trade mark law) 
Public protected against confusion or deception 
Pure intangibles 
Q 
Quality junction (see Functions - trade mark) 
R 
Real rights 
generally 
in trade marks (SA law) 
Realism 
Rectification of the Register (and grounds for) 
204-210, 219 
386-390, 433, 452 
26, 29-31, 34, 44, 70, 73-74, 432, 438 
26, 32, 80-81, 83 
103-105, 253-254, 256, 284-285, 293, 294 
723 
45, 77, 197, 215, 282-286, 293, 294-295, 338, 
341-342, 534, 559, 561, 565-566, 596, 605, 
614, 627, 628 
77, 87, 89, 127, 137, 196, 199, 251, 264, 276, 
384, 402, 412, 416, 423, 425, 446, 452, 512, 
555, 557 
29, 37, 89, 167, 202, 216, 273, 276, 278, 282, 
287, 293, 369, 370, 402, 416, 417, 425, 545, 
556, 561, 562, 643, 652, 659, 661, 663, 679, 
680 
207-208 
502-506, 523 
283, 558, 657 
381, 390-391, 403-404, 408, 451 
45-46, 61, 130, 133, 141, 218, 251, 252, 278, 
283, 289-290, 344, 345, 406, 413 
Refusal (grounds for) 
absolute 
relative 
under the 1875-1905 UK Acts 
under the 1938 UK Act (bars to registration) 
under the 1963 SA Act (bars to registration) 
Reputation 
and distinctiveness 
and goodwill 
as basis for trade mark protection 
Registrar 
certificate of refusal (1875, 1883-1888 UK Acts) 
certificate of refusal (1919 UK Act) 
certificate under 1963 SA Act 
certificate under 1993 SA Act 
discretion under 1938 UK Act 
discretion under 1993 SA Act 
discretion under 1994 UK Act 
Register 
first in UK 
need for 
Parts of (see Part A and Part B) 
Registration 
effect of in rrwdern SA law 
effect of in SA prior to 1916 Act 
effect of (under UK Acts prior to 1938 UK Act) 
effect of (under US Acts of 1870, 1881, 1905) 
effect of (under the 1938 UK Act) 
effect of under the Directive 
effect of under 1963 SA Act 
obtaining under the 1916 SA Act 
obtaining under the Lanham Act 
obtaining under the 1963 SA Act 
343, 351, 583, 593, 594-600, 631 
343, 351, 583, 593, 599, 601-605, 631 
45-46, 126-127 
126-139 
261-265, 299 
297-299 
724 
171, 172, 183-185, 287-288, 296-299, 
339-340, 368, 371 
24, 36, 41-42, 44, 105, 184-185, 266, 270, 
287, 290-291, 297-299, 540-541, 545, 
648-651, 184-185, 298-299 
46, 47, 48, 58, 63 
63 
274 
658, 659-662, 674 
96, 124-125, 129-130, 131-132, 133, 135, 
136-137, 195, 577 
583, 605-606, 674 
577, 583, 605-606 
44 
40-41 
564-565 
234-236, 241 
44-45, 63-64 
65-69 
143-146, 162 
351 
263 
237-238 
421-422, 424, 428-429 
250-265 
Regulation (The) 
Regulations (EC) 
s 
Search costs 
Search goods 
Secondary meaning 
in US law 
under Lanham Act 
Selling fanction (see Functions - trade mark) 
'Service mark' 
under the Lanham Act 
under the 1938 UK Act 
under the 1963 SA Act 
Service marks 
Services 
Shape (as a trade mark) 
'Similar goods' 
Single European Act 
Sounds (as trade marks) 
Spaak report 
Special circumstances in the trade 
Special Council of Ministers (EU) 
302, 328-329, 332-347, 376, 578, 579, 681 
307, 321-322 
391-392, 393, 395, 396, 398, 403 
480-482 
67-68, 385, 409, 427, 429, 445 
409 
408-409, 413 
725 
93-94, 102-107, 109-110, 122-123, 145-146, 
152-156, 159, 188, 201, 254 
254, 255-256 
92, 93-94, 95, 96-98, 102-107, 131-132, 138, 
149, 150, 154-157, 246, 254, 299, 409, 584 
247, 254, 255-256, 259 
98, 101-102, 251-253, 585-587, 597, 599, 623 
239-240, 610, 611, 617, 622-623 
306, 309-310, 325 
98, 253, 586-587 
305 
61 
304 
'Specific subject matter' (EC) 
Smells (as trade marks) 
Subjective rights 
and immaterial property rights 
in the Common Law 
theory of 
to trade marks 
Subsidiarity 
Suggestive marks 
T 
Tarnishment 
Territoriality 
372-375, 377, 442 
Trade mark economics (see Economics) 
Trade mark imago (see Imago-trademark) 
Trade mark infringement action (Common Law) 
Trade Marks 
and distinguishing signs (see Distinguishing signs) 
as assets 
appurtenant to goodwill 
common law in SA 
common law right to defined 
defined under the 1905 UK Act 
defined under the 1938 UK Act 
defined under the Lanham Act 
defined under the 1963 SA Act 
defined under the 1993 SA Act 
defined under the 1994 UK Act 
defined under the Directive 
367-368, 369, 374, 376-377, 379 
98, 586-587 
522 
513-519 
501, 507-513, 519-522 
511-513, 528, 558-560, 639-640 
313-315 
68-69, 385 
726 
446-447, 448, 543, 544, 551, 637, 638, 643-646 
293, 295, 298, 300, 331, 354, 367, 371, 
40-41, 47, 63, 71, 73-74, 77 
1, 13, 14, 18, 20, 181-183, 465, 467 
75-83, 164-169, 177, 216, 480, 486, 535-537 
558, 567-568 
215-218, 231-234, 237 
58-59 
95, 100, 102-107 
408-411 
253-256 
584-591 
584, 585-590 
583 
Trade Marks (cont) 
duration of 
earliest in medieval England 
earliest modern 
essential junction of, (EC) (see Essential Function) 
junctions of (see Functions - trade mark) 
intrinsic value in (see Values [trade mark]) 
in Roman-Dutch law (old authorities) 
having a reputation (in UK) 
limits of the rights thereto 
merchandising value of 
property in (see Property) 
subjective right to defined 
right to defined in SA law prior to the 1916 SA Act 
technical (US law) 
well known (in UK) (see Well known trade marks) 
well known (in SA) (see Well known trade marks) 
Trafficking 
Treaty of Paris (ECSC) 
Treaties of Rome (EEC and Eurotom) 
Treaty of Rome (EC) (See also EC Treaty) 
TRIPS 
u 
Unfair competition 
action in US law 
absence of general action in Common Law 
Union Treaty 
Use 
220, 560 
13-14 
20 
178-180, 203 
226-230 
611, 628 
562 
435 
558-574 
231-234, 237 
38, 67-68, 71, 75, 384, 385, 427, 429, 534 
170, 196-198, 278, 293, 671, 677 
304 
305 
306, 313, 331, 372, 576, 577 
379, 582 
727 
38, 67-71, 76, 81, 386, 390, 392, 401, 408, 
427, 429 
92 
306, 312-313, 315, 325 
96, 97-98, 100, 103, 216-218, 231, 241, 253, 
269, 272, 285, 289-290, 390, 408, 411, 418, 
428-429, 435 
v 
Values (trade mark) 
advertising (see Advertising value) 
distinction (see Distinction - value of) 
goodwill 
merchandizing 
Variable functions (see Functions - trade mark) 
Vestal Bill 
Vesting (of trade mark rights) 
w 
Well known trade marks 
generally 
in modern systems 
under the Directive 
under the 1993 SA Act 
under the 1994 UK Act 
Western European Union 
15, 180-181, 559, 640, 642 
538, 559, 564, 574, 640 
432, 435, 568 
406 
428, 537-538, 553, 565-566, 660 
298-299, 431, 548-549, 633-634 
679 
603 
597, 602, 629-632, 633-634, 636-649 
627-628, 631, 680 
303 
728 
